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SIB HUGH 1PALLISER 5 BABT„ 

admiral of the white. 

My mind sees rw medium, between life, with 
entire honour. and, death without, and. I. 
ardently wish that: your judgment mnv 
he guided by the same alternative. 

Ihlliser's detente/. 

I 

1 

( 

t, 

* 

























































THE LIFE 


OF 

SIR HUGH PALLISER, BART. 

t . . . . ' 


ADMIRAL OF THE WHITE, 


AND 


GOVERNOR OF GREENWICH HOSPITAL. 


BY ROBERT M. HUNT, ESQ. 



LONDON: 

CHAPMAN AND HALL, 186, STRAND. 


1844. 





DA* 7 

./ 



C. WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND. 



TO 


SIR HUGH PALLISER PALLISER, BART. 

THIS MEMOIR 

IS GRATEFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY 

INSCRIBED BY HIS FRIEND, 

THE AUTPIOR. 


Dunmore, Mat/, 1844. 


a 2 










P 11 E F A C E. 


Notwithstanding the brilliant victories which shed 
such unfading lustre on the British navy during the 
late war, that service has never been adorned with 
men more chivalrous, and no period of our national 
history is more replete with interest and with deeds of 
naval gallantry, than that in which Anson, Boscawen, 
Hawke, and Saunders crowned their country with mi¬ 
litary glory. It is hoped therefore, that the biography 
of one, who in his early professional career won the 
friendship of the former, and who shared in the princi¬ 
pal achievements, and was the favourite officer of the 
latter hero at the siege and conquest of Quebec, may 
not prove unacceptable to the readers of this depart¬ 
ment of literature. But though any addition bearing 
the stamp of authenticity to the annals of a service 
upon which the British Empire mainly relies for safety 


o 



VI 


PREFACE. 


and defence, would probably meet with an indulgent 
reception, this memoir would not have been under, 
taken, if the unfounded calumnies which forced Palliser, 
in vindication of his own honour, to bring his comman¬ 
der-in-chief to trial, had not been studiously revived 
by the relative and biographer of Admiral Keppel, after 
their repose in judicious silence for more than half a 
century. 

Keppel was chosen to command the western squadron 
—the chief defence of the kingdom—at a time when the 
threatened confederacy of France and Spain, and the 
revolt of our American colonies placed the safety of 
Great Britain in the utmost peril. A French fleet of 
unusual magnitude, was met off Brest by an English 
armament fully manned and equipped, equal to them at 
first, and greatly superior in metal on the day of battle, 
but after an indecisive action of a few hours’ duration, 
the enemy were permitted to form their line unmo¬ 
lested, and to return to port unpursued, whereby a mo¬ 
mentous opportunity was sacrificed of capturing or 
destroying the great marine force of France. The 
underhand attempt of the commander-in-chief, in con¬ 
junction with his officers, to father his own timid in¬ 
competency on Palliser, and to account for a pheno¬ 
menon so new to the nation, by imputing the disgrace 


PREFACE. 


Vll 


ol the day to his disobedience, was repelled with the 
indignant energy emanating from the consciousness of 
a strict performance of duty, and of having, together 
with his division of the fleet, borne the brunt of the 
battle: a judicial inquiry was demanded by him, and 
the facts—many of them for the first time now related 
—will enable the unbiassed, and particularly the pro¬ 
fessional reader, to judge to whom events as dishonour¬ 
able to the British flag as unfortunate to the state, were 
attributable. 

It has been the custom of the eulogists of Admiral 
Aeppel to represent him as a party-persecuted man, and 
to maintain that the ministry, with a view of perverting 
justice, had taken an active part against him in the 
trials which ensued, but not a shadow of evidence can 
be adduced to confirm their assertions; for the same 
short-sighted spirit of compromise and futile con¬ 
ciliation, which led government to entrust the ex¬ 
ecution of their schemes to a man, who from his po- 

,V' 

litical predelictions, and his strong party feelings was 
too deeply imbued with the factious animosity of their 
opponents, to approve of them, led them to a passive 
participation in the endeavours of Keppel’s many power¬ 
ful friends, to shelter his faults by opposing public in¬ 
quiry instead of promoting it, thus fixing upon Palliser 


Vlll 


PREFACE. 


the invidious and painful responsibility of preferring 
charges of neglect of duty against his commander. 

It was due to an officer so highly estimated as Pal- 
liser for ability and bravery during a distinguished ser¬ 
vice of four-and-forty years, and who had obtained, in 
an eminent degree, the esteem of his sovereign and the 
confidence of his country, that his conduct, and that of 
the commander-in-chief in the action off Brest, should 
be amply investigated; and it may not be considered 
irrelevant for his biographer to observe, that he is him¬ 
self a seaman, therefore in some degree qualified to 
form an opinion on the facts, and to discuss the merits 
of the proceedings of both officers on that important 
occasion. 

In addition to the family documents intrusted to him, 
the author was favoured by the Earl of Sandwich with 
several interesting papers from his valuable collection 
of manuscripts, together with the private letters of 
Palliser to his illustrious ancestor, then first lord of the 
admiralty. To the politeness of the Hon. Sydney 
Herbert, Secretary of the Admiralty, the author is in¬ 
debted for having had access to the Admiralty Records; 
and he has gratefully to acknowledge the ready aid af¬ 
forded him in his researches by Henry Bedford, Esq., 
keeper of the Records. Plis obligations are also par-. 



PREFACE. 


IX 


ticularly due to William Upcott, Esq., the possessor of 
one of the largest and rarest autograph collections in 
Europe, for the opportunity of referring to the Anson 
MSS. in his care, as well as to other original records; 
and he owes his acknowledgment to Sir Henry Ellis, 
and the officers of the British Museum, for much as¬ 
sistance and attention. 

From such sources of accurate information, the 
writer has drawn his materials, and if he has done 
justice to an exalted character, and has succeeded in 
exhibiting the unfounded nature of the imputations 
which the fallacious statements of Keppel and his 
party gave birth to, and which were fostered by the 
intemperance and facile delusion of the times, truth 
will be triumphant, and his object perfectly attained. 



’ 







































CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER I. 


ADMIRAL SIR HUGH PALLISER’s EARLY SERVICES IN THE NAVY- 

THE ACTION OFF TOULON WITH THE COMBINED FLEETS OF 

FRANCE AND SPAIN. 


PAGE. 

The Palliser Family—The Admiral’s Father, a Captain in the 
British Army—Severely wounded at the Battle of Almanza—The 
Birth of Hugh Palliser—Left an Orphan in Infancy—Enters the 
Navy at Eleven Years of Age—Is made a Lieutenant at the Age 
of Nineteen Years—Appointed first Lieutenant of the Essex 
Line-of-battle Ship—Joins the Fleet in the Mediterranean under 
the Command of Admiral Mathews—The combined Fleets of 
France and Spain assembled at Toulon—The English Fleet sta¬ 
tioned off Toulon—The combined Fleets put to Sea—The Ac¬ 
tion off Toulon—Unsuccessful Issue—Cowardice of several of 
the English Captains—The combined Fleets in sight two Days 
after the Action—Mathews does not attempt to bring on a second 
Engagement—This indecisive Battle made a Subject of Parlia¬ 
mentary Inquiry—Admiral Mathews and Vice-admiral Lestock 
brought to a Court-martial—Mathews cashiered—Lestock ac¬ 
quitted—Six Captains tried—Cowardice of the Captain of the 
Essex—Conduct of Mathews in the Action off Toulon and that 
of Keppel in the Action off Brest compared—Lestock like Palli¬ 
ser, falsely accused by his chief Commander.. I 




Xll 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER II. 

SERVICE IN THE CHANNEL—WEST INDIES AND NORTH AMERICA- 

TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF ADMIRAL BVNG. 

PAGE. 

Palliser promoted to the Rank of Commander—Cruises in the Chan¬ 
nel—Captures Four French Privateers—Promoted to the Rank 
of Post-captain—Joins Commodore Legge’s Squadron on the West- 
India Station—Cruises off Martinico—Explosion of the Arms in 
the Arms-chest—Palliser has Three Balls lodged in different Parts 
of his Body—Letters from Commodore Pocock and Palliser to 
Lord Anson—Palliser returns to England—Despatched with In¬ 
telligence of Peace to Admiral Boscawen, commanding in the 
East Indies—Service on the Coast of Scotland—State of Europe 
— Origin of the Seven Years’ War—Alliance of Austria, France, 
and Russia—Disturbances in Canada—Braddock’s Expedition— 
Palliser and Keppel engaged in the Expedition—Keppel returns 
to England in the Sea-Horse, commanded by Palliser—Admiral 
Byng’s Action off Minorca—His Trial and Condemnation—His 
Judges seek to be released from their Oath of Secresy—The 
Conduct of Keppel on that Occasion. 25 

CHAPTER III. 

CRUISE IN THE EAGLE—EXPEDITION AGAINST QUEBEC-SERVICE 

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 

Palliser appointed to the Eagle of Sixty Guns—Cruises off Ushant 
in Company with the Medway—Falls in with a French Ship— 
Brings her to Action, and captures her—Number of Killed and 
Wounded in the Action—The Admiralty express their Appro¬ 
bation of his gallant Conduct—Cook, afterwards the celebrated 
Circumnavigator, a Seaman on board the Eagle—His good Con¬ 
duct and Ability noticed by Captain Palliser—Interests himself in 
the Advancement of Cook — Palliser commissioned for the 
Shrewsbury, 74—Joins Lord Anson’s Fleet—Despatched with a 
Squadron to cruise off Brest—Captures a large Fleet of French 
Merchantmen under the Convoy of Two Frigates—Drives the 
Frigates on Shore—Expedition against Quebec—The Fleet under 
the Command of Saunders—The Army commanded by Wolfe— 
Palliser joins the Fleet—Obtains a Master’s Warrant for Cook— 
Naval Proceedings off Quebec—Cook surveys and makes a Chart 
of the River St. Lawrence—The Siege of Quebec—The Death of 
Wolfe—The Capture of Quebec—Palliser takes Possession of the 
Lower Town—Ihe Fleet returns to England—Palliser joins the 




CONTENTS. 


PAGE, 

Fleet in the Mediterranean under Saunders—Returns to England 
—Despatched with a Squadron to Newfoundland—Treaty of 
Peace with France, Spain, and Portugal. 58 

CHAPTER IV. 

GOVERNOR OF NEWFOUNDLAND — COMPTROLLER OF THE NAVY-A 

LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY. 

Palliserappointed Governor of Newfoundland, and Naval Comman¬ 
der-in-chief on that Station—Appoints Cook Marine Surveyor— 
Disputes with the French—Correspondence with the Admiralty— 
Return from Newfoundland—Appointed Comptroller of the Navy 
—Projected Voyage of Discovery to the South Seas—Recom¬ 
mends the Appointment of Cook to the Command of the Enter¬ 
prise—The Discoveries in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries 
by Columbus, Vasquez de Gama, and Magellan — Voyages of 
Byron, Wallis, and Cateret—Cook’s First Voyage round the 
World—Cook’s Second Voyage in search of a Southern Continent 
—Palliser selects the Ships for this Enterprise—Voyages of 
Hudson, Baffin, and Davis, in search of a North-west Passage to 
India—Expedition of the Honourable Captain Phipps towards 
the North Pole—Palliser created a Baronet—Promoted to the 
Rank of Rear-admiral—Appointed Lieutenant-general of Marines 
and a Lord of the Admiralty—Cook’s Third Voyage—His Instruc¬ 
tions drawn lip by Sir Hugh Palliser—Murder of Cook at the 
Sandwich Islands—A Monument erected to his Memory by his 
early Friend and Patron, Sir Hugh Palliser. 84 

CHAPTER V. 

HOSTILITIES WITH AMERICA-ALLIANCE OF FRANCE WITH AMERICA. 

Disputes with America—The Stamp Act—Franklin examined before 
the House of Commons—Passive Opposition of the Americans— 

A Duty levelled upon Tea—Breaking out of Hostilities—The 
Battle of Lexington—Declaration of American Independence — 
Warlike Preparations of France and Spain—Assembling of Par¬ 
liament—Ministers attacked on the supposed inefficient State of 
the Navy—Replies of Lord North, Lord Mulgrave, and Sir Hugh 
Palliser—The Conduct of the Earl of Sandwich as First Lord of 
the Admiralty assailed—Defended by Lord North and Sir Hugh 
Palliser—Intelligence of the Surrender of the British Army at 
Saratoga—France unites with America—French Fleet under the 
Command of Count d’Estairig destined for America—Proceedings 




XIV 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE. 

in the House of Lords—The Earl of Chatham’s erroneous Repre¬ 
sentation of the State of the Navy—The Earl of Sandwich’s satis¬ 
factory Proof of the Efficiency of the Naval Armanent—Active 
Preparations for War at the different Ports—Letters from the 
Earl of Sandwich to the Secretary of the Admiralty. 124 

CHAPTER VI. 

WAR WITH FRANCE—KEPPEL COMMANDS THE CHANNEL FLEET. 

Squadron under Sir Peter Parker and Commodore Hotham, sent 
to reinforce the Fleet in America, commanded by Lord Howe— 
Admiral Byron appointed to cruise off Gibraltar and intercept 
the Count d’Estaing—Keppel Appointed to the Command of the 
Channel Fleet—The Character of Keppel—Charnock’s Obser¬ 
vations on Keppel—His Political Feelings and Connexions— 
Opposed to the Ministry—Keppel’s Instructions—The Fleet puts 
to Sea—Palliser Commands the Blue Division of the Fleet— 
Capture of the French Frigates, La Belle Poule, Pallas, and 
Licorne—Papers found on Board of the Frigates—Keppel’s Return 
with the whole Fleet to Port—The East and West India Trade 
hourly expected home—Public Alarm on the Return of Keppel’s 
Fleet, leaving the Home Seas unprotected—Letter from Lord 
North on the Strength of the French Armament at Brest—Letter 
to the Earl of Sandwich on Keppel’s Retreat from a Force of ima¬ 
gined superiority—Letter from Sir Hugh Palliser to Lord Sand¬ 
wich—Intreats Him to rely on Keppel’s Honour—Keppel ex¬ 
presses to Palliser his satisfaction with the Candour and Conduct 
of the First Lord of the Admiralty. 145 

CHAPTER VII. 

THE ACTION OFF BREST. 

The Meet again puts to Sea—Falls in with the Enemy—Both 
Fleets manoeuvre in sight of each other for four successive Days — 

Six Ships of the Blue Division separated from their Flag on the 
Morning of the 27th, by a Signal from the Admiral—Disorder of 
the English Fleet—The Action—Some of the English Ships not 
able to get into Action—Sir Hugh Palliser engages sixteen of the 
Enemy—Deprived of the Support of several Ships of his Division 
by the Admiral’s Signal in the Morning—Turns to renew the 
Battle after passing the Enemy’s Line—Keppel hauls down the 
Signal for Battle—The English Fleet stands away from the Ene¬ 
my—The Enemy seen the next Morning, and not pursued— 
Keppel returns with the Fleet to England—His Account of the 
Action—List of Killed and Wounded in the different Ships. 170 







CONTENTS. XV 

CHAPTER VIII. 

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENGAGEMENT-THE CONDUCT OF KEFPEL. 

PAGE. 

Relative Strength of the English and French Fleets—Superiority 
of the English in the Number of Ships and of Guns on the 
Evening of the 27th of July—Conduct of Admiral Keppel—His 
Duplicity towards Palliser—Erroneous Statements of his late 
Biographer—Clerk’s Essay on Naval Tactics—His Observations 
on the Action off Brest—Keppel’s singular Apprehensions of 
a Lee Shore—The Distance of his Fleet from the Coast of 
France on the Morning of the 28th—Letters to the Prime Mi¬ 
nister of England from Emissaries at Paris—The French claim 
the Victory, and assert that Keppel stood away and declined 
Battle, and that they pursued him—The French Admiral’s Ac¬ 
count of his Meeting with the Fleet of England—Number of 
Killed and Wounded on board the Fleet of France. 187 

CHAPTER IX. 

THE FLEET REFITTED-UNSUCCESSFUL CRUIZE IN SEARCH OF THE 

ENEMY-PALLISER’S DISPUTE WITH KEPPEL. 

Unsuccessful Operations of our Naval Armament in America— 

Lord Howe out-manoeuvred by Count d’Estaing—Resigns his 
Command and returns to England—Narrowly escapes being 
captured by D’Orvillier’s Squadron in the Chops of the Chan¬ 
nel—Pallisers Letters to the Earl of Sandwich—Damage sus¬ 
tained by the Ships in the Action off Brest—The Channel Fleet 
again puts to Sea—Unsuccessful Cruise—Anonymous Publi¬ 
cation reflecting on Sir Hugh Palliser—Traced to a Relative of 
Admiral Keppel’s and a Lieutenant of his Ship—Palliser’s Let¬ 
ters to the Earl of Sandwich on the Subject—Palliser requires 
Keppel to contradict the Slander contained in the Publication— 
Keppel’s Refusal—Palliser’s published Account of the Action off 
Brest—Palliser’s Interview with the King—Parliamentary Pro¬ 
ceedings—The Memorial of twelve Admirals to the King—Re¬ 
marks on the Memorial—Presented by the Duke of Bolton—His 
Naval Character . 219 

CHAPTER X. 

COURT-MARTIAL ON ADMIRAL KEPPEL. 

Charge exhibited against Keppel—The Demeanour of Palliser con¬ 
trasted with that of Keppel, by an Eye-witness—Remarks on the 
Extraordinary Conduct of the Court—Their Attempts to elicit 
the Opinions of Witnesses as to Keppel’s Conduct—Resisted by 
several of the Witnesses—Lord Mulgrave’s Address to the Court 
on the Impropriety of converting Witnesses into Judges—Alter- 




XVI 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE* 

ations in the Log-books of the Formidable and Robuste—The 
Attack on Captain Hood—He maintains his Right to revise his 
Log-book — Alterations in other Log-books of the Fleet not 
noticed—The Log-book of the Victory, the Admiral’s Ship, con¬ 
taining the only False Entry proved by Admiral Campbell and 
the Master of the Victory—Palliser’s Private Letters to the Earl 
of Sandwich during the Trial—Remarks on Keppel’s Defence— 

Its Singular Contradictions—Palliser refused Permission to ad¬ 
dress the Court, and observe on the Evidence—The Sentence of 
the Court—Public Riots—Sir Hugh Palliser’s House attacked 
by the Mob, and the Contents destroyed—He narrowly escapes 
falling into their Hands . 268 

CHAPTER XI. 

COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER-THE DEFENCE-HONOURABLE 

ACQUITTAL. 

Sir Hugh Palliser’s Correspondence with the Admiralty—Court- 
martial on Palliser—Charge Exhibited—Evidence for the Prose¬ 
cution, Admiral Keppel, Admiral Campbell, the Hon. Boyle 
Walsingham ; Captain Faulkner, of the Victory, Captain Mar¬ 
shal, of the Arethusa, repeating Frigate, Hon. Thomas Windsor, 
of the Fox Frigate, the Captain and Master of Palliser’s Ship, 
the Formidable—The Defence—Evidence for the Defence— 
Sentence—Honourable Acquittal . 308 

CHAPTER XII. 

SIR HUGH PALLISER APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF GREENWICH 
HOSPITAL—HIS DEATH AND CHARACTER. 

Palliser tenders his services Afloat—Appointment to Greenwich 
Hospital—Returned for the Borough of Huntingdon—Proceed¬ 
ings in Parliament—Fox’s Motion on the Subject of Palliser’s 
Appointment—The Animosity of Fox and Burke—Their at¬ 
tempts to run down and ruin Sir Hugh Palliser—Fox’s unprin¬ 
cipled Public Conduct—Bentham’s Character of Fox—His mo¬ 
tion on Palliser’s Appointment—Replies of Lord North, Lord 
Mulgrave, and Commodore Johnson, to Mr. Fox’s Attack on 
Palliser—Palliser’s Address to the House—His Observations on 
the Ungenerous Conduct of Burke — Majority against Fox’s 
Motion — Palliser retires from Public Life — The King’s At¬ 
tachment to Palliser—The Royal Family Palliser’s frequent 
Guests at Greenwich—Palliser receives the Princess Caroline 
at his House on her Arrival, previous to her Marriage—The 
Death of Sir Hugh Palliser—His private and professional Cha¬ 
racter.^. 391 








































•* 






' 
















































































































































THE LIFE 


OF 

ADMIRAL SIR HUGH PALLISER. 


CHAPTER I. 

ADMIRAL SIR HUGH PALLISER’s EARLY SERVICES IN THE 

NAVY-THE ACTION OFF TOULON WITH THE 

COMBINED FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN. 

The Palliser Family—The Admiral's Father a Captain in the British Army 
—Severely wounded at the Battle of Almanza—The Birth of Hugh Pal¬ 
liser—Left an Orphan in Infancy—Enters the Navy at Eleven Years of 
Age—Is made a Lieutenant at the Age of Nineteen Years—Appointed 
first Lieutenant of the Essex Line-of-battle ship—Joins the Fleet in the 
Mediterranean under the Command of Admiral Mathews—The com¬ 
bined Fleets of France and Spain assembled at Toulon—The English 
Fleet stationed off Toulon—The combined Fleets put to Sea—The 
Action off Toulon—Unsuccessful Issue—Cowardice of several of the 
English Captains—The combined Fleets in sight two Days after the 
Action—Mathews does not attempt to bring on a second Engagement— 
This indecisive Battle made a Subject of Parliamentary Inquiry—Ad¬ 
miral Mathews and Vice-admiral Lestock brought to a Court-martial— 
Mathews cashiered—Lestock acquitted—Six Captains tried—Cowardice 
of the Captain of the Essex—Conduct of Mathews in the Action off 
Toulon and that of Iveppel in the Action off Brest compared—Lestock, 
like Palliser, falsely accused by his chief Commander. 

1734 to 1745. 

The ancient and respectable family from which. Ad¬ 
miral Sir Hugh Palliser was descended, possessed con- 

B 



2 THE ACTION OFF TOULON [cii. T. 

siderable estates in the northern part of Yorkshire, at 
a place named Newly Wish. His father, the youngest 
son of a very numerous family, was a captain in the 
British army, and was severely wounded in the battle 
of Almanza. Two of his father’s brothers were also 
in the army, distinguished themselves in the service of 
their country, were both wounded in battle, and died 
lieutenant-colonels. 

The eldest brother, having nearly squandered the 
Yorkshire estate, sold it, and settled in Ireland, where 
he improved his fortune, and lived to the advanced 
age of one hundred years. By his will, the estates in 
Ireland, which the present baronet enjoys, were en¬ 
tailed on the admiral. The second brother, who was 
educated for the church, also settled in Ireland, was 
appointed to the archbishopric of Cashel, and on his 
death, at a venerable age, made considerable endow¬ 
ments on the college of Dublin. 

Admiral Sir Hugh Palliser was born on the 26 th of 
February, 1723; a few months after his birth he lost 
his father, and before he reached his second year was 
also deprived, by death, of his mother’s care; and at the 
early age of eleven was sent to sea under the command 
and protection of a relative of his mother’s, a captain 
in the navy. The wooden walls of Old England were 
then but a stern nursery—privations, hardships, and 
humbling duties, unknown to youths who enter the ser¬ 
vice in its present days of refinement and comparative 
ease, were the unalloyed accompaniments of a young 
sea-officer’s education — formidable to the tenderness 
of aristocratic breeding, but offering those honours 
and distinctions as the reward of a career of services 


1744.] WITH THE FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN. 3 

and merit alone, which of late years have been be¬ 
stowed without either, upon the sons of high family 
and nobility. 

The family papers contain no information of the ser¬ 
vices of Palliser as a midshipman. However, having 
qualified himself, and passed the examination neces¬ 
sary to render him eligible for a commission, he was 
made a lieutenant in 1742, and had not attained 
his twenty-first year, when he was appointed first lieu¬ 
tenant of the Essex line-of-battle ship, then fitting out 
to join the squadron under the command of Admiral 
Mathews, stationed off Toulon, in which harbour the 
combined fleets of France and Spain had been for some 
time assembled. 

The court of Madrid proposed that the confederate 
fleets should force their way out of the harbour of 
Toulon, and a private treaty was entered into, by 
which France was to be indemnified for any as¬ 
sistance she afforded Don Philip. It was likewise 
agreed upon, that if the combined fleets should de¬ 
stroy th&t of Mathews, they had nothing further to 
apprehend in the Mediterranean, and that they 
should immediately join the Brest fleet in forwarding 
a descent upon Great Britain. With this view, Boque- 
ville put to sea before the rest of their expedition was 
ready, hoping to be joined by the combined fleets from 
Toulon, or at least by De Court’s squadron, in case the 
affairs in Italy would not suffer the Spanish squadrons 
to leave that coast. 

Admiral Mathews was then at the court of Turin, 
and concluding that the combined fleets would attempt 
to sail, despatched expresses for all the English ships 

b 2 


4 


THE ACTION OEF TOULON [CH. I. 


at Minorca, and at other places in the Mediterranean, 
to join him with the utmost expedition. 

Early in the month of February, the British fleet 
had assembled; and the Diamond and Winchelsea 
being appointed to cruise off Toulon, and observe the 
motions of the French and Spanish fleets which lay 
with their topsails loose, ready for sea, made the signal 
at three o’clock in the afternoon, February 8th, that 
the confederate fleets were standing out to sea. The 
English admiral immediately made the signal to un¬ 
moor, when the whole fleet unmoored, and hove 
short. On the following morning, as soon as a 
breeze sprang up, the fleet weighed by signal, and 
formed in line of battle. Both the British and 
the enemies’ fleets continued plying to windward 
the whole day, but the breeze dying away towards 
evening, the British fleet anchored again in the bay, 
and at six the next morning got under weigh; the 
enemy being then in a line of battle ahead, about five 
leagues distant. 

The British and the combined forces of France and 
Spain, were as under: 


British Fleet. 


Ships. Guns. Men. 

Of the line. 29 . 2150 . 15,915 

Frigates. 18 . 594 . 3,647 


Total 


47 


2744 


French and Spanish Fleets. 

Guns. 


19,562 


Men. 


Ships. 

Of the line, French. 16 ) 1QOO lon 

Spanish. 12 J. 1822 19 ’ 120 

Frigate . 1 200 


Total 


36 


2022 


1,400 

20,520 





















5 


1744.] WITH THE FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN. 

The British van was commanded by Rear-admiral 
Rowley; the centre by Admiral Mathews, command- 
er-in-chief; and the rear by Vice-admiral Lestock. 

The French van was commanded by Commodore 
Gabaret; the centre, by Admiral De Court, command¬ 
er-in-chief; and the rear by the Spanish admiral, Don 
Juan Navarro. 

On the evening of the 10th, the British fleet again 
brought-to, and the wind having shifted during the night, 
it left the vice-admiral to windward, the rear-admiral to 
leeward of the centre, and the whole British fleet to 
wind w ard of the enemy. At the dawn of day, the enemies’ 
fleets were formed in a line to leeward with the utmost re¬ 
gularity and closeness. The British admiral, after making 
the signal to make sail and draw into line of battle ahead, 
made the signal for the commanders in the second and 
third post to make more sail, and at eleven the signal 
was made to engage the enemy; when the French and 
Spanish fleets showed their colours, which they had 
not done before, continuing in their well-formed line, 
and appearing to sail as well under their topsails as the 
British ships with every thing set. 

About one o’clock, the Namur, the English admiral’s 
ship, and his second ahead, the Marlborough, Captain 
Cornwall, bore down on the Spanish ship, the Real 
Philip, of 114 guns, and began the engagement with 
great spirit. At two o’clock, Rear-admiral Rowley got 
up near the French admiral, who poured in a broad¬ 
side, and then the action commenced in that quarter. 

Vice-admiral Lestock, whom the shift of wind during 
the night had left with his division some miles to wind¬ 
ward, with every sail set it was possible to carry, was 


THE ACTION OFF TOULON 


G 


[CH. I. 


unable to get up with the enemy, and to take any part 
in the engagement. The breeze was so light at the 
time, accompanied by a heavy swell, that the ships had 
scarcely steerage way. Admiral Mathews, after the 
battle had commenced, impatient at the supposed tar¬ 
diness of the vice-admiral, despatched a lieutenant to 
communicate verbally his order to make more sail ; 
when Lestock, pointing to his masts crowded with every 
stitch of canvass that could be spread, asked the ad¬ 
miral’s lieutenant, what it was further possible for him 
to do ? 

In less than an hour after the beginning of the en¬ 
gagement, one of the Spanish ships bore away out of the 
line, and though fired into by some of the ships of the 
Spanish squadron, could' not be brought back. The 
Marlborough’s main and mizen-masts were shot away, 
and her gallant commander, Captain Cornwall, who 
shortly before lost both his legs by one shot, was 
crushed by the mizen-mast as it went by the board, 
and had just sufficient life to tell the agony he was in. 
The Real Philip’s fire had become slack, but her se¬ 
conds a-head and a-stern poured in their broadsides 
upon the crippled Marlborough, and though there were 
many ships near, not one attempted to get between her 
and the enemy. The Namur at the same time bore 
away, and the fire-ship, which had been ordered to 
steer right down upon the Real, blew up before she 
reached that ship, without doing any execution. The 
crew of the fire-ship had just shoved off in the boats, 
leaving the captain and lieutenant on board, and a few 
men with a boat alongside. But the destructive ser¬ 
vice she was called upon to perform, was prevented by 


7 


1744 .] WITH THE FLEETS OF FRANCE ANI) SPAIN. 

her sudden and fearful explosion. When last seen, she 
was bearing right down before the wind for the Spanish 
admiral, the first lieutenant at the helm, and the cap¬ 
tain with a lighted match in his hand. 

Soon after this misfortune—if the failure of the at¬ 
tempt to run a ship, loaded with combustible matter, 
alongside a gallant enemy, who had fought his ship 
nobly, against considerable odds, can be termed a mis¬ 
fortune—the British admiral hauled down the signal 
for battle, also the signal for the line of battle ahead, 
and made the signal to leave off chase. At this time 
the wind had shifted, and came more to the westward, 
when the French fleet tacked, and were endeavouring 
to hem in Rowley and his division, but soon afterwards 
sheered off. 

The El Poder, a sixty-gun ship of six hundred men, 
in the van of the Spanish admiral, having for a consi¬ 
derable time received the fire of several of our ships, 
but at two great a distance to be effective, struck, after 
a gallant defence, to the Berwick, Captain Hawke, 
who engaged her within pistol-shot, and as her captain 
related, killed twenty-seven of her men, and dismounted 
seven of her lower-deck guns with the first broadside. 
She was taken possession of by the first and fourth 
lieutenants of Hawke’s ship ; the first lieutenant, with 
his boat’s crew, afterwards left her, and she was shortly 
retaken by the French, with the fourth lieutenant and 
seventeen men on board. 

The British fleet plied to windward during the 
night ; there were no cruisers stationed to watch the 
motions of the enemy, and at daybreak the follow- 



8 


THE ACTION OFF TOULON 


[CH. I. 

ing morning, Mathews and his squadron were five 
or six leagues to windward of the confederate fleets. 
The signal to bear down was then made, and though 
four of the Spanish ships appeared disabled, the British 
fleet was again brought to at night. On the morning 
of the 13th, Vice-admiral Lestock made signals for 
seeing twenty sail or upwards of the enemy’s ships ; 
notwithstanding which, with a fresh breeze and the 
weather gauge, the admiral made the signal to give over 
chase. 

A month after this unsuccessful and disgraceful en¬ 
counter with an enemy so greatly inferior in force, Ad¬ 
miral Mathews expressed dissatisfaction with the con¬ 
duct of Lestock, and forwarded him a letter of suspen¬ 
sion till his behaviour should be inquired into. Upon 
the receipt of this letter, Lestock immediately struck 
his flag, and returned to England in the Salisbury. 

The situation of Lestock was at this time peculiarly 
severe and trying. He was, in the eyes of the disap¬ 
pointed and enraged public, the criminal cause of the 
failure of the late engagement, and resentment and 
prepossession against him were daily gathering ground. 
However, at his earnest entreaty, a court-martial was 
ordered to be held to try him, and he had time allowed 
him to bring his witnesses from the Mediterranean. 
The public thought this delay was only intended to 
ward off an inquiry, and to screen other great men as 
well as Lestock, and therefore a motion was made in 
the House of Commons on the 7th of May, 1745, 
“ That they would grant a committee of the whole 
house, to inquire into the cause of the miscarriage of 


9 


1744.] WITH THE FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN. 

the attack made in the Mediterranean, on the joint fleets 
of France and Spain, by the British fleet, which was 
superior in number of ships to them both.” 

Major Selwyn, in bringing forward this motion, said, 
“ Although those who have the honour to serve by 
sea and land, may wear the livery of the crown, they 
are still but the servants of the state, and in that light 
their conduct, as well as their grievances, are within 
our cognizance, and every individual man of them may, 
accordingly, be rewarded or stigmatized by us, who 
are not only the grand council of the nation, but the 
grand inquest also. It is but a melancholy circum¬ 
stance to reflect upon, that if the major part of our 
fleet in the Mediterranean had done their respective 
duties, or exerted themselves in any proportion with 
the honourable gentlemen who commanded, and his 
second, whose loss to this nation can never be too 
much lamented ; in all probability, we had not yet 
been at war with France, for nothing is more plain 
and obvious to me, than that the French designed we 
should have destroyed the Spanish fleet; nay, they 
were surprised that thirteen of our ships of the line 
should be kept at bay by only five of the Spanish fleet, 
neglected, and in a manner deserted by their allies, for 
which neglect, though attended with no ill conse¬ 
quences, the French admiral was rebuked on his return 
home, by way of compliment to the Spanish court. If 
this miscarriage is not inquired into, I dread its conse¬ 
quences during the continuance of this war—a mis¬ 
carriage that has brought disgrace upon the flag of 
England—that flag which never flew before upon the 
ocean, without carrying terror with it to every mari- 


10 


THE ACTION OFF TOULON 


[CII. I. 

time power, but is now become tlie scoff and by-word 
of France, whose people shake their heads at it, and 
at this day they serve up the action off Toulon as a 
burlesque entertainment upon the several stages of 
their playhouses.” 

The motion was seconded by Mr. Cornwall, brother 
to the gallant captain of the Marlborough. “ His duty to 
his country and his nearest and dearest relative compelled 
him,” he observed, “to second the motion which the wor¬ 
thy gentleman behind him had so properly made; but he 
must call the day mentioned, cruel as well as disho¬ 
nourable. There was not a man in the nation who did 
not know in his private capacity that there had been 
great misconduct, and very great cowardice, somewhere 
or other, in the commanders of the English squadron* 
Should not then our ministers themselves have laid 
the whole before parliament ; but which of us in his 
public capacity has ever heard a word of it ? More 
than twelve months ago, forty ships of England made 
with difficulty a drawn battle of it, against thirty ships 
of the combined fleets of France and Spain, yet the 
parliament of England is told nothing of it, nor has 
asked a single question concerning it. Therefore, for 
God’s sake,—for the sake of common sense as well as 
justice and our own honour, let the inquiry be hast¬ 
ened.” 

Mr. Pelham said, “ He did not rise to justify the con¬ 
duct of our admirals and other officers concerned in 
the action off Toulon, nor would he be so unjust as to 
condemn any of them unheard. Whether our disap¬ 
pointment was owing to disobedience, cowardice, bad 
conduct, or accident, he would not take upon him to 



1744.] WITH THE FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN. 11 

determine ; nor did he think it a question proper for 
that house to inquire into. The motion now made he 
was sensible was a very popular one, but he had three 
very material objections to its being agreed to. In the 
first place he thought it would be an encroachment 
upon the prerogative of the crown ; in the second, it 
would be below the dignity of the house, because it 
would be descending to take upon it what properly be¬ 
longed to their own inferior courts; and in the third, it 
would be a breach of one of the most equitable and 
known maxims of our constitution, that ‘no man 
ought to be subject to two trials for one and the same 
act.’ What he now said might seem strong to many 
gentlemen who might think that common sense and 
reason were sufficient to enable them to judge of a sea 
engagement, but if this motion were agreed to, and an 
inquiry entered upon, they would soon be convinced of 
the truth of what he said. Most of them, he believed, 
would find themselves in a labyrinth when they began 
to hear the evidence of our seamen upon this subject, 
and so far from understanding the matter, very few of 
them would understand the language. Therefore,” he 
observed, “ if we enter into the inquiry proposed, I 
think we should order a dictionary of sea terms to be 
composed, and such a number of copies to be printed, 
as may be sufficient for the members of the house. 
When we have done this,—when every member has 
made himself so much master of his dictionary as to 
understand the language of the witnesses, how shall we 
judge whether the orders given were proper or not, or 
whether it was possible to comply with them ? If we 
trust to the opinions of witnesses we may depend upon 


12 THE ACTION OFF TOULON [CH. I. 

it, we shall find it to be so many men so many minds. 
How shall gentlemen who have never been at sea 
judge of two reasons, and by what rule shall we prefer 
the opinion of one seaman to another ? Therefore, in 
the light I behold this motion at present, I cannot ap¬ 
prove of it, but shall suspend my judgment till I hear 
what other gentlemen have to say upon the subject.” 

Mr. Cornwall, in reply, claimed credit for motives of 
duty more than curiosity in advocating this inquiry, 
though he did confess he should be extremely curious 
to know how a squadron of thirty French and Spanish 
ships came to escape from a British squadron of forty 
men-of-war, every way superior to them, without so 
much as having one ship either sunk, destroyed, or 
taken ; nay, as they retook one of their ships, together 
with a lieutenant and some brave British sailors on 
board, it might properly be said that they took one 
ship from us, and carried the signs of victory trium¬ 
phantly to Spain. 

It was eventually resolved unanimously, u That it 
should be referred to a committee of the house to in¬ 
quire into the cause of the miscarriage.” However, 
notwithstanding that much pains had been taken, and 
much time consumed, the house only came to the fol¬ 
lowing resolution : “ That the British fleet, at the time 
of the engagement, was superior in force to the com¬ 
bined fleets of France and Spain; that the miscarriage 
in that action reflected on the honour of his majesty, 
and was highly detrimental to the common cause, and 
to the interests of the British nation. That there was 
reason to apprehend from the evidence laid before the 
committee, that this miscarriage was owing to mis- 


1744.] WITH THE FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN. 13 

conduct and misbehaviour in some of the commanders 
of the British fleet, and it was resolved to address his 
majesty that he would be most graciously pleased to 
give directions that courts-martial should be held in 
the most solemn and speedy manner to inquire into the 
conduct of Admiral Mathews, Vice-admiral Lestock, 
Captains Burrish, Norris, Williams, Ambrose, Frog- 
more, and Dilk, in relation to the late engagement. 

The flagrant cowardice of Captain Richard Norris 
of the Essex was brought before the Lords Commis¬ 
sioners of the admiralty by the following letters and 
depositions of the officers of that ship: 

To Vice-admiral Rowley. 

“ Essex, 

“ Port Mahon, Jan. 8th, 1744. 

“ Sir, 

“We having this day heard a copy of a letter from 
you to Captain Norris publicly read to the ship’s com¬ 
pany, in which you signify to him that you have an 
order from the Right Honourable the Lords Com¬ 
missioners of the Admiralty, to hold a court-martial to 
inquire into his conduct and behaviour in the engage¬ 
ment with the French and Spaniards, on the 11th of 
February. We think it incumbent on us, whose names 
are hereunto subscribed, to offer ourselves as witnesses, 
in order to do justice between our king and country 
and Captain Norris, at any time you please to ap¬ 
point. 

“ Hugh Palliser, First Lieutenant. 

“ Hamilton Gore, Third Lieutenant. 

“ Joseph Peyton, Fourth Lieutenant. 

“ Joseph Myers, Master. 

“ William Sutherland, Lieutenant, Marines.” 


14 TIIE ACTION OFF TOULON [CH. I. 

Ten rnidsliipmen of the ship also subscribed their 
names to this document. 

The Deputy-Judge-Advocate was authorised to take 
the sworn depositions of the officers of the Essex 
touching the conduct of Captain Norris. 

Hugh Palliser, First Lieutenant of his Majesty’s ship 
Essex, deposed: a That on Saturday, the 11th of 
February last, from the time the admiral made the 
signal to engage till sunset, the Essex was never within 
gunshot of the enemy, for she hauled out of the line of 
battle when the Namur began the engagement, and 
then lay to windward at least a gun-shot of the line.” 

He further deposed: “ That they began to fire when 
the admiral did, but he, judging they were too far off, 
came up on the quarterdeck to inform the captain 
thereof, who would not allow him time to speak, but 
ordered him forward, saying, ‘ For God’s sake, Palliser, 
go forward and help them to trim the head sails.’ (The 
ship being then luffed in the wind, and nearly a-back.) 
When he returned again on the quarterdeck he was 
ordered down by the captain, who said to him as he 
was offering to speak, ‘ Go down to your quarters, sir,’ 
which he accordingly did, and found that by their 
having luffed so much, none of the starboard guns 
could be brought to bear on the enemy; upon which, a 
mate came down with orders to him to cease firing, and 
to point the metal aft. He also observed, that by luff¬ 
ing they brought the Dorsetshire to bear in the same 
manner as the enemy’s ship, so that some of the 
men mistook her for an enemy and fired at her, till the 
smoke cleared away, when they discovered her blue 
ensign. 

“ In a short time after this, he was sent for by the 


15 


1744.] WITH THE FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN. 

captain to ask liis advice, whether it was not better to 
stay where they were than to bear down, where there 
were five fresh ships of the enemy coming up. After 
desiring a little time to look round him and to observe, 
he answered, ‘ That if they did not go down to the as¬ 
sistance of the Marlborough, which had then lost her 
masts, she would certainly be destroyed or taken by 
the five ships.’ 

“ Looking about him again, he perceived the fire-ship 
going down towards the Spanish admiral’s ship, the 
Real Philip, and represented to the captain the impro¬ 
bability of her ever doing any execution, if some ship 
did not go down to cover her from that ship’s fire, the 
shot from which at the time flew very thick about 
her. This he frequently repeated, to which Captain 
Norris as often replied, ‘ We must not go down ; if we 
do, we shall be sunk or torn to pieces.’ He then re¬ 
presented to the captain, that if they would only bear 
down on the Real as the Dorsetshire did, they should 
do execution upon her, as she was going off in a dis¬ 
abled condition ; but to this he made no answer, but 
seemed displeased. 

“ Some time after, Mr. Bentley, one of the admiral’s 
lieutenants, came under their stern, and told Captain 
Norris, that if he did not bear down to the assistance 
of the Marlborough, she would be lost ; to which he 
made no direct answer, but said he should be torn to 
pieces. He himself then said to Mr. Bentley, that 
Captain Norris seemed to be afraid that the five fresh 
ships would be too much for us; to which Mr. Bentley 
replied , L That he had been on board the Dorsetshire, 
which was filling powder and going down.’ When 


16 


THE ACTION OFF TOULON 


[CH. I. 

Mr. Bentley went away, the captain whispered to him, 
that Mr. Bentley did not say it was the admiral’s or¬ 
ders to bear down ; to which he answered, 4 I hope 
the admiral is not killed.’ 

u After the fire-ship blew up, they bore away a little, 
and he then went to the captain to ask him whether he 
should go down and try a single shot ; to which the 
captain answered, 4 Do, Palliser.’ Upon the firing of 
one gun, the people were so eager, that they fired se¬ 
veral, when he received a message from Captain Nor¬ 
ris, at his peril to fire no more, for the shot fell short. 
After this, with the captain’s leave, he fired two shots, 
both of which he himself saw fall short. At this dis¬ 
tance they kept from the enemy till sunset, when the 
admiral wore, and they followed him, firing upon the 
enemy as they passed them, which was the only time 
they were near enough to do execution.” 

He further declared: 44 That for the whole day the cap¬ 
tain never endeavoured to cheer or encourage the petty 
officers and seamen to do their duty, but on the con¬ 
trary, appeared with a downcast countenance, often 
crying with a sigh, 4 1 wish it was over.’ 

44 Sworn before the Judge-Advocate, on board his 
Majesty’s ship Essex, January 18th, 1744.” 

Joseph Myers, Master of the Essex, deposed :— 
44 That on the morning of the 11th of February last, 
after the admiral had made the signal to engage, Cap¬ 
tain Norris showed all the signs of the utmost fear and 
dejection ; and that when deponent was singing the 
famous Ninety-second, the Captain said, 4 It will be all 
over with us presently, we shall have no reason to 
sing ;’ and then he walked about sighing, and showing 


17 


1744.] WITH THE FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN. 

in his face the greatest confusion ; and notwithstanding 
that an officer came from the admiral with directions to 
keep the line as close as possible, yet after the action 
began till sunset, he never was in the line.” 

He further deposed :— 44 That after the admiral be¬ 
gan the engagement, Captain Norris said to him, 
4 There will be the Dorsetshire and ourselves for that 
ship astern of the Real to which he replied, 4 The 
devil’s in it if we are not enough for her ourselves.’ 
Then the captain edged down a little, and began to 
fire, but shortly after sprung his luff; when, seeing 
that the shot fell short, he told the captain it was throw¬ 
ing powder and shot overboard to fire at her any 
longer at such a distance, and would answer no pur¬ 
pose ; and upon telling him so a second time, he or¬ 
dered all firing to cease, and then lay a considerable 
way to windward of his station. When they had re¬ 
mained thus for some time, the captain ordered a gun 
to be laid down, and seeing it did not reach, tried a se¬ 
cond, but to no purpose, for they both fell short. Upon 
seeing the fire-ship bearing down, the captain sent for 
Mr. Palliser, to advise with him, who, after he had 
looked about him, answered, 4 That if they did not go 
down to cover the fire-ship, she must be sunk by the 
enemy’s fire.’ Upon which Captain Norris turned 

away. 

44 Towards the close of the evening, when the ad¬ 
miral wore down among the enemy, the captain or¬ 
dered him to tack; to which he said, 4 Tack, sir! the 
ship will not stay—we must wear after the admiral;’ 
when he ordered the helm a-weather. As soon as the 

c 


18 THE ACTION OFF TOULON [CII. I. 

ship was wore round and the yards braced, he turned 
himself to the men at the guns, who continued firing 
till they passed the enemy, when he went across to 
the captain in the starboard gangway, and told him 
all the enemy’s shot fell short of them.” 

He further deposed:—“ That during the time they 
were running past the enemy, he never saw the cap¬ 
tain on the quarterdeck, but always in the starboard 
gangway, crouching under the hammocks. 

u Sworn to on board his Majesty’s ship, Essex, be¬ 
fore the Judge-Advocate, January 18th, 1744.” 

The other officers of the Essex, and several of the 
petty officers, made depositions of a similar nature, as 
to the timidity of Captain Norris. Lieutenant-colonel 
Crosbie and a lieutenant of marines alone, bore testi¬ 
mony in favour of his behaviour during the action. 
However, Captain Norris, who was permitted by Ad¬ 
miral Mathews to quit his ship at Port Mahon, never 
ventured to appear and take his trial, and was struck 
off the list of captains. 

A court-martial assembled on board the Prince of 
Orange for the trial of Admiral Mathews: “ Charged 
with breach of duty when in command of his Majesty’s 
fleet in the Mediterranean.” After a long investigation, 
the court resolved unanimously: “ That the admiral 
made the signal for the vice-admiral and his division 
to leave off chase on the 13tli of February, when the 
enemy was in sight to leeward; and, that he was the 
principal cause, by divers breaches of duty, of the mis¬ 
carriage of his Majesty’s fleet in the Mediterranean in 
February, 1744, and adjudged him to be cashiered and 


19 


1744.] WITH THE FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN. 

rendered incapable of any employment in his Majesty’s 
service.”* 

A court-martial was also assembled on board the same 
ship for the trial of Vice-admiral Lestock. The vice-ad¬ 
miral was charged with bringing-to, too far to windward 
of the admiral on the night of the 10 th, and with not 
making sufficient sail to get into his station on the 11th, 
by which the ships of his division took no part in the 
engagement. The sittings of the court extended from 
the 12th of March to the 3d of June, when the reso¬ 
lutions come to, unanimously were: “ That Vice-admi¬ 
ral Lestock brought-to on the evening of the 10th, in 
conformity with the admiral’s signal to bring-to, and 
that most of the witnesses in support of the charge, 
and all who appeared on the prisoner’s defence, de¬ 
clared that it was impossible for the vice-admiral to 
join the admiral and close the line, before the signal 
to leave off chase was made in the evening. And even 
most of the remaining witnesses have proved that de¬ 
claration by circumstances. 

w That it did not appear that the vice-admiral was 
a principal or any part of the cause of the miscarriage 
of his Majesty’s fleet in the Mediterranean: that if the 
vice-admiral and his whole division had been abso^ 
lutely away, and the four sternmost ships of the enemy 
(who were of no service to the enemy in the engage¬ 
ment) had also been excluded, the rest of his Majesty’s 
fleet would have still remained superior to the rest of 
the combined fleets. That the vice-admiral continued 
in his command during the whole month of February, 


* Court-martial on Admiral Mathews. 


20 THE ACTION OFF TOULON [CH. 1 . 

and was distinguished by a particular mark of trust 
and confidence the day after all these accusations were 
laid to his charge, being ordered to lead with his 
Majesty’s fleet, in case of coming to an engagement with 
the enemy on either tack, and it is therefore to be pre¬ 
sumed that the admiral did not then think him guilty 
of these notorious breaches of duty. That the infor¬ 
mation upon which the charge is grounded appears to 
be frivolous, absurd, and not true ; that a great number 
of witnesses brought in its support, and also in the 
prisoner’s defence, fully refute the whole and every 
part, and the court do unanimously acquit the prisoner 
of the whole and every part of the charge brought 
against him, and he is hereby honourably acquitted.”* 

Lieutenant Palliser was one of the witnesses called 
upon in support of the charge against Lestoek, who in 
commenting on the evidence in his defence in allusion 
to some part of Palliser’s, remarked, “ This gentleman 
has given his evidence so clearly, and with so much 
judgment in every other part of his examination, that 
it gives me a good deal of pain to mention the mistake 
he had, I dare say, inadvertently fallen into, but I 
think I am under the necessity of doing so, that the 
prosecutors may have no cause to say I was so unfair 
as to state the facts he had said for me and not those 
against me.”f 

Walpole remarks, writing after the parliamentary 
inquiry, and previously to the courts-martial being 
held, “ The House of Commons have at last finished 
their great affair—their inquiry into the Mediterranean 


* Minutes of court-martial on Vice-admiral Lestoek. 
f Lestock’s defence. 


1744.] WITH THE FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN. 21 

miscarriage. It was carried on with, more decency and 
impartiality than ever was known in so tumultuous, 
popular, and partial a court. I can’t say it ended so, 
for the tories, all but one single man, voted against 
Mathews, whom they have not forgiven for lately 
opposing one of their friends in Monmouthshire, and 
for carrying his election. The greater part of the 
whigs are for Lestock: this last is a great man ; his 
cause, most unfriended, came before the house with all 
the odium that could be laid upon a man standing in 
the light of having betrayed his country. His merits, 
I mean his parts, prevailed, and have set him in a very 
advantageous point of view. Harry Fox has gained 
the greatest honour by his assiduity and capacity in 
this affair. Mathews remains in the light of a hot, 
brave, imperious, dull, confused fellow. The question 
was to address the king to appoint a trial by court- 
martial of the two admirals and the four coward cap¬ 
tains. Mathews’ friends were for leaving out his name, 
but after a very long debate were only seventy-six to 
two hundred and eighteen. It is generally supposed 
that the two admirals will be acquitted, and the four 
captains hanged. By what I can make out (for you 
know I have been confined, and could not attend the 
examination) Lestock preferred his safety to the glory 
of his country ; I don’t mean cowardly, for he is un¬ 
questionably brave, but selfish. Having to do with a 
man who he knew would take the slightest opportu¬ 
nity to ruin him if he in the least transgressed his 
orders, and knowing that man too dull to give right 
orders, he chose to stick to the letter, when by 


THE ACTION OFF TOULON 


22 


[CH. I. 


neglecting it he might have done the greatest ser¬ 
vice.”* 

In a life of Admiral Keppel lately published, his biogra¬ 
pher, adverting to this action, observes, “ That though not 
immediately connected with the subject of his memoir, 
the engagement by its results exercised so baneful an 
influence upon the naval battles of the ensuing thirty- 
eight years, including that fought by Keppel in 1778, 
that a brief notice of the action and its consequences 
will not be out of place. Nor for another reason 
should the matter pass without notice, inasmuch as the 
treatment Mathews received so nearly resembles that 
experienced by Keppel, each as commander-in-chief 
having been brought to a court-martial to screen the 
conduct of an inferior officer.”y 

The writer of this memoir ventures to entertain 
opinions, drawn from the facts developed upon the trials 
of both these officers, widely different from those of the 
author above quoted. The indecisive results of both ac¬ 
tions, as well as the conduct of both commanders, bear a 
strong resemblance to each other, it is true. In the en¬ 
gagement off Brest, Keppel, like Mathews, blundered 
into action with an enemy formed in regular order of 
battle, without any order or concerted plan of his own, 
and like Mathews exhausted his bravery in the first en¬ 
counter, for both admirals drew off their fleets, appointed 
no frigates to watch the motions of their opponents, and 
though on both events the enemy was inferior to them 
in numbers and in force, yet when seen to leeward after 

* Walpole’s Letters. Vol. ii, p. 26. 

t The Life of Keppel, by the Hon. and Rev. Tlios. Keppel. Vol. i., p. 72. 


1744.] WITH THE FLEETS OF FRANCE AND SPAIN. 23 

the battles, neither of the English admirals attempted 
to bear down upon them, and they were allowed to 
dejiart unmolested, and to boast, certainly not without 
a plausible foundation, of having been the victors. 

The cases of Vice-admirals Lestock and Palliser on 
the occasions in question, are parallel in almost every 
feature : the failure in both instances was imputed to 
them by whispered calumnies and by anonymous pub¬ 
lications, and both had to contend with popular odium, 
till inquiry by courts-martial, and by public discussion, 
brought the truth to light. The disobedience imputed 
to them, namely, of not keeping near enough to their 
respective commanders, originated in the same cause, 
and bore a resemblance in each instance, with these 
differences—that Mathews outsailed his vice-admiral 
in bearing down on the enemy to begin the engage¬ 
ment, whilst Keppel outsailed his, in standing from 
them after the encounter, and that Lestock was unable 
to get into action, whilst Palliser fought his ship with 
his mizen-topsail aback down the whole French line ; 
and though rendered almost a perfect wreck by the fire 
of so many ships, turned to renew the battle, which 
his commander had made the general signal to discon¬ 
tinue. 

The parallel between the chiefs, otherwise nearly 
perfect, ends with the sentences of the courts-martial 
held upon them. Mathews, as already related, was 
dismissed the service, whilst Keppel was honourably 
acquitted ; and the readers of naval history are left to 
wonder at decisions of so opposite a nature, in con¬ 
nexion with acts and their results, in almost every de¬ 
gree similar. 


24 THE ACTION OFF TOULON. [CH. I. 

Mathews undoubtedly rushed gallantly into action ; 
but as personal intrepidity in a commander-in-chief is 
at best but a vulgar, although an indispensable quali¬ 
fication ; and as the admiral did not demonstrate by 
his conduct the possession of a higher one, and by his 
avoiding another engagement, not even a constant com¬ 
mand of that, the sentence must be deemed a just one? 
which excluded him from the possibility of again tar¬ 
nishing the flag of his country in a naval battle. 


1746.] 


SERVICE IN THE CHANNEL. 


25 


CHAPTER II. 

SERVICE IN THE CHANNEL—WEST INDIES AND NORTH 
AMERICA-TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF ADMIRAL BYNG. 

Palliser promoted to the Rank of Commander—Cruises in the Channel— 
Captures Four French Privateers—Promoted to the Rank of Post-cap¬ 
tain—Joins Commodore Legge’s Squadron on the West-India Station— 
Cruises off Martinico—Explosion of the Arms in the Arms-chest—Pal¬ 
liser has Three Balls lodged in different Parts of his Body—Letters from 
Commodore Pocock and Palliser to Lord Anson—Palliser returns to 
England—Despatched with Intelligence of Peace to Admiral Boscawen, 
Commanding in the East Indies—Service on the Coast of Scotland— 
State of Europe—Origin of the Seven Years’ War—Alliance of Aus¬ 
tria, France, and Russia—Disturbances in Canada—Braddock’s Expedi¬ 
tion—Palliser and Keppel engaged in the Expedition—Keppel returns 
to England in the Sea-Horse, Commanded by Palliser—Admiral Byng’s 
Action off Minorca—His Trial and Condemnation—His Judges seek to 
be Released from their Oath of Secresy—The Conduct of Keppel on 
that Occasion. 

1746 to 1767, 

The conduct of Lieutenant Palliser in the unfor¬ 
tunate action off Toulon, and in connexion with the 
proceedings resulting from it, was so satisfactory to 
the authorities at the Admiralty, that on the 4th of 
July, 1746, he was promoted to the rank of com¬ 
mander, and appointed to the Weazle sloop, with or¬ 
ders to cruise between the Isle of Wight and Beachy 
Head, for the protection of coasters, which were con* 


26 SERVICE IN THE CHANNEL. [CH. II. 

tinually harassed by the privateers and other active 
craft of our opposite enemy. 

Whilst engaged in this service, which required un¬ 
ceasing vigilance and exertion, he, in a short time, 
captured four French privateers, and carried them all 
into Portsmouth. 

The following is a gazetted account of two of those 
captures : 

“Admiralty Office, Oct. 14. 

“ Captain Palliser, in his Majesty’s sloop the Weazle, 
being on a cruise off the Isle of Wight on the 8th in¬ 
stant, at ten in the morning, saw a shallop, which he 
gave chase to, and at once came up with her and took 
her. She was called the Jeanette, a French privateer^ 
belonging to Boulogne, mounting six carriage-guns and 
six swivel-guns; she had forty-eight men on board, and 
was commanded by Amboine Collert. 

“ When Captain Palliser had shifted the prisoners, he 
gave chase to another vessel, and at dark came up with 
her and took her. She was called the Fortune, a 
French privateer of Honfleur, mounting ten carriage 
and ten swivel-guns, and had ninety-five fighting men 
on board, commanded by John Gilliere. Both prizes 
were brought into port.” 

These captures led immediately to further promo¬ 
tion, and on the 25 th of November following, Palliser 
was made a post-captain, and appointed to the Captain, 
a ship of seventy guns. 

The Captain was Commodore Legge’s ship, who 
was then appointed commander-in-chief at the Lee¬ 
ward Islands. The command of the Captain was in- 


1746.] SERVICE IN THE WEST INDIES. 27 

tended for Captain Hervey, afterwards Earl of Bristol ; 
but as lie had not served at sea as master and com¬ 
mander, the rules of the service at that time did not 
admit of his promotion to the command. 

On the death of Commodore Legge at Barbadoes, 
Captain Palliser moved in October, 1747, into the 
Sutherland, a ship of fifty guns. By this step, not re¬ 
quired by the usages of the service, but which was 
taken, in order that the senior captain on the station 
(captain, afterwards Sir George Pocock), should be in 
the best and largest ship, Palliser was thrown out of 
an opportunity of making a fortune. 

The Sutherland had lately been dismasted in a hur¬ 
ricane, and was being refitted, when the Weazle sloop, 
despatched by Admiral Hawke, arrived with informa¬ 
tion that the admiral had fallen in with a large 
French convoy for the West Indies ; had taken nearly 
all their men-of-war, and dispersed their merchant- 
ships. 

Commodore Pocock was cruising with part of his 
squadron off the Island of Martinico—the rest of his 
fleet being dispersed on different services—when this 
intelligence reached him, which was not sufficiently 
early to afford him time to collect his ships in a situa¬ 
tion best calculated for intercepting so large a fleet as 
that approaching. The captures, however, were nu¬ 
merous : five of the ships bound for St. Domingo were 
taken, and of those which were going to Martinico and 
the other islands; eight became prizes to the Captain, 
Palliser’s late ship, the cargoes of which were valued 
at 100,000/. Fifteen other sail of merchant-ships, and 
many of the enemy’s privateers were also taken. 


SERVICE IN THE WEST INDIES. [cH. II. 

The Sutherland was not ready for sea when the 
squadron to which she belonged was thus actively and 
profitably engaged, but shortly afterwards she pro¬ 
ceeded on a cruise to leeward of Martinico, and her 
supply of water falling short, steered for Prince Ru¬ 
pert’s bay in the island of St. Domingo. As that part 
of the island was then inhabited only by the native 
savages, and straggling parties of French, the watering 
of a British ship was a duty of some danger to those 
engaged in it. In order to protect the watering-party, 
a body of marines were ordered under arms for land¬ 
ing. Whilst the ship’s armourers were engaged in 
taking arms for the party out of the arms-chest, which 
was filled with cartouch-boxes and loaded muskets, by 
some unfortunate negligence, one of the muskets struck 
fire, which was communicated to the cartouch-boxes, 
and occasioned all the arms to explode. The armourer 
and his mate were killed on the spot, and Captain 

a lsei, \v ho was seated at the time on a gun at the 
opposite side of the quarterdeck, had three bullets at 
the same instant lodged in different parts of his body 
One entered his left shoulder, another his left hip 
and one passed completely through him, entering at the 
e t si e o his back, and which was extracted from the 
right groin. His recovery was for a long time hope¬ 
less, as a wasting fever supervened, but youth and a 
vigorous constitution at length conquered, and in a 

lew months he was enabled to return to England as a 
passenger in the Dreadnought. 

Mr. Upcott has kindly furnished the author with 

r,h p",! 8 le ““ from Pocock 

“ , J | Ca l ,lal " P*' 1 ™ 1" Lord Anson relating to Ike 
accident. & b 



1748.] SERVICE IN THE WEST INDIES. 29 

Commodore Pocock to Lord Anson. 

“ Sutherland, Antigua, 

“ May 24th, 1748. 

“ My Lord, 

“ I was sorry to liear your lordship had been indis¬ 
posed, and hope now your health is entirely re-esta¬ 
blished. I have been looking up the French at Mar- 
tinico since the 17 th of last December in the best man¬ 
ner I was able. The India ships, I believe, must ca¬ 
reen before they depart, the sheathing of three of them 
being quite cut off. The Achilles was sheathed with 
a particular sort of wood, which the worms do not 
care to touch, but I was informed by the captain of 
her, that they had begun to nibble. Several of the 
other ships have been under the necessity of pushing 
out, occasioned by their long stay, and the excessive 
dearness of all sorts of provisions, especially wine and 
flour. Mr. Osborne joined me on the 1st instant, and 
when we arrived in English harbour, I wished to re¬ 
turn into my former ship; accordingly, the admiral 
appointed me, as Captain Palliser had been compelled 
to resign for his health, not being recovered from the 
severe wounds he has received, and is to proceed with 
me to England with the convoy which sails in June, 
when I shall have the honour of saluting your lord- 
ship. In the meantime I rest with the most perfect 
esteem and respect, 

“ Your lordship’s most humble, 

“ And obedient servant, 

“ G. Pocock.” 


30 SERVICE IN THE WEST INDIES. [CH. II. 

Captain Palliser to Lord Anson. 

“ Antigua, 

“May 28th, 1748. 

“ My Lord, 

“ After sucli extraordinary favours as I have had 
from you, it is very probable that you may be greatly 
surprised to hear of my being now without a ship, I 
therefore cannot omit this opportunity of acquainting 
your lordship with it, and the occasion thereof. I 
took the liberty some time ago of informing you of my 
having moved into the Sutherland, since which, by an 
accident, in February last, of the anns-chest catching 
fire, I had the misfortune of being wounded by a shot 
in my right shoulder, and another which passed di¬ 
rectly through my body, which has taken away the 
use of my legs, and has left me at present incapable of 
serving. Upon Admiral Osborne’s arrival, he ac¬ 
quainted me that I must not continue in command of 
the Sutherland, but should immediately proceed in 
the Tilbury to Jamaica with the convoy, and not being 
in a condition to comply with this order, I was under 
the necessity of quitting. The fever having now left 
me, I begin to gather strength, and hope to be able to 
embark in the next convoy for England, Admiral Os¬ 
borne having been pleased to give me leave to go as a 
passenger in the Sutherland. The great sense of the 
singular favours which I have constantly received from 
your lordship, made me not a little cautious of incur¬ 
ring your lordship’s displeasure; it was therefore with 
great regret that I asked leave to quit, knowing how 
improper a thing it is, and how much the board disap- 


1748.] TREATY OF AIX-LA-CIIAPELLE. 31 

prove of such an act, without very sufficient cause; and 
the misfortune which has befallen me will I trust be 
esteemed so. 

u If I am never able to serve again, I shall always re¬ 
member, and to my last day remain most sincerely 
thankful for the many favours already received from 
your lordship. 

u I am with greatest respect, 

“ Your most obedient servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 

On the return of Captain Palliser to England, he 
was commissioned for the Sheerness frigate. A treaty 
of peace, usually termed the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
the basis of which was a restitution of the conquests 
made on both sides during the war, r as well as a release 
of prisoners, speedily followed the success of our naval 
arms against those of France and Spain, more particu¬ 
larly in the general engagements during the previous 
year; when the fleet under the command of Vice-ad¬ 
miral Anson, captured six men-of-war and four armed 
Indiamen, and when a detached squadron, under Ad¬ 
miral Warren, picked up three sloops, of twenty guns 
each, together with the remainder of the India ships, con¬ 
taining treasure to the amount of upwards of 300,000/.,* 
which was conveyed by twenty waggons to the Bank, in 
a procession consisting of several thousand persons. The 
fleet under the command of Hawke also dispersed the 
West India convoy, took six ships of the enemy’s line, 
and brought them into Portsmouth. 

O 


* Barrow’s Life of Anson. 


32 


SERVICE ON THE COAST OF SCOTLAND. [CH. II. 

On the ratification of this treaty, Captain Palliser 
was sent express in the Sheerness frigate to Admiral 
Boscawen, in command on the East-India station, car¬ 
rying the proclamation of peace, and the French king’s 
orders to his governer of Madras, to surrender that 
place to the admiral, who, after taking possession, re¬ 
turned to England. 

Palliser continued in command of the Sheerness 
till 1750, when she was paid off at Deptford, and we 
do not find him again employed until 1753, when he 
was commissioned for the Yarmouth, a guard-ship lying 
at Chatham. 

Shortly after his appointment, intelligence reached 
government that the rebels who had fled to France, 
after the rash and unsuccessful attempt of the young 
Pretender, in 1745, to recover the throne of his ances¬ 
tors—were forming schemes in concert with the court 
of France, for returning secretly to Scotland, in order 
to foment fresh disturbances in that country, where the 
cause of the young Prince Charles Edward had still 
many enthusiastic adherents. Captain Palliser was 
selected to be sent on the service of intercepting them, 
and, accordingly, was placed in command of the Sea- 
Plorse, a twenty-gun ship, and was furnished with all 
the necessary instructions for the prevention of the 
contemplated expedition from France. 

This service not only gained him the ill-will of the 
disaffected, but brought him in contact also with the 
numerous smugglers on that coast, to whom his activity 
had rendered him so obnoxious, that many artifices 
were concerted to interrupt and embarrass him. 

He had received orders to enter as many volunteers 



33 


1753.] SERVICE ON THE COAST OF SCOTLAND. 

as should offer themselves, and several entreaties were 
made him by parents, wives, and relations, to press men 
who were represented to be abandoned characters, who 
treated their families ill, and whose conduct would be 
benefited by the discipline of a king’s cruiser. How¬ 
ever, having no orders to press, he rejected all such 
proposals, and avoided the snares laid for him in that 
direction. 

The device of a forged indenture was at length re¬ 
sorted to, and the captain was at last over-reached 
and led into a disagreeable dilemma. A young man 
presented himself as a volunteer, and had scarcely 
been received on board when he was claimed by the 
master of a merchant ship as his apprentice. This 
claim Captain Palliser resisted, as the young man him¬ 
self denied having ever been bound apprentice, and 
asserted that the indenture was a forgery. Moreover, 
as he was of age, if even he had been bound an ap¬ 
prentice, he was then legally free to enter the king’s 
service. The judge of the Vice-admiralty court of 
Scotland was engaged however, to proceed against 
Palliser for entering him, and a warrant was made out 
to take the man from his Majesty’s ship ; this was re¬ 
sisted on the part of the captain, who maintained his 
right to receive and detain him till he should have 
orders on the subject from the Lords of the Admiralty, 
and when he next went on shore he was arrested, and 
imprisoned in theTalbooth gaol for some days; but the 
Lords of the Session eventually interposed their autho¬ 
rity, and released him from the disagreeable quarters 
his cunning friends had provided for him. The master 
of the merchantman fled the country to avoid the im- 


D 


34 ORIGIN OF THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR, [CH. II. 

pending prosecution for having forged the indenture, 
and the Sea-Horse was, in a short time afterwards, re¬ 
called from the coast of Scotland to be employed in 
services more congenial to the active mind of her com¬ 
mander.* 

Before Captain Palliser had been sent on this un¬ 
pleasant mission to the coast of Scotland, a change to 
some extent had taken place in the administration. 
“ It might have seemed to one,” Lord John Bussell ob¬ 
serves, “ who did not know the interior of the court 
and the cabinet, that at the end of the year 1750 the 
political sky was remarkably serene : a costly and 
sanguinary war had been terminated by a peace ho¬ 
nourable to both parties, and the remaining causes of 
dissension were amicably arranged. The treaty of 
commerce with Spain, and the settlement of the affairs 
of Sweden, dispelled the lingering clouds which, from 
opposite quarters, portended further tempests. The 
ministry which had driven the Pretender from Derby 
to Culloden, from Culloden to Avignon, and from 
Avignon to Borne, which comprised in its ranks nearly 
all the influence of the Whig leaders, and all the talent 
of the rising statesmen of the day, which after great 
efforts against the united power of France and Spain, 
prepared in the flourishing state of public credit to re¬ 
duce the interest of the national debt to three per cent., 
might seem to the world strong and secure, but in¬ 
ternal dissensions were hid under the smooth surface.”f 
The Duke of Bedford resigned the seals, and the Ad¬ 
miralty, by the dismissal of Lord Sandwich, was de- 

* Palliser’s Journal. 

f The Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford. Vol. ii., p. 7a 


35 


1754.] ORIGIN OF THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR. 

privecl of the services of one of the most talented and 
able men that ever presided at the head of the naval 
affairs of Great Britain. 

The practical knowledge and business habits of Lord 
Anson, who was appointed first lord on his removal, 
supplied the place of the master intellect of Sandwich, 
as far as such qualifications extended, and as both were 
guided by the principle of bestowing those appoint¬ 
ments of honour and distinction within their patronage 
upon men who by services and merit were alone en¬ 
titled to them, England stands indebted to their dis¬ 
crimination for many names, which adorn the pages of 
her naval history. On this change taking place Admi¬ 
rals Boscawen and Bowley received their appoint¬ 
ments as Lords of the Admiralty. 

The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle afforded little more 
than an uneasy respite to the intriguing statesmen of the 
different courts of Europe, and to the restless bands of 
warriors who had not been called upon to disarm. 
Enterprises, having in themselves objects of attainment 
perfectly distinct from each other, plunged the conti¬ 
nent of Europe, and the possessions of England and 
France on the opposite shores of the Atlantic, into the 
many sanguinary conflicts of the memorable Seven 
Years’ War. 

By the treaties of Breslau, in 1742, and of Dresden, 
in December, 1745, Maria Theresa of Austria ceded six 
principalities of Silesia and the duchy of Glatz, to Fre¬ 
derick II., King of Prussia. The loss of those territories 
was too important and humbling to that empress to 
exclude an anxious desire for their restoration to the 
Austrian dominions; she therefore united herself with 

d 2 


36 ORIGIN OF THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR. [CH. II. 

Elizabeth, Empress of Russia, the personal enemy of 
Frederick II., enlisted the King of Poland and the 
Elector of Saxony in her cause, and in pursuance of 
her plan, succeeded in accomplishing an alliance with 
France, notwithstanding the enmity that for centu¬ 
ries had existed between Austria and that kingdom. 

This union of France and Austria, so improbable 
from the many conflicting interests of both kingdoms, 
filled Europe with astonishment ; for notwithstanding 
the irritation of France at the alliance recently entered 
into between England and Prussia, and although the 
Austrian ambassador at Paris had some years pre¬ 
viously urged the court of Versailles to an union 
with that of Vienna, still France was not seriously 
disposed to overwhelm the Prussian monarch. Her 
chief designs were directed against England, and 
as an invasion of Hanover would engage a large 
British force in the protection of that kingdom, and 
facilitate the enterprises of France against our settle¬ 
ments in America, this alliance was embraced in order 
to enable a French army to march through Germany. 

France promised the Austrian empress 24,000 aux¬ 
iliary troops, which from various causes arising out of 
the events of the war, were afterwards augmented 
to 180,000.* 

The measures concocted with so much secresy and 
zeal between the courts of Austria, Russia, and 
Saxony, to crush the Prussian monarch, were defeated 
by one of the cabinet council, who made disclosures of 
their concerted plans of operation, and placed in the 
hands of the Prussian ambassador at Dresden, a chest 

* Geschiehte des Siebenjahrigen Krieges. J. W. Von Archenholtz. 


37 


1754.] ORIGIN OF THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR. 

containing all the secret despatches. Frederick re¬ 
solved to anticipate his enemies, and his proceedings 
were marked with rapidity and decision. He marched 
at once, at the head of an army of G0,000 men, 
into Saxony, possessed himself of the electorate, seized 
the revenues, suspended the government, and appointed 
a governor, to whom he ordered implicit obedience. 
The palace of the Queen of Poland at Dresden was 
entered, and that at the same time that Frederick sent 
her every assurance of his friendship, necessity and 
his own safety compelled him to demand the key of a 
certain closet, but the queen placed her back against 
the door, and declared to the officer who made the 
demand, that it should only be by depriving her of 
life that he entered there. This officer threw himself 
on his knees before the queen, entreated her to consider 
that his monarch’s commands must be obeyed, and that 
if she persisted in refusing him admission he should 
be compelled to use force. At length the closet was 
opened, and Frederick obtained possession of the 
wished-for papers. But we turn from the extraordi¬ 
nary achievements of this warlike and literary mo¬ 
narch, who for years contended single-handed against 
the united forces of several powerful kingdoms, to 
events more immediately connected with England’s 
participation in the Seven Years’ War. 

Whilst Maria Theresa was occupied in promoting 
this confederacy of so many princes against our ally the 
King of Prussia, disagreements between the British co¬ 
lonists in America and those of France, were daily aug¬ 
menting, and at length, in 1754, broke out into an open 
rupture. 


38 EXPEDITION TO NORTH AMERICA. [dl. II. 

The attacks of the Indians and the encroachments of 
the French upon our American possessions, had latterly 
been of so harassing and determined a nature, that a 
plan for the union of the various colonies for mutual 
protection was drawn up by Franklin, but rejected by 
the British ministry, from a dread, it would seem, of 
sanctioning any proceeding, even for the common de¬ 
fence, that might assume an appearance of independ¬ 
ence, and cause the Americans to become acquainted 
with their own strength. 

The French colonists of Canada and of the valley of 
the Mississipi,had made such advances into the territory 
of Virginia,—which were protested against in vain,— 
that the British government was resolved, notwith¬ 
standing the professed amity existing between France 
and England, to interfere in a decisive manner, and 
General Braddock was appointed to the command of 
an army to be sent to Virginia, for the purpose of 
driving the French from their encroachments within 
the boundaries of that province. 

Commodore Keppel, with two ships of sixty guns 
each, and some frigates, was appointed to the naval 
command on the American station, and Captain Pal- 
liser was ordered to the Nore, conveying with him in 
the Sea-Horse as many volunteers—intended for the 
manning of the commodore’s squadron—as that ship 
could carry, and was thence directed to proceed imme¬ 
diately to the south of Ireland, accompanied by the 
Nightingale frigate, for the purpose of convoying trans¬ 
ports, with two regiments on board, to Hampton, in 
Virginia. 

Commodore Keppel set sail on the 28th of Decern- 


17 54.] EXPEDITION TO NORTH AMERICA. 39 

ber, 1754, and after a long and stormy passage, arrived 
at Hampton roads on the 19th of February following. 
The ships of his squadron suffered severely in their 
masts, sails, and rigging, and their crews were in so 
sickly a state on their arrival, that few were lit for the 
performance of any duty. 

d he convoy, under Captain Palliser, got under weigh 
at Cork early in the ensuing January, and by his judi¬ 
cious and seaman-like adoption of the southern track, 
avoided the boisterous weather prevalent at that sea¬ 
son of the year in more northern latitudes, and in¬ 
sured a fair passage to transports, crowded with men, 
to whom the heavy seas of the northern Atlantic 
would have been perhaps as formidable enemies as 
those they were proceeding to encounter on the Ame¬ 
rican shores. 

Having steered south with his convoy, till he nearly 
approached the northern tropic, and got within the in¬ 
fluence of the moderate and steady breezes of the N.E. 
trade-wind, they arrived at Virginia early in March, 
where the commodore, from the boisterous weather he 
had experienced on his passage, and the effects of it 
on his ships’ companies, judged it expedient to provide 
hospitals for the reception of the troops under Palli- 
ser’s convoy ; but all being in good health, the Sea- 
Horse, Nightingale, and transports, were enabled to 
proceed, without any delay, up the River Potomac to 
Alexandria, where the troops landed, and were en¬ 
camped.* 

General Braddock, on his arrival in America, found 


# Log of his Majesty’s ship Sea-Horse. 


40 EXPEDITION TO NORTH AMERICA. [CH. II. 

matters in a most unsatisfactory and confused state. 
The colonies were at variance with each other, no ma 
gazines were collected, and the provincial forces were 
still to be raised. A Congress, the first held in Ame¬ 
rica, composed of General Braddock, Commodore Kep- 
pel, and all his Majesty’s governors of colonies, assem¬ 
bled at Alexandria. The provincial troops, with the 
celebrated Washington at their head, joined the king’s 
troops, and the plan agreed upon at the Congress, was 
to set on foot three expeditions to the northward ; one 
against the fort near the Falls of Niagara, another 
against Fort Frederick, or Crown Point, and a third 
against the forts which the French had erected in the 
province of Nova Scotia. This last was commanded 
by the general in person, and consisted of two British 
regiments and about 1000 provincial troops. 

The first of these expeditions, under the command of 
General Shirley, marched against the fort near Niagara, 
and totally miscarried. Colonel Johnson, who was in¬ 
trusted with the second, consisting, for the most part, 
of colonial troops, proceeded towards Crown Point, 
but ascertaining that the French were coming in great 
force to attack him, he entrenched his army in a strong 
situation, and waited for his assailants. 

The French commander, with a large body of re. 
gular forces, aided by the Canadian militia and several 
tribes of Indians, resolved to meet Colonel Johnson on 
his march, and surprised a detached corps, under 
Colonel Williams, which was defeated ; but the at¬ 
tack upon Johnson in his entrenchments, was so well 
repulsed, that after an assault, which continued for 
some hours, the enemy’s troops were forced to retire 


1754.] EXPEDITION TO NORTH AMERICA. 41 

with a considerable loss, leaving their commander— 
who was so dangerously wounded that he could not 
be carried off—a prisoner on the field. For his con¬ 
duct on this occasion, Colonel Johnson was created a 
baronet of Great Britain. 

General Braddock, after many delays and embarrass¬ 
ments, marched towards the Ohio, and on the 9th of 
July had got within a few miles of Fort du Quesne, 
when he unfortunately fell into an ambuscade, where 
his army was totally defeated, he himself mortally 
wounded, and several of his officers left on the field. 
Washington, who had accompanied him in this expe¬ 
dition as aide-de-camp, and who had warned him in 
vain of the impending danger, manifested on this oc¬ 
casion that military talent he was destined afterwards 
to display, in so signal a manner, against the forces it 
was now exercised in rescuing from the danger they 
had been led into. He succeeded in effecting a retreat 
of the remnant of the defeated army, and in joining 
the rear of the division under Colonel Dunbar, on whom 
the chief command had devolved. 

The baggage, field-artillery, ammunition, together 
with the general’s papers and instructions, all fell into 
the hands of the enemy, and thus terminated the Ame¬ 
rican campaign, which had been commenced with such 
ardent anticipations of success. 

The French embarked their troops at Brest, and the 
transports were escorted by a fleet of twenty sail of the 
line, under the command of Admiral Macnamara, who, 
after seeing the whole to sea, well clear of the coast of 
England, returned to France with nine sail of the line, 
leaving the remainder under the command of M. Bois 


42 EXPEDITION TO NORTH AMERICA. [cil. II. 

de la Moth, who, when near Newfoundland, detached 
four sail of the line and two frigates, with troops and 
stores to Louisbourg, and with the remainder pro¬ 
ceeded to Quebec. 

When intelligence was received in England that the 
French fleet under Macnamara had sailed from Brest, 
Admiral Boscawen, with eleven sail of the line under 
his command, and two regiments of the line, accompa¬ 
nying him on board, sailed from Plymouth on the 27th 
of April. Seven sail of the line under the command 
of Bear-admiral Holburne, were afterwards sent to re¬ 
inforce him, and on his arrival on the American coast, 
he took a station where he should be most likely to fall 
in with the French. 

M. Bois de la Moth, who sailed direct for Quebec, 
met with a heavy gale at the mouth of the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence, which dispersed his squadron, and four of 
his line-of-battle ships fell in with Boscawen’s fleet on 
the 6th of June. The signal for chase was imme¬ 
diately made, and his fleet were gaining on the French, 
when a thick fog came on, and the pursuit was aban¬ 
doned. 

The weather cleared again on the 8th, when three 
ships of the line were observed close in with the Eng¬ 
lish squadron. Captain Lord Howe in the Dunkirk, 
came up with the Alcide, the sternmost ship of the 
French, which struck to him on the approach of the 
Torbay; and her commander, M. de Hoquart, became 
Admiral Boscawen’s prisoner for the third time. An¬ 
other shortly surrendered to the Defiance, but a fog 
coming on suddenly, enabled the third ship, a seventy- 
four, to escape. 


1755.] EXPEDITION TO NORTH AMERICA. 43 

On tlie arrival of Boscawen on the American coast 
after the unfortunate defeat of Braddock, the Centu¬ 
rion, Commodore Keppel’s ship, was ordered to join 
his squadron, and Keppel returned to England, as a 
passenger, with Captain Palliser in the Sea-Horse. 

• Notwithstanding that hostilities had already com¬ 
menced in America, when the intelligence of the cap¬ 
tures made by Admiral Boscawen reached France, 
loud complaints were uttered, a breach of national faith 
on the part of England was proclaimed, and the French 
ambassadors in London and Hanover were immedi¬ 
ately recalled. But though war on neither side had been 
formally announced, Sir Edward Hawke put to sea with 
a fleet of eighteen sail of the line, in order to watch the 
movements of the French, and to intercept any of their 
ships of war that might be sent to reinforce the squad¬ 
ron of Bois de la Moth, and Boscawen finding that the 
French fleet had got to Quebec, returned to England in 
November. 

The threatened invasion of Hanover, and even of Eng¬ 
land, by the French, at last brought a message from the 
king to Parliament. Early in May the following year, 
a declaration of war was issued against France, and 
in June, war was formally declared by the French 
against England. The French had already effected a 
descent on the island of Minorca, and Admiral Byng 
was despatched from Spithead with a fleet of ten sail 
of the line, having orders to call at Gibraltar for a de¬ 
tachment of troops to be conveyed to the relief of that 
island. 

Although that expedition is not immediately con¬ 
nected with the services in which the subject of this 


44 THE ACTION OFF MINORCA. [CH. II. 

memoir was then engaged, the fate of Byng is a tra¬ 
gedy, which a writer, referring to the general naval 
events of that epoch, cannot well allude to without 
recording an opinion. 

On the 20th of May the two fleets came to action. 
The English consisted of thirteen sail of the line and 
five frigates; the French had twelve sail and the same 
number of frigates, but were better manned, and supe¬ 
rior to the English in the number of guns and weight 
of metal. The British guns amounted to 932, in¬ 
cluding frigates, all 32 and 24-pounders, and the men to 
6885. The French, to 982 guns, 52 and 36-pounders, 
and the number of their men to 9600. The English 
admiral’s gazetted account of the action says: 

“ Having ordered the Deptford, a ship of fifty guns 
to quit the line, that our force might become equal to 
the enemy, at two I made the signal to engage. I 
found it was the surest method to order each ship to 
close down on the one that fell to her lot, and I must 
express my great satisfaction at the very gallant manner 
in which the rear-admiral set the van example, by in¬ 
stantly bearing down on the ship he was to engage, 
with his second, who occasioned one of the French 
ships to begin the engagement, which was done by 
raking ours as they went down. The Intrepid, unfor¬ 
tunately at the beginning, had her foretopmast shot 
away, and as that hung on her foretopsail and backed 
it, he had no command of his ship, his foretack and all 
his braces being cut away at the same time, so he drove 
on the next ship to him, the Revenge, and obliged that 
ship and the ship, ahead of me, to throw all aback. 
This obliged me to do the same also for a few minutes, 


1756.] THE ACTION OEF MINORCA. 45 

to prevent their falling on board of me, though not 
before we had drove our adversary out of the line, who 
put before the wind, and had several shots fired at him 
from his own admiral. This not only caused the ene¬ 
my’s centre to be unattacked, but the rear-admiral’s 
division to be uncovered for some time. I sent and 
called the ships ahead of me to go down on the 
enemy, and ordered the Chesterfield to lie by the 
Intrepid, and the Deptford to supply the Intrepid’s 
place. I found the enemy edged away constantly, and 
as they went three feet to our one, they would never 
permit our closing with them, but took the advantage 
of destroying our rigging: for though I closed the rear- 
admiral fast, I found I could not gain close to the 
enemy, whose van were fairly drove from their line, 
but their admiral was joining them by bearing away.” 

The fleets were separated during the night, and 
when Byng had fully ascertained the damage his ships 
had received, a council of war was held, composed of 
all the naval and military officers of rank in the Bri¬ 
tish squadron; when it was unanimously resolved that 
they should proceed to Gibraltar to refit, instead of 
seeking another engagement in the disabled condition 
which many of the fleet then were. 

The admiral’s account of the action, as above quoted, 
is, it must be allowed, but a confused composition. 
He, however, complained that this published letter was 
a garbled statement, and that all explanatory reasons 
for his retreat to Gibraltar were purposely omitted, 
particularly those passages wherein he mentioned, 
“ That the Intrepid and Defiance were so damaged in 
their masts, that they could not be properly secured at 


46 THE TRIAL OF ADMIRAL BYNG, [CIT. II. 

sea; and also that the squadron in general were very 
sickly, that many were killed and wounded, and that 
he had nowhere to put a third of their number, if he 
made an hospital even of one of the ships, which could 
not have been easily done at sea.” Another part was 
left out, where he said, “ I forward the resolutions of 
the council of war, which were unanimous, and I hope 
we shall find stores to refit us at Gibraltar, and if I 
have any reinforcement, will not lose a moment’s time 
in again seeking the enemy and once more giving them 
battle; though they have a great advantage in being 
clean ships, that go three feet to our one, and there¬ 
fore have the choice how they will engage us, or if 
they will do so at all, will never let us close upon them, 
as their sole view is to disable our ships, in which 
they have too well succeeded, although we obliged 
them to bear up.” That part was further expunged 
from his letter; where he expressed his anxiety to 
make sure of protecting Gibraltar, to which his in¬ 
structions particularly referred, as he found it impracti¬ 
cable either to succour or relieve Minorca. 

Acting upon the French admiral’s gasconading ac¬ 
count of the engagement, which was received in Eng¬ 
land before any intelligence arrived from Byng, Sir 
Edward Hawke and Bear-admiral Saunders were sent 
out to supersede him in command of the squadron. 
When the garbled letter of the English admiral was 
published, from which every passage was carefully ex¬ 
cluded that could justify his retreat to Gibraltar, the 
popular indignation was directed exclusively against 
him, instead of against those in the administration of 
naval affairs, who were called upon to have made ear- 


1757.] THE TRIAL OF ADMIRAL BYNG. 47 

lier and more adequate arrangements for tlie relief of 
Minorca, on whom that indignation would more justly 
have fallen, and for whose neglect and mismanagement 
the unfortunate admiral was doomed to be a sacrifice. 
Grenville, in a letter to Pitt, observes, “ Though the 
venality of this hour may be deemed sufficient to throw 
the whole blame upon Byng, sending an insufficient 
force, is a question, that in the judgment of every im¬ 
partial man now and hereafter, will require a better 
answer than I am afraid can be given to it. "Whatever 
faults Byng may have, I believe he was not reckoned 
backward in point of personal courage, which makes 
this affair the more extraordinary, and induces me to 
wait for his own account of it before I form an opi¬ 
nion.”* 

After several months close imprisonment, a court- 
martial assembled to try the admiral. That tribunal 
came to thirty-seven resolutions ; and though his 
bravery, coolness, and decision, during the action were 
testified to by those who were near him at the time, 
and acknowledged by his judges, who, in their last re¬ 
solution, unanimously declared, “ That he did not seem 
wanting in personal courage, and that his misconduct 
did not arise, they believed, from either cowardice or 
disaffection and though they were of opinion, “ that 
the ships a-head of the Ramifies (Byng’s own ship) 
crippled and thrown out of command by the enemy’s 
fire, were an impediment to his continuing to go down.” 
The accident which prevented his approach to the 
enemy, was immediately lost sight of, and in the very 


* Chatham Correspondence. Vol. i., p. 164. 


48 THE TRIAL OF ADMIRAL BYNG. [CH. II. 

teeth of that impediment, admitted as a fact in their 
twenty-fifth resolution, and over which the admiral 
could have had no control ; the circumstance which 
interfered with the execution of what should have been 
performed, was confounded with an intentional omis¬ 
sion of his duty; and it was resolved unanimously, that 
Byng fell under the 12th article of war—to wit,“ or shall 
not do his utmost to take or destroy every ship which 
it shall be his duty to engage,” though the court pre¬ 
viously decided that, owing to an accident, it was not 
possible for him to do his utmost. That article, there¬ 
fore, positively prescribing death, he was adjudged to be 
shot, and a warrant was immediately afterwards signed 
for his execution, notwithstanding a strong recommen¬ 
dation for mercy from the members of the court to his 
Majesty. 

When the admiral was sent for to receive his sen¬ 
tence, he declared to some of his friends present, that 
he expected to be reprimanded, and that he possibly 
might be cashiered ; “ Because,” he observed, “ there 
must have been several controverted points, the court 
has been shut up for a long time, and almost all the 
questions proposed by the court, have tended much 
more to pick out faults in my conduct, than to get at 
the true state of the circumstances; but I confess, I 
cannot conceive what they will fix upon.”* A member 
of the court shortly afterwards came out, and told one of 
his relations, that he had the court’s leave to inform 
him that they had found the admiral capitally guilty. 
On this being repeated to him, he exclaimed, “ Will 


* An Appeal to the People. 


1757 .] THE TRIAL OF ADMIRAL BYNG. 49 

nothing but my blood satisfy them ? Let them take 
it.” 

It was considered unlikely that such a sentence 
would ever be put into execution ; and when the pro¬ 
bability of a pardon was mentioned by his anxious 
friends, the admiral indignantly exclaimed, “ What will 
that signify to me ? What satisfaction can I receive 
from the liberty, to crawl a few years longer on earth, 
with the infamous load of a pardon at my back ? I 
despise life on such terms, and would rather have them 
take it.” 

To add to the series of untoward events connected 
with the lamentable fate of this officer, Captain Keppel, 
in behalf of himself and other members of the court-mar¬ 
tial, made application in parliament to be released from 
the oath of secresy which they had taken, “ as the sen¬ 
tence of death they had passed lay heavily on their con¬ 
sciences.” A bill was accordingly brought in to that 
effect, and carried through the House of Commons by 
a large majority ; but the House of Lords resolved, 
before the bill obtained their consent, to question the 
members of the court-martial, as to their knowledge of 
any matter which might show the sentence to be un¬ 
just, or procured by unlawful means. Some of the 
members of the court, in whose behalf Captain Kep¬ 
pel declared he made application, disclaimed having 
given him authority to interfere; and when he himself 
was questioned by one of the lords, whether he was of 
opinion that he had any particulars to reveal relative 
to the sentence passed upon Admiral Byng, which he 
judged necessary for his Majesty’s information, and 
which he thought likely to incline his Majesty to 


50 THE EXECUTION OF ADMIRAL BYNG. [ciI. II. 

mercy. He replied, that he could not answer without 
particularising the reason for his vote and opinion, and 
thus reconciled himself to the remorse which had 
urged him to seek the puerile formality of a parlia¬ 
mentary dispensation from his oath of secresy. These 
quibbles of a conscience upon which the fatal sentence 
was said to have lain heavily,—on so solemn an occa¬ 
sion, as that on which the life of a man was at stake, 
declared by that judge himself to have been neither 
guilty of cowardice nor disaffection,—seem to have been 
cruelly misplaced, and sealed the doom of Byng, by 
giving a fresh impulse to the popular clamour for his 
execution, when it was thus implied by the abandon¬ 
ment of those scruples in the minds of his judges, that 
the extenuating or exculpating circumstances to be 
revealed, when they were at liberty to speak out, had 
no existence. 

The City of London was foremost in the sanguinary 
outcry for the admiral’s execution, and the king is said 
to have pledged himself that he should suffer that 
summary punishment. 

Mr. Bigby says in a letter to the Duke of Bedford, 
“ I cannot forbear telling you, Lord Temple* pressed 
him (the king) some days ago, very strongly for a par¬ 
don for Mr. Byng. His Majesty persevered, and told 
his lordship very flatly, he thought him guilty of 
cowardice in the action, and therefore would not break 

his word they had forced him to give his people_to 

pardon no delinquents. His lordship walked up to hi s 
nose, and sans autre ceremonie , said, ‘ What shall you 


* Keeper of the Privy Seal. 


1757 .] THE EXECUTION OF ADMIRAL BYNG. 51 

think if lie dies courageously ?’ His Majesty stifled 
his anger and made no reply.”* 

Walpole observes, “ On the affair of Byng, Lord 
Temple had even gone so far as to sketch out some 
parallel between the monarch himself and the admiral, 
in which the advantage did not lie on the side of the 
battle in which his Majesty was engaged.”]* 

The sentence which had been respited till his Ma¬ 
jesty became acquainted with what the members of 
the court-martial had to say, was now ordered to be 
put immediately into execution, and a warrant was 
conveyed to Portsmouth by Admiral Boscawen, con¬ 
demning Byng to be shot to death on the forecastle of 
the Monarch. 

When the warrant was read to him by the marshal, 
the admiral observed, “ That the place appointed for 
his execution was an indignity to his birth, to his fa¬ 
mily, and to his rank in the service. I have not,” he 
said, “ been treated like an officer in any instance since 
I was disgraced, excepting in that of being ordered to 
be shot. It is true the place or manner is of no great 
importance to me, but I think living admirals should 
consult the dignity of the rank for their own sakes. I 
cannot plead a precedent of an admiral or a general 
officer in the army being shot : they make a precedent 
of me, such as admirals hereafter may feel the effects 
of.” On the application of his friends, Boscawen con¬ 
sented to change the place of execution to the quarter¬ 
deck. 

The forenoon preceding the day of his execution, the 

* Correspondence of John, Duke of Bedford, vol. ii., p. 238. 
t Walpole’s Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 198. 

E 2 


52 THE EXECUTION OF ADMIRAL BYNG. [cil. II. 

admiral heard prayers and received the sacrament with 
some of his relatives and friends, whom he took leave 
of in the evening, saying, “ I am to die to-morrow, and 
as my country requires my life, I am ready to resign it, 
though I do not as yet know what my crime is. I think 
my judges, injustice to posterity and to officers who come 
after us, should have explained my crime a little more 
fully, and pointed out the way to avoid falling into the 
same errors. As the sentence and resolutions now stand, 
I am persuaded no admiral will be wiser hereafter by 
them, or know better how to conduct himself on a like 
occasion.” 

On the following day, as the last hour of his life 
drew near, his friends sought to dissuade him from the 
resolution he had formed to die with his face unco¬ 
vered, and to look and receive his fate. He at length 
unwillingly yielded, and consented to have a bandage 
over his eyes, and to make a signal by dropping a 
handkerchief. 

When the hour arrived he handed a paper to the 
marshal containing his last thoughts. It was dated on 
board his Majesty’s ship Monarch, Portsmouth, March 
14th, 1757, and was as follows: 

a A few moments will now deliver me from the 
virulent persecution, and frustrate the further malice 
of my enemies, nor need I envy them a life subject to 
the sensations my injuries and the injustice done me 
must create. Persuaded I am that justice will be done 
my reputation hereafter. The manner and cause of 
raising the popular clamour and prejudice against me 
will be seen through ; I shall be considered (as I now 
perceive myself) a victim destined to divert the indig- 


53 


1757.] THE EXECUTION OE ADMIRAL BYNG. 

nation and resentment of an injured and deluded 
people from the proper objects. My enemies them- 
selves must now think me innocent. Happy for me at 
this, my last moment, that I know my own innocence, 
and am conscious that no part of my country’s misfor¬ 
tunes can be owing to me. I heartily wish the shed¬ 
ding of my blood may contribute to the happiness and 
service of my country, but I cannot resign my just 
claim to a faithful discharge of my duty, according to 
the best of my judgment, and to the utmost exertion 
of my ability, for his Majesty’s honour and my coun¬ 
try’s service. I am sorry my endeavours were not 
attended with more success, and that the armament 
under my command proved too weak to succeed in an 
expedition of such moment. Truth has prevailed 
over calumny and falsehood, and justice has wiped off 
the ignominious stain of my supposed disaffection and 
want of courage. My heart acquits me of these 
crimes, but who can be presumptuously sure of his 
own judgment? If my crime is an error of judgment, 
or differing in opinion from my judges, and if yet the 
error in judgment should be on their side, God forgive 
them as I do! and may the distress of their minds, and 
the uneasiness of their consciences, which in justice to 
me they have represented, be believed, and subside as 
my resentment has done! The Supreme Judge sees all 
hearts and all motives, and to Him I must submit the 
justice of my cause.” 

The cabin doors were then thrown open, and the 
admiral came out with a stately pace and a composed 
countenance, and having knelt down, tied a handker^ 
chief he held in his hand over his eyes. The marines 

J 


54 THE EXECUTION OF ADMIRAL BYNG. [CH. II. 

in the meantime advanced, and when his friends re¬ 
tired, presented their pieces; the first line kneeling with 
their bayonets about half a yard from his breast, the 
second line stooping and close to the first, and the third 
standing upright. The admiral remained on his knees 
something more than a minute, composed and in prayer, 
and then dropped the handkerchief, the signal agreed 
upon. The marines immediately fired ; one shot 
missed, four passed through different parts of his 
breast, and one went through his heart. He sunk 
down motionless on the deck, and a seaman, who in 
sorrow and in deep attention witnessed the scene, cried 
out with a kind of enthusiasm, “ There lies the bravest 
and best officer of the navy!”* 

If the judges of this ill-fated admiral had made a 
distinction between wilful negligence and negligence 
resulting from deficient judgment, having unanimously 
freed him from any imputation of cowardice or disaf¬ 
fection, they might, in voting him to have fallen under 
the twelfth article of war, which prescribed death, 
have given an equitable and humane construction to 
that article, as it could never have been intended to 
deprive any man of life in punishment for an oversight, 
and they might have voted that from incapacity he was 
unfit for any command in his Majesty’s navy, leaving it 
therefore in their own power to have sentenced him to 
whatever punishment they thought fit, and to have 
thereby avoided the everlasting stain which the murder 
of a brave and innocent man must leave on the memo¬ 
ries of all those who were parties either to his condem¬ 
nation or his execution. 


* Appeal to the People. 


55 


1757.] THE EXECUTION OF ADMIRAL BYNG. 

The cruel measures adopted against Byng were se¬ 
verely criticised and condemned by our gallant enemies. 
Voltaire, in satirising this national disgrace, remarked, 
that the English shot their admiral “ pour encourager 
les autres,” and the following generous testimony to 
his courage and conduct in the action with Galissoniere, 
from the French commander-in-chief, the Due de 
Richelieu, was transmitted to England. 

“ I am very sensibly concerned for Admiral Byng. 
I do assure you whatever I have seen of him does him 
honour. After having done all that man could reason¬ 
ably expect from him, he ought not to be censured for 
suffering a defeat. When two commanders contend 
for victory, though both are equally men of honour, 
yet one must necessarily be worsted, and there is no¬ 
thing against Byng but his being worsted, for his 
whole conduct is that of an able seaman, and is justly 
worthy of admiration. The strength of the two fleets 
was at least equal. The English had thirteen ships 
and we twelve, much better furnished and much 
cleaner. Fortune, that presides over all battles, espe¬ 
cially those that are fought at sea, was more favour¬ 
able to us than to our adversaries, by sending our 
balls into their ships with greater execution. I am 
persuaded, and it is the generally received opinion, that 
if the English had obstinately continued the engage¬ 
ment the whole fleet would have been destroyed. 

“ In short, there can be no higher act of injustice 
than what is now attempted against Admiral Byng, 
and all men of honour, and all gentlemen of the army, 
are particularly interested in the event.” 

Sir John Barrow, from whose life of Anson the 


56 THE EXECUTION OF ADMIRAL BYNG. [CH. II. 

above letter is extracted* implies a doubt of that 
document’s having ever reached the unfortunate ad¬ 
miral, though it found its way to Lord Anson,—then 
at the head of the Admiralty—whose illustrious name, 
it is to be deplored, should suffer the tarnish of any 
association with so sanguinary a procedure. 

Walpole, in his usual felicitous manner, thus sums up 
the events of the trial and execution : “ Mr. Byng was 
acquitted of cowardice in the fullest manner,—of cow¬ 
ardice by men who (to say the best of them) were too 
scrupulous to acquit him of a crime of which they 
thought him guilty, when they imagined it was their 
duty to condemn him for another crime of which they 
did not think him guilty. For this, unbiassed posterity 
will undoubtedly judge of these men. If there was 
any meaning in this strange procedure, it must have 
been this. They thought the admiral guilty of an 
error in judgment, as from an error in judgment he had 
not done all they supposed he might have done, and 
then believing that the article of war intended to in¬ 
flict death on all kinds of blame, they considered 
under what chapter of blame to rank Mr. Byng’s error. 
These honest men, as it was not cowardice nor disaffec¬ 
tion, agreed that a want of judgment was the nearest 
relative to neglect, and for that condemned him. This 
reasoning, I presume, is the best defence that could be 
made for these expounders of naval laws. If any 
thing could excuse men for condemning a person whom 
they thought innocent, it would be because the execu¬ 
tion of a criminal, when his judge recommends him to 
mercy, is almost unheard of. 

* Barrow’s Life of Anson, p. 276. 


1757.] THE EXECUTION OE ADMIRAL BYNG. 57 

“ The late ministers had sufficiently barricaded the 
gates of Mercy when they engaged the king in that 
promise to the city of London, and who ever will read 
the inhuman letters of their tool, Cleland, the secretary 
of the Admiralty, will be a competent judge of what 
mercy Mr. Byng had to expect after condemnation. 

“ If Keppel had no more to tell than that he had been 
drawn into the harsher measure, by the probability of 
the gentler preponderating at last, he had in truth, 
been much misunderstood. His regret had worn all the 
appearance of remorse. How he came to appear calm 
and so indifferent at the last moment in which either 
regret or remorse could hope to have any effect, I pre¬ 
tend not to decide. Whilst the admiral fell like a 
victim, he acted like a hero. He was the only man 
whom his enemies had no power to bend to their pur¬ 
poses.”* 


* Walpole’s Memoirs of George II. Vol. ii., p. 121. 


58 


CRUISE IN THE EAGLE. 


[CH. III. 


CHAPTER III. 

CRUISE IN THE EAGLE—EXPEDITION AGAINST QUEBEC 
—SERVICE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 

Palliser appointed to the Eagle of Sixty Guns—Cruises off Ushant in 
Company with the Medway—Falls in with a French Ship—Brings her 
to Action, and Captures her—Number of Killed and Wounded in the 
Action—The Admiralty express their Approbation of his gallant Con¬ 
duct—Cook, afterwards the celebrated Circumnavigator, a Seaman on 
board the Eagle—His good Conduct and Ability noticed by Captain Pal¬ 
liser—Interests himself in the Advancement of Cook—Palliser commis¬ 
sioned for the Shrewsbury, 74—Joins Lord Anson’s Fleet—Despatched 
with a Squadron to cruise off Brest—Captures a large Fleet of French 
Merchantmen under the Convoy of Two Frigates—Drives the Frigates 
on Shore—Expedition against Quebec—The Fleet under the Command 
of Saunders—The Army commanded by Wolfe—Palliser joins the 
Fleet—Obtains a Master’s Warrant for Cook—Naval Proceedings off 
Quebec—Cook Surveys and makes a Chart of the River St. Lawrence— 
The Siege of Quebec—The Death of Wolfe—The Capture of Quebec— 
Palliser takes Possession of the Lower Town—The Fleet returns to 
England—Palliser joins the Fleet in the Mediterranean under Saunders 
—Returns to England—Despatched with a Squadron to Newfoundland 
—Treaty of Peace with France, Spain, and Portugal. 

1757 to 1763. 

Soon after the return of Palliser to England after the 
unfortunate expedition of Braddock, he was commis¬ 
sioned for the Eagle, a ship of sixty guns, and on the 
commencement of hostilities against France, was or¬ 
dered to cruise off Ushant in company with another 



1757.] CAPTURE OF A FIFTY-GUN SHIP. 59 

sixty-gun ship, tlie Medway, Captain Propy. On the 
30th of May, at midnight, they fell in with, and gave 
chase to a large ship, which at daylight the next 
morning, showed French colours, and appeared, with 
her lower tier of guns run out, to be a ship of force, 
ready for battle. The Medway shortened sail to clear 
for action, but every preparation having been made on 
board the Eagle during the chase, she passed ahead 
with her men at quarters, and began the attack at a 
distance which caused every shot to take effect. 

The following letter to the secretary of the Admi¬ 
ralty, contains the captain’s own account of this en¬ 
gagement. 

“ Eagle, 

“ Plymouth Sound, 

“June 5th, 1757. 

“ Sir, 

“ Please to acquaint the Eight Honourable the 
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that on the 
30th ult. being in latitude 48° north, and longitude 2° 
west, with his Majesty’s ship the Eagle under my 
command, and in company with the Medway, gave 
chase between one and two in the morning to a ship 
standing to the eastward. As daylight came on, we 
discovered her to be a large ship under French colours, 
with all her sails set. About a quarter before four 
o’clock, having got up on her lee quarter, distant about 
two ships’ length, I attacked her, and after a close and 
very brisk fire on both sides, which lasted for forty mi¬ 
nutes, she struck to us, just as the Medway came up 
under her stern, and began to fire. 

“ Very soon after she struck, her mizen-mast fell 
over the side, and immediately after, her main and fore- 


60 CAPTURE OF A FIFTY-GUN SHIP. [cil. III. 

masts. She proves to be the Due d’Aquitaine, of about 
fifteen hundred tons, mounting fifty guns upon two 
decks, all French eighteen pounders, with a crew of 
four hundred and ninety-three men, commanded by 
M. d’Esqueton. She belongs to the French East India 
Company, and came last from Lisbon, where she 
landed a very rich cargo from the East Indies. She 
sailed from Lisbon equipped only for war, under or¬ 
ders to cruise for fifteen days ten or twelve leagues off 
the rock of Lisbon, in order to intercept one of our 
twenty-gun ships, on the point of sailing with a con¬ 
voy. During her cruise she took an English brig 
bound from Cadiz to Cork. 

“In the engagement I had only ten men killed and 
thirty-two wounded, seven of which are in a very 
dangerous way. The French had fifty killed, and 
a great many wounded, twenty-two of which are in a 
very dangerous state. Our masts, rigging, and sails 
are very much shattered, and I am afraid the whole 
must be shifted. 

“ This day I arrived with the prize in company with 
the Medway. Enclosed are the dimensions and the 
captain’s instructions, also the state and condition of his 
Majesty’s ship under my command. 

“ I have the honour to remain, 

“ Your most obedient servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser. 

“ P S. After communicating the captain of the 
prize’s instructions to their lordships, have the good¬ 
ness to return me the document, as I must deliver it 
with the other papers into the Admiralty-court. 


1757 .] CAPTURE OF A FIFTY-GUN SHIP. 61 

u Visible damage to his Majesty's ship the Eagle . 

“ Twenty shot-holes through her sides. Three lower- 
deck ports shot away. A knee shot through, and se¬ 
veral timber heads shot away. The bowsprit much 
wounded. The fore-mast, a shot through the middle 
of it, and wounded in another place. Two anchor- 
stocks shot away. Several shots and bars of iron 
sticking in the main and mizen-masts, and several 
bars of iron sticking in the sides and yards. The sprit- 
sail yard, two top-sail yards, main yard, main-topsail 
yard, and mizen yard, all wounded. The fore and 
main-topmasts shattered, fore-stay, five fore-mast 
shrouds, three back-stays, fore top-mast-stay, two mizen 
shrouds, top-sail-sheets, ties, halyards, and almost all 
the running rigging shot away. Sails rent almost all 
to rags.” 

The Board’s minute of the 8th of June directed, 
“ That Captain Palliser should be informed that their 
lordships were highly pleased with his success and 
gallant conduct on this occasion, and ordered the Eagle 
to be refitted at Plymouth.”* 

Captain Proby was very unjustly accused of back¬ 
wardness in this attack, but Palliser took frequent op¬ 
portunities of expressing his conviction, that to the 
circumstance of the Medway’s not being clear for 
action, he himself was indebted for the good fortune of 
being able to engage and make a prize of the French¬ 
man, before Captain Proby came up to take a part in 
the action, and that officer afterwards gave repeated 
proofs of bravery in his Majesty’s service. 

* Admiralty Records. 


02 CRUISE IN THE EAGLE. [CH. HI. 

Shortly after Captain Palliser had taken command 
of the Eagle, a young sailor, who had volunteered from 
a merchant-ship in the Thames to try his future for¬ 
tune in the royal navy, attracted his notice. A certain 
reserve and steadiness of demeanour, differing from 
the usual heedless bearing of the foremast-man, but 
united to the qualifications of an active and diligent 
able seaman, marked him as being naturally superior to 
the situation in which he was then found. Elis know¬ 
ledge of the scientific, as well as the practical parts of 
the navigation, was soon ascertained by his captain, 
and every encouragement which lay in his power was 
immediately afforded him. This seaman was James 
Cook, afterwards the enterprising circumnavigator, and 
celebrated Captain Cook. 

Hitherto, with the exception of a voyage or two- 
made in the capacity of mate, Cook had been but a 
common sailor, mostly employed in the coasting trade, 
and the acquirements he possessed were entirely the 
result of his own unaided industry. 

Before the Eagle went to sea, Captain Palliser re¬ 
ceived a letter from the member for Scarborough, Mr. 
Osbaldeston, intimating that several of his neighbours 
had solicited him to write in favour of a person named 
Cook, on board his ship ; they had been informed that 
the captain had taken notice of him, and they were de¬ 
sirous of ascertaining in what manner his promotion 
would be forwarded. Captain Palliser, in reply, and 
in justice to the ability which he had ascertained the 
young seaman to be possessed of, acquainted Mr. 
Osbaldeston that a master’s appointment might be pro¬ 
cured, which would raise Cook to a situation he was 


1757.] EXPEDITION AGAINST QUEBEC. 63 

qualified to fill with credit. This first acquaintance, 
originating under circumstances where disparity of 
rank raised such a barrier between them, resulted in 
the commander’s steady friendship for that distinguished 
seaman, whose fortunes were ever after anxiously pro¬ 
moted by him, Cook’s earliest and constant patron, and 
to whose discrimination of the merit that might per¬ 
haps otherwise have remained in obscurity, England is 
indebted for one of her boldest and most adventurous 
navigators, and one of the greatest maritime discoverers 
of any age. 

The approbation which the Lords of the Admiralty 
expressed on the capture of the Due d’Aquitaine, was 
followed up by the immediate appointment of Captain 
Palliser to the Shrewsbury, a new ship of seventy- 
four guns; and at the beginning of the ensuing year, he 
was ordered to join the Western squadron, under the 
command of Lord Anson, who detached him at the 
head of a small fleet, with orders to cruise off the en¬ 
trance of Brest, for the purposing of watching the 
French fleet in that harbour, and of giving the earliest 
intelligence of any general movement of the enemy. 
Whilst thus engaged, he fell in with a fleet of French 
merchantmen, under the convoy of two large frigates, 
which he drove on shore at the entrance of the Bay of 
d’Ouvernes, having pursued them till the shoalness of 
the water prevented his continuing the chase ; but the 
greatest part of the convoy fell into his hands, and 
were immediately conducted across the channel. 

The formidable expedition against Quebec, was now 
decided upon, and the gallant Wolfe, an officer who 
had not yet attained his thirty-fourth year, but whose 


64 EXPEDITION AGAINST QUEBEC. [CII. Ill, 

precocious talents and military genius afforded every 
promise of conducting it with, success, was selected for 
the command of the land forces ; Brigadier-generals 
Monckton, Townsend, and Lieutenant-colonel Murray 
were appointed to act under him ; and the troops con¬ 
sisted of ten battalions of infantry, three companies of 
provincial grenadiers, and some companies of artillery. 
The fleet, the most numerous and important part of 
the force destined for this service, consisting of twenty 
sail of the line, sixteen frigates, besides sloops and fire¬ 
ships,* was placed under the command of Admiral 
Saunders, with Rear-admirals Durrel and Holmes under 
him. To this fleet Captain Palliser was attached, and 
Admiral Saunders, with General Wolfe, sailed in 
February, 1759, for Louisbourg, Cape Breton, which 
was appointed the general rendezvous for the fleet and 
transports. On their arrival, however, they found that 
port blocked up with ice, and were forced to bear 
away for Halifax, whence they shortly departed again 
for Louisbourg, and on the 6th of June, made sail and 
anchored at the mouth of the River St. Lawrence. On 
the 26th of June, and on the 27th, the whole British 
army landed on the Island of St. Orleans, and encamped 
about a mile from shore. 

M. de Montcalm, on learning the destination of the 
British armament, took every measure to defeat so for¬ 
midable an enterprise. The plan of his operations 
was to act entirely on the defensive, and as the whole 
north shore of the river St. Lawrence had few spots 
were a landing could be easily effected, he lined the 


* Beatson’s Naval and Military Memoirs. 


EXPEDITION AGAINST QUEBEC. 


65 


1759 .] 


banks with troops, and the main body of the French 
army, amounting to 15,000 men, was encamped near 
Quebec. 

Before the fleet had sailed from England, a master’s 
warrant was obtained for Cook through the interest of 
Captain Palliser, when he received his appointment of 
master to the Mercury, one of the frigates engaged in the 
expedition; and on the further recommendation of his 
friend, who knew his competency for the task, Mr. Cook 
was selected by Admiral Saunders for the difficult and 
dangerous service of taking soundings in the channel 
of the Biver St. Lawrence, between the Island of Orleans 
and the north shore, and directly in front of the French 
fortified camp, in order that the admiral might bring 
his ships against the enemy’s batteries, and cover the 
attack on the main body of their forces, which the 
heroic Wolfe was to lead. 

The ability and resolution of Cook were demon¬ 
strated by the steady and successful manner in which 
he performed this hazardous and laborious service, 
which he was engaged in for many successive nights. 
On one occasion, when discovered by the enemy, a 
fleet of canoes were launched for the purpose of cutting 
him off, when he was forced to run his barge on shore, 
which was carried away a prize, and Cook narrowly 
escaped with his life, having jumped out of the bow as 
the Indians entered the boat at the stern. However, 
he furnished Admiral Saunders with an accurate chart 
of the river—an instance of his great aptness as a 
draftsman, for he had not learned the art of drawing, 
and probably had never used a pencil before. 

This chart Cook improved by an additional sur- 


F 


GG THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF QUEBEC. [cn. ITT. 

vey of the river below Quebec, which greatly faci¬ 
litated the operations of the fleet ; and when published 
with sailing directions for the whole River St. Lawrence, 
at once established the diligence and professional talent 
of its author. 

The naval proceedings, in connexion with the siege 
and conquest of Quebec, are fully and explicitly re¬ 
lated in the following despatch from Admiral Saun¬ 
ders. 

“ Ship Stirling Castle, 

“ Off Point Levi, River St. Lawrence, 

“ September 5, 1759. 

“ In my letter of June G, I acquainted you that I 
was then proceeding to the River St. Lawrence. On 
the 2Gth, I got up with the first division of the fleet 
and transports, as far as the middle of the Isle of Or¬ 
leans, where I immediately prepared to land the troops, 
which I did next morning. The same day the second 
and third divisions came up, and the troops from them 
were landed likewise. 

“ I got thus far without any loss or accident what¬ 
ever ; but directly after landing the troops, a very 
hard gale of wind came on, by which many anchors 
and small boats were lost, and much damage received 
among the transports, by their running on board of each 
other. The ships that lost most anchors, I supplied 
from the men-of-war, as far as I was able, and in other 
respects gave them the best assistance in my power. 

On the 28th, at midnight, the enemy sent down from 
Quebec seven fire-ships, and though our ships and 
transports were so numerous, and necessarily spread 
over a great part of the channel, we towed them all 
clear and aground, without receiving the least damage 


1759.] SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF QUEBEC. G7 

from them amongst our ships. The next night Gene¬ 
ral Monckton crossed the river, and landed with his 
brigade on the south shore, and took post at Point 
Levi, and General Wolfe took his on the westernmost 
point of the Isle of Orleans. 

“ On the 1st of July I moved up between the points 
of Orleans and Levi, and it being resolved to land on 
the north shore below the Falls of Montmorency, I 
placed on the 8th, his Majesty’s sloop the Porcupine 
and the Boscawen, armed vessels, in the channel be¬ 
tween Orleans and the shore, to cover the landing, 
which took place that night. On the 17th I ordered 
the captain of the Sutherland to proceed with the first 
fair wind and night-tide, above the town of Quebec, 
and take with him his Majesty’s ships Diana and Squir¬ 
rel, with the armed sloops and cats, armed and loaded 
with provisions. On the 18th, at night, they all got 
up except the Diana, and gave General Wolfe an op¬ 
portunity of reconnoitering above the town, those ships 
having carried some troops with them for that purpose. 
The Diana ran on shore upon the rocks off Point Levi, 
and received so much damage, that I have sent her to 
Boston with twenty-seven sail of American transports, 
where they are to be discharged, and the Diana having 
repaired her damage, is to proceed to England, taking 
with her the mast-ship, and what trade may be ready 
to accompany her. 

“ On the 28th, at midnight, the enemy sent a raft of 
fire-stages, amounting nearly to a hundred radeaux, 
which succeeded no better than their fire-ships. 

“ On the 31st, General Wolfe determined to land a 
number of troops above the Falls of Montmorency, in 

f 2 


68 SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF QUEBEC. [CII. III. 

order to attack the enemy’s lines, to cover which, I 
placed the Centurion in the channel between the Isle 
of Orleans and the falls, and ran on shore two cats at 
high water, which I had armed for the purpose, 
against two small batteries and two redoubts, situated 
where our troops were to land. About six in the 
evening they landed, but the general not thinking it 
proper to persevere in the attack, soon after part of 
them re-embarked, and the rest crossed the falls with 
General Wolfe. Upon which, to prevent the two cats 
from falling into the enemy’s hands, they being dry on 
shore, I gave orders to have the men taken out of 
them and to have them set on fire, which was accord¬ 
ingly done. 

u On the 5th of August, in the night, I sent 
twenty flat-boats up the river to the Sutherland, 
to embark 1260 of the troops, with Brigadier-ge¬ 
neral Murray, from a post we had taken on the 
south shore. I sent Admiral Holmes up to the Su¬ 
therland to act in concert with him, and to give all the 
assistance the ships and boats could afford. At the 
same time I directed Admiral Holmes to use his best 
endeavours to get at and destroy the enemy’s ships 
above the town, and for that purpose I ordered the 
Lowestoffe and Hunter sloops, with two armed sloops, 
and two cats, and provisions, to pass Quebec and join 
the Sutherland, but the wind blowing westerly, it was 
the 27th before they got up, which was the fourth 
they had made to gain their passage. 

“ On the 25th, at night, Admiral Holmes and Ge¬ 
neral Murray with part of the troops returned. They 
had met with and destroyed a magazine of the enemy’s 


1759.] SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF QUEBEC. 69 

clothing, some gunpowder, and other things, and Ad¬ 
miral Holmes had been ten or twelve leagues above the 
town, but found it impossible at this time to get fur¬ 
ther up. 

“General Wolfe having resolved to quit the camp 
at Montmorency, and to go above the town in hopes of 
getting between the enemy and their provisions (sup¬ 
posed to be in their ships there), and by that means 
force them to an action, I sent upon the 29th, the 
Sea-Horse and two armed sloops, with two cats laden 
with provisions to join the rest above Quebec, and 
having taken off all the artillery from the camp at 
Montmorency on the 3d inst., in the forenoon, the 
troops embarked from thence and landed at Point 
Levi. The 4th, at night, I sent up all the flat-bottomed 
boats, and this night a part of the troops will march 
up the south shore above the town, to be embarked 
in the ships and vessels there, and to-morrow night the 
rest will follow. Admiral Holmes is also gone up again 
to assist in their future operations, and to try if with 
the assistance of the troops, it is practicable to get at 
the enemy’s ships. 

“ As General Wolfe writes by this opportunity, he 
will give you an account of his part of the operations 
and his thoughts on what further may be done for his 
Majesty’s service. The enemy appear to be numerous 
and appear to be strong!} 7 posted; but let the event be 
what it will, we shall remain here as long as the season 
of the year will permit, in order to prevent their de¬ 
taching troops from hence against General Amherst; 
and I shall leave cruisers at the mouth of the river, to 


70 SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF QUEBEC. [CH. III. 

cut off any supplies that may be sent them, with strict 
orders to keep that station as long as possible. 

“ The town of Quebec is not habitable, being almost 
entirely burned and destroyed. 

“ I enclose you the present disposition of the ships 
under my command. Twenty of the victuallers that 
sailed from England with the Echo have arrived. 
One unloaded at Louisbourg, having received damage 
on her passage out, and another I have heard no¬ 
thing of. 

“ No ships of the enemy have come this way, that I 
have had any intelligence of since my arrival in the 
river, with the exception of one laden with flour and 
brandy, which was taken by the Lizard. 

“ Before Admiral Durrel got into the river, three 
frigates, and seventeen sail with provisions, stores, and 
recruits, got up, and are those we were so anxious to 
destroy. Yesterday, I received a letter from General 
Amherst, dated Camp, at Crown Point, August 7th, 
wherein he only desires I would send transports and 
convoy to New York, to carry 607 prisoners, taken at 
the surrender of Niagara. I should have written 
sooner from hence, but while my despatches were pre¬ 
paring, General Wolfe was taken very ill: he has been 
better since, but is still greatly out of order. I shall 
very soon send home the great ships, and 

“ I have the honour to be, &c., 

“ Charles Saunders.” 

Wolfe having recovered from the indisposition pro¬ 
duced in a great measure by the almost inactive sus- 


SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF QUEBEC. 


71 


1759 .] 


pense of nearly three months, passed in view of the 
cautious enemy without being able to bring on an en¬ 
gagement, resolved to force a battle, and on the even¬ 
ing of the 12th, all the troops were ordered on board 
their respective ships, and having drifted up during the 
night with the ebb-tide, were disembarked above Cape 
Diamond before daybreak. General Montcalm, in 
order to save the town, was now compelled to trust to 
the fortune of a general battle, and as day dawned, the 
French army was perceived in motion, advancing gal¬ 
lantly to the attack. 

Wolfe placed himself at the head of the provincial 
grenadiers, and in the first charge received his mortal 
wound, and was carried motionless to the rear of the 
British army, where the dying warrior, heedless of bo¬ 
dily anguish, or his approaching early doom, passed 
the few remaining moments of life, wrapt in anxious 
suspense, inquiring only how the tide of battle was set¬ 
ting At length, intelligence was brought him, that 
the enemy was utterly defeated, and retreating in every 
direction. When faintly exclaiming, “ I now die con¬ 
tent;” as the glad cry of victory sounded through the 
ranks, the hero expired in the arms of one of his sol¬ 
diers. 

General Monckton, at the head of the 47th regiment, 
was shot through the body, and the French command¬ 
er-in-chief was also carried off the field mortally 
wounded. 

Quebec thus abandoned by the retreat of the French, 
fell into the hands of our victorious army. Lieute¬ 
nant-colonel Murray, at the head of three companies of 
grenadiers, and a detachment ol artillery, marched in 


72 SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF QUEBEC. [CH. III. 

and took possession of the upper town, and at the same 
time Captain Palliser, leading a body of seamen, en¬ 
tered the lower town and planted the British standard 
on the enemy’s batteries. 

When the intelligence of the success of this formid¬ 
able expedition, which extinguished the power of 
France in America, was received in England, addresses 
were presented to his Majesty from the Universities, 
and the principal cities and corporations of the king¬ 
dom, congratulating his Majesty on the signal victory 
gained by his forces in America, and a royal procla¬ 
mation was issued, appointing a day of solemn thanks¬ 
giving to Almighty God throughout the British domi¬ 
nions. The colonists also shared in the joy of this 
triumph, and Franklin, in the following paragraph of 
a letter written to Lord Kimes immediately after that 
event, may be thought to convey their feelings in ge¬ 
neral on the occasion. 

“No one,” he observes, “ can more sincerely rejoice 
than I do, on the reduction of Canada; and this not 
merely as I am a colonist, but as I am a Briton. I 
have long been of opinion that the foundations of the 
future grandeur and stability of the British empire are 
in America: and though like other foundations they 
are low and little seen, they are nevertheless broad and 
strong enough to support the greatest political struc¬ 
ture human wisdom ever yet erected. I am, therefore, 
by no means for restoring Canada. If we keep it, all 
the country from St. Lawrence to Mississippi, will in 
another century be filled with British people; Britain 
herself will become vastly more populous, by the im¬ 
mense increase of her commerce; the Atlantic sea will 


1759.] SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF QUEBEC. 75 

be covered with your trading ships; and your naval 
powers, thence continually increasing, will extend your 
influence round the whole globe, and over the world. 
If the French remain in Canada, they will continually 
harass our colonies by the Indians, and impede if not 
prevent their growth: your progress to greatness will 
at best be slow, and give room for many accidents, that 
may for ever prevent it.” 

The public rejoicings for the victorious issue of our 
arms on the opposite side of the Atlantic had not sub¬ 
sided, when the gallant action of our fleet, under the 
command of Admiral Hawke, off Ushant, with the 
French fleet under M. Conflans, was proclaimed, an¬ 
nouncing that four of the enemy’s largest ships were 
totally destroyed, one taken, and the remainder dis¬ 
persed in a shattered, disabled condition. 

It was whilst Hawke was engaged in this brilliant 
and successful encounter, that Admiral Saunders, 
having returned from America, heard as he anchored 
in Plymouth Sound, that the French commander had 
embraced the opportunity of the English admiral’s 
being driven off the French coast by the violence of 
the weather, to make sail from Brest. The wind fa- 
vouredThe patriotism of the conqueror of Quebec, and 
he at once made sail to the assistance of Hawke, with¬ 
out waiting even to land his glory, or heeding the 
formality of an order, when the service of his country 
might be benefited by the omission; but the victory 
was achieved before he could reach the scene of action 
and share in the honours of the day; for, as Walpole 
observes, “ Such too was the age that England did not 
require the addition of a Saunders.” 


74 SERVICE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. [dl. III. 

The signal success of Admiral Boscawen in his 
action with the French, under De la Clue, off Gibral¬ 
tar, in August, and the defeat of their fleet under Con- 
flans, off Ushant, so effectually humbled the maritime 
power of that nation at the close of this year, that 
the fleets of England rode triumphant round the whole 
globe, and the navy of France was confined in every 
direction within the limits of her own ports. 

Captain Palliser, who had returned to England with 
Admiral Saunders, after the surrender of Quebec, was 
now attached to a squadron despatched under the com¬ 
mand of that distinguished officer to cruize in the Me¬ 
diterranean, and prevent the sailing of a fleet from 
Toulon, which the French were equipping there to 
send up the Levant. 

As soon as the admiral passed the Straits of Gibral¬ 
tar, the Vestal and Pallas frigates were ordered from 
the fleet, the former to sail along the Spanish shore ? 
and the latter along the coast of Barbary, in order to 
reconnoitre the different bays and harbours, whilst the 
main body steered a mid-sea course towards Minorca, 
off which island they were joined again by the two 
frigates, without their being enabled to obtain any 
intelligence of the enemy. Admiral Saunders now 
made sail for Toulon, and by the stratagem of disguis¬ 
ing one of the frigates so as to resemble a merchantman, 
and sending her in advance, out of sight of the fleet, 
they succeeded in decoying a pilot vessel alongside, 
from the crew of which it was ascertained that a 
French squadron, consisting of some sixty-four gun 
ships, two ships of fifty guns, and two large frigates, 


75 


17G1-] SERVICE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 

had sailed from the port of Toulon, conveying an am¬ 
bassador from France to counteract the measures which 
the envoy of the King of Prussia was then concerting 
at Constantinople, for the formation of an alliance be¬ 
tween that monarch and the Grand Sultan. This in¬ 
formation induced the admiral to detach a squadron 
under the command of Captain Palliser in search of 
them: this squadron comprised the following ships : 


GUNS. 

Shrewsbury 74 

Somerset 74 

Dunkirk 60 

Preston 50 


FRIGATES. 

Shannon. 

Pallas. 

Vestal. 

Pennington. 


Palliser had not long left the fleet when he de¬ 
scried the enemy’s squadron, to which he instantly 
gave chase; but as it consisted of clean ships, just from 
port, they shortly ran him out of sight, and took refuge 
in the Turkish harbours, where they put themselves 
under the protection of the forts of the Grand Seigneur; 
part sought shelter in the island of Candia, and part in 
the Morea, where Palliser blockaded them for several 
months, and prevented their giving any annoyance 
to our extensive trade in the Mediterranean. In the 
meantime to humble the enemy, who shunned a meeting 
with him, he sent a public message to the English am¬ 
bassador at the Porte, requesting him to have it pro¬ 
mulgated, that nothing but respect for the neutrality of 
the Grand Seigneur’s dominions prevented his entering 
the ports where the French took refuge, and bringing 
them to action. This challenge had not the effect of 
inducing the enemy to abandon the protection which 
the batteries of the Turkish sovereign afforded them, 


76 


WAR WITH SPAIN. 


[CII. III. 

and the foulness* of Palliser’s ships at length obliged 
him to quit his station, and repair to Gibraltar, for the 
purpose of cleaning and refitting, when the French 
squadron embraced the opportunity of his disappear¬ 
ance, and returned back to Toulon. 

Palliser remained on his station until the close of the 
ensuing year, when he was ordered to return to Eng¬ 
land. 

About this period arrangements were made for the 
assembling of a Congress in Augsburg, a city of 
Suabia in Germany, where plans for a termination 
of hostilities and the establishment of a general peace 
were to be discussed. Ambassadors from the courts of 
Great Britain, France, and Austria were appointed, and 
preparations were already made for their residence in 
that city pending the discussions. Austria even had 
made a reduction in her army to the amount of 20,000 
men and 1500 officers;f but these promising advances 
towards a speedy cessation of the war which for five 
successive years had devastated Europe, led to no satis¬ 
factory result. France objected to the terms of the 
proposed treaty, and concluded a secret alliance with 
the court of Spain, generally termed the Family com¬ 
pact. 

Intelligence of this alliance was not proclaimed be¬ 
fore the latter end of the year, and in January follow¬ 
ing, war was formally declared by England against her 
new enemy. Pitt foresaw the confederacy which the 

* Copper sheathing for the bottoms of ships was not then in use, and 
the adhesion, to a great extent, of different marine substances, after being 
a short time at sea or in harbour without cleaning, retarded their speed. 

j- Gescbichte des Siebenjahrigen Krieges. Durch J. W. Von Archen- 
holtz Ch. xi. 


WAR WITH SPAIN. 


77 


1762.] 

courts of Versailles and Madrid had just entered into, 
and had urged upon his colleagues the necessity of an¬ 
ticipating the hostilities contemplated by these joint 
powers ; but blind to the arguments with which that 
vigorous and enlightened statesman supported the adop¬ 
tion of immediate action, they set themselves against 
the measures they were soon after compelled to resort 
to, and Pitt—unwilling to bear the responsibility of 
proceedings which he was not permitted to control— 
with the universal regret of the nation, abandoned the 
helm of state, at the moment that his comprehensive 
intellect was most needed for its guidance. 

The British ministry having at length resolved to 
commence hostilities against Spain, it was determined 
as in the last war, to attack her rich foreign settlements. 
An expedition was accordingly fitted out for the Spanish 
Main, and the city of Havanna, in the Island of 
Cuba, the most important and opident colony of 
Spain, w r here the precious metals from the Mexican 
mines were stored previous to their transmission to 
Europe, was selected as the first field of operation for 
a hostile British armament. 

Sir George Pocock, an early friend of Palliser’s, and 
under whom he had served in the West Indies, was 
appointed to the command of a formidable fleet of 
fifty-four ships of war, and one hundred and sixty 
transports. This officer had chiefly served in the East, 
and had peculiarly distinguished himself at the attack 
upon Chandernagore, where he was severely wounded. 
General the Earl of Albemarle was selected for the 
chief command of the land forces, destined for this 
service, which amounted to 16,000 men, the greater 


78 


WAR WITH SPAIN. 


[CII. III. 

part consisting of troops sent to Martmico, under Ge¬ 
neral Monckton, and a force from America, chiefly 
comprising provincials. 

This expedition, although crowned with success,* 
was attended with a fearful sacrifice of human life, and 
the valuable conquest of Havanna cost England up¬ 
wards of 10,000 of the flower of her gallant seamen 
and soldiers, the greater part of whom were carried 
off by the pestilential effects of that fatal climate, and 
those who survived, returned to their country, the vic¬ 
tims of broken and decayed constitutions. 

Whilst our naval and military forces were thus en¬ 
gaged in the New World, Spain marched an army into 
Portugal : a nation, though once warlike and power¬ 
ful, now incapable of defending herself from such 
an attack without the assistance of the auxiliary 
troops, which, as her ally, we were called upon to fur¬ 
nish. 

By this last invasion, Europe became the scene of a 
ruthless war from one extremity to the other. Every 
nation, from the Carpathian Mountains to the Atlantic 
Ocean, were now in arms ; but the space within those 
boundaries was too narrow for their warlike conflicts, 
and the fearful devastation of human life which marked 
this eventful period of history, was extended to Ame¬ 
rica, the East and West Indies, the Coast of Africa, 
and even to the remote Philippine Islands. The death, 
however, of one frail mortal was destined to alter the 


* The English acquired by the expedition to Havanna, upwards 
of three millions sterling. The share of prize money which fell to the 
commanders-in-chief, amounted, to 1 * 22 , 700 /. each. 


79 


1762 .] STATE OF EUROPE. 

whole aspect of the political horizon of Europe. Eliza¬ 
beth, Empress of Eussia, was summoned to a change 
the most striking and awful within the range of mor¬ 
tality—from the throne of despotism to the grave— 
and the personal antipathy to the King of Prussia, 
which led the Eussian Empress into an alliance with 
Austria and France, in order to accomplish his over¬ 
throw, found no sympathy in the breast of her succes¬ 
sor, Peter III., whose first act on ascending the throne, 
was to assure Frederick of his friendship and assistance. 
Peace with Prussia was immediately declared; a treaty 
of alliance between that kingdom and Eussia speedily 
followed, and some confidential letters having passed 
between the sovereigns, Peter formed an enthusiastic 
friendship for his new ally, and openly avowed his 
determination to afford him succour, should he fail in 
inducing the courts of Vienna and Versailles to con¬ 
clude a peace with Frederick, and to restore the con¬ 
quests made by the allied forces in the course of the war. 
Austria, however, would listen only to terms based 
upon conditions dictated by herself, and of a nature so 
harsh and humbling to Prussia, that they were at once 
rejected by the two allied monarchs, and the general in 
command of the Eussian forces in Germany, was or¬ 
dered to march with his army, amounting to 20,000 
men into the Prussian camp. 

This decisive step, taken by the Eussian Emperor 
without any intimation being given to his former 
allies, was a startling event to the Empress Theresa 
of Austria, who had already disbanded upwards of 
20,000 of her troops, convinced that the next cam- 


80 EXPEDITION TO NEWFOUNDLAND. [CH. III. 

paign would terminate the career of the Prussian 
monarch. 

The comparatively defenceless state in which the 
Island of Newfoundland was left by the withdrawal of 
our ships and troops from the American coast, to co¬ 
operate with those employed in hostilities against the 
Spanish settlements, induced France, whilst we were 
thus engaged, to equip with the greatest secresy a small 
squadron, consisting of six ships of war, having on 
board 1500 men, destined to make a descent on that 
island. 

This little armament slipped out of Brest in a thick 
fog, and information of the circumstance being obtained 
in England soon after their departure, Sir Edward 
Hawke was despatched in pursuit, but the enemy suc¬ 
ceeded in getting clear out to sea. 

On the 1 ltli of May, the French squadron came in 
sight of a British convoy of three rich fleets, the cap¬ 
ture of which would have been of much greater im¬ 
portance to France, and much more injurious to the 
commercial interests of England than the taking of St. 

O O 

John’s, Newfoundland. 

These fleets consisted of the trade for North Ame¬ 
rica, escorted by the Gosport ; the trade for the West 
Indies, escorted by the Danae, and a squadron of the 
East India Company’s ships, which Captain Rowley, 
of the Superb, seventy-four, had to escort to the west¬ 
ward. 

As soon as the enemy came in sight of our fleets, 
they gave chase, and Captain Rowley having issued 
orders for the different ships to continue their course, 


81 


1762.] EXPEDITION TO NEWFOUNDLAND. 

formed a rear-guard with the vessels of war for their 
protection. The French commander, however, as 
soon as he reconnoitered the English squadron, and 
perceived the preparations made by Captain Rowley 
for an attack, hauled his wind, and went off. Chase 
was instantly given by the three English ships, but 
the French exhibited their usual superiority in speed, 
and Captain Rowley was compelled to give up the 
pursuit, and to proceed with his consorts to the care of 
their convoy. 

Captain Palliser, who had returned from the Medi¬ 
terranean, when in the previous year a cessation of 
hostilities between England and France was pending, 
now received orders to take the command of a squad¬ 
ron, and proceed to Newfoundland, which island the 
French had surprised and taken. Lord Colville com¬ 
manded the naval force on that station, and Palliser 
was directed to co-operate with him and Colonel Am¬ 
herst, who had already commenced operations for the 
recapture of the town of St. John’s. 

The squadron engaged in this service consisted of 
the following ships : 

Shrewsbury 74 guns . . Commodore Palliser. 

Superb 74 „ . . Captain Rowley. 

Bedford 54 „ . . Captain Martin. 

Minerva 34 „ . . Captain Peyton. 

They set sail from England in August, and two days 
before their arrival at Newfoundland, Colonel Amherst 
had surprised and entered the town at the same time 
that the French naval commander, M. D. Fernay, stole 


G 


82 TEACE WITH FRANCE AND SPAIN. [ciT. III. 

out of the harbour under cover of one of those thick 
fogs so prevalent on that coast. When it cleared up, 
the enemy’s ships were seen and pursued by Lord Col¬ 
ville, but were fortunate enough to effect their escape, 
though they must have passed close to the squad¬ 
ron, under Commodore Palliser, then standing in for 
the land. 

The French garrison surrendered themselves pri¬ 
soners of war to Colonel Amherst, and the French 
commodore decamped in such haste, that he left his 
anchors behind him, and even turned the boats adrift 
which had towed him out of the harbour.* 

Hostilities against France having now terminated, and 
the capture of Havannah, a punishment so well merited 
by the Spaniards for the unjust war they engaged in, 
having established the maritime superiority of England, 
both in the Old and the New World, overtures of peace 
were made by France and Spain with every appear¬ 
ance of sincerity, and a definitive treaty was concluded 
at Fontainebleau, February 10, 1763, between Great 
Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal, which confirmed 
to Great Britain, the Islands of Granada, St. Vincent, 
Dominico, and Tobago, in the West Indies, as well 
as the extensive provinces of Canada, East and West 
Florida, and part of Louisiana in North America. 

Austria, forsaken by her allies, and left to contend 
single-handed against the invincible Prussians, conclude a 
treaty of peace about the same time with Frederick, which 
did not leave a single captured village even, unrestored 
to him, and at the end of the sanguinary Seven Years’ 
War—during which more than a million of human 

* Beat son’s Naval Memoirs. Vol. ii., p. 576 . 



1763.] PEACE WITH FRANCE AND SPAIN. 83 

beings were sacrificed to the ambition, revenge, and 
personal hatred of a few—the powerful monarchs who 
covered the whole continent of Europe with their 
bands of armed warriors, were compelled to repose,— 
their resources exhausted, and their glory diminished, 
—at the same point from which they started in their 
schemes of conquest and devastation. 



84 


SERVICE IN NEWFOUNDLAND, 


[CII. IV. 


CHAPTER IV. 

GOVERNOR OF NEWFOUNDLAND-COMPTROLLER OF THE 

NAVY—A LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY. 

PalJiser appointed Governor of Newfoundland, and Naval Commander-in- 
chief on that Station—Appoints Cook Marine Surveyor—Disputes with 
the French—Correspondence with the Admiralty—Return from New¬ 
foundland—Appointed Comptroller of the Navy—Projected Voyage of 
Discovery to the South Seas—Recommends the Appointment of Cook 
to the Command of the Enterprise—The Discoveries in the Fifteenth 
and Sixteenth Centuries by Columbus, Vasquez de Gama, and Magellan 
—Voyages of Byron, Wallis, and Cateret—Cook’s First Voyage round 
the World—Cook’s Second Voyage in search of a Southern Continent— 
Palliser selects the Ships for this Enterprise—Voyages of Hudson, Baffin, 
and Davis, in search of a North-west Passage to India—Expedition 
of the Honourable Captain Phipps towards the North Pole — Pal¬ 
liser created a Baronet—Promoted to the Rank of Rear-admiral—Ap¬ 
pointed Lieutenant-general of Marines, and a Lord of the Admiralty— 
Cook’s Third Voyage—His Instructions drawn up by Sir Hugh Palliser 
—Murder of Cook at the Sandwich Islands—A Monument erected to 
his Memory by his early Friend and Patron, Sir Hugh Palliser. 

1764 to 1776. 

After the establishment of peace, complaints were 
received in England of frequent encroachments made 
by the French on our fisheries in Newfoundland. This 
island was discovered by Sebastian Cabbot in the year 
1477, a few years after Columbus had discovered the 


85 


1764.] AS GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 

New World, and as Cabbot’s expedition was promoted 
by Henry VII., that monarch laid claim to the sove¬ 
reignty of the island, and settlements were effected 
there in the next reign. 

The English had been in possession of Newfound¬ 
land nearly a century before the French attempted to 
establish themselves there; nevertheless, the right to 
the island became a constant subject of dispute between 
France and England. In one of our wars with that 
nation, Placentia and some other settlements were 
taken by the French, but the property of the country 
was entirely vested in England by the treaty of 
Utrecht, reserving to the French the liberty of taking 
fish on the banks and drying them on the shore. This 
enormous bank is about six hundred miles in length, 
and three hundred in breadth, and so many advantages 
accrue to Great Britain and her colonies from the ex¬ 
tensive fishery it affords, in which nearly 3000 small 
craft are engaged, giving employment to 30,000 hands, 
that Newfoundland is deservedly considered a most 
important possession, and particularly valuable in a 
commercial point of view. 

In order to prevent the encroachments complained 
of, and to extend the necessary protection to so large 
a branch of our national industry, Commodore Palliser 
was appointed Governor of Newfoundland and Labra¬ 
dor, and also commander-in-chief of the station, with 
a squadron under his command, consisting of the 
Guernsey, of fifty guns, and several frigates, which 
sailed from England in the beginning of the year. 
The island was subject also to frequent predatory 
visits from the Esquimaux Indians, a people chiefly 


86 SERVICE IN NEWFOUNDLAND, [CH. IV. 

inhabiting the coast of Labrador, along the borders oi 
Hudson’s Bay, and remarkable for their extraordinary 
covetousness, their total disregard of the rights of pro¬ 
perty, and whose principal employment is hunting and 
fishing. 

On Commodore Palliser’s arrival, he found a French 
commodore at the island, with a squadron of similar 
force to his own, who had taken upon himself the ad¬ 
justment of the disputes existing between the English 
and French employed in the fisheries. 

This interference was at once resisted by Commodore 
Palliser, who, as the sovereignty of the island was 
vested in the crown of Great Britain, would not sanc¬ 
tion the exercise of any foreign authority within his 
government, and therefore required that the French 
commander should abandon every attempt at jurisdic¬ 
tion on the coast, as it was his duty alone to render 
strict justice to the rights of both nations. 

He also put an immediate stop to the erection of 
fortifications, which the French had commenced on the 
Island of St. Pierre, as the terms of the last peace, 
though ceding that island to them for the purpose of 
drying and curing their fish, prohibited its being occu¬ 
pied by an armed force. 

These decisive measures produced urgent complaints 
against Palliser, which were put forward by the French 
government, through their ambassador in London. The 
British ministry, however, supported the acts of their 
governor, and encouraged him to maintain strictly the 
measures he had adopted to keep the French within 
the bounds prescribed by former treaties. 

Amongst other privileges claimed by them, was that 


1764.] AS GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 87 

of fishing along the west coast of Newfoundland, in 
confirmation of which, it was asserted that Cape Ray 
was Point Riche, and that the names of those points 
were altered on the English charts, for the purpose of 
curtailing the French boundaries ; and to verify this 
assertion, the French ambassador produced a chart, on 
which they were designated in accordance with the 
right contended for. 

Commodore Palliser immediately discovered that the 
alleged alteration in the English charts, was a device to 
which they themselves had resorted, and he was ena¬ 
bled to prove that the English charts had been pub¬ 
lished before Point Riche was made a boundary mark. 
He also happened to have in his possession a French 
chart, on which the respective points were named as 
laid down by the English ; and as the chart produced 
by the French ambassador was evidently taken from 
the same plate, the names of points in question being 
inserted to justify their encroachments, the fraud was 
clearly established to have emanated from themselves; 
and although the French ambassador admitted that he 
was deceived and in error, disputes about limits and 
privileges continued till the French were altogether 
dispossessed, in 1793. of every settlement on the 
coast. 

The responsibilities devolving on Palliser in this 
government, which required on his part both the 
enaction and administration of laws to maintain order 
amongst the mixed classes frequenting the coasts of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, may be inferred from 
the following letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty: 


88 


SERVICE IN NEWFOUNDLAND, 


[CII. IV. 


To Philip Stephens , Esq., Admiralty. 

“Ship Guernsey, 

“ October 18, 1766. 

“ Sir, 

u Please to acquaint the Right Honourable the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the service on 
these stations being now over for this season, I have 
ordered his Majesty ship, the Liverpool, with the convoy, 
to Cadiz; the Pearl to Lisbon; and the Hope schooner 
to join Commodore Hood at Halifax, 

“ Be pleased also to inform their lordships, that I 
find the two sloops, the Stag and Zephyr, too small for 
this service, as they will not stow provisions enough to 
be employed on such disturbed stations, where no sup¬ 
plies are to be got. 

“ The rest of the ships are barely sufficient to per¬ 
form the several services to be attended to. First, to 
keep the French within the limits prescribed by the 
treaties, and thereby present their rivalling us in our 
valuable fish trade. Secondly, to prevent this country 
becoming a mart for all kinds of clandestine trade be¬ 
tween the French and all our colonies. Thirdly, to 
enforce the fishery laws, and preserve peace and some 
degree of order amongst the fisheries, especially amongst 
the mixed multitudes now resorting to the new northern 
banks about the straits of Belle Isle, composed of 
about 5000 of the very scum of the most disorderly 
people from the different colonies, disturbing each 
other, and conspiring to ruin and exclude all British 
adventurers from that new and valuable fishery ; be- 


1766.] AS GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER-IN-CIIIEF. 89 

sides a number of wild, ungovernable people from the 
interior of Newfoundland, who are in every respect as 
savage and as barbarous as the most savage tribes of 
the American continent. 

“ The whole number of vessels and men employed 
in these parts this year, amounts to about 3500 vessels, 
and 15,000 men, one thousand of which number of 
vessels are French, with nearly 8000 men employed on 
board them, which adds to the confusion, and this upon a 
coast inhabited by the most savage people in the world 
—the Esquimaux. All these circumstances have re¬ 
quired the whole number of king’s ships on the sta¬ 
tion, and my utmost endeavours to preserve peace and 
prevent the greatest mischief and bloodshed. 

u I send this by the Merlin, which has on board 
eighteen Frenchmen belonging to a French ship, seized 
for clandestine trade, which please to inform their lord- 
ships of, that they may, if they think fit, order one of 
the cutters to land them on the coast of France.* 

“ I remain, Sir, 

“ Your obedient servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 

The stringent measures put in force by the go¬ 
vernor, to repress every encroachment of the French 
beyond the prescribed limits, rendered him peculiarly 
obnoxious to them, and every circumstance was laid 
hold of that could tend to embarrass him. A quarrel 
between some of the English coast-guard and a small 
body of Frenchmen, was magnified into a case of un- 


* Admiralty Records 


00 SERVICE IN NEWFOUNDLAND, [CIL IV. 

warrantable ill-treatment, and a memorial of complaint 
to that effect was presented to government by the 
French ambassador. 

The following is the governor’s explanation of the 
alleged outrage : 

To Philip Stephens , Esq., Admiralty. 

“ Guernsey, 

“ January 3, 17G8. 

“ Sir, 

“ In answer to your letter of the 7th ultimo, inclos¬ 
ing a copy of a French memorial, complaining of the 
ill-treatment which two Frenchmen, therein named, 
pretend to have met with from Englishmen in New¬ 
foundland, on the 11th of June last, transmitted by 
the Earl of Shelburne to the Lords Commissioners of 
the Admiralty, and signifying their lordships’ directions 
that I should make a report to them of the state of the 
facts mentioned in the same memorial, for the king’s 
information. 

“ Be pleased to inform their lordships, that no report 
of any transaction had been made to me, to which I 
could apply this case. I therefore deferred answering 
it till I had made the strictest inquiry to discover what 
has given rise to this imperfect story, which I find is 
simply this : 

Complaints having been made by our fishermen on 
the coast of Newfoundland, in the neighbourhood of 
St. Pierre’s, that the French from that island came over 
to the coast in breeding season, to take, destroy, and 
drive away the sea-fowls which bred on the little islands 
and rocks along the coast, and upon which our fishers 


1768.]] AS governor and commander-in-chief. 91 

entirely depend for bait in the early season before the 
bait fish come in. In order to prevent these and other 
mischiefs and encroachments, I stationed some cruisers 
at St. Pierre’s, the officer in command of one of which, it 
seems, put men on shore upon Green Island, to keep 
the French from thence, whilst he went to drive them 
off from other places. In his absence, some French¬ 
men landed there; the guards would not suffer them to 
kill the birds, and told them they had no right to do 
so, upon which a quarrel ensued; the Englishmen en¬ 
deavoured to carry the Frenchmen as offenders to their 
officer, and the Frenchmen got the upper hand ; but 
reflecting on the unjustifiable act they had been guilty 
of, in landing on the king’s territories, and forcibly car. 
rying his subjects away, they brought them back again, 
and had the address to prevail on the men never to 
make a report of this affair to me. Some time after 
this happened, I received a letter from the Governor of 
St. Pierre’s, to which he says, ‘ Les officiers qui servent 
sous vos ordres dans cette partie, ce sont parfaitment 
comportes depuis votre depart, ils n’ont rien entrepis 
d’opposer a la conduite, que nous avons a tenir recipro- 
quement.’ So that I conclude this story cannot have 
been reported to the Court of France by him, though 
he is ready enough to complain, but has been framed 
by some other person disposed to raise disputes ; and 
why the French court should make such a story the 
foundation for a memorial, and seriously require the 
king’s subjects to be punished, whilst their own state¬ 
ment of the matter shows that their people are the ag¬ 
gressors, I am at a loss to account for ; but I hope it 
may serve to show, that however industrious the Court 


92 SERVICE IN NEWFOUNDLAND, [CH. IV. 

of France may be in seeking for matters to create dis¬ 
putes between the two nations, it is plain that they can 
find no real cause for complaints.* 

“ I remain, Sir, 

“ Your most obedient Servant, 

“Hugh Palliser.” 

The conduct of Commodore Palliser met so en¬ 
tirely with the approbation of his Majesty, that each 
successive year of his government was marked by some 
reward. When he first embarked on this service, he 
had a broad pennant, but no other pay than that of the 
Captain of a fifty-gun ship. The second year ten 
shillings a day was allowed him for the broad pen¬ 
nant ; the third he was allowed a captain under him, 
and received the pay of a rear-admiral, with the addi¬ 
tional allowance of table-money, and the two years 
he was retained in this office beyond the usual period, 
500/. a year was allowed him as governor, in addition 
to his naval pay. Cliarnock observes, “ That the 
wise and salutary laws which he caused to be enacted 
for the benefit of his country, and the comfort and 
happiness of the poor fishermen in Newfoundland 
during his government of that island, are proofs of 
a sound mind, and a humane and benevolent dispo¬ 
sition.”')' 

One of the duties which, by the orders of the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty devolved on the com¬ 
modore when appointed to the naval command on this 
station, was to have an accurate survey executed of 


* Admiralty Records. 


t Cliarnock in voce Palliser. 


1768.] AS GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 93 

the whole shores of Newfoundland and Labrador, as 
the charts of those parts of the North American coast 
were very imperfect, and it was highly necessary for 
the extensive trade carried on by the English in that 
part of the world, that others more correct should be 
published. The diligence and ability which Mr. Cook 
displayed in accomplishing a survey of the River St. 
Lawrence, under the guidance of his early friend Cap¬ 
tain Palliser, marked him at once as being eminently 
suited for the performance of this scientific and import¬ 
ant service. 

After the taking of Quebec, Cook was appointed 
master of the Northumberland, commanded by Lord 
Colville, and during the three years he remained in 
this ship, the leisure afforded him by her being in port 
the whole winter, was unremittingly devoted to those 
studies which qualified him for the future great under¬ 
takings he was destined to be engaged in. To geome¬ 
try and astronomy he applied himself with that per¬ 
severing industry peculiar to his character ; and whilst 
engaged in the active duties of master on board the 
Northumberland, he found sufficient time to read “ Eu¬ 
clid,” and to remedy, by other intellectual efforts, the 
defects of a neglected education. 

The recommendation of Commodore Palliser was 
willingly acceded to by the Admiralty, and Mr. Cook 
was appointed Marine Surveyor of Newfoundland and 
the coast of Labrador, under his orders. A suitable 
establishment was provided for Cook on shore, and a 
schooner was placed under his command, with the ne¬ 
cessary assistants on board for so extended an opera¬ 
tion. 


94 SERVICE IN NEWFOUNDLAND. [CH. IV. 

His observations were not limited, however, to the 
coast, for he penetrated and explored the innermost parts 
of Newfoundland, and discovered some large lakes hi¬ 
therto unknown. On the following application from 
Commodore Palliser, the Lords of the Admiralty 
immediately sanctioned the publication of the dif¬ 
ferent charts that Cook had projected, which, from 
their accuracy and usefulness, reflected the greatest 
credit upon this accomplished seaman. 

To Philip Stephens , Esy., Admiralty. 

“ February 3, 1768. 

“ Sir, 

“ Mr. Cook, appointed by the Right Honourable my 
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to survey the 
sea-coast of Newfoundland and Labrador, under my 
directions, having finished his chart of the south-east 
coast of Newfoundland adjacent to the islands of 
St. Pierre, and including the said islands, and upon a 
large scale of one inch to a mile, you will herewith 
receive the said chart, which be pleased to lay before 
the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the 
Admiralty. 

“ He having also the last year delivered into the 
board, his survey of the northern part of Newfound¬ 
land upon the same scale, and having now prepared 
a chart of that part, together with a chart of the oppo¬ 
site part of the coast of Labrador, including the 
islands and Straits of Belle Isle; likewise another of the 
above-mentioned survey of a part of the south-east 
of Newfoundland, both upon a proper scale to be 
useful to the trade and navigation of his Majesty’s 


MARITIME DISCOVERIES. 


95 


1768 .] 

subjects, therefore, as a publication of the same, I 
am of opinion, will be a great encouragement to new 
adventurers in the fisheries upon these coasts, be pleased 
to move their lordships to permit Mr. Cook to publish 
the same* 

“ I remain, Sir, 

“ Your most obedient servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 

Before Cook quitted his station of marine surveyor 
of Newfoundland and Labrador, he had made an ob¬ 
servation of an eclipse of the sun, deducing therefrom 
the longitude of the place, and he furnished the Royal 
Society, amongst whom he had already acquired the 
reputation of being an able mathematician, with a 
paper on the subject, which is inserted in the fifty- 
seventh volume of the “ Philosophical Transactions,” 
and which indicated the extraordinary progress he had 
made in the study of astronomy. 

On the return of Commodore Palliser to England, 
another opportunity was afforded him of promoting 
the interests of Cook, and of conducting him to em¬ 
ployments from which has emanated the lasting fame 
so justly earned by that celebrated navigator. 

The invention of the mariner’s compass, about the 
year 1300, led to that spirit of discovery which distin¬ 
guished the latter end of the fifteenth and the begin¬ 
ning of the sixteenth centuries. Three illustrious 
foreigners, Columbus, Yasquez de Gama, and Magel¬ 
lan, rendered their names immortal by opening a vast 


* Admiralty Records. 


96 MARITIME DISCOVERIES. [CH. IV. 

field for maritime enterprise hitherto supposed to have 
lain only in the wild imaginations of restless adven¬ 
turers. Columbus traversing unknown seas, made 
astonished Europe acquainted with another world, the 
existence of which—whilst he traversed Europe for 
years in search of some prince who would promote his 
lofty views—‘the learned and devout were accus¬ 
tomed to denounce as the visionary and impious con¬ 
ceit of that enthusiastic mariner. Vasquez de Gama, 
in the service of Portugal, doubled the Cape of Good 
Hope, and pointed a new and unexplored path to the 
east. Whilst Magellan, in the service of Spain, en¬ 
tered the great South Pacific through the straits that 
now bear his name, and his ship, returning by the 
Cape of Good Hope, was the first to circumnavigate 
the globe, the glory of which Magellan, who was mur¬ 
dered by the savages of one of the Philippine islands, 
was himself deprived of enjoying. 

Towards the latter end of the sixteenth century, the 
noble spirit which animated those daring seamen 
began to decline, and distant navigations were under¬ 
taken, chiefly for the purposes of war or for the pro¬ 
motion of the avaricious views of reckless freebooters. 

In the reign of George II. expeditions for discovery 
were again guided by more generous impulses, and 
voyages were undertaken, not with the object of plun¬ 
dering the defenceless inhabitants of newly explored 
lands, but with that of benefitting the human species, 
and extending the ameliorating influence of science 
and civilisation to the haunts of savage life. 

Voyages had been performed in this reign, with the 
view of finding a north-west passage through Hudson’s 



1768.] cook’s first voyage round the world. 97 

Bay, and after the accession of George III. two voyages 
round the world were undertaken and conducted by 
Byron, Wallis, and Carteret. But as the principal object 
of these navigators was to explore and take possession 
of the islands in the South Atlantic Ocean, named the 
Falkland Islands, and to return by the East Indies, 
their discoveries in the Pacific Ocean were thus limited 
in extent. 

Astronomers having calculated that a transit of 
Venus over the sun’s disk would take place in 1769, 
which would be best observed in some part of the 
South Seas, either at the Marquesas or the Friendly 
Islands; the observation of this transit in different 
parts of the world was a matter in astronomy of suffi¬ 
cient consequence to excite the attention of foreign 
nations as well as our own, and the Royal Society 
addressed a long memorial to the king, dated February, 
1768, pointing out the great scientific importance 
of this phenomenon, which occupied the attention of 
the principal Courts of Europe; and they entreated 
his Majesty that a vessel might be ordered at the ex¬ 
pense of government, to proceed to the South Seas 
with persons capable of making the desired obser¬ 
vation. 

His Majesty readily acceded to the request of the 
Royal Society, and signified his desire to the Lords of 
the Admiralty, that a ship should be equipped for the 
purpose of carrying out those selected by the members 
of the society for the prosecution of their object. 

The scientific acquirements of Cook, superadded to 
his nautical abilities, pointed him out as being emi¬ 
nently qualified for such a service. The opinion of 

H 


98 MARITIME DISCOVERIES. [CH. IV. 

Commodore Palliser was taken by the Lords of the 
Admiralty, as one who had such certain means of 
being informed of the extent of Cook’s capacity, and 
he rejoiced that the occasion presented itself when he 
could again bear testimony to the high character, talent, 
and untiring perseverance of this able navigator. Cook 
was therefore appointed to the command of the expe¬ 
dition, and promoted at the same time to the rank of 
lieutenant. 

The task of procuring a vessel adapted for the un¬ 
dertaking was consigned to Palliser, who, after an 
examination of several merchantmen in the River 
Thames, selected one of about 400 tons burden, which 
was named the Endeavour. 

Mr. Green, the astronomer, was associated with 
Cook in conducting the astronomical part of the enter¬ 
prise, and he was to be accompanied by Mr. Banks, 
afterwards Sir Joseph Banks, and Dr. Solander of the 
British Museum—a gentleman distinguished for his 
knowledge of natural history and botany. 

Whilst preparations were being made for this expe¬ 
dition, Captain Wallis returned from a voyage round 
the world, and the president of the Royal Society 
having directed him to ascertain a situation in the 
Pacific, best adapted from the general clearness of the 
atmosphere for the observations of the transit of Venus, 
he adjudged Otaheite to be most eligible. Cook, there¬ 
fore, received orders to proceed to that island direct, 
and as soon as the astronomical observations were 
completed, to prosecute the design of making disco¬ 
veries in the Pacific Ocean as far as forty degrees 
south; and then, if no land should be fallen in with, to 


1768.] COOKS FIRST VOYAGE ROUND THE WORLD. 99 

shape his course for New Zealand, which he was to 
explore. 

Lieutenant Cook took command of the Endeavour 
on the 25th of May; his ship’s company amounted to 
eighty men; provisions for two years were put on board, 
and the armament consisted of ten carriage, and ten 
swivel guns, with an adequate supply of small arms 
and ammunition. On the 30th of July she sailed down 
the river, and at the latter end of the ensuing month 
she made sail from Plymouth Sound, and proceeded on 
her voyage. 

Towards the end of the following year, on the re¬ 
moval of Commodore Palliser from the Government of 
Newfoundland, he was appointed Comptroller of the 
Navy, and at the same time was elected an Elder 
Brother of the Trinity House. The civil departments 
of the service now engaged his active faculties, and 
the prosecution of those great maritime discoveries, for 
which the years intervening between the peace of 1763, 
and the renewal of war in 1778 are signalized, was an 
object to which he assiduously devoted himself. 

Shortly after his appointment to this office at the 
navy-board, the administration of Lord North was 
formed. Lord Sandwich was placed at the head of 
the Admiralty, and the influence of that enlightened 
nobleman was exercised in forwarding those noble 
enterprises, which extended the boundaries of science 
in the learned world, and shed the first rays of civi¬ 
lisation upon regions, where human nature lay buried 
in all the degrading darkness of savage existence,—ser¬ 
vices conferring more lustre on his memory, than the 
vigorous measures even which marked his guidance of 

h 2 


100 


MARITIME DISCOVERIES. 


[CII. IV. 

the naval might of England, when directed for purposes 
of war against the combined forces of two powerful 
maritime nations. 

The expedition under the command of Lieutenant 
Cook having completed their observations on the tran¬ 
sit of Venus, proceeded to effect the other objects of 
the voyage. The Society Islands were visited, the 
eastern coast of New Zealand was examined, and thence 
directing their course to New Holland, the eastern 
side of that vast island never before explored, was now 
surveyed, and Cook having sailed along the barrier 
reef at its northern extremity, entered the opening at 
present named Torres Straits, and successfully navi¬ 
gating that dangerous passage, returned home by the 
Cape of Good Hope, and arrived in England in July. 

The manner in which this enterprise had been con¬ 
ducted by Cook, corresponded with the expectations of 
his early friend and former commander, and with his 
own previous character for energy and ability. His 
papers relating to the transit observations, together 
with those of Mr. Green, were placed in the hands of 
the astronomer royal, and a further paper from Cook, 
on the nature of the tides in the South Sea, was com¬ 
municated to the Royal Society. 

These services met with their just reward, and the 
immediate promotion of Cook to the rank of comman¬ 
der took place on his arrival. Although he had sailed 
over those latitudes in the Pacific Ocean where a southern 
continent was then generally believed to lie, and had as¬ 
certained that neither New Zealand nor New Holland 
were parts of such a continent, still the existence of this 
Terra Australis incognita, which had engaged the atten- 


1771.] cook’s SECOND VOYAGE. 101 

tion of most of the maritime powers for nearly two cen¬ 
turies, was maintained by philosophers; and geogaphers 
seemed to have an universal belief that it would at 
length be discovered. 

When government resolved to establish, if possible, 
the truth of this great geographical question, which 
was calculated to extend our knowledge of the globe 
to its utmost limits, Cook was at once selected to carry 
their resolution into effect, and Palliser, in his capacity 
of Comptroller of the Navy, was deputed by the Ad¬ 
miralty to provide two ships of a similar construction 
to that of the Endeavour, which proved to be ad¬ 
mirably adapted for the purposes of the contemplated 
expedition to the Polar Seas. 

Accordingly two vessels were purchased by him which 
were named, the Resolution and Adventure, and in 
fitting them out for so arduous and perilous an under¬ 
taking, every circumstance was attended to that could 
promote the comfort and success of the voyage. Lord 
Sandwich, accompanied by Commodore Palliser, visited 
them frequently in the course of their equipment, 
and the wishes of Cook, who had taken command 
of the Resolution, were strictly regarded in every par¬ 
ticular. 

To the officers and men on board the ships, which 
in the Resolution amounted to one hundred and twelve, 
and in the Adventure to eiglity-one, were added 
persons skilled in natural history, astronomy, and 
mathematics. And artists were engaged to delineate 
the most striking scenes, and the extraordinary pro¬ 
ductions of nature that would present themselves in 


VOYAGES IN SEARCH OF 


102 


[cii. iv. 


the wild regions they visited, and to illustrate objects 
that could not otherwise be fully described. 

Commodore Palliser took leave of Cook at Plymouth, 
having handed him his instructions from the Admiralty, 
embracing the most extended scheme of discovery that 
the history of navigation records. Not only was the 
whole globe to be circumnavigated, but the boldest and 
most persevering efforts that the intrepid and skilful sea¬ 
man who commanded the enterprise was capable of, 
were to be used in solving the question of the existence 
of a great continent at the southern extremity of the 
earth. 

Captain Cook had no sooner sailed for the south, 
than the Admiralty projected an expedition to the 
Northern Seas, the object of which was to ascertain 
how far navigation was practicable under the North 
Pole. 

The most celebrated philosophers and navigators of 
their time had contended, that a communication be¬ 
tween the Atlantic and the Pacific must exist in the 
northern hemisphere, connecting the two great oceans, 
as the Straits of Magellan connected them in the 
southern. Sebastian Cabbot, one of the most renowned 
navigators of the fifteenth century, was so convinced of 
this, that he proposed the discovery of that passage to 
Henry VII., who equipped an expedition for the pur¬ 
pose, and though the mutiny of his crew, after reach¬ 
ing the sixty-eighth degree of northern latitude, forced 
him to abandon the enterprise, his perseverance in 
the undertaking was rewarded by the king, who cre¬ 
ated a new office for the purpose, and appointed him 
Grand Pilot of England, with an annuity for life. 


1773.] MARITIME DISCOVERIES. 103 

The attention of the maritime nations of Europe was 
too much engaged in discoveries amongst the fruitful 
regions which Magellan and Vasquez de Gama had 
led the way to, round the southern extremity of South 
America and Africa, to promote any enterprise that 
had reference only to the barren countries of the north. 
However, as the commerce of the east increased and 
became lucrative, the desire of shortening the passage 
thither, excited the emulation of those interested in 
the traffic of India, and a body of London merchants 
appointed Captain Davis, in the year 1585, to conduct 
a voyage northward with that design in view. This 
navigator passed the straits that still bear his name, 
and advanced as high as sixty-seven degrees north, in 
an open sea, the shores of which he explored till winter, 
with its perpetual snow and ice setting in, obliged him 
to return. 

Two other voyages in the same direction, equally 
unsuccessful, repressed for awhile this favourite pur¬ 
suit ; but in the year 1610, Hudson adopted a new 
course to the north-west, which led him through the 
passage into that bay, which, as well as the passage, 
was named after him. 

This resolute navigator determined upon passing a 
winter on the desolate shores of the bay, in order to 
prosecute his discovery the first favourable moment of 
the following summer ; but his crew mutinied, and 
cast him adrift in a boat with a few who faithfully ad¬ 
hered to their commander, and the remainder returned 
with the ship to England, giving so false an account of 
the voyage, that the existence of a passage to the Pacific 
was looked upon as no longer doubtful. Baffin therefore 


104 A NORTHERN PASSAGE TO THE PACIFIC. [CH. IV. 

set sail, resolved to have the honour of the discovery, 
but steered for Davis’s Straits, and having entered, he 
found the sea within to be bounded all round by a bar¬ 
ren coast, with the exception of an inlet from the north, 
in latitude seventy-eight degrees. 

The Hudson’s Bay Company was then established^ 
whose charter obliged them to follow up this inquiry; 
and about the middle of the following century, an act 
was passed, insuring a reward of 20,000/. sterling, to 
any ship belonging to his Majesty’s subjects, which 
would determine the existence of such a passage. 

With this reward to stimulate the pursuit, two ships 
were fitted out, as a last attempt, by the Hudson’s Bay 
Company, and having examined every inlet bearing 
the slightest appearance of a navigable strait, they 
reached the extremity of a gulf as far as the sixty- 
seventh degree of north latitude, beyond which no 
communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, 
in a commercial point of view, could be of any use ; 
they therefore relinquished any further search, and re¬ 
turned as all their predecessors, in the same inquiry 
had returned, with a sorrowful account of the hard¬ 
ships they had endured, and the dangers they had en¬ 
countered. 

The Hudson’s Bay Company therefore abandoned 
any future attempt in pursuit of this object by sea, but 
instituted an expedition by land for the purpose ; and 
whilst they were thus engaged, the Admiralty, en¬ 
couraged by the Royal Society, determined upon an¬ 
other expedition to the North, the chief object of 
which was to ascertain how far navigation was practi¬ 
cable under the Pole. 


1773.] CAPTAIN PHIPPS’S VOYAGE NORTHWARD. 105 

It was then imagined that the sun in those regions, 
having about the middle of summer thirty-three de¬ 
grees of altitude, with little depression towards the 
horizon, might invigorate that part of the hemisphere 
with more heat than in our climate, where it has only 
fifteen degrees of altitude in the winter, and is sixteen 
hours below the horizon, in which space of time the 
earth would lose by radiation, the heat it received dur¬ 
ing the day. This consideration was coupled with 
the belief, that about the year 1670, several Dutch 
ships had actually sailed under the Pole, and the mer¬ 
chants of Holland grounded a petition thereon, for the 
exclusive charter to trade to China and Japan by the 
northern passage. 

The Honourable Captain Phipps, afterwards Lord 
Mulgrave, as soon as the design was spoken of, proffered 
his services to carry it into execution. He was there¬ 
fore appointed to the Pace-Horse, and proceeded on 
his voyage about the middle of June. Captain Phipps 
reached the latitude of eighty degrees and a half north, 
when his ship became locked in the ice, and apprehen¬ 
sions were entertained of their being compelled to pass 
the winter in this situation. By great labour and per¬ 
severance, a passage was at length made, which enabled 
them to get out to sea, and the voyage thus terminated 
without any important discovery. 

The commander concludes his account of the expe¬ 
dition, by observing, “ That by setting out just at the 
proper season, they not only reached the eightieth de¬ 
gree of latitude without meeting any obstruction from 
the ice, but they had likewise time sufficient to examine 
the track of icy coast between the latitudes eighty and 


106 PALLISER CREATED A BARONET. [CIl. IV. 

eighty-one north, extending more than twenty degrees 
from west to east, in which there did not exist the 
least opening, the whole being one continued wall of 
ice, impassable by human art.”* 

The leading part Commodore Palliser had taken in 
the promotion of the exploring expeditions set on foot 
after the peace, and the nautical and geographical 
knowledge he displayed in directing the equipments, 
and preparing the instructions under which the com¬ 
manders were to act, induced his Majesty to mark the 
sense he entertained of those services of Palliser in the 
civil branches of his profession, by creating him a 
Baronet of Great Britain, which honour was followed 
by his being chosen Member for Scarborough, at the 
general election that took place shortly afterwards. 

The ensuing year a promotion of flag-officers oc¬ 
curred, amongst whom Sir Hugh Palliser was included, 
and he was advanced to the rank of rear-admiral, being 
appointed at the same time one of the Lords of the 
Admiralty. About this period he had to mourn the 
death of his greatest friend, Admiral Charles Saunders, 
who bequeathed him a legacy of 5000/. in affectionate 
remembrance of their services together at the siege of 
Quebec and in the Mediterranean, nominating him also 
one of the executors of his will. Sir Hugh Palliser 
succeeded Admiral Saunders in the office of Lieute¬ 
nant-general of Marines. This office, and that of Ge¬ 
neral of Marines, were sinecure appointments, and had 
been created by a former government, for the sole pur- 

* Journal of a Voyage to the North Pole. By the Honourable Captain 
Phipps. 


1775.] APPOINTED A LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY. 107 

pose of their being conferred in reward of distin¬ 
guished professional merit ; and the selection of Sir 
Hugh Palliser, as the successor of Saunders, gave such 
umbrage to Admiral Keppel, that he took upon himself 
to address a letter of remonstrance to Lord Sandwich 
on the subject ; and in the favour shown Palliser by 
the king and the first Lord of the Admiralty on future 
occasions, and on this one in particular, originated those 
feelings of envy and animosity, which, though con¬ 
cealed for a time, were fully brought to light by the 
unscrupulous endeavours of Keppel at a later period,— 
even under the mask of friendship,—to blast his repu¬ 
tation by secret and false insinuations. 

The position of Sir Hugh Palliser, as one of the 
Lords of the Admiralty, enabled him to advance ma¬ 
terially the interests of Captain Cook, who had re¬ 
turned from his perilous voyage, having made a circuit 
of the Southern Ocean in the highest latitude hitherto 
traversed, and having ascertained the impossibility of 
there being a continent unless near the Pole. By twice 
visiting the islands within the tropics whilst engaged 
in this leading pursuit, he made many new discoveries, 
and determined the situation of several lands formerly 
visited. The existence, however, of the Terra Aus¬ 
tralis incognita, maintained by philosophers, was still 
left undecided ; but the expedition conducted by Cook 
had demonstrated, that a country situated in that remote 
part of our earth, was doomed by nature to lie buried 
in the desolation of the snows and ice of an everlasting 
winter. 

The late discoveries of Captain Ross have fully es¬ 
tablished the correctness of the theory, that lofty 


108 MARITIME DISCOVERIES. [CH. VI. 

regions were situated near the South Pole ; but 
those discoveries have also proved that snow-storms, 
intense cold, perpetual ice, the gloom of months of un¬ 
mitigated darkness, and every thing dangerous and de¬ 
structive to human life—exclude man from all beyond 
a mere knowledge of their existence. 

The merits of Cook scarcely needed the solicitation 
of so warm a friend as Sir Hugh Palliser, to induce 
the first Lord of the Admiralty to reward the man 
who, for three years, had been engaged in such hazard¬ 
ous and important undertakings ; and he was promoted 
immediately on his return to the rank of post-captain, 
receiving also the further honour of being appointed 
Captain of Greenwich Hospital. 

A northern passage to the Pacific Ocean still re¬ 
mained undecided. Lieutenant Pickersgill had been 
engaged in exploring the shores of Baffin’s Bay with 
the usual unsuccessful issue, but it was not yet rendered 
certain that a passage might not be discovered on the 
western side of America, leading from the Pacific into 
the Atlantic, and the Lords of the Admiralty resolved 
that a voyage should be undertaken for that purpose. 

At a meeting of the Academy of Sciences at Paris, 
a curious memoir was read concerning this object of so 
much interest to navigators. It appeared that M. de 
Mendoza, an intelligent captain of a vessel in the ser¬ 
vice of Spain, charged with the care of former estab¬ 
lishments^ vourable to the marine, had made a minute 
examination of the archives of several departments. 
There he found the relation of a voyage made in the 
year 1598, by Lorenzo Herrero de Maldonada, which 
states, “ that at the entry into Davis’s Straits, north lati- 


109 


1776.] cook’s third voyage. 

tude sixty degrees, and twenty-eight degrees of longitude 
counting from the first meridian, he turned to the west, 
leaving Hudson’s Bay on the south, and Baffin’s Bay on 
the north. Arrived at latitude sixty-five degrees and two 
hundred and ninety-seven, he went towards the north 
by the Straits of Labrador, till he reached seventy-six 
degrees, and two hundred seventy-eight degrees ; and 
finding himself in the Icy Sea, he turned south-west to 
latitude sixty degrees, and longitude two hundred and 
seventy-five degrees, where he found a strait, which 
separates Asia from America, by which he entered 
into the south sea, which he called the Straits of 
Anian.” 

Notwithstanding the many fruitless attempts that 
had already been made in that direction, Lieutenant 
Young was despatched to examine the western parts 
of Baffin’s Bay, whilst the projected expedition was to 
proceed in search of an inlet from the Pacific. 

It was thought unreasonable, however desirous the 
Lords of the Admiralty might be of availing themselves 
of his extensive knowledge and experience, to ask 
Cook to relinquish his post of honourable retirement 
at Greenwich Hospital, and engage once more in the 
numerous perils and labours that such an enterprise 
would involve; but it was decided to take him into 
consultation, and he and Sir Hugh Palliser were in¬ 
vited to dine with Lord Sandwich, when the arrange¬ 
ments for the voyage were to be discussed, and a person 
was to be selected who might be deemed capable of 
conducting this grand discovery. 

The views which government purposed to carry 
into operation were no sooner developed to Cook, than 


110 SAILING INSTRUCTIONS. [CII. IV. 

the greatness of the adventure and the importance of 
the result to science and navigation, aroused all the 
enterprising feelings of this intrepid seaman. The life of 
repose which after so many toils and dangers he might 
have enjoyed in the honourable retirement provided 
for him by his Sovereign, was abandoned for the glory 
and excitement of the vast enterprise submitted to him 
by his noble host, and with that earnest energy of man¬ 
ner for which he was remarkable, he declared that he 
himself would undertake the command of the expedi¬ 
tion. 

The offer was eagerly embraced and laid before the 
king, who unhesitatingly approved of Captain Cook 
being entrusted with the guidance of this favourite ob¬ 
ject of investigation. 

The duty devolved upon Sir Hugh Palliser of 
drawing up the instructions under which Cook was 
to sail, and they comprise so enlarged a sphere of dis¬ 
covery, and embrace such a variety of operations to be 
carried into effect, that the composition indicates no 
ordinary talent, and is well worthy of perusal. 

“ Secret instructions of Captain James Cook, com¬ 
mander of his Majesty’s ship, the Eesolution. 

“ Whereas, his Majesty’s pleasure has been signified 
to us, that an attempt should be made to find out a 
northern passage by sea, from the Pacific to the Atlan¬ 
tic Ocean: and whereas, we have, in pursuance thereof, 
caused his Majesty’s sloops, Resolution and Discovery, 
to be fitted in all respects proper to proceed upon a 
voyage for the purpose above-mentioned; and from the 
experience we have had of your abilities and good-con¬ 
duct in your voyages, have thought fit to entrust you 


1776.] cook’s THIRD VOYAGE. Ill 

with the conduct of the present intended voyage, and 
with that view appointed you to command the first- 
mentioned sloop, and directed Captain Clarke, who 
commands the other, to follow your orders for his fur¬ 
ther proceedings; you are hereby required and directed 
to proceed with the said two sloops directly to the 
Cape of Good Hope, unless you shall judge it neces¬ 
sary to stop at Madeira, the Cape de Verde, or Canary 
Islands, to take in wine for the use of their companies; 
in which case you are at liberty to do so, taking care 
to remain there no longer than may be necessary for 
that purpose. On your arrival at the Cape of Good 
Hope, you are to refresh the sloop’s companies, and 
cause the sloops to be supplied with as much provi¬ 
sions and water as they can conveniently stow. You 
are, if possible, to leave the Cape of Good Hope by 
the end of October, or the beginning of November 
next, and to proceed to the southward in search of 
some islands, said to be lately seen by the French in 
the latitude of forty-eight degrees south, and about the 
meridian of Mauritius. In case you find those islands, 
you are to examine them thoroughly for a good har¬ 
bour; and upon discovering one, make the necessary 
observations to facilitate the finding it again, as a good 
port in that situation may hereafter prove very useful, 
although it should afford little or nothing more than shel¬ 
ter, wood, and water. You are not, however, to spend 
too much time in looking out for those islands, or in the 
examination of them, if found, but to proceed to Ota- 
heite, or the Society’s Isles, (touching at New Zealand 
in your way thither, if you should judge it necessary 
and convenient,) and taking care to arrive there time 


112 * SAILING INSTRUCTIONS. [CH. IV. 

enough, to admit of your giving the sloops’ companies 
the refreshment they may stand in need of, before you 
prosecute the further object of these instructions upon 
your arrival at Otaheite, or the Society’s Isles, you are 
to land Orinah at such of them as he may choose, and 
to leave him there. 

“You are to distribute among the chiefs of those is¬ 
lands such parts of the presents with which you have 
been supplied as you shall judge proper, reserving the 
remainder to distribute among the natives of the coun¬ 
tries you may discover in the northern hemisphere; 
and having refreshed the people belonging to the 
sloops under your command, and taken on board such 
wood and water as they respectively stand in need of, 
you are to leave those islands in the beginning of 
February, or sooner, if you shall judge it necessary, 
and then proceed in as direct a course as you can to 
the Coast of New Albion, endeavouring to fall in with it 
in the latitude of forty-five degrees north, and taking care 
in your way thither not to lose any time in search of new 
lands, or to stop at any you may fall in with, unless you 
may find it necessary to recruit your wood and water. 
You are also in your way thither strictly enjoined 
not to touch upon any part of the Spanish dominions 
or the western continent of America, unless driven 
thither by some unavoidable accident; in which case 
you are to stay no longer there than shall be absolutely 
necessary, and to be very careful not to give umbrage 
or offence to any of the inhabitants or subjects of his 
Catholic Majesty. And if in your farther progress to 
the northward, as hereafter directed, you find any sub¬ 
jects of any European prince or state upon any part 


1776.] cook’s THIRD VOYAGE. 113 

of tlie coast you may think proper to visit, you are not 
to disturb them, or give them any just cause of offence, 
but, on the contrary, to treat them with civility and 
friendship. Upon your arrival on the coast of New 
Albion, you are to put into the first convenient port, 
to recruit your wood and water, and to procure re¬ 
freshments, and then to proceed northward along the 
coast as far as the latitude of sixty-five degrees, or 
farther, if you are not obstructed by lands or ice, taking 
care not to lose any time in exploring rivers or inlets, 
or upon any other account, until you get into the 
before-mentioned latitude of sixty-five degrees, where 
we could wish you to arrive in the month of June 
next. When you get that length, you are very 
carefully to search for, and to explore such rivers 
or inlets as may appear to be of a considerable ex¬ 
tent, and pointing towards Hudson’s or Baffin’s Bay; 
and if, from your own observations, or from any in¬ 
formation you may receive from the natives (who, 
there is reason to believe, are the same race of peo¬ 
ple, and speak the same language, of which you 
are furnished with a vocabulary, as the Esquimaux), 
there shall appear to be a certainty or even a proba¬ 
bility of a water passage into the afore-mentioned bays, 
or either of them, you are in such case to use your 
utmost endeavours to pass through with one or both 
of the sloops, unless you shall be of opinion, that the 
passage may be effected with more certainty, or with 
greater probability, by smaller vessels, in which case 
you are to set up the frames of one or both the small 
vessels with which you are to be provided, and when 
they are put together, and are properly fitted, stored, 

i 


114 SAILING INSTRUCTIONS. [cil. IV. 

and victualled, you are to despatch, one or both of 
them, under the care of proper officers, men and boats, 
in order to attempt the said passage; with such instruc¬ 
tions for their rejoining you, if they should fail, or for 
their further proceedings if they should succeed in the 
attempt, as you shall judge most proper. But, never¬ 
theless, if you shall find it more eligible to pursue any 
other measures than those above pointed out, in order 
to make a discovery of the above-mentioned passage 
(if any such there be), you are at liberty, and we leave 
it to your discretion to pursue such measures accord¬ 
ingly. In case you shall be satisfied that there is no 
passage through the above-mentioned bays, sufficient 
for the purposes of navigation, you are, at the proper 
season of the year, to repair to the port of St. Peter 
and St. Paul in Kamtschatka, or wherever else you 
shall judge more proper, in order to refresh your 
people and to pass the winter; and in the spring of the 
ensuing year, 1778, to proceed from thence to the north¬ 
ward, as far as in your prudence you may think pro¬ 
per, in further search of a north-east or north-west pas¬ 
sage from the Pacific Ocean or the North Sea. And if, 
from your own observation, or any information you 
may receive, there shall appear to be a probability of 
such passage, you are to proceed as above directed; 
and having discovered such passage, or failed in the 
attempt, make the best of your way back to England 
by such route as you may think best for the improve¬ 
ment of geography and navigation, repairing to Spit- 
head with both ships, where they are to remain till 
further order. At whatever places you may touch in 
the course of your voyage, where accurate observations 


1776.] cook’s THIRD VOYAGE. 115 

of the nature hereafter mentioned have not already 
been made, you are, as far as your time will allow, 
very carefully to observe the true situation of such 
places both in latitude and longitude; the variation of 
the needle, bearings of headlands, height, direction, 
and course of the tides and currents; depths and sound¬ 
ings of the sea; shoals, rocks, &c., and also to survey, 
make charts, and take views of such bays, harbours, 
and different parts of the coast. And to make such 
notations thereon as may be useful either to navi¬ 
gation or commerce. You are also carefully to observe 
the nature of the soil and the produce thereof; the 
animals and fowls that inhabit or frequent it; the 
fishes that are to be found in the rivers, or upon the 
coast, and in what plenty; and in case there are any 
peculiar to such places, to describe them as mi¬ 
nutely, and to make as accurate drawings of them, 
as you can; and if you find any metals, minerals, or 
valuable stones, or any extraneous fossils, you are to 
bring home specimens of each; as also of the seeds of such 
trees, shrubs, plants, fruits, and grains, peculiar to those 
places, as you may be able to collect, and to transmit 
them to our secretary, that proper examination and ex¬ 
periments may be made of them. You are likewise to 
observe the genius, temper, disposition, and number, of 
the natives and inhabitants, where you find any, and to 
endeavour, by all proper means, to cultivate a friend¬ 
ship with them; making them presents of such trin¬ 
kets as you may have on board, and they may like 
best; inviting them to traffic, and showing them every 
kind of civility and regard, but taking care never¬ 
theless, not to suffer yourselves to be surprised by them, 

i 2 


116 SAILING INSTRUCTIONS. [CII. IV. 

but to be always on your guard against any accidents. 
You are also with the consent of the natives, to take 
possession, in the name of the King of Great Britain, 
of convenient situations in such countries as you may 
discover that have not already been discovered, or 
visited by any other European power; and to dis¬ 
tribute among the inhabitants such things as will 
remain as traces and testimonies of your having been 
there; but if you find the countries so discovered 
are uninhabited, you are to take possession of them 
for his Majesty, by setting up proper marks and in¬ 
scriptions as first discoverers and possessors. But 
forasmuch as in undertakings of this nature, several 
emergencies may arise, not to be foreseen, and there¬ 
fore not particularly to be provided for by instructions 
beforehand, you are, in all such cases, to proceed as 
you shall judge most advantageous to the service on 
which you are employed. You are by all opportunities 
to send to our secretary, for our information, accounts 
of your proceedings, and copies of the surveys and 
drawings you shall have made, and upon your arrival 
in England, you are immediately to repair to this office, 
in order to lay before us a full account of your pro¬ 
ceedings in the whole course of your voyage; taking 
care before you leave the sloop, to demand from the 
officers and petty officers, the logbooks and journals 
they may have kept, and to seal them up for our in¬ 
spection; and enjoining them and the whole crew, not 
to divulge where they have been, until they shall have 
permission so to do; and you are to direct Captain 
Clarke to do the same with respect to the officers, 
petty officers, and crew of the Discovery. If any ac- 


1776.] COOIvS THIRD VOYAGE. 117 

cident should happen to the Resolution in the course 
ol the voyage, so as to disable her from proceeding 
any farther, you are in such case to remove yourself 
and her crew into the Discovery, and to prosecute your 
voyage in her; her commander being hereby strictly 
required to receive you on board, and to obey your 
orders the same in every respect as when you were 
actually on board the Resolution; and in case of your 
inability, by sickness or otherwise, to carry these in¬ 
structions into execution, you are to be careful to leave 
them with the next officer in command, who is hereby 
required to execute them in the best manner he can. 

“ Sandwich, 

“ H. Palliser. 

“ Given under our hands, the 6th day of July, 1776, 
by command of their lordships, the commissioners for 
executing the office of Lord High Admiral of Great 
Britain and Ireland.” 

The usual attention was paid to the equipment of 
the Resolution and Discovery, the former of which Cook 
took the command of. An assortment of domestic animals, 
garden-seeds, and other articles calculated to be of use 
to the natives of the lands he was to visit, were put on 
board, and every suitable provision was made for the 
scientific departments of the expedition. 

Foreign nations were as deeply interested as our own 
in the results of this enterprise. About the time that 
Captain Cook was expected to have been on his way 
home, hostilities had commenced between England and 
her American colonies, then in alliance with France, 


118 FRANKLIN’S LETTER. [CH. IV 

and orders were issued by the French government that 
Cook should on no account be molested by any of their 
ships that might happen to meet him. The privateers 
of America were then also sweeping the seas in every 
direction, and the following official letter was written 
by Franklin, to prevent any interruption if he should 
happen to fall into their hands: 

“ To all Captains and Commanders of Armed Ships , 
acting by Commission from the Congress of the 
United States of America, now in war with Great 
Britain . 

“ Gentlemen, 

w Ships having been fitted out from England, before 
the commencement of this war, to make discoveries of 
new countries in unknown seas, under the conduct of 
that most celebrated navigator, Captain Cook. An 
undertaking truly laudable in itself, as the increase of 
geographical knowledge facilitates the communication 
between distant nations, in the exchange of useful pro¬ 
ducts and manufactures, and the extension of arts, 
whereby the common enjoyments of human life are 
multiplied and augmented, and science of other kinds 
increased, to the benefit of mankind in general. This is, 
therefore, most earnestly to recommend to every one of 
you, that in case the said ships, which are now expected 
in the European seas on their return, should happen to 
fall into your hands, you would not consider them 
enemies, nor suffer any plunder to be made of the 
effects contained in them, nor obstruct their immediate 
return to England, by detaining them or sending them 


1776 .] cook’s THIRD VOYAGE. 119 

into any other port of Europe and America; but that 
you would treat the said Captain Cook and his people 
with all civility and kindness, affording them as com¬ 
mon friends to mankind, all the assistance in your 
power, which they may happen to stand in need of. 

“ In so doing, you will not only gratify the genero¬ 
sity of your own dispositions, but there is no doubt of 
your obtaining the approbation of the Congress and 
your own American owners. 

“ I have the honour to be, 

“ Gentlemen, 

“ Your most obedient, &c., 

“ B. Franklin, 

‘‘ Minister Plenipotentiary from the Congress of the United States to the 

Court of France.” 


“ The generous proceeding of Dr. Franklin in writ¬ 
ing this letter,” observes his biographer, “ became well 
known in England, and the sentiments it manifested 
were so much approved of by the government there, 
that when the narrative of Cook’s voyage was printed, 
the Admiralty sent Dr. Franklin a copy of it in three 
volumes, quarto, accompanied with a very polite letter 
from Lord Howe, signifying that the present was made 
with his Majesty’s express approbation ; and the Royal 
Society having, in honour of that illustrious navigator^ 
who was one of their members, struck some gold medals 
to be distributed among his friends, and the friends of 
the voyage; one of these medals was also sent to Dr. 
Franklin, by order of the society, together with a letter 
from their President, Sir Joseph Banks, expressing like- 


THE DEATH OF COOK. 


120 


[CH. IV. 


wise that it was sent with the approbation of his Ma- 
jesty.” 

When Captain Cook took leave of Sir Hugh Palliser 
to proceed on this voyage—from which it was doomed 
he should never re turn—he presented his earliest friend 
and patron with the journals of his two previous voy¬ 
ages ; they now lie before the author, and consist of 
two volumes, including charts and drawings of many 
of the distant lands he visited. The manuscript is in 
Cook’s own handwriting; every object and circumstance 
described with the greatest accuracy and minuteness, 
and are in themselves an evidence—composed as they 
daily were amidst scenes of peril and excitement—of 
the cool judgment, the extraordinary self-possession, 
and unchanging firmness of mind, which, in the most 
stirring and hazardous moments, characterized that 
intrepid mariner. 

His untimely end at the Island of Owhyee, where 
he fell, pierced by the dagger of a savage Indian, 
is familiar to every English reader ; and that va¬ 
luable life fell a sacrifice to the high sense of duty and 
humanity, which led him in every danger, to consider 
the safety of his men before his own ; for in keeping 
the savages at bay whilst he warned the party by whom 
he was accompanied to their boats, the fatal blow was 
given him. 

Though statues have been raised amongst us to per¬ 
petuate the memory of statesmen and warriors, the 
distinguished seaman, whose life was thus lost in the 
performance of such enduring services, was left by his 
country without a public testimony of the vast under- 


cook’s monument. 


121 


1776 .] 

takings lie so successfully conducted. But this neglect 
was felt by him, who had marked the man in his ob¬ 
scurity on board the Eagle, and had watched over his 
progress to distinction: the affection of his old comman¬ 
der repaired the nation’s forgetfulness, and a monument 
to the memory of Cook was erected on the most elevated 
part of the Vache Park, in Buckinghamshire, by Admiral 
Palliser, formed of a square block, surmounted by a 
globe, and enclosed by a neat, but simple roofed build¬ 
ing, open at the four sides, which are turned in arches. 
The structure crowns an elevated mound, surrounded 
by a moat, with a rustic drawbridge, and forms a pic¬ 
turesque object from the admiral’s house and the ad¬ 
joining grounds. 

It bears the following inscription, indited by his 
friend : 

NORTH. 

TO THE MEMORY OF 

CAPTAIN JAMES COOK, 

THE ABLEST AND MOST RENOWNED NAVIGATOR THIS OR 
ANY COUNTRY HATH PRODUCED. 


He raised himself solely by his merit, 

From a very obscure birth to the rank 
Of Post-captain in the Royal Navy, and 
Was unfortunately killed by the savages 
Of the Island of Owhyee, on the 14th of February, 
1779, which island he had not long before 
Discovered, when prosecuting his third 
Voyage round the globe. 

He possessed, in an eminent degree, all the 
Qualifications requisite for his profession 
And his great undertakings; together with the 
Amiable and worthy qualities of the best of men, 


122 


cook’s monument. 


[CH. IV. 


Cool and deliberate in judging—sagacious 
In determining—active in executing—steady, 
Persevering, and enterprising—vigilance and 
Unremitting caution, unsubdued by labour, 
Difficulties, or disappointments, marked his 
Character. He was fertile in expedients, 
Never wanting in presence of mind, always 
Self-possessed, and commanding the full use 
Of a sound understanding. 


WEST. 

Mild, just, but exact in discipline, he 
Was a father to his people, who were 
Attached to him from affection, and 
Obedient from confidence. 

He explored the southern hemisphere to 
A much higher latitude than had ever 
Been reached before, and with fewer accidents 
Than frequently befall those who navigate 
The coasts of this island. 

By his benevolent and unabating attentions 
To the welfare of his ship’s company, he 
Discovered and introduced a system 
For the preservation of the health of seaman 
On long voyages, which has proved 
Wonderfully efficacious : for in his second 
Voyage round the world, which continued 
Upwards of three years, he lost only 
One man by distemper out of one hundred and 
Eighteen, of which his ships’ company consisted. 
The object of his last mission was to discover 
And ascertain the boundaries of Asia and 
America, and to penetrate into the Northern 
Ocean by the north-east Cape of Asia. 
Traveller! contemplate, admire, revere, and 
Emulate this great Master in his profession. 
Whose skill and labours have enlarged 
Natural philosophy ; have extended nautical 
Science, and have disclosed the long 


1776.] 


cook’s monument. 

SOUTH. 

Concealed and admirable arrangements 
Of the Almighty in the formation of this 
Globe, and, at the same time, the arrogance 
Of mortals, in presuming to account by 
Their speculations, for the laws by which 
He was pleased to create it. Beyond 
All doubt it is now discovered that the 
Same Great Being who created the 
Universe by his fiat, ordained by the same 
That our earth should keep a just poise, without 
A corresponding southern continent. 

And it does so. “ He stretches out the 
North over the empty space, and hangeth 

The earth upon nothing.”— Job , xxvi*, 7. 

If the arduous but exact researches 
Of this extraordinary man have not 
Discovered a new world, they have discovered 
Seas unnavigated and unknown before. 
r lhey have made us acquainted with 
Islands, people, and productions, of which 
We had no conception. And if he has not 
Been so fortunate as Americus to give his 
Name to a continent, his pretensions 
To such a distinction remain unrivalled, 

And he will be revered while there 
Remains a page of his own modest 
Account of his voyages, and as long as 
Mariners and geographers shall be 

EAST. 

Instructed by his new map of the 
Southern hemisphere to trace the various 
Courses and discoveries he has made. 

If public services merit public acknow¬ 
ledgments, if the man who adorned and 
Raised the fame of his country, is deserving 
Of honours, then Captain Cook is entitled 
To have a monument raised to his memory, 

Bv a generous and grateful nation.” 

“ Virtutis uberrimum alimentum est lionos.” 

Val. Maximus, Lib. ii. Cap. 6 


123 


124 


DISPUTES WITH AMERICA. 


[CH. V. 


CHAPTER V. 

HOSTILITIES WITH AMERICA—ALLIANCE OF FRANCE 

WITH AMERICA. 

Disputes with America—The Stamp Act—Franklin examined before the 
House of Commons—Passive Opposition of the Americans—A Duty 
levelled upon Tea—Breaking out of Hostilities—The Battle of Lex¬ 
ington—Declaration of American Independence—Warlike Preparations 
of France and Spain—Assembling of Parliament—Ministers attacked 
on the supposed inefficient State of the Navy—Replies of Lord North* 
Lord Mulgrave, and Sir Hugh Palliser—The Conduct of the Earl of 
Sandwich as First Lord of the Admiralty assailed—Defended by Lord 
North and Sir Hugh Palliser—Intelligence of the Surrender of the 
British Army at Saratoga—France unites with America—French Fleet 
under the Command of Count d’Estaing destined for America—Pro¬ 
ceedings in the House of Lords—The Earl of Chatham’s erroneous 
Representation of the State of the Navy—The Earl of Sandwich’s satis¬ 
factory Proof of the Efficiency of the Naval Armament—Active Pre¬ 
parations for War at the different Ports—Letters from the Earl of 
Sandwich to the Secretary of the Admiralty. 

1776 to 1778. 

After tlie battle of Quebec, several vexatious mea¬ 
sures were adopted by the British Parliament, for the 
regulation of the commerce of the American colonies, 
and the Stamp Act proposed by Mr. Grenville, in 
order to compensate the mother country for the ex¬ 
penses incurred during the war with the French in 


THE STAMP ACT. 


125 


1776 .] 

Canada, met with universal opposition and dissatis¬ 
faction, on the grounds that taxation without repre¬ 
sentation was unconstitutional and oppressive. 

The act, notwithstanding the outcry raised against 
it, was passed, which at once roused the Americans to 
a passive resistance of the law, but on the formation of 
the Rockingham Administration an attempt was made 
to repeal that odious impost. 

On this occasion Franklin was examined before the 
House of Commons, and on being asked if no regu¬ 
lation involving a tax would be received by the colo¬ 
nists, he replied “ Their opinion is that when aids to 
the crown are wanted, they are to be asked of the 
several assemblies, according to the old established 
usage, who will, as they have always done, grant them 
freely; and that their money ought not to have been 
given away without their consent, by persons at a dis¬ 
tance, unacquainted with their circumstances and abi¬ 
lities. The granting aids to the crown is the only 
means they have of recommending themselves to their 
sovereign; and they think it extremely hard and un¬ 
just that a body of men, in which they have no repre¬ 
sentatives, should make a merit to itself, by giving and 
granting what is not its own but theirs, and thus de¬ 
prive them of a right they esteem of the utmost value 
and importance, as it is the security of all their other 
rights.” 

However, though the Stamp Act was repealed, it 
was only on the principle of expediency, and par¬ 
liament insisted upon its right not only to tax the 
colonies, but to bind them to every measure it should 
think fit to adopt, and other taxes were imposed of a 


126 REVOLT OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES. [CH. V. 

nature equally objectionable which aroused a feeling 
of very general indignation. The law rendered inopera¬ 
tive by passive opposition, was at length set at open de¬ 
fiance by the people of Boston, who destroyed some 
cargoes of tea about to be landed,—an article subject to 
the noxious import duty of three-pence per pound. 

This act of violence was resented at home by the 
passing of a bill through Parliament, which made it 
illegal for shipping to enter the port of Boston. On 
the intelligence of this rigorous enactment reaching 
America, it became a signal for a general armed oppo¬ 
sition to the British government. Washington placed 
himself at the head of a body of provincial troops, and 
regularly exercised them in the use of arms on the plains 
of Virginia. Assemblies met in the character of Con¬ 
gresses—provisions, ammunition, and arms were col¬ 
lected—but no blood was shed till the battle of Lex¬ 
ington was fought in April, 1775, which event ren¬ 
dered reconciliation hopeless. 

The legislature of Massachussets, after that hostile 
encounter, passed a vote for raising a body of 30,000 
men, and the grand question of a total separation from 
Great Britain, and the establishment of national inde¬ 
pendence was now universally agitated throughout the 
colonies. Jefferson, Adams, Franklin, Sharman, and 
Livingston, who had been chosen to consider whether 
this decisive step should be taken, concurred in the 
general feeling of the colonists, and that memorable 
document, the Declaration of Independence, couched 
in the clear, nervous diction for which the writings of 
Jefferson, its composer, are remarkable, was solemnly 
proclaimed in July, 1776. 


1776.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 127 

France and Spain were not disposed to remain idle 
spectators of the unequal struggle between America 
and the Mother Country, and the warlike prepara¬ 
tions being made in the different continental ports, 
indicated that an opportunity was only wanting to 
induce the former nations to engage in hostilities, 
and to side with the Americans in their endeavour to 
throw off the yoke of British dominion. 

On the assembling of parliament at the close of this 
year, the debates relative to American affairs assumed 
the usual acrimony on both sides. The king opened the 
session with a speech expressive of the strongest feelings 
against the independence of the states. 

In the course of the debates on the address, Colonel 
Barre, who opposed it, said, u He would turn from 
America to what he considered another important sub¬ 
ject; the tremendous appearance of a war in Europe, 
and told the house, in a most peremptory tone, that a 
war of the most serious kind threatened this country; 
a war with the united powers of France and Spain; 
that the attack would shortly be made, and made within 
the hearing of those who sat in the house.” 

A laugh arising from the opposite benches, the colo¬ 
nel observed, with some warmth, “ Gentlemen may 
laugh, but I dare predict that those who laugh now, 
will, in the moment of danger, be lying in tears, on 
their backs like cowards.” He then declared that Franee 
was full two months beforehand with us in prepara¬ 
tions, but we were entirely defenceless and unable to 
make any resistance should she soon begin. That the 
Noble Lord (North) shifted his ground so often, that 
there was no dependence on his information, and that 


128 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [cil. V. 

even now lie had said, he relied on the present assur¬ 
ances of the pacific intentions of France, but that he 
did not know how soon she might alter her inten¬ 
tion.” 

Lord North declared, “ He firmly believed the court 
of Versailles, but as he was no prophet, he could not 
answer for events six months hence. The Noble Lord 
complained of having his words watched and thrown 
perpetually in his teeth.” 

Colonel Barre replied, u That as the ostensible mi¬ 
nister of the crown, it would be extraordinary if his 
words were not watched. The minister of this coun¬ 
try, he said, ought always to have information sufficient 
of what the French were about, to undertake to pro¬ 
nounce for six months, if he could not, his neck ought 
to be brought to the block. Had the minister informa¬ 
tion, he would ask, of a particular species of arma¬ 
ment preparing by the French in the ports of France, 
which were immediately opposite and nearest this 
kingdom? He put it roundly, and it required imme¬ 
diate explanation. If the ministry had not the neces¬ 
sary information, they were not fit for their posts, and 
ought to hold them no longer. He entered into the 
state of our naval power, and asserted that we were by 
no means a match for France and Spain. He re¬ 
commended the ministry, at all events, to make up 
matters with America, and observed, that in the last 
war we had 12,000 seamen from America, who would 
now, should France attack us, be fighting against us. 
Recall, therefore, he said, your fleets and armies from 
America and leave the colonists to the enjoyment of 
their liberties.” This sentence created a louder laugh 


1776.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 129 

than was formerly indulged in by the occupiers of the 
several official benches, which irritated the colonel so 
much, that he arraigned them with a want of manners? 
and declared he thought professed courtiers had been 
better bred. 

He then again denounced vengeance, and after innu¬ 
merable repetitions of the danger of our present situa¬ 
tion, desired the ministry to appoint proper officers, 
and to place in command of the fleet an admiral who 
had once already saved his country, and he need not 
say that he meant Keppel. 

Admiral Keppel said, “ That things had an ex¬ 
tremely disagreeable appearance. He asserted, from the 
most authentic information, that Spain had twenty- 
five ships of the line, but he believed them to be ill 
manned with marines. It was otherwise with France, 
who, from her military force, had always a sufficient 
number of men to serve on board her ships of war.” 

Lord Germaine in rising said, “ He should give all 
the satisfaction in his power, not speaking from notes, re¬ 
lative to the state of our armament. The Eight Honour¬ 
able Gentleman who made the assertion is much mis¬ 
taken in saying, that our twenty-three ships of the line 
are not half manned; they want only 1500 of their 
full complement; and twelve are fully manned, and 
there are no reasons for those numerous extravagant 
apprehensions which that honourable gentleman has 
stated so largely. I am further asked what are the 
numbers of the armies in America. The number under 
General Howe is 25,000, and he will be reinforced by 
5000 more, which are near the American coast by 
this time. He has besides 2000 provincials. The 


K 


130 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. V. 

army in Canada amounts to 11,000 men.” Another 
thing asked, is whether the administration knows any 
thing of particular preparations on the coast of France. 
“ I have asked the Noble Lord by me (Lord North), 
and he knows nothing of any such, further than what 
is necessary for carrying the registered seamen to Brest, 
nor have I any intelligence of that sort.” 

Mr. Fox spoke at some length against the address, 
when the house divided. For the amendment, 87; 
against it, 242. 

The house then formed itself into a committee of 
supply, when Mr. Buller moved, that 45,000 seamen, 
including 10,000 marines, be employed for the service 
of the ensuing year. 

Mr. Lutterell observed, “ That the naval strength of 
this nation for the protection of Great Britain and Ire¬ 
land, was by no means equal to that publicly specified 
by some of the most responsible characters. So far 
from twenty-three ships of the line being fit for sea, as 
was asserted at the opening of Parliament by the first 
naval authority in Great Britain, and insisted on by 
the Noble Lord over the way (Lord George Germaine) 
on the first day of the session, we had not a sufficient 
number of men to complete the complements of thirteen 
sail of the twenty-three guard-ships. We shall be told, 
perhaps, that it is highly improper thus publicly to 
expose the weakness of our navy to those inimical 
powers. If there was a ray of hope that such specious 
falsehoods of government could impose upon the 
statesmen at the other side of the Channel, we might 
allow that we had, in the Noble Earl, the best Com¬ 
missioner of the Admiralty that ever presided at the 


1776.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 131 

board, so long as the safety of the nation depends upon 
concealing or disguising the truth. He would therefore 
move for an inquiry into his conduct.” 

Lord Mulgrave said, “ He was glad to find the Ho¬ 
nourable Member intended to move for a serious par¬ 
liamentary inquiry into the conduct of his noble friend 
at the head of the Admiralty board ; for whenever the 
truth came out, the Honourable Member, however pre¬ 
judiced he was at this time by vague, ill-founded, and 
empty conjectures, would, if he had any candour in his 
nature, become a convert to a better founded and more 
just opinion, as the British nation had never known a 
Commissioner of the Admiralty equal to the present in 
capacity and meritorious services. He therefore wished 
the Honourable Member to move for a fair public test 
of the Noble Earl’s conduct; and he, as the Noble 
Earl’s friend, would stand as forward as any gentleman 
in opposition could, to second it.” 

Lord North also got up in behalf of Lord Sandwich- 
a His Majesty,” he said, “ had, in the Noble Earl, a 
very capable and zealous servant, who ought not to be 
thus attacked in his absence, and have imputations cast 
upon him, derived only from loose surmises and low 
newspaper abuse ; and that if the Honourable Member 
would inform himself of the real desert of the Noble 
Earl, he must retract his assertions, and admit that the 
most laborious and eminent public services had been 
rendered by him to this empire since he came to the 
naval administration. Neither could any of his pre¬ 
decessors, upon the whole, boast of equal preten¬ 
sions to the applause of his country, and to the respect 
of every unprejudiced individual.” 

k 2 


132 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CII. V. 

Lord Palmerston spoke in support of Lord Sandwich 
and the present board of Admiralty, but said, “ That 
in commending the Noble Earl’s assiduity and talents, 
he would not be understood to detract in any degree 
from the praise due to Lord Hawke, with whom he 
had likewise been in office. Lord Sandwich acquitted 
himself in a manner becoming a man, who stood in the 
peculiar situation of having had the honour to serve 
his Majesty at the Admiralty board under three suc¬ 
cessive administrations.” 

Mr. Buller stated, “ That the naval force in the Bri¬ 
tish ports was sufficient for the defence of these domi¬ 
nions and the maintenance of our national honour, 
against any combined powers whatever that might at¬ 
tempt hostilities.” 

Sir Hugh Palliser closed the arguments in the com¬ 
mittee, by saying, “ That he hoped the house would re¬ 
pose confidence in the strength of our naval establish¬ 
ment at home, in the sufficiency of the ships and men, 
and in the zeal and abilities of the Noble Earl, the first 
Lord of the Admiralty.” 

Mr. Temple Lutterell followed up the attacks upon 
the naval administration by shortly afterwards intro¬ 
ducing a bill for the manning of the navy in times of 
war. In the course of his arguments in favour of so 
desirable, though impracticable a measure, as providing 
for the exigencies of war without impressment, he ob¬ 
served, “ That the unconstitutional effects, the oppres¬ 
sion, and the inefficiency of levying men for the navy 
by an impress, were but too sensibly felt by the whole 
nation.” 

A valuable sea-officer, Governor Johnson, who is 


1777.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 133 

a distinguished ornament of this legislature, and whose 
private and public character do real honour to human 
nature, having formerly treated of the practise of im¬ 
pressing, says, “ It disgraces government, shocks the 
spirit of our constitution, and violates the laws of hu¬ 
manity ; therefore every plan to obviate the evil, has 
a claim to a patient hearing and a candid discussion.” 
After quoting the opinions of several naval officers on 
the subject, and on the many evils of the present sys¬ 
tem, he said, u The bill proposed, regulated the wages 
of seamen, enacted that any seaman who offered him¬ 
self voluntary, should not be required to serve longer 
than three years, and provided a pension according to 
servitude, and rewards according to good conduct.” 

Lord Mulgrave opposed the motion. He said, “ No 
object had been more fully considered, or more wisely 
provided for, than the encouragement of seamen, and 
the manning of the navy. More than twenty different 
acts to answer those purposes having passed, from the 
time of the Register Act, in 1696, to the present time. 
The honourable member’s scheme had not even the 
claim of novelty to recommend it to their attention, as 
one similar to it, but not so exceptionable, had been 
passed in King William’s reign. If the cause of press¬ 
ing was considered, it would be immediately seen how 
improbable, if not impossible, it must be, to man the 
navy in war by any other means. The several plans 
proceeded upon the idea of the King’s service being so 
disagreeable to seamen, as to make some encouragement 
in order to induce them to enter it ; but the contrary 
was notoriously the fact, as it is known that upon the 
ordinary peace establishment, the navy is always 


134 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. V. 

manned by volunteers ; for not being subject to the 
extortions and impositions too often met with, the em¬ 
ployment being constant, the work lighter, and the 
provisions better, the seamen prefer the navy to the 
merchant-service. It was not difficult to account for 
the change of sentiment in war. Every one knows 
the effect of a demand for labourers on the price of 
labour. This was sensibly felt on an armament. The 
merchants were obliged to give greater wages to induce 
the men to quit other ways of life ; and under these 
circumstances, it was not to be expected that any thing 
but compulsion would bring seamen, at the usual rate 
of wages, into the navy. The fate of the Register 
Act, after a trial of so many years, and at an expense 
of 500,000/., proved how ineffectual prospects of future 
advantage were when put into the scale against the 
temptation of a great present increase of wages.” 

Mr. Lutterell in his speech, having adverted to the 
supposed deficiency of seamen in the fleet, was con¬ 
tradicted by Sir Hugh Palliser, who affirmed, “ as an 
officer, and as an official man,” that the whole fleet now 
fitting out would be completely manned in a very short 
time, and much sooner than any naval force that could 
be sent out by France or Spain. That we had thirty- 
five ships of the line ready for sea, and were in every 
respect superior in strength to any force it was pos¬ 
sible for either or both of those powers, with their ut¬ 
most exertions, to equip. He attacked Mr. Lutterell 
on the account given by him of the Spanish navy, 
charging him with ignorance on the subject, and said, 
“ if the Honourable Gentleman’s assertions, that we had 
no more than twenty men-of-war of the line actually 


WAR WITH AMERICA. 


135 


1777.] 

ready to face an enemy, were correct or founded in 
truth, he need not have employed so much time in en¬ 
deavouring to prove that France and Spain meant to 
attack us, for the fact would be that they would have 
done so already.” 

Notwithstanding the frequent advantages gained by 
the American forces in field, under the chief command 
of General Washington, the contest with the naval 
superiority of England, was of too hopeless a character 
to afford the revolted colonies the remotest prospect of 
eventual success, without foreign assistance. The defi¬ 
ciency in money and stores, as their warlike operations 
became extended, engaged the anxious attention of 
the Congress of the United States, and Dr. Franklin 
was appointed one of their commissioners at the court of 
France, to solicit the alliance of the French monarch. 
But though a large amount was granted as secret aid 
to the colonies, the commissioners were not publicly re¬ 
ceived, until intelligence arrived of the surrender of the 
whole British army, under General Burgoyne, to the 
American forces at Saratoga, when an alliance, de¬ 
fensive and offensive, was entered into, and a fleet was 
instantly equipped to proceed under the command of 
Count d’Estaing. 

Without advocating or attempting even to palliate the 
harsh and impolitic measures of the British Parliament 
and his Majesty’s government, which led to those un¬ 
happy results, we feel justified in acknowledging that 
ministers met the emergency with that energy and 
ability which characterized them as individuals as well 
as officially; and though thwarted without intermission 
in every proceeding deemed necessary by them for the 


136 PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS. [CH. V. 

safety of the empire, and though assailed on every sub¬ 
ject with the uncompromising hostility of a powerful 
faction in opposition, led by men of popular and com¬ 
manding talents in both Houses of Parliament; the most 
extended plans of naval and military operations were 
adopted to meet the impending attacks of our implac¬ 
able continental enemies. 

Our navy, under the control of the illustrious noble¬ 
man presiding at the Admiralty, notwithstanding the 
prohibition of the Corporation of London, and other 
towns, to the raising of men by impressment within the 
jurisdiction of their civil authorities, was already in a 
situation to maintain the superiority of England over 
all other maritime powers united; and the sovereignty 
of the seas, so indisputably vested in her by the vic¬ 
tories of former wars, was endangered only in the com¬ 
ing conflict, by the unfortunate selection of officers en¬ 
trusted with the chief command of our fleets in the 
Channel seas, and on the coast of America. 

The assembling of Parliament, on the 18th of No¬ 
vember, was signalized by the usual display of ani¬ 
mosity on the part of the opposition in both houses. 
The Earl of Chatham, in the House of Lords, moved 
an amendment to the address to his Majesty, and as¬ 
sailed the ministry with a burst of the florid eloquence 
and the glittering diction peculiar to that popular states¬ 
man. “ My lords,” he said, “ what is the present state 
of the nation. It is big with difficulty and danger; it 
is full of the most destructive circumstances. What is 
your defence? Nothing! Our inveterate enemies, 
the two leading branches of the House of Bourbon, 
have a formidable navy. Their intentions are hostile; 


137 


1777.] PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 

I know it. Their coasts are lined with troops from the 
furthermost parts of the coast of Spain up to Dunkirk, 
and what have you to oppose them? Not five thou¬ 
sand men in this island; not more in Ireland, nor 
above twenty ships of the line, manned, and fit for ser¬ 
vice. What has been the conduct of ministers? How 
have they endeavoured to conciliate the obedience and 
affection of their American brethren? They have gone 
to Germany, and have bought the alliance of every piti¬ 
ful, beggerly, insignificant, paltry prince, to cut the 
throats of their loyal, brave, and injured brethren in 
America. They have entered into mercenary treaties 
with those human butchers, for the purchase and 
the sale of human blood. If success is ever to attend 
British arms, Britain must recur to her former means of 
conquest. If any thing is to be effected, it must be by 
British legions and British valour. In such a case, 
should the raising of British troops become necessary, 
I should cheerfully co-operate. I would, my lords, sell 
my shirt off my back to assist in proper measures wisely 
conducted, but I would not part with a single shilling 
to the present ministry. As to America, and its views of 
independency, I must own, I always looked upon that 
country to be as much a part of Great Britain, to every 
purpose but that of taxation, as Devonshire, Surrey, or 
Middlesex. When I say this, I would be clearly un¬ 
derstood to reserve to the colonies, their municipal 
rights, the preservation of their charters, and alone all 
the right of taxing themselves. 

“ These are my ideas, founded, I believe, on a 
thorough knowledge of the people of that country, and 
I am persuaded the colonies will never consent to treat 


138 PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS. [CII. V. 

with us, will never submit while there is a single 
foreign troop in your service.” 

Lord Sandwich in reply, said, “ I am persuaded of 
the great talents of the Noble Earl who has now pre¬ 
sented you with so alarming a representation of the 
state of our public affairs. I know his powers of ora¬ 
tory are universally acknowledged, and that with 
great justice. This nation owes him many signal obli¬ 
gations, as a senator and as a statesman; but with all 
possible deference for the Noble Lord’s abilities and 
opinions, notwithstanding every advantage of know¬ 
ledge and experience that he possesses, notwithstand¬ 
ing the Noble Lord’s amazing powers of oratory, I very 
freely confess that I cannot agree with his lordship in 
a single argument he has urged in support of his 
amendment. Oratory is one thing, my lords, and truth, 
reason, and conviction, another! When the matter 
which the Noble Earl has brought forward to-night is 
separated from the manner, and from the oratorio 
powers which accompanied it, it will most certainly be 
found to contain nothing that can induce your lord- 
ships to dissent from the address now moved. It is in 
my apprehension, though urged with all possible plau¬ 
sibility, totally destitute of any thing that bears the 
resemblance of an argument. The Noble Lord has, I 
presume, been much misinformed, otherwise he would 
never have asserted what I know myself to be unsup¬ 
ported by fact. I do not impute any intentional de¬ 
sign to mislead; but speaking of matters within my own 
knowledge, I hope his lordship will excuse me for 
dissenting from him, and endeavouring to set the house 
right on facts which, if not contradicted, might be pre- 


1777.] PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 139 

sumed to be true. I am specially called upon to ex¬ 
plain what must liave come under my own cognizance 
in my official situation, as presiding at the head of the 
naval department. It is rather a disagreeable task. 
There may be many strangers and foreigners present, 
and what passes here this night, in discharge of my 
duty as an official man, may be wafted by the next 
post to the continent. But the Noble Lord’s assertions 
call for explanations on my part, lest the public should 
be misled, or that it should get out in the world, that 
the Noble Earl’s confident assertions respecting our 
navy are just. The Noble Earl asserts that the whole 
of our naval force for home defence, does not amount 
to twenty ships of the line fit for sea. I tell the Noble 
Earl that he is misinformed, and that he should not 
credit those, who in this instance so grossly deceived 
him. I do not mean to controvert his lordship’s facts 
on mere memory. I have the list now before me, and 
I will venture to assure him, that we have double that 
number. We have now forty-two ships of the line in 
commission in Great Britain, thirty-five of which are 
completely manned and ready for sea at a moment’s 
warning. When I say this I would wish to speak 
accurately, and submit the whole to your lordships’ 
judgment. These thirty-five ships, when their com¬ 
plements are full, require 20,890 men, seamen, and 
marines; of this number, 18,420 are actually shipped, 
and the remainder are ready as soon as called for. The 
deficiency is composed of 2235 marines, and 600 sea¬ 
men, who are now at the several ports. These marines 
are on shore on purpose to improve in discipline and 
in the use of arms, and the 600 seamen are distributed 


140 PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS. [CH. V. 

on board tlie other ships, the complements of which 
are not yet formed. Those other ships will require 
4000 seamen and marines, in the proportion of 700 
marines to 3300 seamen. Of the seamen there are 
900 already on board, so that of the forty-two ships of 
the line in commission, all sound, provided, and well 
found, there are 2400 seamen, and 700 marines want¬ 
ing. The former can be procured, on very short 
notice, by the means of a press, or on an emergency by 
recalling the protections now out, and by other jus¬ 
tifiable means, should the exigencies of the times make 
such exertions necessary. This information is sup¬ 
ported by documents not to be disputed. The Noble 
Earl seems to doubt of our state of preparation against 
any sudden attack in America. As to that I can in¬ 
form his lordship, that our whole force serving under 
Lord Howe consists of ninety-three ships and vessels 
of war, six of these are of the line of battle; there are 
eighty-seven frigates, sloops, and vessels of force. The 
number of frigates which were requisite to carry on 
the operations under Lord Howe, I acknowledge, 
stripped us of our frigates and smaller vessels, but care 
has been taken to remedy that evil and to replace 
them. Thirty-four frigates are in commission, employed 
in different services, ten have since been built in 
King’s yards, thirty in private yards, besides twenty 
that have been purchased from the merchants, making 
in the whole between ninety and a hundred. From 
these facts I do venture to contend, not only that the 
Noble Earl has been grossly deceived, but that we have 
a naval force now ready for sea, should France and 
Spain entertain any hostile disposition towards us, 


1777.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, 141 

much superior to any they can muster. I am per¬ 
suaded from my certain knowledge that they have 
nothing able to cope with us in Europe, as our whole 
force now fit for sea, or on our actual service, consists of 
fifty-four ships of the line, and upwards of 200 fri¬ 
gates and sloops. The Noble Earl asked, after giving 
a deplorable account of our navy, with what justice I 
leave your lordships to determine,—where is the man 
of reputation in his profession who would stake his 
credit on any naval force we are able to send out? I 
will answer his lordship. There is such a man to be 
found. Admiral Keppel, who is ready to stake his 
credit on the issue, and willing to meet the ene¬ 
mies of his country, if any such there be; brave, 
gallant, and nobly allied, a man in whom the Noble 
Earl himself would wish to confide, and of whom he 
entertains the most exalted opinion.” 

This encouraging explanation of the state of our 
naval armament at home and abroad, was followed up, 
as soon as the intentions of France and Spain were 
discovered, by increased efforts on the part of the 
Admiralty to collect officers and seamen for manning 
additional ships. 

The following letters from Lord Sandwich to the 
Secretary of the Admiralty indicate the prompt and 
business-like mind of his lordship. 

The Earl of Sandwich to George Jackson , Esq. 

“ December 27, 1777. 

“ Sir, 

“ It is purposed to put some more ships immediately 
in commission; you will therefore lay before the Board 


142 PREPARATION FOR WAR [CH. V. 

of Commissioners, that Lord Longford is to command 
the America, Captain Alexander Hood, the Kobust, 
and Captain Keith Stewart the Berwick. Lieutenant 
Lefebre, on half-pay, should be appointed third of the 
America, and Edward Wells, now in the Merchant, 
armed ship, fourth of the America. Mr. William 
Gold, of the Romney, but now in London, having a 
few days ago passed his examination, to succeed Mr. 
Wells in the Merchant. Mr. Peter Hill, of the Sultan, 
may be appointed fourth lieutenant of the Robust, and 
Mr. William Demale fifth. The latter is recommended 
by Captain Alexander Hood, who will know where to 
find him. 

“ I have no lieutenant as yet for the Berwick, and 
must desire you to tell Mr. Wright to send me a list, in 
which those are marked that are unemployed; and you 
will asked Captain Stewart and Captain Hood, whe¬ 
ther they have any lieutenants on half-pay to recom¬ 
mend. 

“ Captain Hood’s yacht must be paid off, and the 
men turned over to the Robust, in the same manner 
as was done by the other two yachts. 

“ I entirely disapprove of taking the men out of 
prison as proposed by Captain Boid. Orders must be 
given for the Active’s sails to be ready at all events by 
the 5th of January, as she must go with the West In¬ 
dia convoy which is to sail at that time. 

“ I have no objection to the giving Captain Parker 
leave of absence for a limited time; for instance, a 
fortnight or three weeks, but not in the general terms in 
which he asks, until the ship is ordered into harbour. 

“ I have written to Sir Hugh Palliser upon the sub- 


WITH FRANCE AND SPAIN. 


143 


1777.] 

ject of Sir Thomas Pye’s having stopped Admiral Duff 
from sailing, 

“ And remain, 

“ Very sincerely yours, 

“ Sandwich. 

“ To George Jackson, Esq. 

“ P.S. You will send me a messenger this evening.” 


The Savne to the Same. 

“ December 30. 

“ Sir, 

u The account of prizes in the several letters from 
our western cruisers, should be put into the morning 
papers, as also Admiral Young’s account of the taking 
of the Snake Privateer. I hope I don’t understand 
him right, when he says that a very large convoy is 
coming home, and was to sail the first week in Novem¬ 
ber. Some ships should, I think, be sent out imme¬ 
diately to the westward for their protection. 

“ I have no objection to Sir Chaloner Ogle’s having 
a fortnight’s, leave of absence, and Mr. Atkenson, of the 
Marius, the same time. John Bay ley should be ap¬ 
pointed carpenter of the Proserpine, and orders given 
to the marshal to apprehend his predecessor, who has 
deserted. 

u Yours sincerely, 

“ Sandwich. 

“ P.S. Since writing the above, Sir Hugh Palliser 
has come here, and brings me a letter, which makes 
any further attention about the West India convoy 



144 PREPARATIONS OF WAR WITH FRANCE, &C. [CII. V. 

unnecessary. You will send orders-to day to Ply¬ 
mouth for the Foudroyant and the Bienfaisant, to be 
hastened into the Sound, and to hold themselves in 
readiness for sea. 

“ You will send a messenger to-night. You will 
send orders to Portsmouth for the Trident and the 
Centaur to hold themselves in readiness for sea.” 


1778 .] 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


145 


CHAPTER VI. 

WAR WITH FRANCE—KEPPEL COMMANDS THE CHANNEL 

FLEET. 

Squadrons under Sir Peter Parker and Commodore Hotham, sent to Rein¬ 
force the Fleet in America, commanded by Lord Howe—Admiral Byron 
appointed to cruise off Gibraltar and intercept the Count d’Estaing— 
Keppel appointed to the Command of the Channel Fleet—The Character 
of Keppel—Charnock’s Observations on Keppel—His Political Feelings 
and Connexions—Opposed to the Ministry—Keppel’s Instructions— 
The Fleet puts to Sea—Palliser Commands the Blue Division of the 
Fleet—Capture of the French Frigates, La Belle Poule, Pallas, and 
Licorne—Papers found on Board of the Frigates—Keppel’s Return with 
the whole Fleet to Port—The East and West India Trade hourly ex¬ 
pected Home—Public Alarm on the Return of Keppel’s Fleet, leaving the 
Home Seas unprotected—Letter from Lord North on the Strength of 
the French Armament at Brest—Letter to the Earl of Sandwich on 
Keppel’s Retreat from a Force of imagined superiority—Letter from Sir 
Hugh Palliser to Lord Sandwich—Intreats Him to rely on Keppel’s 
Honour—Keppel expresses to Palliser his Satisfaction with the Candour 
and Conduct of the First Lord of the Admiralty. 

1778. 

Our disputes with America, and the sympathy ma¬ 
nifested towards her by the court of Versailles, rendered 
a war with France ultimately certain ; and as our 
West India islands were likely to present themselves 
to the Americans in conjunction with the French, as 

L 


14G WAR WITH FRANCE. [CH. VI. 

being most open to a successful attack, a reinforce¬ 
ment of two squadrons, one under Commodore Hotham, 
and another under Sir Peter Parker, were despatched 
to join Admiral Lord Howe, then in command of the 
American station; whilst nine ships of the line were 
manned and equipped for the purpose of proceeding 
under Admiral Byron to cruise off the Straits of 
Gibraltar, and intercept the Count d’Estaing, who was 
preparing to sail from France with an auxiliary squad¬ 
ron of men-of-war and transports for the Americans. 

The fleet destined for the home service, became an 
object of paramount importance, from the moment the 
disaffection of our colonies, and the encouragement 
given in Europe to their revolt against the mother 
country, foretold approaching hostilities with our old 
continental enemies, and of no less importance was the 
choice of an officer to command the naval armament, on 
which was to depend the entire defence of the king¬ 
dom. 

In the month of November, 1776, Sir Hugh Palliser 
was the bearer of a message from Lord Sandwich, in 
order to ascertain, as the appearance of foreign powers 
in our disputes might require a home fleet, whether 
Keppel would undertake the command,* and, unhappily 
for his country and for himself, had been the means of 
promoting this selection of government and his lord- 
ship, and of removing a variety of obstacles existing, 
both on their parts, and on the part of Admiral Kep¬ 
pel himself. 

The friendship formed between Palliser and Kep- 


* Keppel’s Defence. 


1778.] KEPPEL COMMANDS THE CHANNEL FLEET. 147 

pel on board the Sea-Horse, when these two officers 
returned home together after the unfortunate expedition 
of Bradock to Virginia, was doomed shortly to be de¬ 
stroyed by the ill-disguised duplicity of Keppel, in his 
vain endeavours to cloak a succession of errors, arising 
chiefly out of the false position in which he was placed, 
by being entrusted with a command, involving such 
mighty consequences to the British Empire. He had 
distinguished himself on many occasions in former wars, 
and from his intrepidity, as well as from a peculiar 
openness and kindness of manner, had obtained great 
popularity in the navy. But his whole career, in the 
prominent and onerous offices of commander-in-chief 
and first lord of the Admiralty, indicated an absence of 
those mental qualities, suited to a sphere of action above 
the duties of a gallant officer on his own quarterdeck. 
As one of the members of the court-martial held on the 
unfortunate Admiral Byng, we find him, as before re¬ 
lated in these pages, confused in his judgment and 
opinions, and incapable of the manly reasoning that 
would convince him, that secresy, though enjoined by 
an oath, when involving the awful question of the 
forfeiture of a brave man’s life was criminal in the highest 
degree, if it promoted injustice, and that if silence aided 
a deed so fearful as the undeserved condemnation to 
death of a fellow-being, every feeling of natural re¬ 
ligion and morality demanded an unreserved disclosure. 
His mind, feeble though human, faltered on this me¬ 
morable occasion, and sought the vain ceremony of a 
parliamentary sanction to speak out, when no thinking 
man would have hesitated or have believed, that any 
assembly of men possessed the authority of influencing 

l 2 


148 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


[CH. VI. 

a matter, resting exclusively between God and his own 
conscience, particularly at the thrilling moment when 
the utterance of its just dictates might have stayed 
the hand that signed the warrant for the execution of 
a commander, whose courage and honour he himself 
had borne testimony to, in the very sentence even 
that condemned him to suffer the penalty of a coward 
and a traitor. 

A writer of acknowledged impartiality* draws the 
following mental portrait of Keppel, exhibiting features 
of a more popular and engaging, than of a Stirling and 
exalted order. “ It will be impossible to give any de¬ 
lineation of Keppel’s character without incurring cen¬ 
sure, either from his admirers, or those of a different 
description. This will ever be the case with a man, 
who by unfortunately having merits and qualities at¬ 
tributed to him, superior to those he really possessed, 
has induced a denial from his opponents, of such virtues 
as they would, without opposition, have unanimously 
allowed him the possession of, had not his friends, by 
their imprudent attempts to raise him into something 
more than a hero, caused the former to counterbalance 
panegyric by ill-founded censure. 

“ Prior to that ill-fated event (his dispute with Pal- 
liser), which all men must admit, was injurious to the 
country, the service, and his own fame, he was the 
idol of all parties, in and out of the service. His 
bravery, his prudence, his diligence, he had happily 
afforded reiterated proofs of. A frankness of disposi¬ 
tion, that trait of character usually distinguished by the 
appellation of good humour, had acquired him amongst 


* Charnock in voce Lord Keppel. 


1778 .] KEPPEL COMMANDS THE CHANNEL FLEET. 149 

the seamen, a degree of love bordering almost on 
adoration. There was, however, a manifest alteration 
in his carriage and disposition after his accession to the 
high rank held in the ministry, an alteration painfully 
observed by his warmest admirers; his former openness 
of behaviour became converted into reserve, and his 
good nature sank into the habit of promising those 
things, which neither his power allowed him, and per¬ 
haps, on many occasions, his inclinations did not induce 
him to fulfil. This change caused him, by insensible 
degrees, to lose much of that popularity he had before 
enjoyed; and it is by no means certain, if chance, or the 
political current of affairs, had permitted him to remain 
much longer in the public sphere, he would have ex¬ 
perienced the same mortifying reverse, which has ever 
since the existence of governments attended occasionally 
the brightest meteors of popularity. As it was, he lived 
not to acquire the dignity of being hated, but passed 
through the latter end of life unmolested, unsatirized, 
and nearly unnoticed.” 

Whatever may be said in favour of the spirit of con¬ 
ciliation which induced his Majesty’s ministers to place 
so popular an officer in the distinguished post of naval 
commander-in-chief, yet the immense national import¬ 
ance attached at such a crisis to the fleet destined for 
the protection of the British dominions at home, ren¬ 
ders the wisdom more than doubtful, of consigning so 
momentous a trust to their avowed political foe, and 
the undisguised partisan of the leading opponents of 
their principles of government. Keppel’s own honest re¬ 
flections must also have shown him, that whilst goaded 
into animosity against them by the factious clamours of 


150 WAR WITH FRANCE. [CII. VI. 

his party, he feigned a confidence in their measures 
which had no real existence in his mind; and that he 
could not bring to his command that unswerving zeal, 
which the honour of his country required him to be 
possessed of. For every event that would shed a lustre 
upon the arms of England, and be reflected back upon 
the government which swayed their operations, would 
give rise to a host of disappointed feelings in the bo¬ 
soms of a long array of relatives and friends, whose 
fortunes, either private or political, rested on the 
downfal or disgrace of his sovereign’s advisers. 

A mind of so narrow a caste as that of Keppel’s, 
however naturally honourable, was not equal to this 
conflict between so many private anxieties, and the 
public duties of an office embracing such deep respon¬ 
sibilities. When ardour and energy should have ex¬ 
isted, doubts and apprehensions clouded his thoughts, 
and the unsuccessful issue of his encounter with the 
enemy, as well as the painful circumstances arising out 
of that inglorious event, demonstrate the baneful influ¬ 
ence of his imperfect reliance on the men who confided 
to him the maritime defence of the nation. 

The poison of party malice, poured into his ear by 
his friends, both in private and in public, during the 
discussion of affairs previous to his appointment, was 
not discontinued when it became known that he had 
undertaken this great naval command; and his cousin, 
the Duke of Richmond, in a letter, the language of 
which must be looked upon as detestable, when in¬ 
tended to warp the feelings of a man standing in Ad¬ 
miral Keppel’s relation to the trusted servants of his 
monarch, thus proffers his friendly admonitions. 


1778 .] KEPPEL COMMANDS THE CHANNEL ELEET. 151 

The whole composition is so illustrative of that 
narrowness of intellect, prone to attribute every un¬ 
worthy motive to the possessor of opinions differing 
from those of its own prejudiced formation, that, inde¬ 
pendently of the harassing suspicions it was calculated 
to excite in the breast of the admiral, as an extract 
would give but an imperfect notion of the liberality of 
sentiment which usually emanated from his grace in 
canvassing the motives of a political adversary, his 
characteristic epistle is given in full. 

The Duke of Richmond to Admiral Keppel, 

11 My dearest Admiral, 

u I cannot wish you joy of having the command of a 
fleet prepared by the Earl of Sandwich, with new men 
and officers, unacquainted with each other, to risk your 
reputation and the fate of your country upon, against 
a French and Spanish fleet, who are, I fear, much 
better prepared. At the same time, I confess I do not 
see how you could refuse your service Let me, how¬ 
ever, advise you to insist upon your own terms. No 
one can be surprised that you should suspect a mi¬ 
nister, whom you have constantly opposed, of not 
giving you all the help he might do to a friend, with¬ 
out suspecting him of treachery. If he has a bad fleet 
to send out, ’tis doing Lord Sandwich no injustice to 
suppose he would be glad to put it under the command 
of a man whom he does not love, and yet whose name 
will justify the choice of the nation. If we meet with 
a misfortune, he hopes to get off;—he was not to blame 
for having given the command to a relation or friend. 


152 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


[CH. VI. 

He chose the man the nation called for. He hopes to 
secure himself against the attacks of opposition, because 
he hopes to blend himself with you in the operations 
carrying on, and if blame is to be borne, he will en¬ 
deavour, by every art he is but too much master of, to 
throw it on your shoulders. I would advise you to 
have the condition of each ship examined by your own 
officers, and assented to by the Admiralty in writing. 
I would insist upon having so many seamen to each 
ship, and the most distinct and clear orders before I 
went to sea. 

“ Your own judgment will enable you to weigh these 
and other considerations much better than any body else 
can possibly do, and how far you have a right to be in¬ 
dulged in the nomination of the man next in command 
to you, and other officers; only be assured that the more 
peremptory and exact you are in every particular now, 
the safer and easier you will be hereafter. I would 
determine not to trust to Lord Sandwich for a piece of 
rope yarn, but have the most authentic returns in due 
form. 

“ God bless you ! Pardon my impertinent zeal, and 
believe me ever, 

“ Your most affectionate 

u Humble servant, 

“ Richmond.”* 

Though usefully engaged in the service of his country 
as one of the Lords of the Admiralty, no sooner were 
hostilities apprehended with France and Spain, than 
Sir Hugh Palliser solicited the honour of an opportu- 

* Keppel’s “ Life of Admiral Keppel.” Vol. ii., p. 3. 


1778.] KEPPEL COMMANDS THE CHANNEL FLEET. 153 

nity of meeting the enemy, and was raised to the rank 
of Vice-admiral of the Blue, and appointed to lead 
the third division of the channel fleet. 

Information had been received by government that 
a large body of troops were in readiness for embarka¬ 
tion at Brest, and that a junction was arranged between 
the squadrons being equipped at that port and at 
Toulon, with the probable intention of invading our 
coasts. Accordingly, a large British fleet was prepared 
for sea, and the following instructions, bearing date 
April 25th, 1778, were given to the commander-in¬ 
chief. 

“ Secret Instructions for the Honourable Augustus 
Keppel , Admiral of the Blue Squadron of his Ma¬ 
jesty's fleet , and Commander-in-chief of a squadron 
of his Majesty's in the channel soundings , or wher¬ 
ever else his service may require ships employed, 
and to he employed. 

u Whereas the very considerable armaments making 
in the ports of France, together with the late offensive 
proceedings of the French court, give the strongest 
reasons to apprehend that their intentions may be hos¬ 
tile against his Majesty’s dominions and subjects. And 
whereas, from intelligence received, there is reason to 
believe that the French squadron, fitted out at Toulon, 
is designed to join the squadron at Brest; and it being 
of great importance that the junction of those squa¬ 
drons should, if possible, be prevented, and that the 
troops destined to reinforce the garrison of Gibraltar, 
which are to embark at Portsmouth about the 24th inst., 
and proceed from thence under the convoy of Com- 


154 WAR WITH FRANCE. [cil. VI. 

modore Evans in the Invincible, in conjunction with 
the Exeter, should be protected from any attempts 
that may be made to interrupt them by the ships from 
Brest, You are, therefore, in pursuance of his Ma¬ 
jesty’s pleasure, signified to us by Lord Viscount Wey¬ 
mouth, one of the principal secretaries of state, hereby 
required and directed, so soon as the troops before 
mentioned are embarked to take Commodore Evans 
under your command (he being directed to obey your 
orders), and putting to sea, the first opportunity of 
wind and weather, with the commodore and his con¬ 
voy, and such of the ships of the squadron under your 
command as are in readiness, you are to proceed 
down the channel into the latitude of Ushant, direct 
him to prosecute his voyage to Gibraltar, agreeable to 
the orders he shall have received from us; ordering, if 
you judge it necessary, some of the ships of your squa¬ 
dron to accompany the convoy, for its greater security, 
so much farther on its way as you may think proper; 
and then to rejoin you on such rendezvous as you shall 
appoint. When you have despatched the convoy for 
Gibraltar, as above-mentioned, you are, in further pur¬ 
suance of his Majesty’s pleasure, to cruise at such a 
distance, and upon such a station off the port at Brest, 
as you shall judge most proper to prevent the junction 
ol the French squadrons above-mentioned, and to in¬ 
tercept any ships that may attempt to sail from Brest 
to molest the convoy going to Gibraltar. If you fall in 
with, or discover the Toulon squadron attempting to 
push into Brest, you are to use your utmost endea¬ 
vours to take or destroy it; and if the Brest squadron, 
or any part of it should put to sea, you are to use the 


1778.] keppel’s instructions. 155 

like endeavours to take or destroy suck of the ships as 
you may be able to come up with. If the Brest squa¬ 
dron should slip by you and proceed up the British 
Channel, or to any part of the coast of Ireland, you 
are immediately to follow it; or, if you receive certain 
intelligence of its having taken any other route, you 
are, in that case, to pursue it, if there is a probability of 
your being able to overtake it, without leaving Great 
Britain and Ireland exposed, the protection of which 
must always be the principal object of your care and 
attention. 

“ If in the course of your cruise, any of the ships of 
your squadron in chasing or otherwise, should fall in 
with any French ships of the line of battle, they are to 
use their endeavours to take or destroy them; and in 
case any French frigates of war should attend upon 
the fleet, or appear to be watching your motions, you 
are to oblige them to desist, and, on their refusal, to 
seize them and send them to England. 

“ Intelligence having been received that several rich 
ships, bound to France from the East Indies (a list 
of which is inclosed), are shortly expected at Port 
L’Orient, or some other port in the Bay of Biscay, you 
are to direct the several commanders of the ships of 
your squadron in case they fall in with the said ships, 
or any of them, to seize them and send them to some 
convenient port in England, to be secured until his 
Majesty’s further pleasure concerning them shall be 
known, taking care that every person belonging to all 
ships so seized or intercepted be well treated, and that 
no plunder or embezzlement be made of any effects on 
board. 


156 WAR WITH FRANCE. [ciI. VI. 

“ In case the Toulon squadron shall have joined the 
squadron at Brest before you arrive upon your station, 
or while you are upon it should elude your vigilance, 
and find the means of passing you into that port, and 
the two squadrons, when combined, should venture to 
come out, or if at the time the Toulon squadron may 
be attempting to push into the port of Brest (pursued, 
perhaps, by the squadron under your command), the 
squadron in that port should come out, in order to 
succour and effect a junction with the other, you are 
in either of these cases, if the superiority of the French 
fleet is not very apparent, to give them battle. But if 
the French fleet, when the squadrons above-mentioned 
are joined, shall be manifestly superior to yours, and 
should come out to meet you, or if you are satisfied 
that, after the junction of the two squadrons at Brest, 
they are superior to you, though they do not come 
out, you are in either of those cases, to return with the 
squadron under your command to St. Helen’s for a 
reinforcement, it being our intention to direct not 
only the ships of your squadron which may not be in 
readiness to sail with you, but all such others as shall 
from time to time be got ready, to assemble at that 
place for the purpose of reinforcing you if it be neces¬ 
sary. 

u You are, during the course of your cruise, to take 
or destroy all such ships and vessels belonging to the 
rebellious colonies, and all ships and vessels going to, 
or returning from, trading with those colonies, as you 
may fall in. 

“ And, whereas the great armaments that are 
making in the ports of Spain may eventually be or- 


1778 .] keppel’s instructions. 157 

dered to join those in the ports of France, the pre¬ 
venting of which is of very great consequence, you 
are, therefore, in pursuance of his Majesty’s pleasure, 
signified as afore-mentioned, hereby required and d- 
rected to endeavour to seize any Spanish ships of war 
of the line that you may discover or meet with acting 
in conjunction with the French, and to intercept such 
as may be attempting to enter, or are evidently bound 
to any of the ports of France; but in all other cases 
you are to consider the ships of Spain as those of a 
power at peace and in friendship with Great Britain, 
and to afford them any assistance or protection they 
may stand in need of. 

“ You are to transmit to our secretary, for our infor¬ 
mation before you sail, a copy of your intended ren¬ 
dezvous, and of the signals by which the ships of your 
squadron are known to each other; and you are to 
send to him during your cruise, frequent accounts of 
your proceedings, with such intelligence as you may 
receive that may be necessary to be communicated to 
us, directing the officer by whom you send your des¬ 
patches to forward the same from the port where he 
arrives, by express. 

a While you are employed on the service before- 
mentioned, you are to protect such of the trade and 
ships of his Majesty’s subjects as may fall in your 
way. 

“You are to continue in the said service for the 
space of one month after you arrive upon your station, 
and at the expiration of that time to return with your 
squadron to St. Helens, sending by an express an 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


158 


[CII. VI. 


account of your arrival and proceedings, and waiting 

there for further orders. 

(Signed) “ Sandwich. 

“ J. Buller. 

“ Lisburne. 

“ H. Peyton/’ 


“Given, fyc., April 25,1778. 


A continuance of boisterous weather retarded the 
sailing of the fleet for some time after all was ready for 
sea. The Ocean, of ninety guns, Captain Laforey, 
was selected for the flag of Sir Hugh Palliser, and she 
dropped down to St. Helens on the 1st of June. 

The following is a private letter from the Vice- 
admiral to Lord Sandwich. 


Sir Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich . 

“ Ocean, 

“ St. Helen’s Road, June 2,1778. 

“ My Lord, 

“ I have deferred acknowledging the honour of your 
lordship’s letter by Mr. Montague, in hopes to have 
been able to do so before this time from Plymouth, and 
at the same time to have informed your lordship of 
our being on our way to look for the Brest or Toulon 
fleets, or both. For if M. Duchaffault has left Brest, 
with only eighteen or twenty sail of the line, I think 
when we join Admiral Byron, that we may reckon 
ourselves a match for both fleets, notwithstanding the 
great superiority they possess in their number of fri¬ 
gates. 


1778.] THE BRITISH FLEET PUTS TO SEA. 159 

“ By means of the embargo continuing, I hope you 
will get men enough to keep pace with the energy and 
increasing strength of the enemy, and that the number 
of fine ships we have at Portsmouth, together with 
the Duke, Formidable, Thunder and others, to be 
equipped, will enable you to furnish us with rein¬ 
forcements and reliefs for such ships, as from time to 
time must come in to refit. 

“ Reflecting on the extravagant number of men, 
said to be on board both the French squadrons (if 
those accounts be true), I cannot bring myself to 
believe that they are going any long voyage, but 
think it is probable they meditate a descent somewhere 
near home, and at the same time having a great army 
on the opposite coast, and a great number of privateers 
and frigates, if the Spaniards decide upon acting in 
concert with them, they may annoy and even attack us 
elsewhere. But I have wearied myself and will not 
weary your lordship with conjectures about them. I 
am impatient to be at a certainty, and that is to be 
obtained only by getting a sight of them, which if we 
once have the good fortune to do, I trust we shall give 
such an account of them, as the king and the public 
have a right to expect from us. 

“ It is rather lucky that we did not go to sea the 
other day, as the wind has blown, and still continues 
to blow so hard, westerly, that we would not have 
gained ground; and the convoy must have been driven 
to leeward. 

“ Your son is very well. I admire his spirit in leav¬ 
ing his friends and the pleasures of the shore, so soon 
after so long a voyage, in pursuit of knowledge in his 


160 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


[CH. VI. 

profession, and in the hope of soon seeing a battle. I 
find him very deserving of the character that Sir Ed¬ 
ward Hughes and Captain Walters have given of him. 
He does the duty of a lieutenant; takes a watch with 
another lieutenant—for in these large ships we have 
two in a watch—and is quartered by me. I will find 
him very useful, and he will soon become my right- 
hand man. 

“ I am always, with the greatest respect, 

“ My Lord, 

“ Your lordship’s most obedient servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser. 

“ June 3d. P. S. I wrote the foregoing last night. 
I am now with Admiral Keppel, who expresses much 
satisfaction at your lordship’s explicitness and attention 
to him. This makes me happy who am so much at¬ 
tached to you both. I think Monsieur d’Estaing must 
be in a bad plight if he is as crowded as we are told.” 

It would seem from the postscript of the above 
letter, that the admiral prepared for sea, expressing his 
approbation of the arrangements made by the Ad¬ 
miralty to enable him to meet the enemy, with a force 
equal to any they could bring against him. 

Twenty sail of the line, three frigates, two armed 
cutters, and a fire-ship assembled at St. Helen’s on the 
4th of June, and got under weigh on the 13th. They 
were shortly afterwards joined by two other ships, one 
of 90, and one of 64 guns. 

This fleet was arranged in three divisions; the van 
under the command of Sir Robert Harland, Vice-ad- 


161 


1778.] THE AHETIIUSA AND BELLE POULE. 

miral of the Red, the centre under Admiral Keppel, 
and the rear under Sir Hugh Palliser, Vice-admiral 
of the Blue. 

The admiral had scarcely reached his station off 
Ushant, when two French frigates, accompanied by two 
schooners of ten guns each, were descried, evidently en¬ 
gaged in reconnoitering his squadron. In conformity 
therefore with his instructions, and the obvious ne¬ 
cessity of preventing this inspection of his force, the 
signal for chase was made, and in the evening Sir Wil¬ 
liam Burnaby, in the Milford frigate, came up with the 
Licorne, a French frigate of 82 guns, and brought her 
into the fleet. The Arethusa, Captain Marshall, also 
got alongside of the other French frigate, La Belle 
Poule, and upon the Frenchman’s refusal to accompany 
her, a gun from the Arethusa was fired across his 
bow, which he returned with a whole broadside. A 
close action immediately ensued, which lasted for more 
than two hours, and which has rendered the battle of 
the “ Saucy Arethusa” and the famed “ Belle Poule/’ 
the burden of a nautical song, still an universal fore¬ 
castle favourite. 

Both ships had drifted close in with the shore during 
the engagement, and the French, according to their usual 
system, having directed their fire chiefly against the 
spars and rigging of their adversary, she was so shat¬ 
tered aloft that she became unmanageable; but La 
Belle Poule set her foresail, and stood into a small bay 
amongst the rocks, which her pilot was acquainted 
with, whence she was towed into a place of safety, by 
some boats that came to her assistance at daylight. 

The Arethusa had eight men killed, and thirty-six 

M 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


162 


[CH. VI. 


wounded; her gallant antagonist, forty-eight killed, and 
fifty wounded, four of whom were officers. 

Whilst the frigates were engaged, the Alert cutter, 
Lieutenant Fairfax, got alongside the French schooner, 
whose commander signified his intention of following 
the example of La Belle Poule, and after a spirited 
action was compelled to strike to Lieutenant Fairfax, 
who ran him on board immediately on his refusal to 
follow him into the fleet. 

On the following morning another French frigate, 
the Pallas, was brought under the stern of the Ad¬ 
miral’s ship. 

Papers were found on board of these French frigates, 
alluding to the force assembled in Brest harbour, and 
the effect of their import upon the commander-in-chief, 
was a resolution to return to St. Helen’s for a rein¬ 
forcement. 

“ I cannot help,” he says, in his letter to the Ad¬ 
miralty, “ allowing that the fleet under my command, 
of twenty ships of the line, and two or three frigates, 
is manifestly inferior to the French fleet as above stated, 
my instructions, in such an event, directing me to re¬ 
pair to St. Helen’s, I think myself obliged, unpleasant 
as my feelings are upon the occasion, to repair thither. 

u I am not bold enough, however my pride otherwise 
might have influenced me, to risk the fate of England 
upon the appearance of such inferiority on the side of 
the English fleet.” 

The papers which caused this needless pang to the 
admiral’s feelings, were of the vaguest and most indefinite 
character, entirely without date, and containing nothing 
more precise, than an order to have anchorage pro¬ 
vided for a certain number of ships, declared by those 


1778.] keppel’s return to port. 163 

on board the captured frigates to amount to twenty- 
seven of the line; but containing no evidence that they 
were ready for sea, and as several French merchant¬ 
men had passed through the British fleet a few days 
previously, which must have conveyed information to 
France of the number of ships of which the fleet was 
composed, the presumption is, no such force was at 
Brest in a condition for immediate service, otherwise, 
what reason can be assigned for the French comman¬ 
der’s not putting instantly to sea, in order to engage 
and crush so inferior an enemy, instead of remaining in 
port until the 8th of the ensuing month. 

The cautionary orders under which the admiral 
sailed, directed him in the event of a manifest superiority 
on the part of the French to put back to St. Helen’s; 
but the inconclusive information derived from the 
captives and their papers, amounted at furthest but to 
a questionable superiority of enemy’s ships in a port, 
which they could sail from only by day, when an ac¬ 
curate knowledge of their number could have been ob¬ 
tained in time sufficient to despatch a communication to 
the Admiralty for a reinforcement, or to secure as a 
last resource, if necessary, the safe return of the fleet to 
Portsmouth. The channel was narrow enough to ad¬ 
mit of the admiral’s remaining on his station off the 
French coast, and insuring at the same time the refuge 
of a British port, when it became expedient to seek it. 

Emergencies frequently occur in war when a retreat 
becomes honourable, and demands the highest order of 
courage, moral courage; but that dignified feeling should 
on this occasion have dictated that so painful a duty 
should have been deferred till rendered unconditionally 

m 2 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


164 


[cii. vr. 


necessary, and that a retreat from a pursuing force of 
ascertained superiority would have been more justi¬ 
fiable and satisfactory, than from one of imaginary 
magnitude so harmlessly situated. 

To such an order, thus timidly interpreted by Kep- 
pel, poor Nelson would have directed his sightless eye; 
and, as at the battle of Copenhagen, when the Danish 
batteries were strewing his decks with the dead and the 
dying—on his commander’s signal of recall being re¬ 
ported to him—would have pronounced with his un¬ 
daunted smile the chivalrous truth—“ that he could 
not see it.” 

The following letter from the prime minister to the 
Earl of Sandwich, refutes the imputation frequently 
put forward, that government was aware when the 
admiral was sent to sea, that the fleet he commanded 
was greatly inferior to the force France had in readi¬ 
ness to send against him, and also indicates, that the 
admiral’s apprehensions relative to the presumed supe¬ 
riority of the enemy at Brest, as derived from the 
papers found on board the French frigates, did not 
extend to the councils of his Majesty. 


Lord North to the Earl of Sandwich . 

“ July, 1778, 

“ Downing Street, Friday Morning. 

“ My dear Lord, 

“ The lords of the cabinet who staid at my house 
yesterday evening after your lordship left us, expressed 
in very strong terms, their anxiety about Jersey and 
Guernsey, and seemed to consider the preservation of 
those islands, as the most pressing of services; and as it 
appears by the intelligence we have received, that Ad- 


keppel’s return to port. 


165 


1778 .] 

miral Keppel is at present superior to the French fleet , 
they wished either the ships which are destined to join 
him, or if they are not fit for that service, a part of their 
crews, maybe employed in the protection of Jersey and 
Guernsey. 

“ I perceive by Mr. Smith’s letters that a new frigate 
has arrived at Plymouth, and I suppose there are some 
ships under the line now at Portsmouth; the addition, 
therefore, of one or two ships to the Acteon’s squadron 
may preserve the islands, and the retarding for a few 
days the junction of a large ship of the line or two, to 
Mr. Keppel’s fleet, does not appear at present likely 
to be of any fatal consequence. 

“ 1 am, mv dear Lord, 

“ Yours most sincerely, 

“ North.” 

An event so unparalleled in the naval annals of 
Great Britain, as the precipitate flight of twenty-two 
sail of the line from an enemy, seen only on paper, na¬ 
turally gave rise to opinions of a conflicting character, 
respecting the motives which prompted our comman¬ 
der-in-chief on this memorable occasion, and caused the 
utmost anxiety in the minds of all parties, particularly 
of those immediately connected with the commerce of 
the kingdom. And though the doubtful admission was 
afterwards wrung from Lord North in parliament, “that 
the extreme cautiousness of the measure exempted the 
admiral from blameyet the return of the whole chan¬ 
nel fleet to St. Helen’s, leaving the home seas unpro¬ 
tected, when merchant fleets of immense value were 
hourly expected from abroad, must have filled the 


166 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


[CH. VI. 

public mind with serious and alarming apprehensions, 
and must have originated impressions of the admiral’s 
conduct differing greatly from those so indulgently 
expressed by his lordship. 

The following extract from a letter amongst the Earl 
of Sandwich’s papers, expresses probably the general 
conviction on the subject:—“ Mr.Keppel has returned 
—if I am rightly informed—with the whole western 
squadron, consisting of twenty-two ships of the line, 
of which five were one hundred or ninety guns a-piece, 
because the Brest fleet, from papers on board the 
Licorne, appears to be of twenty-five ships of the line, 
and two of fifty guns, ready or nearly so to be put to 
sea. This our admiral has taken upon himself to do 
without orders, when two great fleets of merchant- 
ships were expected from the West Indies, and it is 
the time for the return of the East Indiamen; so that 
five men-of-war, with a few frigates sent out of Brest, 
might take them all, and sweep the Channel clearer 
than Van Tromp did the Medway. 

“ There are but two reasons to be assigned for such 
conduct; either that Mr. Keppel has become so nervous 
as to have lost all his spirit, or he is so factious, as to 
sacrifice the honour, trade, and wealth of his country 
to party views. I am inclined to believe the latter is 
the case, for I am told his relative, Lieutenant Berkely 
in his private letters, immediately communicated to 
the opposition the cause of his return, namely, Lord 
Sandwich had sent him to sea with a fleet not capable 
of facing the enemy, being deficient in numbers and 
strength. 

* Sandwich MSS. 


1778.] keppel’s return to port. 167 

Notwithstanding the visionary nature of those alarms 
apprehended from a foe peaceably moored in the har¬ 
bour of Brest—the admiral’s retreat to St. Helen’s, 
being to some extent in accordance with the letter, 
though little consonant with the spirit of his instruc¬ 
tions, or with the expectations of many, who hailed 
his appointment to the command of the fleet as the 
advent of new glory to the naval arms of Britain,— 
he was received without any official observation either 
condemnatory or otherwise. But how far those in¬ 
structions are chargeable with his abandonment of our 
homeward-bound fleets to the risk of being conveyed 
to France, may be estimated by his own declarations, 
when defining on a future occasion the extent of his 
authority in his position of commander-in-chief. 

u I am not to be considered,” he says, “ in the light 
merely of an officer with a limited commission, con¬ 
fined to a special military operation, to be considered 
upon certain military rules, with an eye towards a 
court-martial for my acquittal or condemnation, as I 
adhered to those rules or departed from them. My 
commission was of a very different sort; I was entrusted 
with ample discretionary powers for the immediate 
defence of the kingdom. I was placed, in some sort, 
in a political as well as a military situation; and 
though, at my own desire, for the purposes of uni¬ 
formity and secrecy, my instructions came to me through 
the Admiralty alone, yet part of them originated from 
the Secretary of State as well as from the Board. 
Every thing which I did as an officer, was solely sub¬ 
servient and subordinate to the great end of national 
defence; I manoeuvred, I fought, I returned to port, I 


168 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


[CH. VI. 

put to sea, just as it seemed best to me for the purpose 
of my destination. I acted on these principles of large 
discretions, and on those principles I must be tried.”* 
Though no censure emanated from government, the 
anxiety and suspicions of the First Lord of the Admi¬ 
ralty were painfully aroused, but when confided to Sir 
Hugh Palliser, were met by the following generous 
testimony in favour of his commander addressed to 
that nobleman. 

Sir Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich. 

“ Formidable, 

“ St. Helen’s, 6th July. 

“ My Lord, 

“ Before I had the honour to receive your lordship’s 
letter, I had several serious and confidential conversa¬ 
tions with Admiral Keppel upon the matters you men¬ 
tion, and I think I can safely assure your lordship of 
his disposition being of the fairest and most honour¬ 
able kind, and that he is perfectly satisfied so far as 
relates to your lordship’s conduct towards him, of 
which he always speaks in those terms of praise that 
are due to you. Therefore let me beg of you to enter¬ 
tain the strongest dependance, that when a proper op¬ 
portunity offers, he will acquit himself to his king and 
his country as becomes a man of honour, and that we 
shall all do our duty as far as we are enabled. Be 
well assured, likewise, that I shall always most readily 
contribute, my poor,—but best and warmest assistance, 
which you have a full right to expect. The numerous 


* Minutes oi a court-martial on Admiral Keppel. 


17 ^ 8 .] keppel’s return to port. 169 

instances ot your lordship’s friendship, and the good 
offices received at your hands, binds me by every tie 
of gratitude, to be attentive to whatever concerns you. 
I don’t wonder at the general desire of the nation that 
the fleet should be at sea; none wish it more than 
those in it.” 

The sentiments of confidence and satisfaction, re¬ 
specting the conduct of Lord Sandwich expressed by 
the admiral to Palliser on this occasion, are strangely 
at variance with those ascribed to him by his friends 
and party adherents, and recorded by his late biogra¬ 
pher, who says, u Admiral Keppel observed the same 
prudent and manly forbearance which had charac¬ 
terized his conduct upon discovering how grossly he 
had been deceived, as to the number of ships ready for 
sea. He bore in silence the unmerited obloquy la¬ 
vished upon him by his anonymous accusers, abstained 
from criminating the First Lord of the Admiralty— 
for which a bare statement of facts would have suf¬ 
ficed—did all in his power to stifle discontents in others, 
and made every effort to equip his fleet for sea.” But 
however secretly distrustful the admiral may have 
been of a too-confiding government, he carefully for¬ 
bore to exhibit his feelings, and the success of his dis¬ 
simulation is shown by his being continued in com¬ 
mand, when the general dissatisfaction and alarm would 
have been assuaged by the appointment of an officer 
more bold and zealous than he had lately proved 
himself. 


170 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


[CH. VII. 


CHAPTER VII. 

THE ACTION OFF BREST. 

The Fleet again puts to Sea—Falls in with the Enemy—Both Fleets ma¬ 
noeuvre in sight of each other for four successive Days—Six Ships of the 
Blue Division separated from their Flag on the Morning of the *27th, by a 
Signal from the Admiral—Disorder of the English Fleet—The Action— 
Some of the English Ships not able to get into Action—Sir Hugh Palliser 
engages sixteen of the Enemy—Deprived of the Support of several Ships 
of his Division by the Admiral’s Signal in the Morning—Turns to renew 
the Battle after passing the Enemy’s Line—Keppel hauls down the Signal 
for Battle—The English Fleet stands away from the Enemy—The 
Enemy seen the next Morning, and not pursued—Keppel returns with 
the Fleet to England—His Account of the Action—List of Killed and 
Wounded in the different Ships. 

1778 . 

The fortunate arrival of the West India fleets of 
merchantmen, together with the Levant trade, ap¬ 
peased for a time the apprehensions of the mercantile 
community, and afforded an ample supply of seamen 
for the reinforcement of the western squadron. 

The fleet, augmented by eight sail of the line, con¬ 
sisted of the following ships of the line and frigates: 


SHIPS. COMMANDERS. 

GUNS. 

MEN. 

DIVISION. 

Monarch—Capt. Rowley . 

74 

600 ^ 

Vice-admiral 

Hector—Sir John Hamilton, Bart. 

74 

600 

- of 

Centaur—Capt. Cosby . 

64 

500 - 

the Red. 





THE ACTION OFF BREST. 


171 


1778 .] 


SHIPS. COMMANDERS. 

Exeter—Capt. Nott . 

Duke—Capt. Brereton . 

S Sir Robert Harland, Bart. .. i 
Wueen * Capt. Prescot.5 

Shrewsbury—Sir John Lockhart Ross... 

Cumberland—Capt. Peyton. 

Berwick—Capt. Hon. K. Stewart. 

Stirling Castle—Sir Charles Douglas. .. 


GUNS. 

MEN 

64 

500 ' 

74 

600 

90 

750 

74 

600 

74 

600 

74 

600 

64 

500 


DIVISION. 


Vice-admiral 

of 

the Red. 


Courageux—Rt. Hon. Lord Mulgrave.. 

Thunder—Hon. Boyle Walsingham_ 

Vigilant—Capt. Kingsmill. 

Sandwich—Capt. Edwards. 

Valiant—Hon. John Leveson Gower .. 

f Hon. Augustus Keppel....") 

Victory k Rear Adm. Campbell. V 

l. Capt. Faulknor.J 

Foudroyant—Capt. Jervis. 

Prince George—Sir J. Lindsay, K.B. .. 

Bienfaisant—Capt. Macbride. 

Vengeance—Capt. Clements. 


74 

74 

64 

90 

74 

100 

80 

90 

64 

74 


Worcester—Capt. Robinson. 

Elizabeth—Hon. F. Maitland. 

Defiance—Capt. Goodall . 

Robust—Capt. Hood . 

t? -a ui ( Sir Hugh Palliser.> 

Formidable } Capt g aze]ey .j 

Ocean—Capt. Laforey . 

America—Rt. Hon. Lord Longford .... 

Terrible—Sir Richard Bickerton. 

Egmont—Capt. Allen. 

Ramilies—Hon. Robert Digby. 


90 

74 

64 

74 

90 

90 

64 

74 

74 

74 


FRIGATES. 


Arethusa—Capt. Marshall. 32 

Milford—Sir William Burnaby, Bart. .. 28 

Pox—Hon. Capt. Windsor. 28 

Proserpine—Capt. Sutton. 28 


Two Fire-ships. 


600 ' 
600 
500 
750 
600 


Admiral of the 


894 


> Blue and Com¬ 
mander-in-chief. 


650 
750 
500 
600 . 


750 ' 
600 
500 
700 

750 

750 

500 

600 

600 

600 


Vice-admiral 

of 

the Blue. 


320 

200 

200 

200 


The commander-in-chief set sail from Portsmouth 
on the 9th of July, and on the day previous the French 
fleet left Brest, divided also into three squadrons, com- 


































172 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


[CH. VII. 

prising tliirty-two ships of the line, and several frigates, 
the white division bearing the flag of the Count d’Or- 
villiers, Leiutenant-general commander-in-chief. The 
White and Blue under the orders of the Count Du- 
chaflault, and the Blue commanded by the Duke de 
Chartres. The commanders of the second and third 
of each were the Count de Guichen, and the Sieur 
Hector of the White; the Count de Rochechouart and 
the Chevalier de Bausset of the White and Blue ; and 
the Count de Grasse and the Chevalier de Monteil. 
The flag-captains of the three commanders were, of 
the Count d’Orvilliers, the Sieur Duplessis Parseault; 
of the Count Duchaffault, the Sieur Huon de Kerma- 
deck; and of the Duke de Chartres, the Sieur de la 
Motte Piquet. 

The weather continued hazy for some days after the 
departure of the British squadron, but on the afternoon 
of the 23d of July it cleared up, when the fleets came 
in sight of each other, and were formed immediately 
in order of battle. The British Admiral’s despatch to 
the Admiralty says, “At four o’clock, the weather 
clearing up, it was perceived the French were standing 
from the King’s fleet to N.E. I immediately made 
the signal for the fleet to wear, still keeping the signal 
for the line of battle a-head, only changing it for the 
ships to bear N.E. and S.W. of each other, and to set 
much sail, though I fear without possible hopes of 
coming up with the French this afternoon, unless they 
are as desirous of closing as I am. I fear the object of 
the French is to get in with their own coast.” 

Shortly after the cutter left with this intelligence, 
the French fleet tacked, and stood directly for the 
English fleet, which was put about, and brought 


THE ACTION OFF BREST. 


173 


1778.] 

to on the larboard tack, standing in a contrary direc¬ 
tion. This evolution, at variance with the first im¬ 
pulse of our admiral on descrying the enemy, left room 
for the French admiral’s assertion, “ that he bore 
down to give the English battle, which they declined,” 
and is open to the inference, that he stood after the 
French with a great press of sail—as expressed in his 
message to the Admiralty—“ without possible hopes 
of coming up with them,” but as soon as they tacked 
and stood towards the British fleet, that he brought to, 
and left it to M. d’Orvilliers to begin the attack. 

The following letter from the admiral, assigns his 
reason for a movement corresponding so little with the 
anxieties mentioned at the conclusion of his previous 
despatch. 

To Philip Stephens , Esq., Secretary of the Admiralty. 

“ Victory, at sea, 5 p.m. 

“ July 24, 1778. 

“ Sir, 

u I despatched the Peggy with my letter to you of 
yesterday afternoon, and about an hour after she left 
me the French fleet tacked and stood towards the 
King’s fleet, the wind at W.N.W. As night was 
so near, and an action in the night always to be 
avoided, I brought the fleet to on the larboard tack, 
leaving the option in the French. It blew very hard 
in the western quarter great part of the night, and in 
the morning the French fleet was seen to the N.W., 
one of their ships crippled in her fore-top mast, and 
one of Vice-admiral Sir Hugh Palliser’s division in 
the loss of a main-topsail yard. 


174 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


[CH. VII. 

“ The French have been in the wind’s eye all day, 
and have had the choice with them constantly to 
come to an engagement. Both fleets are now stand¬ 
ing to the S.W. of Ushant, bearing S. 54 deg. 60 min. 
E. distant twenty-two leagues. The French spread 
with their frigates so greatly, that I should fear single 
ships attempting to join the fleet under my command 
would run much risk of being intercepted. 

“ I am, Sir, 

u Your most obedient, humble servant, 

“ A. Keppel. 

“ P. S. We count the French forty sail, great and 
small.” 

It had blown hard during the night of the twenty- 
third, and two of the enemy’s ships which had fallen 
considerably to leeward, on being chased by the Bien- 
faisant, Captain Macbride, and the Elizabeth, the 
Honourable Captain Maitland, steered to the S.E. 
under a crowd of sail, and did not again join their 
squadron. 

As M. d’Orvilliers allowed these ships to be sepa¬ 
rated from his fleet, rather than bear down to their 
protection, and thus bring on an engagement, it had 
the appearance of his being desirous to avoid a battle, 
but as he showed no disposition to embrace the oppor¬ 
tunity afforded him by the British fleet being brought 
to on the first night of their meeting, either to stand 
in for the French coast, or to proceed to sea, it is but 
justice to a gallant enemy to suppose, that as the 
weather would not admit of his using her lower deck 
guns, his object was to avoid an action under cir- 


1778.] THE ACTION OFF BREST, 175 

cumstances so disadvantageous. Keppel says on his 
trial, u I am certain he is a man of great bravery; but 
he might have many very reasonable motives for avoid¬ 
ing a decisive action. Many objects of the French, and 
those very important, might be obtained without a 
battle.” 

On the 25th and 26th both fleets manoeuvred in 
sight of each other, the French preserving the wea¬ 
ther gage. When day dawned on the 27th of July, 
the British fleet appeared to be about three leagues to 
leeward of the enemy, Sir Robert Harland’s ship, the 
Queen, about four miles distant on the Victory’s wea¬ 
ther quarter, and Sir Hugh Palliser in the Formi¬ 
dable, about three miles on the Victory’s lee bow. The 
relative positions of these ships, separated by such 
great intervals, was the result of the fleet being put 
about altogether by signal, and standing for so many 
hours at night on the same tack, when darkness pre¬ 
vented their officers from adapting their rate of sailing, 
and the course steered to the general disposition of 
the whole squadron; but when brought round again 
on the opposite tack, it is obvious to every seaman 
that the red division would then be a-head of the 
centre, and the blue division a-stern, which, when the 
ships belonging to each flag had taken their places in 
the line, would be the regular order of sailing. 

The situation of the Vice-admiral of the Blue on the 
morning of this eventful day, was chosen by Admiral 
Keppel to form one of the subjects of future crimi¬ 
nation, losing sight of the fact, that if involving any 
evil effects, that situation was the inevitable conse¬ 
quence of the evolution performed by his own orders 


1 76 WAR WITH FRANCE. [CII. VIL 

at the comencement of the preceding night, and that if 
proximity to the enemy on the occasion was to be 
deemed a manifestation of any peculiar anxiety to 
meet them, as the Victory was farther to leeward of 
the Queen,—the nearest ship to the French,—than 
the Formidable was to leeward of the Victory, the 
admiral himself, however much inclined, was not in 
a condition to usurp whatever merit this absurd insi¬ 
nuation was expected to steal from Sir Hugh Palliser, 
and no stronger reason can be assigned, for the belief 
that the Formidable was in a situation approved of by 
the admiral, than the fact that the opportunity was not 
taken of correcting it by signal. 

The admiral’s first captain, Admiral Campbell, on 
making his survey of the fleet at daylight,—for Keppel, 
it appears was in bed and asleep at the time,*—threw 
out signals for six ships of the blue division to chase to 
windward with the ostensible design of collecting those 
ships more to windward, and filling up the interval be¬ 
tween the Victory and the Formidable, caused by some 
of the fleet having dropped to leeward in the course of 
the night. 

At the time those ships were ordered from their di¬ 
vision, two of them, the Terrible and the Robust, 
were between the Victory and the Formidable; two 
were a-head of the Formidable, namely, the Worcester 
and the Egmont, and the other two, the Elizabeth and 
the America, astern of her to leeward. The remain¬ 
ing ships of the division were situated as follows: the 
Ocean, about four points on the Formidable’s weather 

* Keppel’s evidence on Sir Hugh Palliser’s trial. “ On the morning of 
the 27th, he came down and waked me, at what hour I cannot recollect.” 


THE ACTION OFF BREST. 


177 


1778 .] 

quarter, distant nearly three miles; the Defiance, on 
her lee quarter; and the Ramifies more than a mile on 
her weather beam. 

The signal which left the vice-admiral of the Blue 
with only three ships of his division, one three miles 
distant, and the others more than a mile, as it did not 
embrace the whole blue squadron, was generally in¬ 
terpreted by the captains, not as an order to ply to 
windward and close in with the centre of the fleet, but 
as one to chase, with design of forcing a reluctant 
enemy to an engagement; accordingly they stood on 
upon a long tack, and the indefinite import of the sig¬ 
nal had the effect of separating them from their flag, 
dispersing the fleet already scattered and in disorder, at 
the critical period of an impending battle, and exposing 
the vice-admiral to the fire of the enemy, undiverted 
by the support of his ships in their proper situations 
a-head and astern of the Formidable. 

Whilst the chasing ships were urged on under a press 
of sail in this enigmatical pursuit, without any attempt 
being made to enlighten their bewildered commanders, 
and recall them to their stations, the French commander 
wore round on her starboard tack, and shortly after¬ 
wards Admiral Keppel tacked his fleet by signals. A 
favourable change in the wind now enabled him to look 
well up for the enemy, but a sudden squall coming on, 
they were lost sight of for a time, and when it cleared 
away were discerned forming their fine on the larboard 
tack. This evolution brought them down towards the 
British fleet, then so scattered, that the sternmost of the 
chasing ships was distant eight or ten miles from the 
Victory, a state of disorder affording an opportunity for 

N 


178 


WAR WITH FRANCE. [CH. VII. 

commencing the attack of too tempting a nature to be 
thrown away by M. d’Orvilliers; he therefore edged 
away off the wind, and began the action by firing on 
the ships of the Eed division as they led up. Keppel 
then made the signal for battle, and the cannonading was 
returned by each ship as she passed along the French 
line. 

The fleets were now on opposite tacks, and the 
British van was soon out of fire, as they were engaged 
only with the rear division of the enemy and a few of 
their centre. Admiral Keppel got alongside the French 
admiral, and afterwards engaged six other ships. 

Sir Hugh Palliser closed up with the second ship a - 
head of the Count d’Orvilliers, when he laid his mizen 
topsail aback, and eased off all the staysail sheets be¬ 
tween the mainmast and the formast, to retard his pro¬ 
gress down the line. The breeze, which had been fresh 
when the battle began, was now nearly stilled by the 
incessant fire of so many heavy guns, and alone without 
a second ahead or astern nearer than a mile to take off 
the enemy’s attention, he passed slowly along the 
greater part of their centre and their rear division, 
being engaged for an hour and forty minutes with six¬ 
teen ships in succession, mostly within pistol-shot; and 
two of the sternmost, more to windward than the 
rest, appearing not to have been before in action, as 
they had no shot-holes in their sails, or other symptoms 
of damage; the Formidable was luffed up in the wind’s 
eye, to attack them at close quarters. 

As soon as the last ship of the French rear division 
was passed, though all the sails before the foremast, 
with the gear belonging to them, together with braces 


THE ACTION OFF BREST. 


179 


1778 .] 

and bowlines, were shot away, the yards were swung 
by temporary ropes, and the Formidable was wore 
round with her head towards the enemy; when the 
drum again beat to arms, and the hands returned to 
quarters with a cheer, anxious to renew the conflict. 

“ On coming out of action,” says Sir Hugh Palliser, 
on his trial, “ the first moment I was clear of the smoke, 
I anxiously looked for the admiral, being ever solicitous 
to second what appeared to me to be his design. At 
this time he had wore, and I saw him at some distance, 
with the ships of his own division about him, and some 
of mine, which had joined him at the engagement. He 
was standing towards the enemy, and had the signal 
for battle still flying. The Red division was then to 
windward of the rear of the enemy; hence I took for 
granted that the admiral intended to renew the en¬ 
gagement immediately, and rejoicing at the idea, I did 
not one moment hesitate to endeavour taking the lead 
in what then appeared to me so glorious a design. 
Therefore though my ship was the last, or last but one, 
which came out of action, and had suffered very much 
in her sails and rigging, and in loss of men, yet I in¬ 
stantly ordered the ship to be wore, and to stand to¬ 
wards the enemy, who was still within gunshot of us, 
without waiting to examine into the state of our 
damages.” 

Whilst she lay as thus described, the signal for battle 
was hauled down, and the Victory shortened sail, and 
unbent her main topsail as she came up. The ships of 
the Red division, the first out of action, and which had 
suffered so little damage as to be able to carry top¬ 
gallant sails close hauled in a strong breeze, also 

n 2 


180 WAR WITH FRANCE. [CH. VII, 

shortened sail on perceiving the admiral’s signal, and 
as the French fleet were getting round on the other 
tack, and three of their ships were advancing in a di¬ 
rection to cut off the Formidable; the admiral ap¬ 
pearing to have given up any intention of continuing 
the battle, it was rendered necessary to provide for her 
safety by wearing her again and proceeding to join the 
fleet, which was immediately brought to the wind on 
the starboard tack. 

The French lost considerable ground in wearing, 
but formed in an admirable line about a league to lee¬ 
ward of the king’s fleet; looking up towards their 
centre, and standing on under topsails and courses. The 
Sandwich, Robust, Egmont, Ramilies, and Courageux, 
in a crippled state, had fallen to leeward of the king’s 
fleet, and as the enemy steered in a direction to cut 
them off, Admiral Keppel edged down with his divi¬ 
sion to cover them, and at the same time made signals 
for Sir Robert Harland to form with the Red division 
in a line astern. These manoeuvres left the Formidable 
and the other disabled ships of the Blue squadron 
lately out of action, to windward and astern of the 
whole fleet, in which situation they continued, strug¬ 
gling on under all the canvass that the shattered state 
of their spars and rigging would admit of being set, 
and in consequence of the quantity of sail carried by 
the admiral, were unable during the evening to get into 
their stations in the line. 

The damage sustained by the Formidable in particular, 
rendered it impossible without incurring the risk of bring¬ 
ing her masts by the board, to set sail sufficient to enable 
her to keep pace with the Victory under her double- 


THE ACTION OFF BREST 


181 


1778 .] 

reefed topsails and foresail, until they were secured by 
repairs of the rigging, cut and shot away in every di¬ 
rection. Standing on with her stern to the advancing 
enemy, the Victory had increased her distance from the 
Formidable, and towards sunset was more than three 
miles in advance of the vice-admiral of the Blue and 
the disabled ships of his division, when signals were 
made to bear down in the admiral’s wake, with parti¬ 
cular ship’s pennants, omitting that for the Formidable 
lying with her fore-topsail unbent, her main and mi- 
zentop sail yards on the cap, and evidently unable 
to comply with such a signal, though immediately re¬ 
peated by the vice-admiral, but which, from the 
situation of his ship nearly end on astern could not be dis¬ 
cerned from the Victory. Before night the Fox frigate 
was despatched by Admiral Keppel with a verbal 
order to the same effect, answered by Sir Hugh Palliser 
himself from the upper stern-gallery of the Formidable; 
the sun had gone down, however, before the foremast 
was sufficiently secured to admit of the foretopsail, and 
the headsails shot into ribbons in the battle, being re¬ 
placed; but as soon as a new topsail could be safely 
brought to the yard, a jib and foretopmast-staysail bent, 
and the ship got under command, she fetched up into 
her station. 

At the close of day, the van of the French fleet 
then completely formed in line of battle to leeward, 
had got up abreast of the division of the king’s fleet, 
and had shown their disposition to renew the action, 
by firing as they stretched along the British rear, on 
the Vengeance, one of the ships of the admiral’s own 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


182 


[CII. VII. 


division, left to her fate in a shattered condition astern, 
and within random shot of her enemy.* 

There were no frigates stationed as on the preceding 
nights to watch the motions of the enemy, and when 
morning came they were discerned at a distance, with 
the exception of three of their ships, which bore away 
immediately under a crowd of sail to join their fleet. 
Signals were made for the Duke, Bienfaisant, Prince 
George, and Elizabeth, to chase those detached ships 
not more than three or four miles distant from the 
British admiral,f but were no sooner obeyed, than 


* Evidence of Sir William Burnaby, Bart., Captain of the Milford frigate. 

Q. “ After you had delivered the message with which you were sent to 
the Queen, did you take notice of the Vengeance ?” 

A. “ I did.” * 

Q. “ Was she at a distance astern, and did she appear to you to be in a 
disabled state ?” 

A. “ Yes ; she was at least two or three miles astern of the admiral, 
and nearly in his wake ; and then seemed to me to lie in a very disabled 
state.” 

Q. “ What hour was it the Vengeance lay in the disabled state you have 
described r” 

A. “ Between five and six o’clock.” 

Q. “ Were you at any time under apprehension of any danger of her being 
cut off by the French fleet?” 

A. “ I did at that time express my apprehension on the Milford’s quarter¬ 
deck, that she would receive the fire of the French fleet as they passed 
under her lee, and thought it probable she might thereby be destroyed, 
then laying in a very shattered condition and seemingly unable to make 
sail.” 


-f* Evidence of Captain Hood afterwards Lord Bridport. 

Q. What distance were the three ships you mention from the British 
fleet?” 

A. “ I can’t pretend to ascertain the distance with exactness ; they ap¬ 
peared to me, if my eye did not deceive me, to be about four or five miles 
from the Robust, the Robust was then to windward of the Formidable and 


1778.] THE ACTION OFF BREST. 183 

countermanded; a general pursuit, if ever thought of 
was abandoned, and the visionary dangers of a lee- 
shore more than a hundred miles distant, assumed 
shapes so alarming to the mind of our admiral, that 
the safety of the great body of the British trade, then on 
its way home, was lost sight of; and though two East 
India and two West India fleets of incalculable value 
were hourly expected, and which, for aught known to 
the contrary, the enemy had steered to the southward 
to intercept, the British fleet were brought to with 
their heads to the north, and their sterns to the retiring 
foe, and after a short time spent in making further 
repairs and setting up their rigging, sail was made for 
Plymouth, where they anchored on the 31st; the pro¬ 
tection of the home seas, and the maritime commerce 
of Great Britain, being consigned by the commander- 
in-chief to two ships of the line and two frigates. 

The following is the admiral’s account of the en¬ 
gagement. 

Admiral Keppel to Philip Stephens , Esq., Secretary 

to the Admiralty. 

“ Victory, at sea, 

“ July 30, 1778. 

“ Sir, 

“ My letters of the 23d and 24th inst., by the Peggy and 
Union cutters, acquainted you for their lordship’s in- 


the Victory, and these ships were nearer to other British ships, than to the 
Robust. Ushant bore from the Robust north, eighty-one degrees, east 
forty-five leagues distant, the wind was westerly and the weather moderate. 
In the middle of sumnier and with short nights and moderate weather, I 
do not apprehend there would be danger if the fleet had chased till they 
had seen those three French ships and the rest of the fleet into port.” 


184 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


[CH. VII. 

formation, that I was in pursuit, with the king’s fleet 
under my command, of a numerous fleet of French 
ships of war. 

“ From that time till the 27th, the wind was constantly 
in the south-east and north-west quarters, sometimes 
blowing strong, and the French fleet always to wind¬ 
ward, going off: I made use of every method to close 
in with them that was possible, keeping the king’s 
ships at the same time collected, as much as the nature 
of a pursuit would admit of, and which became neces¬ 
sary, from the cautious manner the French proceeded^ 
and the disinclination that appeared in them to allow 
of my bringing the king’s ships close up to a regular 
engagement. This left but little other chance of get¬ 
ting in with them than by seizing the opportunity 
offered, the morning of the 27th, by the winds ad¬ 
mitting of the van of the king’s fleet, under my com¬ 
mand leading up, and closing with their centre and 
rear. 

“ The French began firing upon the headmost of 
Vice-admiral Sir Eobert Harland’s division, and the 
ships with him, as they led up; which cannonade the 
leading ships and the vice-admiral soon returned, as 
did every ship as they closed up. The chase had 
occasioned them to be extended; nevertheless they 
were all soon lost in battle. 

“ The fleets being on different tacks, passed each 
other very close; the object of the French seemed to 
be the disabling the king’s ships in their masts and 
sails, in which they so far succeeded as to prevent 
many of the ships of my fleet being able to follow me 
when I wore to stand after the French fleet. This 


1778.] THE ACTION OFF BREST. 185 

obliged me to wear again, to join those ships, and 
thereby allowed of the French forming their fleet 
again, and ranging it in a line to leeward of the king’s 
fleet towards the close of the day, which I did not 
discourage, but allowed of their doing it, without 
firing upon them, thinking they meant handsomely to 
try their force with us the next morning; but they 
had been so beaten in the day, that they took the 
advantage of the night to go off. 

“ The wind and weather being such that they 
could reach their own shores before there was any 
chance of the king’s fleet getting up with them, in the 
state the ships were in, in their masts, yards, and 
sails, left me no choice of what was proper or advisable 
to do. 

“ The spirited conduct of the Vice-admiral Sir 
Robert Harland, Vice-admiral Sir Hugh Palliser, 
and the captains of the fleet, supported their officers 
and men, deserves much commendation. 

“ A journal of my proceedings with the fleet since I 
left this English land, accompanies this. I shall omit 
nothing that lays with me to get the ships as soon as 
possible in condition to be able to proceed on further 
service. 

a I send Captain Faulkner, captain of the Victory, 
with this account to their lordships. 

“ I am, Sir, 

“Your most obedient and very humble servant, 

“ A. Keppel.” 


186 


WAR WITH FRANCE. 


[CH. VII. 


LIST OF THE KILLED AND WOUNDED. 


SHIPS. 

KILLED. 

WOUNDED. 

Monarch . 

. 2 

9 

Exeter . 

. 4 

6 

Queen . 

. 1 

2 

Shrewsbury . 

. 3 

6 

Berwick .. 

. 10 

11 

Stirling Castle . 

. 2 

11 

Courageux.. 

. 6 

13 

Thunderer. 

. 2 

5 

Vigilant. 

. 2 

3 

Sandwich . 

. 2 

20 

Valiant.. 

. 6 

26 

Victory . 

. 11 

24 

Foudroyant . 

...... 5 

18 

Prince George . 


15 

Vengeance . 

. 4 

18 

Worcester. 

. 3 

5 

Elizabeth . 

. 0 

7 

Defiance . 

. 8 

17 

Robust . 


17 

Formidable . 

. 16 

49 

Ocean. 

. 2 

18 

America . 

. 1 

17 

Terrible. 

. 9 

21 

Egmont. 

. 12 

19 

Ramillies . 

. 12 

16 

Total. 

. 133 

373 


Officers wounded .—Lieutenant Nicholas Clifford, Second of the For¬ 
midable. Lieutenant William Samwell, Third of the Shrewsbury. Lieu¬ 
tenant John Me. Donald of the Marines—Prince George. Surgeon of the 
Elizabeth. 


A. Keppel. 






























1778.] 


OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENGAGEMENT. 


187 


CHAPTER VIII. 

OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENGAGEMENT—THE CONDUCT 

OF KEPPEL. 

Relative Strength of the English and French Fleets—Superiority of the 
English in the Number of Ships and of Guns on the Evening of the 27th 
of July—Conduct of Admiral Keppel—His Duplicity towards Palliser— 
Erroneous Statements of his late Biographer—Clerk’s Essay on Naval 
Tactics—Ilis Observations on the Action off Brest—Keppel’s singular 
Apprehensions of a Lee Shore—The Distance of his Fleet from the 
Coast of France on the Morning of the 28th—Letters to the Prime Mi¬ 
nister of England from Emissaries at Paris—The French claim the 
Victory, and assert that Keppel stood away and declined Battle, and 
that they pursued him—The French Admiral’s Account of bis Meeting 
with the Fleet of England—Number of Killed and Wounded on board 
the Fleet of France. 


1778. 

As Keppel afterwards repudiated the truth of the 
statement contained in that portion of his despatch 
where he mentions, “ that he did not discourage the 
French in forming their line to leeward, but allowed of 
their doing so without firing upon them, thinking they 
meant handsomely to try their force with us the next 
morningand in that also which declares, “ the con¬ 
duct of Sir Hugh Palliser to be deserving of much 
commendationthe veracity of the document may 


188 OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENGAGEMENT. [CH. VIII. 

fairly be questioned in every particular, and the accu¬ 
racy of any other part be deemed conclusive only where 
the language of that part may happen to be corrobo¬ 
rated by circumstances which the assertion of the 
admiral could not alter or affect. 

Captain Faulkner, the bearer of the despatch, re¬ 
ceived instructions to present the commander-in-chief’s 
compliments to Lord Sandwich, and to tell him he had 
more to say to his lordship than he chose to commit 
to writing; and Keppel, upon his trial, put forward in 
his defence, that the object of this message was to ob¬ 
tain an opportunity of conveying to the First Lord of 
the Admiralty, a verbal censure of the officer whom he 
had pronounced in his written communication to be 
deserving of much commendation. But whether this 
explanation of the message be true or false; whether 
—as its real import was never divulged to Lord Sand¬ 
wich—it was afterwards seized upon by Keppel to 
transfer to Palliser the accumulation of disgrace which 
had naturally fallen on himself* or for the purpose of 
justifying his mode of bringing charges for the first 
time against him when his own conduct was publicly 
arraigned; or whether—as the avowed object would 
imply—it was an invidious and a treacherous attempt 
to whisper away the vice-admiral’s character, are 
questions that can alter the baseness of the procedure 
in a very remote degree. If the hidden meaning of 
the message, tending probably to a report of matters 
of a totally different nature, was taken advantage of, 
and converted into a plausible pretext for giving a 
colour of consistency to the crimination of the vice- 
admiral, after the silence of many months; and until a 



189 


1778.] THE CONDUCT OF ADMIRAL KEPPEL. 

disappointed nation demanded a plenary account of 
the admiral’s inefficient proceedings in sight of the 
enemy; the attempt stands branded as a subterfuge 
every way unworthy of an officer and a gentleman; 
and if sent with the alleged intention of expressing 
blame in private, when public praise had been awarded, 
the duplicity of the act is revolting to every honest and 
honourable feeling. 

The reason assigned by Keppel for the adoption of 
this secret accusation, in preference to the straight¬ 
forward course of an open and definite charge, was, 
u that it would suspend the operations of the whole 
fleet, when the exertions of every officer was necessary.” 
But though a court-martial might retard the prepara¬ 
tions for meeting an enemy again, who, on the morning 
of the 28th of July were allowed to depart in peace, 
that result, even, would afford a very imperfect excul¬ 
pation of the dark attempt to sully the honour of an 
unsuspecting friend and brother officer, and exhibits a 
striking contrast to the generous anxiety evinced by 
Palliser* to lull the natural suspicions of Lord Sand¬ 
wich, when Keppel first turned his back upon France, 
and retreated from an enemy, then in a situation be¬ 
yond the possibility of offering him the slightest mo¬ 
lestation. 

In his despatch to the admiralty, the commander-in¬ 
chief tells the world that he had no intention of re¬ 
newing the engagement on the afternoon of the 27th, 
and in direct contradiction to that, attempted after¬ 
wards to prove, on his trial, that Sir Hugh Palliser 
was the only obstruction to this glorious opportunity 

* See Letter, p. 168. 


190 


OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENGAGEMENT. [CH. VIII. 

of destroying the enemy. But can any man suffer his 
understanding to be so imposed upon as to believe that 
zeal for the public service, or any other feeling not 
relating exclusively to himself, could induce Keppel 
to smother the disgrace of that day, rather than bring 
a man to condign punishment, by whose misconduct he 
lost the fairest opportunity ever afforded a British offi¬ 
cer of taking or destroying the navy of France, and by 
that stroke recovering, in all probability, our revolted 
colonies in America, and crushing the warlike dispo¬ 
sition of Spain, looking with an anxious but wavering 
gaze to the results of this encounter between the hostile 
navies of those ancient rivals for the sovereignty of the 
seas; determined to retire or advance as her continental 
ally was conquered or victorious ? Admitting even 
that an officer who had borne the brunt of the battle, 
and who, a few hours before, had exhibited indubitable 
proofs of valour, could be capable of an action so 
irreconcilable with his former behaviour, as wilful 
disobedience of his commander’s- signal under such cir¬ 
cumstances. Was the glory of the day to be sacrificed 
because one man was forgetful of his honour? Was it 
the duty of an officer and a seaman to bring on an en¬ 
gagement at any risk in the morning, when his fleet 
was to leeward, scattered and in disorder, and to avoid 
one in the evening, when to windward of an enemy, 
by the admiral’s own account, a so much beaten,” un¬ 
less each ship was in her station in a compact line of 
battle ? 

The situation of the vice-admiral’s ship, dropping 
astern the whole evening, with her fore topsail unbent, 
and her other topsails on the caps, indicated either 


191 


1778.] THE CONDUCT OF ADMIRAL KEPPEL. 

negligence or misfortune, which it became the para¬ 
mount duty of the commander-in-chief to ascertain 
and correct; and if the Formidable could not be o;ot 
into action, the British fleet, without her, was equal in 
number, and otherwise infinitely superior to the French, 
and eleven of their ships, even then, would have been 
greatly over-matched. 

The French fleet when first seen, consisted of thirty- 
two sail of the line, including two fifty-gun ships, and 
carried, according to the most accurate accounts, 2270 
guns; two of them, namely, Le Due de Bourgoyne, of 
80 guns, and L’Alexandre, of 64, were separated from 
the fleet before the action, and one went away disabled 
immediately after it; supposing her to have mounted 
64 guns, the remaining twenty-nine had only 2062 
guns, which was 216 less than those of the British 
fleet. The French had one ship of 110 guns, one of 
90, two of 80, thirteen of 74, ten of 64, and two of 50. 
Our fleet consisted of one ship of 100 guns, six of 90, 
one of 80, fifteen of 74, and seven of 64. So that sup¬ 
posing the admiral to have renewed the battle without 
the Formidable, two of the enemy’s fifty-gun ships must 
have fought with two of our sixty-fours, five of their 
sixty-fours with five of our seventy-fours, and three of 
their seventy-fours, with three of our ninety’s. 

The vice-admiral’s previous spirited behaviour, when 
on coming out of fire, he doubled at once upon the 
enemy to renew the engagement without pausing to 
ascertain the extent of his damage, afforded the am¬ 
plest assurance, that if Admiral Keppel, instead of car¬ 
rying sail with his stern to his advancing antagonist, 
had brought to, when he effected the protection of the 


192 OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENGAGEMENT. [CH. VIII. 

five crippled ships, the Formidable, as well as tlie 
other disabled ships of the Blue division, would have 
been enabled to get into their stations in the line, and 
the whole fleet would then only have had to edge 
down, when—if fortune influencing to some extent 
the fate of all battles, refused a complete victory to the 
arms of England—an inferior enemy would not have 
been allowed the shadow of a pretence for proclaiming 
to the world, “ that they pursued the king’s great fleet, 
and repeatedly offered them battle in the best order 
to leeward.”* 

In a late biography of Keppel, by the Hon. Mr. 
Keppel—referring to the cause of the engagement not 
being renewed on the evening of the 27th—the author 
states, “ that Sir Hugh Palliser repeated the signal to 
bear down in the admiral’s wake, but omitted to re¬ 
peat the signal for the line of battle.”f This statement 
is certainly at variance with the facts proved by the 
concurrent declarations of several witnesses on the trial 
of the vice-admiral, and however natural the anxiety 
to rescue the memory of a relation from the stigma 
which must ever be attached to it, of utter incompetency 
on this momentous occasion, the subversion of facts 
established upon the sworn testimony of honourable 
British officers, over whose heads the flags for that 
signal were flying the entire evening, can scarcely be 
justified, and if the writer neglected to inform himself 
of the direct and corroborative evidence against the 
truth of so criminal a charge, and in confirmation of 

* French admiral’s despatch. 

f The Life of Admiral Keppel, by the Hon. and Rev. Mr. Keppel, vol. 
ii. p. 44. 


1778.] THE CONDUCT OF ADMIRAL IvEPPEL. 19<i 

the repetition of the signal for the line of battle, ig¬ 
norance when correct information was easily attainable, 
cannot be deemed to form a reasonable excuse for the 
propagation of such glaring inaccuracy. 

Captain Bazeley, commander of the Formidable, in 
his examination, was asked by the court: 

u Was the signal of the line flying on board the For¬ 
midable the whole afternoon to your knowledge?” 

A. “ To the best of my recollection it was.” 

Q. “ When you repeated the signal for the line, did 
you fire a gun at the same time?” 

A. a I do not particularly recollect that.” 

Q. “ But are you positive it was repeated?” 

A. “ Yes, it was repeated; I saw it flying at dif¬ 
ferent times, it was not hauled down before dark.” 

Lieutenant John Hills, of the Formidable, was 
sworn, and asked by the court: “ Do you remember 
seeing the signal for the line flying on board the For¬ 
midable in the afternoon, and any particular circum¬ 
stance which brings that to your recollection?” 

A. “ I do; I did not observe them till Lieutenant 
Winkworth asked me what those signals were; I told 
him if he would send down for my signal-book I would 
inform him. The signal-book was sent for, and I told 
him it was the signal for the line of battle a-head.” 

Lieutenant Grosvenor Winkworth, of the For¬ 
midable, sworn, and asked by the court: “ Had you any 
conversation with Lieutenant Hills relative to a signal- 
book in the afternoon of the 27th of July?” 

A. “ I had.” 

Q. “ About what time, and what was the conver¬ 
sation?” 


o 


194 . OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENGAGEMENT. [CH. VIII. 

A. “ I cannot speak to the time. I observed Mr. 
Hogart hoist two flags at the mizen peak; upon which 
I asked Lieutenant Hills what that signal meant; he 
said he did not know, but if I would send for the signal- 
book he would look. I sent for the signal-book, and 
found it to be the signal for the line of battle a-head.” 

Q. “ How long were they kept flying?” 

A. u I observed them flying most part of the evening. 
All the evening, I believe. 

Q. “ Was there any gun fired to your knowledge 
when the signal was made?” 

A. “ It «was that made me look about to see what 
was the signal that was hoisted.” 

Robert Haven, gunner of the Formidable, sworn, and 
asked by the court to produce his expense-book. 

Q. 46 Does it appear that a signal-gun was fired on 
board the Formidable in the afternoon after the engage¬ 
ment of the 27th? If so, read the article to show the 
expenditure.” 

The article was read as follows: 

“ To fired per signal line of battle a-head. 

“ July 27, 1778. 


** Twelve pounder. l 

“ Powder.. 6 lb. 

“ Cartridge . 1 ” 


Q. “ Is all this book in your own hand-writing?” 

A. “ Yes; except Captain Bazeley’s signature to it.” 
Q. u Has it been constantly in your possession ever 
since?” 

A. “ Constantly; except when the captain’s clerk 
wished it for the captain’s use.” 

Gunners mate of the Formidable sworn, and asked 





195 


1778.] THE CONDUCT OF ADMIRAL KEPPEL. 

by tbe court: “ Do you remember a signal-gun being 
fired in the afternoon after the engagement of the 27th 
of July? and if you remember any thing particular re¬ 
lative to the firing of the gun, give an account of it.” 

A. u It was fired in- the afternoon, presently after the 
engagement; I fired it myself.” 

Q. “ Do you remember whether the shot was 
drawn?” 

A. “ The shot was in it; round and double-headed, 
and pointed to the water.” 

Q. “ Was there any other signal-gun that afternoon?” 
A. “ No.” 

Q. “ How came you to know that the round and 
double-headed shot was in the gun?” 

A. “ They were all shotted on that side before we 
came into action, and the gun was never used. I saw 
them all shotted myself.” 

Kobert Hogart, signal midshipman of the Formidable, 
sworn, and asked by the prisoner: 

“ Give an account to the court what signals were 
repeated on board the Formidable after the Victory 
passed to leeward of her on the afternoon of the 27th, 
beginning with the first of them.” 

A* “ Immediately after the Victory passed to lee¬ 
ward of the Formidable, the signal for the line was re¬ 
peated; that was kept up for some time, then hauled 
down; then the blue flag was hoisted alone at the 
mizen peak, then that was hauled down and the signal 
for the line hoisted again; and afterwards the blue flag 
was hoisted underneath the signal for the line.” 

Q. “ Were the signal for the line and the blue flag 
under it kept up all night?” 

o 2 


196 OBSERVATIONS ON THE ENGAGEMENT. [CH. VIIR 

A. “Yes.” 

Q. “ Was there any time in the afternoon the signal 
for the line, or the blue flag was not flying?” 

A. “No.” 

Q. “ Did you see all those signals you have mentioned 
flying yourself?” 

A. “ Yes, I did.” 

Q. “ Were they made with guns or without?” 

A. “ The signal for the line was with a gun.” 

Amongst the many writers who have discussed the 
professional conduct of Keppel in this action, which 
from its indecisive and inglorious termination, entailed 
consequences so derogatory to the martial honour of 
his country, as well as fatal to the peace of Europe. 
Mr. Clerk, of Eldin, in his “ Essay on Naval Tactics,” 
published a few years after the event, gives the fairest 
and most conclusive exposition of the series of errors 
which characterized Keppel’s command on that me¬ 
morable day. 

The essay referred to, though' written by a landsman 
and a civilian, has obtained the reputation of having 
influenced by its theoretical reasoning, all the splendid 
practical results of our great naval battles, since Lord 
Rodney’s victory, in 1782, to the battle of Trafalgar. 
The introduction to the work is for the most part 
historical, and is intended to show that, notwithstand¬ 
ing the acknowledged bravery and general naval skill 
of our seamen, and notwithstanding the success that has 
usually attended us in rencounters of single ships, yet 
not a single general action has been fairly fought on 
equal terms with decisive effect against the French, or 
French and Spaniards combined, since Mathews’s en- 


1778.j clerk’s essay on naval tactics. 197 

gagement off Toulon, to that of Admiral Graves off 
the Chesapeak. 

A very material distinction subsisted always be¬ 
tween the French and English in their mode of war¬ 
fare. The former, being a continental power and 
relying most on its army, considered its navy as prin¬ 
cipally useful in giving protection to its trade, and co¬ 
operating occasionally with its military forces. Hence 
the French commanders by sea, naturally adopted a 
defensive system of tactics; whilst the English, on the 
other hand, placing their chief reliance on their fleets, 
have bent all their attention to the manoeuvres for 
bringing the enemy to close action. Mr. Clerk’s book 
is not, therefore, properly speaking, so much a system 
of naval tactics, as of that branch of them which treats 
of the most decisive method of conducting an attack; 
and on the science of defence he is wholly silent. 

The first part of the essay relates to the attack from 
to windward as practised by single ships, and the 
author shows that it has always been the custom for 
the commander of the attacking ship, to make his 
approaches in such a manner as to be on equal terms 
with the enemy during the whole of his course. A 
ship may be brought to close action by a superior sailer 
to windward in three ways: first, by running down 
astern and getting nearly into the wake of the enemy, 
and then coming close alongside; secondly, by shooting 
a-head, then wearing and running down on the wea¬ 
ther bow of the enemy, forcing him to bear away to 
leeward; or thirdly, on coming parallel to the enemy, 
to bear down directly and on, till the two vessels are 
sufficiently near for close action. In the two first cases 


198 BRINGING FLEETS INTO ACTION. [CH. VIII. 

it is obvious that whenever the ship receiving the 
attack can bring her broadside to bear, the ship 
making the attack can also do the same, and there¬ 
fore that they are on equal terms, and it is equally 
manifest that in the third case, the attacking ship, 
during the whole time she is bearing down, is exposed 
to a raking broadside from her antagonist, to which 
she has nothing to oppose but her two bow chases: 
hence it must necessarily happen that the attacking 
ship will be more or less damaged in her rigging 
before she has an opportunity of commencing the 
action, in consequence of which her antagonist may 
generally take the option of sailing off without in¬ 
jury, or of commencing a close action under very 
favourable circumstances. 

From the combats of single ships, Mr. Clerk pro¬ 
ceeds to the method of bringing fleets into action, in 
which cases the British were generally compelled 
to be the assailants. The aim of the British admirals, 
in 'conformity to the fighting instructions, has been to 
detain and bring to close action the whole of an 
enemy’s squadron; in conformity with which, the van 
ship of the British has been directed on the van ship 
of the enemy, and so of every other ship in succession. 
But this can be done only by bearing down endwise, 
ship for ship upon the enemy, or forming the line 
abreast, or else in the lasking method in which the 
line is formed ahead, and directed in a slanting posi¬ 
tion on the enemy. In the first of these cases, an 
engagement between two fleets may be considered as a 
combat between several pairs of ships, in which the 
assailants make the attack in the most disadvantageous 


199 


1778.] clerk’s essay on naval tactics. 

manner possible, as already shown in the case of single 
ships. In the second method it is obvious that the 
less slanting the line of attack is, the more it ap¬ 
proaches to the first case, and is liable to the same 
objections; and in proportion as the course is made 
more slanting, it is manifest that a longer line must be 
described, before the van ship of the assailing squa¬ 
dron can fetch the van of the enemy, during the whole 
of which course, the van ships being exposed to a 
heavy fire from nearly the whole of the enemy’s line» 
will suffer proportionally, and be more or less dis¬ 
abled. But if even a single ship in the van of the 
attacking fleet is materially injured, her course will be 
retarded, as also will be that of every ship in her rear. 
Hence the headmost ships will be separated from the 
rest, and exposed to an unequal combat with the enemy. 
If the damaged ship is enabled to proceed, or if her 
second astern is impatient to join the van, the 
wounded ship must be passed either to windward or 
to leeward, in either of which cases time is lost, and 
and the line runs a great risk of being broken, inde¬ 
pendently of the raking fire fore and aft that ship 
which passes to leeward is subject to, while perform¬ 
ing this manoeuvre. 

Another circumstance decidedly in favour of a fleet 
attacked in the foregoing manner is, that the ships 
composing it present their windward broadsides to the 
enemy, and therefore their shot takes a much longer 
range than the leeward batteries of their adversaries, 
and this in proportion to the force of the wind at the 
time. Hence it appears that a fleet to windward join¬ 
ing battle with another to leeward in the manner de- 


200 BRINGING FLEETS INTO ACTION. [ciI. VIII. 

scribed, even if both parties are equally willing to 
fight, must suffer severely, especially in their rigging, 
before they have an opportunity of retaliating; and 
where the fleet receiving the attack are not disposed 
to come to close action, they may readily retire under 
cover of the smoke, from an enemy already crippled. 

Such was the relative state of British and French 
naval tactics during many years; the former aiming at 
the entire destruction of the enemy, made the attack 
as described, in consequence of which the van of the 
British was always more or less crippled, and sepa¬ 
rated from the rest of the fleet, and thus began the 
action with the van of the enemy, unsupported and to 
great disadvantage; in the meantime the van ships of 
the enemy, after a short action, wore in succession, 
and passed to leeward, while the rest of their fleet 
making sail a-head, filled up the vacancy, and thus dis¬ 
charged the fire of the whole line on the British van, 
before the centre and rear divisions could come up 
to their support. The enemy was thus enabled to 
form a new line unmolested, two or three miles to 
leeward of the former, in readiness to repeat precisely 
the same manoeuvre, if their adversaries were at all 
disposed to hazard a second attack. So entirely were 
the French convinced of the efficacy of this system of 
defence, that they often voluntary yielded the wind 
to the British, and as often gained the advantage in 
the subsequent battle, as far as withdrawing unhurt 
and damaging their adversaries can be called an ad¬ 
vantage. 

Having explained the old system of naval tactics, 
both of the British and French, as far as regards the 


201 


1778 .] clerk’s essay on naval tactics. 

attack from to windward, Mr. Clerk proceeds to cite—in 
conformation of the objections which he has made to 
this mode of proceeding—the battles of Admiral Byng, 
off Minorca; Admiral Arbuthnot, off the Chesapeak; 
and Admiral Rodney, off Martinico; in all of which, 
the British line being disordered while at a distance, 
the van has been separated from the rest of the fleet, 
and has had to sustain the whole fire of the enemy 
ship by ship, as they passed in succession to form a 
new line to leeward. 

The mode of attack proposed by Mr. Clerk to super¬ 
sede that, the disadvantages he has thus demonstrated, 
is as follows: Let the attacking fleet instead of form¬ 
ing one line, be arranged in three parallel divisions or 
columns, and when the headmost ships of the fleet 
have got within the distance of three or four miles from 
the rear of the enemy to leeward, let one of the divi¬ 
sions be detached to force an attack on the three or four 
rear ships of the enemy, by falling in their wake and 
coming up alongside, while the rest of the fleet forms a 
line by divisions to windward in order to observe that 
part of the enemy’s squadron which is not engaged. 
This being done, and the wind still continuing in the 
same quarter as at first, one of two things must neces¬ 
sarily happen; either the enemy must abandon the 
ships in his rear that are already engaged, or he must 
return to their support, and come into action to a dis¬ 
advantage, and as close as his adversary pleases. 

Having laid down the general plan of attack, Mr. 
Clerk proceeds in the subsequent sections, to examine 
the different methods by which the remainder of the 
enemy’s fleet may attempt to disengage their rear ships. 


202 BRINGING FLEETS INTO ACTION. [CH. VIII. 

They may attempt in four ways, by tacking to wind¬ 
ward in succession, or all at once, or wearing to lee¬ 
ward in succession, with the van ahead, or at once 
with the rear ahead. But in none of these cases, as the 
author shows by diagrams, can the enemy succeed 
without coming at a disadvantage, into close action with 
the reserved part of the adverse fleet. 

The mode of the attack of fleets from the leeward oc¬ 
cupies the next portion of the essay. This may take 
place when two opponent squadrons are on the same 
or on opposite tacks. Of the first case, or the simple 
attack, there are very few examples, the French always 
preferring to receive battle to the leeward, or on con¬ 
trary tacks to windward. This latter, called by Mr. 
Clerk the cross attack, used to be thus conducted; the 
leading ship of the leeward fleet fetching the enemy 
as near the van as possible, the two squadrons were 
brought parallel, and continued under easy sail, ex¬ 
changing broadsides till they had entirely passed each 
other. By this manner of proceeding they engaged in¬ 
deed on equal terms, but the action was necessarily of 
such short duration, as to prevent any thing decisive 
from taking place. 

Suppose the rate of sailing in each fleet to be no more 
than two miles and a half an hour (a motion abso¬ 
lutely necessary to give the rudder a proper command 
of the ship), then the time during which any two ships 
can be in direct opposition to each other, does not ex¬ 
ceed half a minute, and the space between any two 
contiguous ships in the same line, will be passed over 
in one minute and a half, if the ships are drawn up 
with the usual intervals between each other. There- 


203 


1778.] clerk’s essay on naval tactics. 

fore, in order that each ship should give and receive 
only as many broadsides as their ships in the opposite 
squadron, every broadside must be prepared in a mi¬ 
nute and a half, and discharged in half a minute. 

In order to make the attack from to leeward more 
decisive than it has hitherto been, Mr. Clerk proposes 
the manoeuvre of cutting the enemy’s line. This can 
only be done when the two fleets meet on opposite 
tacks; and the most simple manner of effecting it, is 
for the van ship of the attacking squadron, instead of 
ranging parallel with and to leeward of the enemy, 
to pass through the first interval that occurs, and thus 
lead the line directly across that of the enemy. In 
consequence of this, the van of the attacking fleet will 
be to windward of the enemy’s rear, while the rear will 
still be to leeward of the enemy’s van, thus the attack¬ 
ing squadron will preserve their own line entire, while 
that of their adversary will be cut in two. Further, 
the ships of the rear division thus obstructed, having 
their progress intercepted, are very likely to crowd 
one upon the other and get into confusion, in which 
state they must be forced to leeward. 

If the line of the enemy is cut within three ships 
from the rear, these ships must necessarily be forced so 
far to leeward, that the admiral of the attacking fleet, 
having detached a sufficient force to compel them to a 
speedy surrender, will be able to form the last of his 
squadron in line of battle between the main body of 
the intercepted rear of the enemy; the consequence of 
which, will be, that these ships will be secured before 
the enemy’s van can be brought to their assistance, 


204 


CUTTING THE LINE. 


[CH. VIII. 

nor can he possibly recover them without previously 
defeating in close action the interposed line of battle. 

When the line of the enemy is cut near the centre, 
all the ships astern of the interval through which the 
attacking fleet has passed, will be retarded and forced 
to leeward; in the meantime the van of the assailants 
ranging to windward, and their centre and rear coming 
up, the enemy’s rear will be forced to put before the 
wind, and will probably lose their heavy sailing vessels 
before their van can give any assistance. 

Similar consequences will ensue if the line of the 
enemy is cut so as to separate the rest of the fleet from 
the van; but in this case the attack being made on the 
combined rear and centre of the enemy, the success will 
not be so certain. 

Another mode of attack from the leeward is, for the 
van ship of the attacking squadron, followed by the 
three next astern, to range under the lee of the enemy; 
while the fifth ship, with all the rest astern, pass across 
the enemy’s line and then cut it in two. This mode, 
like the preceding, divides itself into three separate 
cases. If the attack is made on the four sternmost 
ships of the enemy, the four leading ones of the attack¬ 
ing squadron range close under their lee, while the 
rest pass between the fourth and fifth from the enemy’s 
rear, thus completely separating these four ships from 
their friends, which being vigorously attacked both on 
the windward and leeward quarters, and also ahead, 
must necessarily be taken. If the enemy’s line is cut 
about the centre, in the manner just described, the 
success is more doubtful, as the four ships to leeward 


1778.] CLERK’S ESSAY ON NAVAL TACTICS. 205 

will have to sustain unsupported a cannonade from 
half the enemy’s squadron. Still greater will be the 
risk of failure, when the line of the enemy is cut be¬ 
tween the van and the centre; so that, upon the whole, 
Mr. Clerk is of opinion that this mode of attack should 
be directed only upon the enemy’s rear. 

A third modification of attack from the leeward, is 
for the attacking admiral to fetch the centre of the 
enemy’s fleet with his leading ship, to range with the 
van and half the centre to the leeward of the enemy, 
and to pass across the line with the remaining half of 
the fleet. By these means, if the two fleets are of 
equal force, say twenty-four sail each, the twelve rear 
ships of the enemy will be separated from the rest, at 
the very time in which they are engaged with an 
equal squadron to leeward. The headmost ships of 
this rear division will be forced to leeward by the ship 
which cut the line, and will be pressed still farther and 
farther down as the rest of the attacking squadron 
comes up. In the meantime, the leading ships of the 
division which passed to leeward, having ranged beyond 
the enemy’s rear, will put about in succession, to ob¬ 
struct his passage to leeward, on the starboard quarter, 
while the rear ships of the windward division will bear 
down on the larboard. In these circumstances the in¬ 
tercepted division of the enemy must put about to go 
before the wind, and in effecting this will be severely 
raked by the van ships of the windward division, with 
the certainty of having all his crippled ships picked up 
by the vessels that are closely pressing on his larboard 
and starboard quarters. At this moment of cutting 
the line, the van ship of the enemy will be at least two 


CUTTING THE LINE. 


20 G 


[CH. VIII. 


miles ahead, and the distance will have considerably 
increased before any measures can be taken to assist 
the intercepted part of his fleet; so that they will be 
able to give little or no molestation till the crippled 
ships of his rear are secured by the assailants. 

The last mode of attack investigated by the author, 
is the perpendicular, or the attack at right angles. 
Suppose a numerous fleet, formed in an irregular line 
abreast, extended to a great length from windward to 
leeward, and let a much smaller hostile fleet be ob¬ 
served, as the fog clears away, steering in a contrary 
direction to the larger fleet, with the line of battle 
formed ahead, at a few miles distance. In this situa¬ 
tion of affairs—as actually happened in the morning of 
the battle off St. Vincent—it is plain that the larger 
fleet may be defeated with the loss of their windward 
ships. The smaller fleet must push on to windward, 
and divide the enemy’s line between the fifth and sixth 
ship to windward; then the whole fleet tacking at 
the same time, a sufficient force from the rear must be 
detached to carry the intercepted ships, while the van 
forms a line to leeward of the divisions now engaged 
in close action, in order to prevent the rest of the 
larger fleet from working to windward, and disen¬ 
gaging the division thus cut off. 

The conclusion of the work narrates the gallant 
action of Sir Samuel Hood, in Basse Terre roads, St. 
Christopher’s, February 24th, 1782; Admiral Rodney’s 
battle of the 12th of April, 1782, and the two actions 
in the East Indies, between Sir Edward Hughes and 
Suffrein, on the 17th of February, and the 12th of 
April in the same year. 


1778.] clerk’s observations on keppel’s action. 207 

Applying the principles laid down in this work to 
Keppel’s action, Mr. Clerk demonstrates, in a series of 
diagrams, how it might have been fought with signal 
advantage to the British, and concludes with the fol¬ 
lowing observations. “ But since the attempt of cutting 
the enemy’s line had not been thought an advisable 
measure on this occasion, should not some other effi¬ 
cient plan of attack have been concerted by which, 
upon a supposition if the two fleets should be brought 
to pass each other on contrary tacks, that the leading 
ships of the British squadron, after having ranged past 
the enemy’s line, might have been appointed to tack 
by doubling back, and have brought the ships in the 
French rear between cross fires ? A movement of this 
kind would likewise have brought on a closer and 
more general action, or the enemy, in consequence, 
must have abandoned their rear.” 

“ Not having been able to foresee, provide for, or 
advise upon either one or the other of the cases, during 
the four days the British squadron was in pursuit of 
the enemy, is very extraordinary; because by being to 
leeward, the enemy desirous of going off, and the wind 
not changing, it is, without doubt, demonstrable that 
the encounter of adverse fleets in such a position, and 
under such circumstances, will never be on the same 
tack, but of necessity will always be on contrary 
tacks.”* 

Although the system demonstrated by Mr. Clerk to 
be so inefficient, was that generally adopted by British 
officers in conducting naval battles before the publica¬ 
tion of his work, there were splendid and successful 

* Clerk’s “ Essay on Naval Tactics,” p. 121. 


208 keppel’s conduct after the action, [cii. viid 

deviations,—particularly by Anson, Hawke, and Bos- 
cawen—from those fighting rules, to which most of our 
commanders were inveterately wedded, in the teeth 
even of the frequent experience of their inefficacy as 
a mode of bringing a reluctant enemy to a close and 
decisive action. But without applying the test of Mr. 
Clerk’s scientific and conclusive method to the conduct 
of the British commander-in-chief, on the 27th of July, 
his rash and singularly disadvantageous manner of 
beginning the engagement, with his fleet in disorder to 
leeward, and so close upon the wind, that some of his 
ships would not fetch any part of the enemy’s line, and 
his cautious and unaccountable avoidance of battle 
when he could have formed them by shortening sail, 
or bringing to for the blue division to come up, in a 
perfect line to windward, and have edged down to ac¬ 
tion on the same tack with the enemy, or by staying 
or wearing, on the contrary tack if deemed preferable; 
are indications of deficient judgment as a naval officer, 
and of wavering spirit as a man. “ But the proceedings 
of the next morning furnish matter of more unqualified 
mystery, and every seaman must hear with unaffected 
astonishment, a British admiral announce to the world 
his apprehensions of a lee shore at least a hundred 
miles distant, when the variable breezes and tranquil 
weather that usually accompany our long summer days, 
would have calmed even a landsman’s anxieties, and 
wooed him under such seducing aspects as a beaten and 
retreating enemy, to a nearer approach. 

By the Victory’s log the 28th of July, Plymouth bore 
N. 40 deg. 10 min. ; east, distant fifty-nine leagues. 
Ushant bore N. 75 deg. 4 min. ; east, distant twenty- 


209 


1778.] keppel’s conduct after the action. 

seven leagues. From the relative bearings and dis¬ 
tances, therefore, of both places, with the wind at west 
and the weather moderate, the enemy might have been 
chased till Ushant came in sight, their flight fairly as¬ 
certained instead of being complacently assumed, and 
the British squadron, after having made that island) 
might have steered for Plymouth with a leading wind 
abaft the beam, the pursuit of the French rendering 
it needful to make a very trifling deviation only from 
the direct course to that port, with an increase of not 
more than thirty miles between the two distances. 

Different were Hawke’s ideas of duty and honour, 
and of what England required of her admirals; when 
in the same latitude he met the fleet of France com¬ 
manded by Conflans, and supported only by a part of 
his own fleet, dashed in amongst the enemy, observing, 
“ he did not intend to trouble himself by forming lines, 
but that he should attack the Frenchman in his old 
way, and make downright work with him;” and 
having sunk two of their ships and caused two more 
to strike; on a dreary night in November, brought his 
squadron to anchor off a dangerous lee shore, and 
forced the French admiral, who, when day dawned, 
found himself in the midst of his enemies, to run his 
ship upon the rocks, and thus save himself from being 
taken as a prisoner to England. But Hawke consi¬ 
dered the importance of crushing the enemy para¬ 
mount to the risk he was compelled to run, whilst 
Keppel, under circumstances of parallel magnitude to 
the service of his country deemed, as expressed in his 
defence, u his mind would have been filled with no¬ 
tions unworthy of his station, if he pursued a fruitless 

p 


210 LETTERS FROM PARIS. [CH. VHT. 

and hazardous chacethat towards the decline of a 
July day might have brought him up with his flying 
foe, or in sight of the coast which originated such 
extraordinary alarms. 

Before the appearance in England of the French 
admiral’s account of the battle, the following letters 
from emissaries in Paris, were received by the prime 
minister Lord North. 

To Lord North . 

“ Paris, August 3,1778. 

“ My Lord, 

“ As I suppose it will be agreeable to you to have 
an authentic account of the engagement between 
M. d’Orvilliers and Mr. Keppel’s squadron, I am en¬ 
abled to give you what you may depend upon as 
coming from the highest authority in this country. 

u I inform you that for two days before Monday the 
27th of July, the two squadrons were in sight, during 
which the first had offered battle without success; on 
that day about twelve o’clock it was accepted, and 
soon became general. When after two hours’ trial, 
M. d’Orvilliers satisfied of his superiority endeavoured 
to close with his enemy, and having the wind bore 
down to give that advantage to Mr. Keppel, upon 
which the latter hugged the wind and declined com¬ 
bat; when he extinguished his lights (the French 
lights all being up), and by this means Mr. Keppel got 
off, upon which M. d’Orvilliers returned to port to 
refit, where he arrived on Wednesday evening. Thus 
far and that a glorious and important victory is 
gained, I have the fullest authority for. The more 


1778.] LETTERS FROM PARIS. 211 

private, but I believe authentic accounts are, that 
three French ships were separated from the squadron 
by the storm before the battle, and the English were 
one superior—that the loss is 150 killed, and about 
500 wounded, and that some disaster is apprehended 
on board the Victory, as she was the first that bore 
out of the line, and they seemed in great confusion. 
M. Duchaffault and his son are wounded and his 
second killed.” 


To the Same. 

“ Paris, August 10, 1778. 

“ My Lord, 

“ We have at length received Admiral Keppel’s un¬ 
accountable account of the battle of the 27 th of July. 
If it gives pleasure and satisfaction in England, that 
circumstance alone ought to give much satisfaction 
here. It would prove the English are no more the 
same people who waged the last war. This glorious 
English fleet has not taken one ship, and is so shat¬ 
tered as to be unable to proceed in the fight, and re¬ 
turns to port to refit! What a letter, after three days’ 
consideration how to write it; from the 27th to the 
30th! How extraordinary in its own contents! He 
was four days working to bring them to action, and 
then left them to themselves, because he thought they 
meant handsomely to try their force the next morning. 
How could he expect that after the difficulty he had to 
bring them to any action at all? How could he brag 
of having permitted them to form quietly, without 
firing upon them, when the very moment before he 

p 2 



212 


LETTERS FROM PARIS. 


[CH. VIIL 

acknowledges some of his own ships could not come 
up on account of the state they were in as to their 
sails, masts, and rigging? 

“ Every letter from the French fleet says and agrees 
that there was not a cannon fired after three o’clock. 
Why did Mr. Keppel call off Mr. Palliser who was 
advancing with five ships to renew the fire? The 
French admiral has positively asserted that he re¬ 
peatedly offered Mr. Keppel to renew the engagement, 
he as positively asserts that the English put out every 
light and went off, and that the French lights were 
kept burning all night. As to the three false lights 
they were not of the fleet, but were the Due de Bour- 
goyne and the Alexander, which had been separated 
on the 24th, and were putting back to port with a 
prize—a privateer of eighteen guns. 

u The French fleet came into Brest on the 29th, and 
on the 31st several ships were out again. They are all 
getting out as fast as they can, and it was expected 
that on the 9th there would be “twenty-five of them at 
sea, so that if the English admiral is still for fighting 
immediately, he has but to fit and follow. 

“P.S. You may depend, except our people have 
lost their senses, that Pondicherry and every French 
settlement in India will be taken, as soon as news gets 
out, via Suez and Bussorah, of the hostilities. 

“The French Indiamen are all still out: I have not 
heard of any embargo on them. The Count de Noc 
and another ship from L’Orient to America, the Isle 
de France and another (I suppose them to be king’s 
ships), will soon go to the Mauritius. 


LETTERS FROM PARIS. 


213 


1778.J 

u The Due de Chartres has been up here, and one would 
have thought they had gained the most complete vic¬ 
tory by the rejoicings made, illuminations, fireworks, 
&c. The report of Admiral Keppel’s being killled was 
universally believed. The rabble made a pasteboard 
Admiral Keppel, which was drawn in a cart, and 
burnt on one of the rejoicing nights. 

u The Albion man-of-war got into Lisbon about 
the 20th of July with the loss of a mainmast. There is 
not a new one big enough for her in any of the king’s 
stores, but they mean to supply her from one of the 
Portuguese ships.” 

The following relation of the proceedings of the 
French fleet was published in the “ Gazette of France.” 

Extract from the Journal of the King s Naval 

u The 23rd of July, at one o’clock in the afternoon, 
after a fresh W.N.W. wind and hazy weather, which had 
obliged the king’s army to stay at the cape, we per¬ 
ceived as it cleared up, a great number of sails to the 
S. and S.W. by W. The army was then, according 
to estimation, W.N.W. of Usliant, at the distance of 
about thirty leagues of that island, and much about 
the same distance from the Sorlingues, which remained 
N.N.W. 

u The Count d’Orvilliers immediately made a sig¬ 
nal to move, and rally the army, in the usual order of 
battle, the White and Blue squadron, commanded by 
the Count Duchaflault, in the van, the White squa¬ 
dron, under the general’s flag, in the centre, and the 



214 THE FRENCH ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION. [ciI. VIII. 

Blue squadron, commanded by the Due de Chartres, 
in the rear. 

“ About four o’clock, the wind blowing fresh from 
the W., the general made a signal for the king’s army 
to tack about; at the same time the ships we dis¬ 
covered, were rallying. 

“ The wind having shifted to the S.W., these ships 
tacked about in some disorder, with a view, no doubt, 
to gain the wind of the king’s army. The Count 
d’Orvilliers who guessed their project, and wanted to 
preserve the advantage of the wind, made the army 
tack about, all the ships at once, and run with the 
fore main sails, fastened in the foretop masts, and as¬ 
signed the same manner of sailing for the night. 

“ The weather was very stormy, and at one in the 
morning of the 24th, the gale of wind increasing, the 
general ordered the army under the low sails; but as 
soon as daylight appeared, he saw with pain, that the 
Due de Bourgoyne, of eighty guns, and the Alexandra, 
of sixty-four, had separated from the army, and were 
no longer to be seen. The Count d’Orvilliers bore 
down upon them, as well to reconnoitre them, as to 
rally with more facility the king’s army, whose order 
had been deranged in the night by the thick weather. 
The frigate, La Sensible, commanded by the Chevalier 
Bernard de Marigny ? was detached to chase forward, 
and reconnoitre more nearly the ships we descried. 
On the report made by that frigate, the Count d’Orvil¬ 
liers judged they could be no other than the English 
army, under the command of Admiral Keppel, who, 
as well as the king’s army, were manoeuvering to re- 


215 


1778.] THE FRENCH ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION. 

pair the damages of the night. He then made the 
double signal, to tack about by counter-march, and 
range the army in order of battle. 

u At noon it blue fresh, at W.N.W., and the weather 
very stormy; the gale still increasing as the wind 
shifted to W.S.W. At seven o’clock the general indi¬ 
cated the fore main sails for the night. 

“ The 25th, at fore in the morning, the enemy’s 
army remained at E.S.E., four degrees eastward, at the 
distance of three leagues; the wind W.S.W.; the 
king’s army spent that day in manoeuvering to preserve 
the advantage of the wind. 

“ The 26th, at four in the morning, the English army 
remained at E.S.E., five degrees E., at the distance of 
about two leagues from the king’s army; the horizon 
had cleared up, and seemed to announce fair weather:— 
At eight o’clock, the Count d’Orvilliers made a sig¬ 
nal to prepare for an engagement, and at half-past ten 
another signal to tack about by a counter-march, all 
sails flying, to preserve the advantage of the wind, 
receive, and afterwards attack the enemy; the horizon 
soon grew cloudy, the wind rose to the S.W. and 
veered to the S.S.W., with the appearance of foul 
weather. The Count d’Orvilliers lost all hopes of 
fighting that day. 

“ The 27th, at four in the morning, the wind had 
shifted to the W., and announced favourable weather. 
The enemy’s army E.N.E., four degrees E., at the dis¬ 
tance of two leagues and a half from the king’s army. 
The Count d’Orvilliers, observing that the English 
admiral was raising his rear to the wind, and willing 
to make sure of his project, and at the same time draw 


216 THE FRENCH ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION. [CH. VIII. 

nearer to the enemy, ordered his army to tack about 
by counter-march. No sooner was the order of battle 
formed, than the Count d’Orvilliers plainly perceived 
that the whole intention of the English admiral was to 
fall on the rear of the French army, and extend his 
line along-side of it. To prevent this, he caused the 
whole army to tack about at once, with orders to form 
in order of battle inverted, the Blue squadron com¬ 
posing the van, the White the centre, and the White 
and Blue the rear. By this bold manoeuvre, which 
was extremely well executed, he was able to counteract 
the design of the enemy, to assist the Blue squadron, 
and take on the English army the same position that 
their admiral wanted to take on the king’s army, which 
drew up in good order in that line, at ten quarters 
offing; and when the head of the enemy’s army pre¬ 
sented itself to light, behind the Blue squadron, they 
found it on the other side in order of battle, as in re¬ 
serve for the moment; the White and Blue squadrons 
ran at ten quarters offing, and the ships kept too close 
together on the opposite side to fear that the enemy’s 
line would dare attempt to break them through. 

“ The English admiral was then forced to prolong 
the French army, and fight along-side of it. The firing 
began by the Blue squadron, which formed the van, 
and continued successively through the whole line, in 
such manner, that each French ship gave her broad¬ 
side to every English ship, and likewise received theirs. 
The fire was very hot on both sides for about three 
hours; it appears that the firing of the king’s army 
was served with more vivacity than that of the English 
army. 


217 


1778.] THE FRENCH ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION. 

u The position of the enemy to leeward, was more 
advantageous for pointing the guns, and serving the 
first battery; the Count d’Orvilliers, willing to deprive 
him of that advantage, made a signal for the Blue 
squadron to come up by a successive movement, and 
then another for the whole army to range itself in 
order of battle. That movement which was afterwards 
well executed, was nevertheless too much delayed to 
follow the line, and prolong, under the wind, from tail 
to head, the English army, as the general had pro¬ 
posed to do. 

“ It is not astonishing that a movement which was in¬ 
stantaneous, and which opportunity gave birth to, was 
not perfectly laid hold of, at the first instant; but the 
Due de Chartres having passed under the stern of the 
general to ask his intention, the Count d’Orvilliers an¬ 
swered, that his intention was to continue the order of 
battle inverted, by passing under the enemy’s wind, to 
deprive him of the advantage of his position, which 
was speedily executed. This evolution stopped the 
English admiral, whose army had already tacked 
before the wind by counter-march, and was bearing 
on the tail of the French army, by running in a line at 
ten quarters offing. The English admiral having met 
with the king’s army in battle array, and opposed 
to his route, was forced to make a retrograde move¬ 
ment, and profitting by his actual position to windward 
of the French army, to rally his own in order of battle 
on the starboard. 

“ The king’s pursued that of England, and constantly 
offered them battle in the best order to leeward, from 
two in the afternoon till the next morning; but the 


2 1 8 THE FRENCH ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION. [CH. VIII. 

English admiral doubtless did not think fit to accept it’ 
and availed him of the darkness of the night to effect 
his retreat, by carefully hiding his fires, whilst all the 
ships of the king’s army carried theirs, that their po¬ 
sition might be clearly perceived by the English army. 

“ The 28th, at night, the king’s army keeping off the 
latitude of Ushant, where they had established their 
cruise, the astonishment was general when they dis¬ 
covered the Isle of Ushant itself, which the Count 
d’Orvilliers thought himself distant about twenty-five 
or thirty leagues. It is known that after several days’ 
cruise at the mouth of the Channel, several of which 
had been employed in evolutions which do not permit 
to make an exact calculation of the route, an error of 
twenty-five leagues on the longitude is not extraordi¬ 
nary, and that the effects of the currents, not to be es¬ 
timated in the accounts in those parts, might alone 
have occasioned it, if other causes had not concurred 
thereto. 

“ The Count d’Orvilliers, seeing himself off the har¬ 
bour of Brest, determined to enter in with his army, as 
well to put the wounded on shore, as to take such tackle 
in as some ships might stand in need of, to continue 
their cruise. 


“ Total officers killed in the action. 6 ; men ditto, 157 

Total officers wounded .25; men ditto, 495” 




1778.] 


NAVAL OPERATIONS IN AMERICA. 


219 


CHAPTER IX. 

THE FLEET REFITTED-UNSUCCESSFUL CRUISE IN SEARCH 

OF THE ENEMY—PALLISER’s DISPUTE WITH KEPPEL. 

Unsuccessful Operations of our Naval Armament in America—Lord Howe 
out-manoeuvred by Count d’Estaing—Resigns his Command and re¬ 
turns to England—Narrowly escapes being captured by D’Orvillier’s 
Squadron in the Chops of the Channel—Palliser’s Letters to the Earl of 
Sandwich—Damage sustained by the Ships in the Action off Brest—The 
Channel Fleet again puts to Sea—Unsuccessful Cruise—Anonymous 
Publication reflecting on Sir Hugh Palliser—Traced to a Relative of Ad¬ 
miral Keppel’s and a Lieutenant of his Ship—Palliser’s Letters to the 
Earl of Sandwich on the Subject—Palliser requires Keppel to contradict 
the Slander contained in the Publication—Keppel’s Refusal—Palliser’s 
published Account of the Action off Brest —Palliser’s Interview with the 
King—Parliamentary Proceedings — The Memorial of twelve Admirals 
to the King—Remarks on the Memorial—Presented by the Duke of 
Bolton—His Naval Character. 


1778. 

The warlike schemes of government were destined 
to be as fatally marred along the opposite shores of the 
Atlantic, as in the home seas, and the operations of our 
splendid naval armament in America, amounting to 
ninety vessels of war, under the chief command of 


220 NAVAL OPERATIONS IN AMERICA. [dl. IX. 

Lord Howe, were attended witli as little honour and 
success as those of the Channel squadron guided by 
Admiral Keppel. On the 6th of August, Lord Howe 
proceeded to Sandy-Hook, Rhode Island, with the al- 
ledged intention of attacking the enemy’s fleet, which 
had passed the batteries of the island on the 8th of 
August; but on his arrival, instead of availing himself 
of the favourable opportunity of going in with a fair 
wind, he anchored his squadron off Point Judith. The 
wind changing in the mean time, the French admiral, 
sensible of the dangerous situation of his fleet, repassed 
the batteries under a heavy fire, and advanced to at¬ 
tack the British admiral at sea. Instead, however, of 
accepting the proffered battle, a struggle for the weather- 
gage having the appearance of a flight, was main¬ 
tained by the British squadron for some days, in which 
Lord Howe was out-manoeuvred by the French com¬ 
mander, D’Estaing, and a gale having separated the 
fleets, his lordship abandoned the pursuit, and returned 
to Sandy-Hook, whence, resigning his command, he 
sailed for England in the Eagle, and narrowly escaped 
being captured by the French squadron, under D’Or- 
villiers, which he passed through in the chops of the 
Channel. But Lord Howe, afterwards, during his com¬ 
mand of the home fleet, amply retrieved the ineficiency 
of his services on the American coast, exhibiting, as in 
Keppel’s case, another unfortunate illustration of the 
error of entrusting offices of such national magnitude, 
to men of strong party bias, connected with an adverse 
political faction, and avowedly hostile to the govern¬ 
ment, confiding in their exertions, and placing them in 


1778.] NAVAL OPERATIONS IN AMERICA. 221 

situations, requiring not only the qualifications of able 
sea commanders, but all the zeal and integrity of men 
who felt themselves engaged in a contest involving 
the honour of their friends, and the safety of their 
country. 

The anxieties of the nation were soothed for a while 
by the conviction, that the French, as described in Ad¬ 
miral Keppel’s account of the battle of the 27th, “ were 
so beaten” that they fled under cover of the darkness of 
the night, and took refuge in their own port. The 
secret intelligence received by Lord North from Paris, 
showed, however, that whilst every nerve was strained 
by our officers to get the shattered British fleet again 
to sea, M. d’Orvilliers was already out with twenty-five 
sail of the line. A closer inspection of the damage sus¬ 
tained, also demonstrated, that the enemy’s fire in this 
action was well sustained and well directed, and that the 
king’s ships suffered as much nearly in their hulls as in 
their masts and sails, though the usual tactics of the 
French were to aim their broadsides aloft, desirous of 
destroying the spars and rigging of their adversaries, and 
thus rendering them unmanageable. 

On the arrival of the fleet in Plymouth Sound, Sir 
Hugh Palliser writes as follows. 

Sir Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich . 

“ Formidable, July 31,1778. 

“ My Lord, 

“ I troubled your lordship with a short letter on the 
28th, when I had only just time for it, understanding 
a vessel was going away immediately. Although I 
am now more at leisure, I can’t add much respecting 


222 CORRESPONDENCE WITH [CH. IX. 

our encounter on the 27th; however, for your lord¬ 
ship’s private information, I send you a summary 
account, such as I am able to give of it. 

“ I have seen your lordship’s letter of the 18th inst., 
to Admiral Keppel, and as your lordship allows it I 
can’t help troubling you with my sentiments and con¬ 
jectures about some matters concerning the service. 
From the French stealing away, I conclude they are 
very much damaged, and that they got into Brest the 
next day or the day after. As to the surmise that 
they were to go to Quiberoon Bay, I think it is very 
probable, if they had any intention to embark troops 
for a descent in England or Ireland; but I am inclined 
to think it very uncertain, that they will attempt to 
carry such a scheme into execution, after they have 
seen our strength and felt some hard blows; however, 
I have no doubt but they will refit their fleet with all 
possible expedition, and reinforce it to the utmost of 
their power, and if you have not very authentic ac¬ 
counts of the Toulon squadron" being otherwise des¬ 
tined, I shall believe they will join the Brest fleet, and 
that they will exert every nerve to dispute with us the 
superiority in the home seas; this I shall believe to be 
the case, until I know for certain, that the Toulon 
squadron or some ships from Brest are sent abroad; 
therefore though it will be certainly right to have a 
squadron ready for the East Indies or elsewhere, yet I 
shall hope it will be thought not right to detach any 
ships before they are sent. 

u I fear if many frigates do not speedily arrive from 
America, our coasts and trade will be exposed to fre- 


1778.] THE EARL OF SANDWICH. 228 

quent mischief from squadrons of frigates and pri¬ 
vateers. Much more caution is necessary in conducting 
this than any former war; hence your lordship will 
perceive that 1 consider the operations of the French 
in this war will be regulated by the schemes, ope¬ 
rations, and advice of some able and well-informed 
British traitors. A few days here, and a few supplies 
will, I hope, put us into sufficient condition to attend 
their motions. The peaceable language of the Spanish 
ambassador must be pleasing at this critical juncture; 
I wish it may not prove as dissembling as that of the 
French. 

u I cannot conclude without thanking your lordship 
for the despatch you gave at my request, respecting 
the Scarborough volunteers, who arrived when we were 
under sail it; would not have been fair to dispose of 
them otherwise, as that corporation and Stockton 
gave 10/. a seaman entirely on my account, and 5/. to 
landsmen. Amongst the killed in this ship fell the 
boatswain, who is a very great loss at this time. I have 
had a good character of the boatswain of the Blen¬ 
heim, therefore beg the favour of your lordship to let 
him be appointed to the Formidable, and that his 
warrant may be sent down here by the first express 
or post. 

“ I am at considerable disadvantage respecting lieu¬ 
tenants; two being ill before the action, and one 
wounded in the beginning; this can’t be helped, but 
my greatest distress of all is the want of petty officers; 
if your lordship should have any recommended for 
preferment, who have not served their full time, I wish 


CORRESPONDENCE WITH 


224 


[CH. IX. 


you would send them to the Formidable, where they 
may not be out of the way. 

u I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, 

“ My Lord, 

“ Your lordship’s most obedient 

“ and most humble servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser. 


a P.S. I am not yet able to make choice of a boat¬ 
swain here in ordinary, will you be so good as trust 
me with a blank warrant to be filled up under any 
restriction you may be pleased to prescribe; I shall 
take one to whom it will be preferment and not one 
in commission, or not going to sea; and will you please 
to direct Lord Shuldam to order any lieutenant I may 
apply for, to act in the room of the two sick on shore, 
taken from ships now going to sea. Suppose the Blen¬ 
heim. 


The Same to the Same . 

“ Formidable, 

“ Plymouth Sound, August 10 , 1778 . 

“ My Lord, 

“I am surprised at that part of your lordship’s 
letter of the 7 th inst., where you say you have not 
heard a syllable concerning the action from any 
of your friends but Admiral Keppel. I assure your 
lordship the best summary account that I was able to 
give, for a circumstantial one, I believe it was in no 
one’s power to relate, the fleet was so much extended, 
and the beginning of the action was so sudden and 



1778.] THE EARL OF SANDWICH. 225 

unexpected, that very few, if any, can tell what hap¬ 
pened anywhere, except where he was himself. Your 
lordship is very obliging in your notice of what I 
wrote about a carpenter. In my first letter I wrote 
about a boatswain in the room of the one killed in the 
action. I have written to Captain Brodie exactly in 
the terms you wish. 

“ Major Innes must, at least I am sure ought to be 
satisfied with your reasons for not complying with his 
request. 

“ We find a great deal more to do to make us fit for 
sea than we were aware of, both in our mast, rigging 
(and what is more surprising), an unusual number of 
shot holes deep under water, so that the Robust, 
Egmont, Vengeance and Conqueror are obliged to go 
within the island to give large keels to get at them. 
The Egmont is docked. This ship had about seventy 
shot holes in her side, and five under water; it is won¬ 
derful we lost so few men. No time will be lost in 
getting the whole ready. I am still firmly of opinion, 
as I told your lordship in my first letter (which I per¬ 
ceive you have not received), that the French will 
come out again to meet us, although I cannot persuade 
many here to think so; these contemptible opinions of 
our enemy are attended with many bad consequences. 
I do all I can to correct them. Don’t doubt, my lord, 
of our bringing matters to a more decisive issue the 
next meeting, if our people will but believe that the 
French mean to give us battle, and to dispute with us 
the command in the British seas. 

“ I can’t help being very anxious about reinforce¬ 
ments, for I don’t clearly see how you will keep pace 

Q 


226 CORRESPONDENCE WITH [CH. IX. 

with what I am very apprehensive France can do— 
especially if the Toulon ships come round to Brest ? 
and if the Spaniards join them, God knows what will 
happen. 

“ I take the liberty to inform your lordship, that our 
ships that are hastily equipped, and men tumbled on 
board them almost the moment of their going to sea, 
are by no means fit for immediate action; in many 
respects, there being so many things to be done (be¬ 
sides getting her under sail) for which there is not 
time, especially with only a few able men, and more 
especially what concerns the gunner’s matters ; for the 
Ordnance officers do not put the furniture of the guns 
on board in that complete state they ought to be. 

“ I here inclose a memorandum of some particulars, 
which I submit to your lordship, whether you think it 
right to talk to Lord Townsend, or write an official 
to the Board of Ordnance. Captain Collins tells me 
he intends to offer to your lordship s consideration a 
proposal for the marines at quarters, to be exercised 
at great guns as well as small ones. I am of opinion it 
will be very useful, for every ship is obliged to take 
some of their marines to man their great guns; and it 
often happens, that in ships hastily manned, they may 
go into action without a single man at some of the guns, 
who has ever been exercised at a great gun, or has 
seen one fired. This is not the case with the French, 
who have regular companies of gunners for their ships. 

“ I have written to Mr. Stephens for a lieutenant, to 
supply the place of one sick on shore; your lordship 
is so obliging as to say Mr. Winkworth shall be ap¬ 
pointed. 


THE EARL OF SANDWICH. 


227 


1778 .] 

“ I wrote your lordship a short letter the very day 
after the action, to say your son was well: if I omitted 
to mention that he had no dislike for the smell of 
gunpowder, it was a neglect, for I assure you no young 
man could have behaved better; he was constantly at 
his post, close by me, attending to nothing but the 
orders I gave. 

“ I am, with the greatest respect, 

“ My lord, 

u Your lordship’s most obedient 

“ And most humble servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 

Notwithstanding the message by Captain Faulkner, 
and the many opportunities afforded Keppel since his 
return to port, of explaining its signification to Lord 
Sandwich, no disapprobation of Palliser’s conduct on 
the 27th of July was conveyed to his lordship, either 
directly or indirectly; on the contrary, the following 
letter to the Admiralty, on the eve of the departure of 
the fleet in search of the enemy, repeats the confidence 
expressed on former occasions, by the commander-in¬ 
chief, in the Vice-admiral of the Blue, conjointly with 
the officers and men who before accompanied him to 
battle. 

Admiral Keppel to Philip Stephens , Esq.> Secretary 

to the Admiralty . 

“ Victory, Causand Bay, 

“ August 20th, 1778. 

11 Sir, 

u I beg you to inform their lordships that the ships 

Q 2 


228 


DISPUTE WITH KEPPEL. 


[OIL IX, 

most ready of Vice-admiral Sir Robert Harland, and 
Vice-admiral Sir Hugh Palliser, will proceed to sea to¬ 
morrow, and continue off the Sound till I join with 
the ships most backward, which I flatter myself I shall 
be able to do on the next day. The Egmont, which 
ship has been docked, I fear will not be in readiness to 
proceed on that day, but in a day or two after. 

“ I shall have great satisfaction in carrying the very 
same ships in quest of the enemy’s fleet, that came into 
port with me, having the fullest confidence in the zeal, 
bravery, and exertion of every officer in the fleet, as 
well as the men serving in it. 

“ The very extraordinary works that have been ex¬ 
pedited by the officers and people in the dock-yard ? 
directed by Commissioner Parry, Mr. Hunt the sur¬ 
veyor, the builder, and every other officer, has been 
such as to merit much approbation; I am sure I feel 
great obligation to every department in the dock-yard. 
Vice-admiral Shuldham has used the utmost efforts in 
assisting my desires, all that was in his power. 

“ I am, Sir, 
u Your most obedient, 

“ And very humble servant, 

“ A. Keppel.” 

During the absence of the fleet in this unsuccessful 
search of the enemy, murmurs of dissatisfaction at the 
inglorious results of the late action were loudly uttered 
throughout the kingdom, and the appearance of a para¬ 
graph in the “ Morning Intelligencer,” from the pen 
of one apparently cognisant of the chief transactions of 
the day of battle, directed the popular indignation 


1778.] ANONYMOUS PUBLICATION. 229 

against the Vice-admiral of the Blue, who was charged 
in this anonymous publication as follows: 

“ The principal cause of Mr. Keppel’s not re-attacking 
the French, at half-past three in the afternoon (being 
at this time totally refitted from the damages sustained 

in the morning), was Sir II-P-r’s not joining 

him, agreeable to signal to form the line, he being, at 
that time, four miles to windward with his division. 
Mr. Keppel observing a non-compliance, made other 

signals for the respective ships of Sir H-’s division 

to bear down to him, which, in complying with, Sir 
H-called them back into his wake. 

“ Captain Laforey of the Ocean, distressed how to 
act, in consequence of this counter order, sailed up to 

Sir II-to ask him whom he was to obey. Mr. 

Keppel still observing that division continuing to wind¬ 
ward, and neither of them obeying the signal, made 
one for the Fox, Captain Windsor, to come to him; 
and desired him to go with his compliments to Sir 

H-, that his signal had been unremittedly kept up 

for him and his division to form a [line; he supposed 
they did not see it, as they had not complied with it, 
and that they only waited for him and his division 
coming down to renew the action. It was night be¬ 
fore the division did come down, so the occasion was 
lost by the French disappearing the next morning. 
Mr. Keppel’s situation is not to be expressed, when he 
found himself defeated in the fair prospect he had. 

“ These facts will appear in every log-book in the 
fleet; so that if an inquiry into this affair was to take 
place, his conduct would bear the strictest scrutiny, as 








230 


CORRESPONDENCE. 


[CH. IX. 

hitherto no visible reason has appeared as an excuse 

in Sir H-P-r for not complying. Sir Robert 

Harland’s division, and Mr. Keppel’s, who had sus¬ 
tained, to all appearance, as much damage as Sir 

H-; those two divisions were refitted for action at 

the time above mentioned, and Sir H-had not re¬ 

paired his, lying all the time with his foretopsail shat¬ 
tered, and not refitted. 

“ The damage sustained of loss of men on board 
Sir H-was chiefly owing to cartridges blowing be¬ 

tween decks.” 

The following letters relate to the cruise of the fleet 
and to the vice-admiral’s feelings, when the infamous 
slander contained in the foregoing newspaper paragraph 
met his eye. 

Sir Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich. 

“ Formidable, 26th October, 1778. 

- Beating into Spithead. 

a My Lord, 

“ It gives me real concern that the occurrences of 
our cruise have not been such as to countenance me in 
troubling }^our lordship with an account of particulars, 
for not having had the good fortune to meet the French 
fleet, every thing else has been unpleasing; the first part 
of our cruise was particularly fine weather, the middle 
and latter very boisterous and bad, by which many of 
the ships have suffered much in their masts and sails, 
and the fleet has been dispersed; some of them are very 
foul, others leaky, particularly the Ocean, which has 
been so to an extraordinary degree, owing chiefly to 







1778.] CORRESPONDENCE. 231 

her shearing having been kept on too long; it is now 
so rotten, that it washes off in bad weather, and of 
course the ship becomes very leaky; she will require 
a good repair and caulking, with some strengthening 
works to her. 

“ Some French merchant ships fell in our way; but 
in the bad weather many were disabled, and the whole 
dispersed, so that it is possible they may be retaken. 

“ Our chief has, at times, been very much afflicted 
with his disorder, and appears to be much chagrined 
at his bad luck. I wish I could give a better account 
of mj^self. I assure your lordship, I never underwent 
so much anxiety about any thing as I have done during 
this cruise about the object of our pursuit, nor more 
vexation at our disappointment; nor more fatigue and 
pain from the disorder in my foot, which, about two 
months before I left town, broke out afresh, and instead 
of healing again, as I had expected,,and as upon former 
occasions it had done, it has been constantly growing 
worse, insomuch, that if after a little rest it does not 
grow better, I fear I must undergo a similar operation 
to that which I underwent several years ago. During 
the cruise it very rarely permitted me to get an hour’s 
sleep at a time. 

“ I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, 

“ My Lord, 

“ Your lordship’s most obedient, 

“ And most humble servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 



232 


CORRESPONDENCE. 


[CH. IX. 


The Same to the Same. 

“ Portsmouth, October 28th, 1778. 

u My Lord, 

u By Admiral Keppel’s first express, I had the ho¬ 
nour to write to your lordship, for we both got in too 
late for the post. Since that time I have learnt more 
about the condition of the ships ; and although I am 
very imperfectly informed of any thing, I fear we have 
brought you in a fleet almost all unfit for service at pre¬ 
sent. I have seen Lord Howe only for a moment, so I 
know nothing about the state of our ships in America. 
I came on shore last night for the sake of a little rest 
and quiet, which was very much interrupted by a 
paper put into my hands on landing, containing a para¬ 
graph to justify Admiral Keppel’s conduct for not con¬ 
tinuing the battle on the 27th of July last, and laying 
the whole blame on me and my division. After such 
a publication, I think the nation has a right to know, 
and I am determined it shall be rightly informed, whe¬ 
ther I am, or any one else is blameable for what had 
passed on that day; nevertheless I shall not do any 
thing rashly, although I think of the absurd aspersion 
with the highest indignation. 

u I have ever resolved to disregard anonymous 
papers, yet the quarter from whence this reflection 
evidently comes, makes it exceedingly alarming, and to¬ 
gether with many other disagreeable things too numer¬ 
ous to mention in a letter, makes me feel a very miser¬ 
able being at present. 

“ Admiral Keppel is not yet on shore, but the mo¬ 
ment he is, I shall speak to him upon it in very serious 


233 


1778 .] CORRESPONDENCE. 

terms; I have only one favour to hope, which is, that 
I may not be out of the way when Parliament meets. 

“ I am with the greatest respect, 

“ My Lord, 

u Your Lordship’s most obedient 
u And most humble servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 


The Same to the Same . 

“ Pall Mall, October 31. 

“ My Lord, 

“ Your lordship must not be surprised that in my 
present unpleasant situation, I am not in a condition to 
think of any thing else but the measures that may be 
best for me to take. Amongst the many things that 
successively come into my head, I have for the present 
fixed on two for further consideration, as expedients 
for obtaining that satisfaction I ought to have, and 
without which I can neither serve nor live. The one 
is an easy, quiet way, without disturbing the peace of 
any one else; the other a more direct way of coming 
to the point, and matters of fact; but which may be 
productive of many things disagreeable to others, which 
had better be avoided if possible. I have put my 
thoughts together on these two, merely to take time to 
reflect before I adopt any measures whatever, wishing 
to avoid every thing that may be deemed rash. 

“ I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, 

“ My Lord, 

“ Your Lordship’s most obedient and 
“ Most humble servant, 

c< Hugh Palliser.” 



234 


CORRESPONDENCE. 


[CH. IX. 

On the arrival of Admiral Keppel in town, Sir 
Hugh Palliser at once wrote to him, requiring his writ¬ 
ten contradiction of the scandalous reports which had 
been circulated against him. The anonymous para¬ 
graph was traced to Lieutenant Berkely, an officer of 
the Victory, and the admiral’s nephew, who had been 
sent from the fleet whilst they were at sea. 

The paper transmitted to Keppel for signature was 
as follows: 

“ Having seen a paragraph in the ‘ Morning In¬ 
telligencer,’ of the 5th of last month, highly reflecting 
on the conduct of the Vice-admiral of the Blue, on the 
27tli of July last, when the fleet under my command 
engaged the French fleet, and the vice-admiral hav¬ 
ing informed me that reports, to the same purpose, have 
been propagated by some officers of the Victory, I 
think it necessary, in justice to Sir Hugh Palliser, to 
publish to the world, that his conduct on that day was 
in every respect proper and becoming a good officer. 
And I further declare that when I made the signal in 
the evening for the ships to windward to bear down 
into my wake, and afterwards, for particular ships of 
Sir Hugh’s division to do so, he repeated those signals 
properly; and that the calling his and Sir Robert 
Harland’s division into my wake in the evening was 
not for the purpose of renewing the battle at that time , 
but to be in readiness for it in the morning; that in 
obedience to the said signals, such of the ships of Sir 
Hugh Palliser’s division as were in condition for it, did 
immediately bear down, as did the rest so soon as they 
were able; so that Sir Hugh Palliser and his whole 


CORRESPONDENCE. 


1778 .] 


235 


division were all in my wake accordingly by the next 
morning before daylight, ready for action.” 


As no answer was returned to tliis request, Sir 
Hugh Palliser called the following day upon Keppel, 
and in order to meet every objection on bis part, ex¬ 
pressed bis willingness to waive tbe admiral’s signature 
to tbe paper tendered him, and to accept any thing that 
might be agreed upon, if tantamount to his authorised 
contradiction of the aspersions cast upon him by the 
published slanders of his relative. This Keppel re¬ 
fused ; when the vice-admiral, with much warmth and 
indignation, thus appealed to him; the correctness of 
which when afterwards repeated in Parliament, he 
challenged him to deny. 

“ Is it possible that you can countenance such in¬ 
jurious reports against me? I never knew why the 
battle was discontinued before it had been brought to 
a decisive issue. I cannot let the matter stand upon 
this footing. My reputation is wounded. The nation 
is dissatisfied, and it has a right, if there was any fault, 
to be shown where it lies.” 

By the refusal of the admiral either to deny or to 
substantiate the correctness of the charges propagated 
against him, Palliser was driven in self-defence to a 
publication of the following letter, with an annexed ac¬ 
count of the action. 


To the Editor of the London Evening Post 


“ Pall Mall, November 4. 

“ Sir, 

u Having seen since my late arrival at Portsmouth, 


236 SIR HUGH palliser’s account. [ch. IX. 

a very scandalous paragraph in the 4 Morning In¬ 
telligencer’ of the 15th of last month, directly charg¬ 
ing me with being the cause of Admiral Keppel’s not 
re-attacking the French fleet, in the afternoon of the 
27th of July last, containing many gross falsehoods, 
calculated expressly to wound my reputation, and to 
represent me in a culpable light to the whole nation; 
and being well-informed that injurious reports of the 
like nature have been industriously propagated for the 
same purpose by some malignant, wicked people, it be¬ 
comes necessary for me, in order to vindicate my own 
conduct, to publish such particulars relating to the 
battle on that day, as may enable the public, who have 
a right to be fully informed of the truth of a matter of 
so much importance to them, to judge whether I was 
the cause of the French fleet not being re-attacked on 
that afternoon; I therefore request you will publish the 
enclosed paper containing the facts necessary to be 
known, in order to justify me from the said foul as¬ 
persions. 

“ After the nation is in possession thereof, if any 
individual, or if Parliament, or the nation at large, 
call for a public inquiry, I am ready to stand the issue 
of such inquiry, but I shall not answer any questions 
in newspapers, or otherwise. 

“ Your’s, &c. 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 

“ At about six o’clock in the morning, on the 27th of 
July, the British fleet was upon a wind on the larboard 
tack, lying up about W. by N., my division leading on 
that tack, the French fleet was to windward. At half- 


1778.] OF THE ACTION OFF BREST. 237 

past six a signal was made for several of the ships of 
my division to chase to windward, which occasioned 
them to stretch far ahead. 

u At ten the whole fleet tacked together per signal, 
and stood towards the French fleet, who soon after 
were plainly discovered to be on the larboard tack, in 
a regular, well-formed, close line of battle ahead; our 
fleet approached them without any order or line of 
battle. The ships of my division were separated from 
me by the above signal; the ships of the other two 
divisions, though not in a regular line, appeared to be 
nearly so, and in a collected body, excepting the Duke, 
which was far to leeward. 

“ About eleven firing began between the headmost 
ships in our van, and some ships in the van of the 
enemy’s fleet, which became general as our ships got 
up in succession; each proceeding from that part of 
the enemy’s fleet, which they respectively fetched, on 
towards the enemy’s rear,, engaging as they advanced 
along their line. 

“ Admiral Keppel with his division fetched the French 
admiral, and there began to engage. 

“About noon, in the Formidable, I fetched within 
random shot of the Due de Chartres’ ship, who com¬ 
manded the van division of the enemy’s fleet; he fired 
many broadsides at the Formidable, but being at too 
great a distance, she did not return a single shot, but 
reserved her fire till she came within point blank shot 
of the ship she could fetch; there I began to engage, 
and passed on to the French admiral in the centre oi 
the line, engaging within musket shot, and alone; 
having no second either ahead or astern, the ships of 


238 SIR HUGH palliser’s account [ch. IX. 

my division being scattered and separated from me by 
signal as afore-mentioned; however, they all got into 
action, and though not in a connected body with their 
admiral, did their duty so well, that they suffered the 
most, as appears by the damages sustained by those 
ten ships, being equal to the damages sustained by all 
the twenty ships that composed the other two divi¬ 
sions. This was occasioned by the regular and con¬ 
nected line of the enemy’s ships being preserved ; 
whereb}^ they were enabled to employ a greater force 
upon each ship in the war of our fleet, who were sepa¬ 
rated at a considerable interval from each other, occa¬ 
sioned by the before-mentioned signal to chase, and 
from hence arose the numerous damages the Formid¬ 
able sustained, being subjected to the angular fire of a 
long range of the enemy’s ships as she continued her 
progress along their line. This comparison of the da¬ 
mages appears by the account published from Admiral 
Keppel’s letter of the killed and wounded, which was 
as follows: 

“ Admiral Keppel’s division, 43 killed, and 142 
wounded. 

“ Vice-admiral SirKobert Harland’sdivision, 22 killed, 
and 45 wounded. 

“ Vice-admiral Sir Hugh Palliser’s division, 68 killed, 
and 186 wounded. 

“ By the blowing up of some powder on board the 
Formidable, about twenty men were hurt, but I do not 
recollect that any one was killed thereby. The acci¬ 
dent was occasioned by a man having a cartridge 
under his arm at the time he fired his gun. It is said 
the like accident happened on board other ships. 


1778.] OF THE ACTION OFF BREST. 839 

“ I proceeded on with the Formidable to the stern- 
most of the enemy’s ships, keeping my mizen topsail 
aback all the time, and engaged every ship within 
musket shot, the two last of which appeared not to 
have sustained any damage from any of our ships that 
had passed before us, not a shot-hole being seen 
in their sails: the Formidable brought down one of 
the enemy’s ship’s main-yards, which ship appeared 
to be otherwise much damaged, for she quitted their 
line, and went off before the wind, attended by a fri¬ 
gate. 

“ Between two and three o’clock I had passed the 
sternmost ship of the enemy’s line; at this time 
Admiral Keppel was at a distance coming up, and a 
number of ships about him, and, I think, with the 
signal for battle flying. I concluded he was ad¬ 
vancing to renew the battle; Vice-admiral Sir Robert 
Harland was, with several ships, to windward of 
the rear of the enemy. I immediately wore the 
Formidable, and laid her head towards the enemy, 
in order to endeavour to get into battle again, ex¬ 
pecting it to be renewed when Admiral Keppel came 
up. We were then exactly in a line with the enemy’s 
line, and at about random shot from their sternmost 
ships. In this situation the Formidable lay a consi¬ 
derable time, no other ship near her. Soon after 
this the van and centre of the enemy broke their line, 
and appeared to be in confusion: some with their heads 
one way, some another. 

“ The Victory shortened sail, and unbent her main¬ 
top sail; and about this time some of the enemy’s 
ships appeared to be filing off towards us, and two or 


240 SIR HUGH palliser’s account [ch. IX, 

three of their fresh ships standing directly for the For¬ 
midable; I therefore wore again, and laid her head 
towards Admiral Keppel to meet him: then the 
enemy’s ships edged away and pointed to leeward of 
our fleet and began to form the line in that division. 

u When the Victory and Formidable met it was 
past three o’clock; the Victory passed the Formidable 
to windward, wore, passed under her stern, ran down 
to leeward of her, and made sail ahead; this left the 
Formidable at a distance astern, and somewhat to 
windward of the Victory’s wake, which signal I re¬ 
peated, for it was understood to be for Vice-admiral 
Sir Robert Harland and his division to bear down, 
who was then far to windward, and he accordingly 
did bear down, and brought up in the admiral’s wake, 
then nearly abreast of the Formidable, and a little way 
to leeward of her. 

“ At this time it was apparent to the rest of the 
fleet (if it was not so to those in the Victory), that the 
Formidable was not in a manageable condition; we 
were then employed in knotting, splicing, &c., to get 
the ship under command, and to be able to make sail 
to get up with the admiral, who was making sail on 
the starboard tack, the French fleet then astern doing 
the same. 

After Sir Robert Harland’s division had been some 
time in the admiral’s wake, he, with his division (by 
orders it is said), crowded all the sail they could carry, 
to get ahead of the admiral’s division. 

“ Late in the evening we saw the admiral had made 
the signal for some particular ships of my division (not 
the Formidable’s, her incapacity being so apparent), 


1778.] OF THE ACTION OFF BREST. 241 

all wliicli signals I repeated; the Ocean, and such of 
them as were under command, bore down according 
to the signal; others were not in a governable con¬ 
dition, and being employed as I was, knotting, splicing, 
&c., did not immediately bear down. It is to be ob¬ 
served that the Formidable, and the ships of my divi¬ 
sion were the last that came out of the engagement, 
were the most damaged, and had had the least time to 
refit; and that it is the disabled ships of my division 
that are alluded to in Admiral Keppel’s letter, where 
he says, 4 The object of the French seemed to be 
the disabling of the king’s ships in their masts and 
sails; in which they so far succeeded, as to prevent 
many of the ships of my fleet being able to follow me 
when I wrote to stand after the French fleet,’ &c. 

“ If, according to the preceding paragraph, extracted 
from the admiral’s own account, they were unable to 
follow him, when he immediately made sail the con¬ 
trary way, it was unreasonable to suppose them ca¬ 
pable of taking, and keeping their stations in a line 
of battle, at a cable’s length asunder, whilst in that 
condition. 

“ Can any one possibly believe (as the dark assassin 
asserts), that Admiral Keppel called those same crip¬ 
pled ships to him in order to renew the attack, and at 
the moment when he had just sent Sir E. Harland 
away from him with his division of fresh ships, who 
had been the longest out of the action, and had had 
the most time to repair their damage? Besides, the 
admiral’s letters declare that it was not his intention 
to re-attack before the next morning. 

R 


242 DAMAGE SUSTAINED [CH. IX. 

44 At night the Fox frigate. Captain Windsor, came 
to the Formidable, with a message from the admiral to 
me, 4 That he wanted the ships of my division to come 
into his wake,’ but said not a word about his waiting 
for them in order to renew the attack, as is falsely 
asserted. He was answered by myself from the stern 
gallery, in the following words, 4 Acquaint the admiral 
I have repeated his signal for it:’ and was going to 
say, 4 Tell him that the moment my ship is under com¬ 
mand, I will endeavour to get nearer to him.’ But the 
company of the frigate interrupted, by giving three 
cheers, which the Formidable’s people returned. It 
then blew fresh, was dark, and the frigate passed so 
quickly, that there was not time to say thing more 
which could have been heard. 

44 The night was cloudy, with rain, and very dark; 
it required all the tattered sails the Formidable could 
possibly set in the afternoon, and in the night to keep 
way with the admiral, so that we could only spare one 
topsail at a time to be unbended, in order to bend 
others. After we had knotted and spliced as much 
rigging as we could to secure the masts, and make it 
safe to set sail upon them, and having shifted a fore and 
mizentop sail, the ship was then under command, and 
long before daylight, the Formidable, and every ship of 
my division, were in the admiral’s wake, expecting to 
engage immediately at daylight, but the enemy’s fleet 
were gone off.” 

The damage sustained by the Formidable, in the 
opinion of every seaman, must verify the vice-admi¬ 
ral’s assertion of her unmanageable condition. His 


BY THE FORMIDABLE. 


243 


1778.] 

ship, unless totally dismasted, could not well be more 
disabled, or more incapable of keeping pace with the 
admiral carrying double-reefed topsails and foresails. 

The Damages by Shot to her Masts and Hull . 

Bowsprit — Shot six feet from the cap, on the under 
part four inches through. 

Foremast. —Shot at the third woulding on the aft 
side two inches deep, between the fifth and six would, 
ing, nine inches deep; six feet above the forecastle a 
large shot, twenty-two inches through, which disco¬ 
vered the mast to be perfect touchwood, and was in 
danger of going over the side, having no stays, and only 
one shroud to windward; the wound was judged to be 
so bad by the officers of the yard, that they would con¬ 
demn it at Plymouth; but the vice-admiral desired, 
if possible, to have it fished and cased that he might 
be ready for sea the sooner. 

Foreyard. —Shot three inches and a half deep on 
the starboard arm, and a slight wound on the larboard. 

Foretopmast. —Shot three feet below the cap, three 
inches and a half through, and another slight wound. 

Maintopmast. —Shot through with a double-headed 
shot below the cap, which took away more than two- 
thirds of the mast. 

Maintopsail yard. —Shot seven feet from the arm 
four inches and a half deep, and a slight wound on 
the slings. 

Mainyard, —A wound six feet from the slings. 

Mainmast. —Shot under the fifth woulding, six inches 
deep. 

r 2 


244 


DAMAGE SUSTAINED 


[CH. IX. 

Mizenmcist. —A little below the pounds, shot through 
with a large shot which took away two-thirds of the 
diameter, and could not be secured by fishing. 

Mizenyard .—Shot in two places. 

Forecastle. —Fife rails and david chock shot to 
pieces, many shots in the starboard side, and three 
large shots under water; one lower deck-port shot 
away, and others wounded. 

Fore-channel. —Three chain plates shot away. 

Main-channel. —Two ditto. 

Mizen-channel. —One ditto. 

Fixed block in the side for the fore-sheet, shot to 
pieces, and seventy-five large shots in the hull, five of 
them under water.* 

State of the Formidable's Sails and Rigging after the 

Action. 

The jib and all the staysails before the foremast, 
with all the gear belonging to them all cut to pieces— 
hanging over the bows and were cut away. The fore¬ 
top-sail torn to rags and rendered totally useless. The 
foresail very much torn, and an infinite number of shot 
holes in it, so as to be of little or no use. The stay¬ 
sails between the masts likewise cut all to rags and 
rendered useless. The main topsail many shot holes in 
it, and much torn. Foot rope cut, so as to make it 
dangerous to set the sail properly, had the main top¬ 
mast been in a proper state. Mizen topsail very much 
cut and torn. 

* Evidence of the Formidable’s carpenter. 


1778 .] 


BY THE FORMIDABLE. 


245 


Rigging about the Foremast . 

The ropes in general about the bowsprit, and the fore 
and spring stays shot away. Only one fore shroud 
left standing on the weather-side, and three to lee¬ 
ward; several of them cut in two places. Only one 
pair of foretopmast shrouds standing on the lee side, 
and none to windward. All the back stays shot away. 
Foretopgallant stay and shrouds, braces, bowlines, and 
all the running ropes about the foremast, with the fore¬ 
tacks and sheets on both sides, all shot away. 

Rigging about the Mainmast. 

Mainspring-stay shot away. Only two main shrouds 
to windward left standing, and four to leeward, several 
of the others cut in two places. Only two of maintop- 
mast shrouds left standing to windward. Maintop- 
mast stay, spring stay, and all the weather-back stays 
shot away. Main topgallant shrouds, and all the run¬ 
ning ropes (one main brace excepted), main tacks and 
sheets on both sides, shot away. 

Rigging about the Mizenmast. 

Three of the weatlier-mizen shrouds, and most of 
the running rigging, shot away.* 

The day after Palliser’s account of the engagement, 
appeared in print, he, Admiral Keppel, and Lord Howe, 
had each an audience of the king, who expressed his 
perfect approbation of the conduct of the Vice-admiral 
of the Blue and his division, on the 27th of July. Sir 

* Evidence of the captain of the Formidable. 



246 SIR HUGH palliser’s interview [ch. IX. 

Hugh, therefore, immediately wrote to Captain Bazeley 
for the information of the captains of his division, 
whom the anonymous paragraph equally stigmatised, 
stating, that as the king was satisfied, they ought to be 
satisfied, and hoping there would be no further discus¬ 
sion relative to the action. 

Here, probably, the matter would have terminated, 
but for the concerted attack upon Palliser, by Admiral 
Keppel and his partisans, on the assembling of Parlia¬ 
ment. 

Sir Hugh Palliser writes as follows on the subject of 
interview with the king. 

Sir Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich. 

“ Pall-Mall, 

“ November, 6th, 1778. 

“ My Lord, 

u I have had a most gracious reception indeed from 
his Majesty, which, as it ought, makes me perfectly 
easy. Admiral Keppel was about half-an-hour in the 
closet, I guessed from some things which dropped from 
his Majesty, that the admiral declined conversing about 
the engagement, reserving himself, in case any inquiry 
should be called for, until then. Lord Howe was 
in for a much longer time. I had a little conversa¬ 
tion with his lordship, and was sorry to find from what 
he says, that it is very doubtful whether the expedition 
will proceed to the West Indies. Amongst other rea¬ 
sons, he speaks of the ships not being able to proceed 
if these westerly winds continue. I hope some thing 
will arrive before the convoys sail that may inform us 
for certain whether the expedition goes on, and with 


WITH THE KING. 


247 


1778.] 

what ships. I am very uneasy about the state of our 
provission in America, fearing they may not have 
enough to carry them through the winter, and as for 
the ships now going out with supplies, the odds are 
they will not get hold of the coast, but that they may 
be blown oft. I shall wait upon your lordship in the 
morning. 

“I am most respectfully, my lord, 
u Your lordship’s 

“ Most obedient and most humble servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 

On the 2nd of December, the house resolved itself 
into a committee of supply on the navy estimates, 
when it was moved that 70,000 seamen should be em¬ 
ployed for the service of the year 1779. 

Mr. Temple Lutterell in speaking to the motion, 
called the gentlemen’s attention particularly to its being 
the first conversation that had taken place in that 
house upon the conduct of the Admiralty since the 27th 
of July, the business of which day loudly demanded an 
immediate inquiry either there or elsewhere. He 
begged the committee to consider that Admiral Kep- 
pel would not sail again with the same vice-admiral, the 
Vice-admiral of the Blue. He did not attempt to blame 
either the vice-admiral or the commander-in-chief, but 
he said, the whole nation expected that the affair 
would be investigated, so that if either officer deserved 
censure, it should be passed upon him, and if it ap¬ 
peared that the difference between the two officers, 
arose merely from ill-grounded jealousy, it was essential 
to the service that such jealousy should be removed. 


248 PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. [CIL IX. 

The two admirals were, he observed, now in their 
places; he hoped, therefore, they would one or both 
give the house some information on the subject, as 
well for the sake of their own honour, as for the sake 
of the public peace and tranquillity, at a moment when 
it was so essential that unanimity should prevail, at 
least that our military commanders both by sea and 
land should have no differences. 

Lord North and Admiral Keppel both stood up for 
upwards of a minute, but the cry was for Keppel, who 
was pointed to by the chair. 

Admiral Keppel said he could not sit silent, when 
he found himself called upon so directly by the honour¬ 
able gentleman who spoke last, however disagreeable 
it might be to him to say any thing respecting the af¬ 
fair of the 27tli of July, an affair in which his character 
as an officer was so materially concerned. It had been 
said in that house on a preceding occasion, that if Ad¬ 
miral Keppel were to go through the business again, 
he would not fight the French in the same manner. 
He declared he would do so, for that every thing had 
been done that could be done, and he was happy to say 
the British flag had not been tarnished in his hands. 
He impeached no man of neglect of duty, because 
that the officer alluded to, Sir Hugh Palliser, had mani¬ 
fested no want of what was most essential in a British 
seaman —courage ! He apologized to the house: said 
he seldom spoke in public, nor could he trust to his 
memory. In consequence, therefore, of what had passed 
in that house on the first day of the session, he had 
committed to writing what he thought necessary to 


1778.] PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. 249 

say on tlie occasion, whenever his conduct should hap¬ 
pen to be introduced into conversation or debate, 
which with permission he would read. 

Admiral Keppel accordingly produced a written pa¬ 
per, the substance of which was, u that he had been 
called upon at a period very critical to his country, to 
stand forth in her defence, and accepted the command 
of the fleet without having a single friend in the ad¬ 
ministration. He was satisfied with the number and 
condition of the ships, with the skill and gallantry of 
the officers, and with the bravery of the men. Nothing 
was left untried to bring the French to a decisive ac¬ 
tion. He laid no blame any where, for it was his 
constant practice to promote the public service, more 
by example and encouragement, than by the rigour of 
discipline.” 

The admiral said, “ he had been much surprised, 
when an officer under his own command had made an 
appeal to a public newspaper, signed with his name, 
before any accusation had been made against him, and 
was so shocked that he resolved never to sail with the 
gentleman alluded to. He did not suspect the minis¬ 
ters of being the authors or promoters of the abuse 
which appeared in the public prints; he was perfectly 
indifferent as to their smiles and frowns, and was still 
ready to serve his country to the fullest extent of his 
abilities.” 

Sir Hugh Palliser rose as soon as Keppel sat down, 
and declared he was so conscious of not having been 
any hindrance to the renewal of the action with the 
French fleet on the 27th of July, that he was equally 
indifferent with the honourable admiral how soon an 


250 PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. [CH. IX. 

inquiry was set on foot; on tlie contrary, though it 
might generally be thought more advisable for the sake 
of the public to suppress an inquiry, it was his interest 
to wish for one, because he was certain it would then 
come out that he had done his duty in every respect, 
both as an officer and a man. “ The honourable ad¬ 
miral/’ he said, “ seemed to speak with a kind of re¬ 
serve, as if there was something behind. He heartily 
wished him to speak out, that knowing fully what was 
imputed to him, either on the score of neglect, in¬ 
activity, or want of judgment, he might have an op¬ 
portunity of fairly answering the charge, and abiding 
the judgment of the committee, whether he was or was 
not criminal. He had discovered from what the 
honourable admiral had just said, that the principal 
matter which weighed against him in the admiral’s 
mind, was, the publication in the newspaper, a pub¬ 
lication which he had signed with his name, and by 
which he would abide. If it was imprudent, if it was 
wrong, the consequence was to himself. The honoura¬ 
ble admiral had been kind enough to do him justice on 
the essential point of courage, he should nevertheless be 
exceedingly uneasy if he was thought deficient in other 
respects as an officer. It was on that very account 
that he appealed to the public. He heard after he 
came on shore, that it had been insinuated, that he had 
been a hindrance to the re-engagement with the French 
fleet on the 27 th of July. An unauthenticated in¬ 
sinuation of a neglect of duty was a severer stroke to 
an officer than any direct terms of accusation, because 
it was more difficult to remove entirely; he, therefore, 
to clear his honour, which he felt attacked, waited on 


251 


1778.], PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. 

the commander-in-chief to have the matter set to rights, 
and to have those insinuations wiped away, but he 
could get no redress. To say any thing against a friend, 
was to a man ol sensibility the most disagreeable thing in 
nature, but where an officer’s reputation was at stake, 
the removing an unjust stigma was certainly the first 
object. He had therefore appealed to the public, he 
had stated facts, and by those facts he would stand or 
fall. 

“ With reference to the report of not obeying signals it 
was a false report, but even were it true, the public ser¬ 
vice would not have been affected by it, considering the 
superiority of the British fleet, and the circumstances of 
the day. Before he sat down, he repeated his assertion, 
that he was neither guilty of inactivity nor of neglect 
of duty, and in fact, that he was in no manner instru¬ 
mental in preventing a renewal of the action with the 
fleet of M. d’Orvilliers. He repeated that he held all 
whispered insinuations, and all affected tenderness in 
the utmost contempt. If there was any real ground of 
accusation, why not make it fairly and openly? If not, 
why insinuate that he had been wanting in point of 
conduct, though a testimony was given in favour of 
his courage. This he said was a language extremely 
different from the admiral’s despatch containing an ac¬ 
count of the action, in which he informed the Admiralty- 
board of the just and gallant conduct of all the officers 
under his command. On the whole, he despised all the 
means resorted to, both within and without the doors 
of parliament, to vilify and traduce him as a profes¬ 
sional man, but conscious of his innocence, he feared 


252 PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. [-CH. IX. 

neither reports nor assertions, neither a parliamentary 
inquiry, nor a public trial.” 

Admiral Keppel replied, u That the vice-admiral de¬ 
fended his appeal to the public, on the ground that his 
conduct had been grossly misrepresented in the public 
prints; he should nevertheless continue to think such 
an appeal was extremely improper. As to any in¬ 
sinuations or indirect charges he knew not whence they 
came. For his part he had made none, nor did he 
know any'part of the vice-admirals conduct deserving of 
censure , but seeing the name of Sir Hugh Palliser 
signed to a letter in the 4 Evening Post.’ The vice- 
admiral quoted his despatch from on board the Victory ? 
containing a full approbation of the conduct of all the 
officers present that day, in which he was included. 
Most certainly the conclusion was fair, and he was ready 
again to repeat it, and point that testimony, particularly, 
as well as generally. The vice-admiral had alluded to 
signals, and said, that it was no fault of his that the 
fleet of France was not reattacked. As to that he would 
say, that he presumed every inferior officer was to obey 
the signals of his commander, and now when called upon 
to speak out, he would inform the house and the pub¬ 
lic, that the signal for coming into the Victory’s wake 
was flying from three o’clock in the afternoon, until 
eight in the evening, unobeyed; at the same time he 
did not charge the vice-admiral with active disobedience. 
He doubted not that if any inquiry should be thought 
necessary, that he would be able to justify himself, be¬ 
cause he was fully persuaded of his personal bravery.” 

Mr. Lutterell rose, and was proceeding to make ani- 


1778.] ADMIRALTY CORRESPONDENCE. 253 

mad versions on wliat had just passed, and moved an 
address to the crown to order a trial of Sir Hugh Pal- 
liser, but was called to order by Lord Mulgrave for 
deviating from the subject; the navy estimates being 
the subject properly before the house. 

At the termination of this discussion, Palliser walked 
over to Keppel in his seat in the house, and told him, 
that in consequence of the reflections cast upon his 
conduct, he was determined to call for courts-martial 
on them both. Accordingly, seven days after this de¬ 
bate, the vice-admiral lodged charges of misconduct 
against Admiral Keppel, on five different heads, copies 
of which were transmitted him with the following 
letter : 

Philip Stephens , Esq., to Admiral Keppel. 

“ Admiralty Office, December 9th, 1778. 

“ Sir, 

“ Sir Hugh Palliser, Vice-admiral of the Blue squa¬ 
dron of his Majesty’s fleet, having in his letter of this 
day’s date, transmitted to my Lords Commissioners of 
the Admiralty a charge of misconduct and neglect of 
duty against you, on the 27th and 28th of July, 1778, 
in divers instances therein mentioned, and desired that 
a court-martial may be held for trying you for the 
same ; and their lordships intending that a court- 
martial shall be held for that purpose, I have it in com¬ 
mand from them to send you herewith a copy of the 
said charge, that you may be preparing for your 
defence. 

“ I have the honour to be, Sir, &c. 

“ Pit. Stephens.” 


254 ADMIRALTY CORRESPONDENCE. [CH. IX. 

In reply to a letter from Keppel in answer to this, 
the secretary of the Admiralty writes, naming the 7th 
of January—or a later date, if the admiral should not 
be ready—for the assembling of a court-martial, and 
concludes as follows : 

u As to the astonishment you express at the counte¬ 
nance you conceive their lordships have given to this 
proceeding, by resolving, on the same day on which 
the charge was exhibited, to order a court-martial, 
their lordships order me to acquaint you that they 
know of no instance in which the Board of Admiralty, 
upon receiving a specific charge of such a nature, signed 
by an officer of rank, serving under the party accused, 
and accompanied with the request for assembling a 
court-martial thereupon, have delayed coming to a re¬ 
solution to order one, nor would they have thought 
themselves justified if they had hesitated to take the 
necessary steps for bringing the matter to an early and 
legal decision. 

“ I have the honour to be, Sir, &c. 

“Ph. Stephens.” 

On the 11th of December, Mr. Temple Lutterell rose 
and observed, that in the committee on the navy esti¬ 
mates, in the presence of two great naval officers, he 
mentioned the affair of the 27th of July, when both 
the honourable gentlemen rose in their places and re¬ 
spectively defended their characters. Two circum¬ 
stances came out, however, on that occasion, which 
formed the true ground of the question he was about 
to submit to the house. One was, that the com- 


1778.J PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. 255 

mander-in-chief said that his signal to engage was out 
from three till eight in the afternoon, and was not 
obeyed. The vice-admiral admitted the signal, but 
urged the impracticability of obeying it, from the dam¬ 
age he had received. 1 he motion he intended to make 
was founded on the conversation between the admiral 
and the vice-admiral. u He moved that a humble 
address be presented to his Majesty to inquire into the 
conduct of Vice-admiral Sir Hugh Palliser.” 

After some pause, Sir Joseph Mawbey rose and 
seconded the motion. 

Sir Hugh Palliser then rose from his seat next to Lord 
North on the Treasury bench. “ Pie looked upon him¬ 
self,” lie said, u most injuriously treated by the attack 
of some dark, concealed assassin in a newspaper; that he 
waited on his admiral, as the only person who could afford 
him that assistance he wanted towards vindicating his 
character. This application proving fruitless, he had 
recourse to the sole means in his power of wiping off 

the aspersion—an appeal to the public. This he had 
done in a fair and open manner. PI ere the affair rested 

till the honourable gentleman who made the present 
motion brought the subject to be discussed in that 
house, on which occasion he could not help observing, 
that the honourable admiral, instead of explaining, 
acted, in his opinion, in a very unbecoming manner; 
for, without making any direct accusation of a criminal 
nature, he substantially charged him with disobedience, 
and seemed to lay the want of success on the 27th of 
July at his door, either on the score of refusing what 
was actually in his power to do, or on a mere want of 


256 


PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. 


[CH. IX. 

knowledge in his profession. These were insinuations 
he had determined he would not lie under. He was 
conscious he had performed his duty, nor would he, 
from any notions of convenience, expediency, or public 
opinion, father the faults of any man, and be compelled 
to bear the blame of his mistakes and incapacity. 
Therefore, finding that neither by personal applications, 
nor from public motives, the admiral could be prevailed 
upon to do him justice, and that he asserted in the face 
of the nation, that he would never serve with him 
again, he found himself driven to the necessity of doing 
what was extremely irksome and disagreeable ; that 
was, of accusing Admiral Keppel of being the cause of 
our disappointment on that day, when, if the British 
flag was not disgraced, it gained no additional honour. 
He was compelled to do this, to repair the injury done 
to his honour. Such was the precise situation he stood 
in. What he had done, therefore, was dictated by self- 
defence, and he did it with the utmost pain and reluc¬ 
tance, as there was no man living he had a higher 
esteem for than the honourable admiral, as a friend 
and an intimate acquaintance whom he had known for 
many years, and whose intimacy and friendship he had 
looked upon as one of the happiest circumstances of 
his life.” 

The charges exhibited by the vice-admiral were then 
laid upon the table. 

Admiral Pigot affirmed that the Admiralty acted 
very rashly and hastily in this business. An officer 
of Mr. Keppel’s rank, services, and professional cha¬ 
racter, deserved another kind of treatment. The Ad- 


1778.] PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. 257 

rniralty should have acted with a becoming caution, 

before they received the vice-admiral’s complaints, and 
acted upon them. 

Lord Mulgrave replied, that the constitution of the 
Board was such, that when a complaint was preferred, 
they were, of course, not only compelled in discharge 
of their office to receive it, but to give the neces¬ 
sary directions to proceed to trial. What could the 
Board do? The vice-admiral prefers an accusation 
properly drawn up and specifically pointed. They 
must either take upon themselves to prejudge the truth 
of those charges, or admit them to be such as were fit 
to be sent for the consideration of a court-martial. The 
first they could not—dared not do, being totally igno¬ 
rant of the truth or falsehood of them ; the second they 
were obliged to comply with, because the matter ad¬ 
mitted of no alternative. Sir Hugh Palliser said, he 
found that no reparation for his injured honour was to 
be obtained, but by a trial. It could not be expected 
that he would accuse himself. Admiral Keppel, though 
he censured him by openly declaring that he would 
never serve with him, at the same time refused to make 
that kind of accusation which alone could put him in 
the way of vindicating himself; he was, therefore, 
driven to the necessity of becoming an accuser, when 
he could not obtain justice by any other mode. If his 
conduct was criminal, why did not the admiral call 
him to account in a proper manner ? If it was not 
criminal, how could the admiral reconcile to himself 
publicly charging him with disobedience, and accom¬ 
panying that charge with a declaration that he would 
never serve with him again? The truth was, the 

s 


258 PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS. [CH. IX. 

public were disappointed relative to the event of tlie 
engagement of the 27tli of July. No mark of disap¬ 
probation was expressed as to the conduct of the vice- 
admiral, until the public dissatisfaction was made known, 
when it was industriously circulated, that it was his 
fault that the French squadron was not re-attacked. 

This was the true state of the case. And as to not 
making the accusation earlier, the question might be 
asked of the admiral, why did he not mention his dis¬ 
approbation earlier ? 

On the assertion of Sir Joseph Mawbey, that the 
first Lord of the Admiralty directed the deliberations 
of the vice-admiral. Sir Hugh Palliser affirmed upon 
his honour, that beyond mentioning to his lordship his 
determination not to submit to the calumnies in circu¬ 
lation against him, he had no previous concert with 
the noble lord alluded to, nor with any individual at 
the Admiralty-board. What he had done was purely 
in vindication of his own honour and character; that 
such being the object he had' all along in contem¬ 
plation, he never communicated a syllable of his 
ultimate intentions to any man, and be the event what 
it might, he could with truth repeat, that he acted 
throughout upon his own judgment, without either 
counsel or advice. 

On the 16th, Admiral Pigot brought in a bill to 
authorise the admiralty to hold the court-martial on 
shore. The plea for this motion was the admiral’s ill 
state of health,* and the bill was carried through both 
houses ofparliament without much opposition. 

* In one of the pamphlets of the day it is observed, “ An ill state of 
health, with which the admiral had at times been long afflicted, was the 


1778.] THE admirals’ memorial to the king. 259 

Previous to the assembling of the court-martial, the 
following memorial was drawn up by some of Keppel’s 
partisans, and handed round for signature to the dif¬ 
ferent flag officers then at home, but all refused to 
countenance or support it, with the exception of the 
admirals whose names are annexed thereto. 

“We the undersigned admirals of your Majesty’s 
royal navy, having hitherto, on all occasions, served 
your Majesty with zeal and fidelity, and being desirous 
of devoting every action of our lives, and our lives 
themselves, to your Majesty’s service and the defence 
of our country, think ourselves indispensably bound 
by our duty to that service and that country, with all 
possible humility, to represent to your wisdom and 
justice: 

“ That Sir Hugh Palliser, Vice-admiral of the Blue, 
lately serving under the command of the Honourable 
Augustus Keppel, did prefer certain articles of accu¬ 
sation, containing several matters of heinous offence 
against his commander-in-chief, to the lords commis¬ 
sions for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of 

plea upon which the motion was grounded ; and, although I do not mean 
to call in question the justness of the plea, I cannot help thinking that it 
does not well accord with the prior and subsequent boasting of his friends. 
Before the admiral had notice to prepare for trial, his friends represented 
him as the only man in the kingdom capable of being her saviour. And the 
act authorising the Board of Admiralty to order the trial on shore was no 
sooner passed, than his advocates, forgetting all bodily infirmity, insisted 
that he was the only sea-officer capable of interposing between Great 
Britain and that danger which then threatened her. If the admiral’s state 
of health had long been such, that the going on board of a ship in Ports¬ 
mouth harbour, and the coming on shore again, only once a day during the 
trial, would have imminently endangered his life, I hope I may be allowed 
to say that he could not be the fittest person to direct Britannia’s thunder 
amidst conflicting elements 

s 2 


260 THE admirals’ memorial to the king. [cn. IX. 

Great Britain, lie, the said Sir Hugh Palliser, being 
himself a commissioner in the said commission; this 
accusation he, the said Sir Hugh Palliser, withheld 
from the 27tli of July last, the time of the supposed 
offences committed until the ninth day of this present 
December, and then brought forward for the purpose 
of recrimination against charges conjectured by him, 
the said Sir Hugh Palliser, but which, in fact, were 
never made. 

“ That the commissioners of the admiralty, near five 
months after the pretended offences aforesaid, did re¬ 
ceive from their said colleague in office, the charge 
made by him against his said commander; and without 
taking into consideration the relative situation of the 
accuser and the party accused, or attending to the 
avowed motives of the accusation, or the length of 
time of withholding, or the occasion of making the same, 
and without any other deliberation whatever, did, on 
the very same day on which the charge was preferred, 
and without previous notice to’ the party accused of 
an intention of making a charge against him, give 
notice of their intending that a court-martial should be 
held on the said Admiral Keppel, after forty years’ of 
meritorious service, and a variety of actions, in which 
he had exerted eminent courage and conduct, by 
which the honour and power of this nation, and the 
glory of the British flag had been maintained and in¬ 
creased in various parts of the world. 

“ We beg leave to express to your Majesty our con¬ 
cern at this proceeding, and to represent our appre¬ 
hensions of the difficulties and discouragements which 
will inevitably arise to your service therefrom; and 


1778.] THE admirals’ memorial to the king. 261 

tliat it will not be easy for men attentive to tlieir 
honour to serve your Majesty, particularly in situations 
of principal command, if the practice now stated to 
your Majesty be countenanced, or the principles upon 
which the same has been supported shall prevail with 
any lord high admiral or with any commissioner for ex¬ 
ecuting that office. 

“ We are humbly of opinion that a criminal charge 
against an officer (rising in importance according to 
the rank and command of that office), which suspends 
his service to your Majesty, perhaps in the most cri¬ 
tical exigencies of the public affairs, which calls his 
reputation into doubt and discussion, which puts him 
on trial for his life, profession, and reputation; and 
which, in its consequences, may cause a fatal cessation 
in the naval exertions of the kingdom, to be a matter 
of the most serious nature, and never to be made by 
authority but on solid ground, and on mature deli¬ 
beration. The honour of an officer is his most pre¬ 
cious possession and best qualification; the public have 
an interest in it; and whilst those under whom we 
serve countenance accusation, it is often impossible to 
restore military fame by the mere acquittal of a court- 
martial. Imputations made by high authority remain 
long, and affect deeply. The sphere of action of the 
commanders-in-chief is large, and their business intri¬ 
cate, and subject to great variety of opinion; and before 
they are put on the judgment of others for acts done 
upon their discretion, the greatest discretion ought to 
be employed. 

“ Whether the Board of Admiralty hath by law any 
such discretion, we, who are not ol the profession ol 


262 'the admirals’ memorial to the king. [ch. IX. 

the law, cannot positively assert, but if we had con¬ 
ceived that this board had no legal use of their reason 
in a point of such delicacy and importance, we should 
have known on what terms we served; but we never 
did imagine it possible that we were to receive orders 
from, and be accountable to, those who by law were 
reduced to become passive instruments to the possible 
malice, ignorance, or treason, of any individual who 
might think fit to disarm his Majesty’s navy of its best 
and highest officers. We conceive it disrespectful to 
the laws of our country, to suppose them capable of 
such manifest injustice and absurdity. 

“We therefore humbly represent, in behalf of public 
order, as well as of the discipline of the navy, to your 
Majesty, the dangers of long concealed and afterwards 
precipitately adopted charges, and all recriminating 
accusations of subordinate officers against their com- 
manders-in-chief, and particularly the mischief and 
scandal of permitting men, who are at once in high 
civil office and in subordinate military command, pre¬ 
vious to their making such accusations to attempt to cor¬ 
rupt the public judgment by the publication of libels on 
their officers in a common newspaper, thereby exciting 
mutiny in your Majesty’s navy, as well as prejudicing 
the minds of those who are to try the merits of the 
accusation against the said superior officer. 


“ Hawke. 

“ John Moore. 

“ Bolton. 

“ Samuel Graves. 

“ Hugh Pigot. 

“ Robert Harland. 


Bristol. 

James Young. 
Matthew Barton. 
Francis Geary. 
Shuldham. 

Clark Gayton.” 


1778.] OBSERVATIONS ON THE MEMORIAL. 263 

This singular and unjustifiable document—singular 
from its reasoning, and unjustifiable from its tendency 
to stay the arm of justice—if it means any thing, 
means this, that the conduct of officers in situations of 
principal command, be it what it may, should never 
subject them to be brought to a trial, and that any 
inquiry which may u call their reputation into doubt 
and discussion,” should always be avoided, u as it is 
often impossible to restore military fame by the mere 
acquittal of a court-martial.” But the most singular 
part of the disgraceful production, is the motive as¬ 
signed by the subscribing admirals for the adoption 
of this mode of communicating their sentiments to 
his Majesty. Begging leave to represent their appre¬ 
hensions of the difficulties and discouragements which 
will inevitably arise to his service, by accusing cul¬ 
pable connnanders-in-chief, u it will not be easy,” say 
they, “ for men attentive to their honour to serve your 
Majesty if they shall be liable to be brought to a court- 
martial.” These admirals however had deplorably mis¬ 
taken the feelings of men attentive to their honour, 
described in their memorial, as “ an officer’s most pre¬ 
cious possession and his highest qualifications.” Men 
attentive to their honours are the men least appre¬ 
hensive of that investigation which would tend to 
divest it of every unjust and ill-founded imputation, 
and which from a consciousness of the strict and 
honourable performance of their duty, they would 
most assiduously court. What choice was left the Lords 
of the Admiralty, and even if so disposed, how could 
they be justified in attempting to smother the cause of 
an event so inglorious and disastrous to their country, 


264 OBSERVATIONS ON THE MEMORIAL. [cil. IX. 

as the inferior fleet of France being permitted, after a 
passing skirmish, to depart unmolested, and lay claim 
to a victory? Charges of a most specific nature were 
preferred, borne out in appearance by the indecisive re¬ 
sults of the meeting with the enemy, therefore a search¬ 
ing examination, fairly entered into and equitably con¬ 
ducted, was the only means they possessed of ascer¬ 
taining whether those charges were well or ill-founded, 
and it was imperitavely required of them, not only to 
sanction but to facilitate a judicial inquiry. 

The last paragraph of this ignominious though 
abortive effort to throw the protection of silence and 
concealment over the acts, and to bolster up the sink¬ 
ing reputation of the chief commander, at the expense 
and probable ruin of an officer in subordinate authority 
— applied to the conduct of the memorialising ad¬ 
mirals themselves, could scarcely be rendered more 
appropriate; for if the vice-admiral’s publication in 
vindication of imputed disobedience and neglect of 
duty, was an attempt, as they insinuate, “ to corrupt 
the public judgment, as well as to prejudice the minds 
of those who were to try the merits of the accusation 
against his superior officer,” what terms are most 
suitable to their own malignant endeavour to taint 
that very source from which an honest sentence ought 
to flow. 

It is but due to the distinguished veteran seaman 
whose name heads the list of signatures, to observe 
that when the subsequent trials showed how great 
would have been the wrong inflicted upon the Vice- 
admiral of the Blue, if the memorial had been acted 
upon, he expressed the deepest regret at having signed 


265 


1778.] OBSERVATIONS ON THE MEMORIAL. 

it, stating that tlie Earl of Bristol had taken advan¬ 
tage of his ill state of health and incapacity at the 
time, to weigh maturely the propriety of lending his 
support to it, and had seduced him into sanctioning 
that unwarrantable solicitation of his Majesty’s arbi¬ 
trary interference with the course of military justice.* 

“It appears extraordinary,” says a writer of the 
day, “ that Sir Robert Harland should sign the me¬ 
morial presented to the king by the Duke of Bolton. 
In the engagement off Usliant, Sir Robert Harland 
was so prepossessed in his opinion that Admiral 
Keppel meant to renew the attack, that he actually 
pointed out the French ship which he intended to 
engage, and ordered his master to lay him alongside of 
her as soon as the admiral should renew the engage¬ 
ment. The engagement was not renewed, and Sir 
Robert Harland was of course disappointed. Yet he 
has now signed a memorial to the king representing 
the extreme hardship of trying a man for having neg¬ 
lected to do what he himself expected he would have 
done. 

“ The signature of Sir Robert Harland to the me¬ 
morial presented to the king, can only be accounted 
for on this principle: Sir Robert was promoted to the 
command of the division through the interest of 
Admiral Keppel. 

“ As for Admiral Campbell, he is materially con- 


* Lord Hawke was so indignant with the Earl of Bristol for having mis- 
tatcd matters to him on this occasion, that he would never afterwards 
see him. This Lord Hawke declared to Captain Maplestown, Lieutenant- 
governor of Greenwich Hospital, who mentioned the circumstance to 
many .—Palliser MSS. 


266 OBSERVATIONS ON THE MEMORIAL. [oil. IX. 

cerned in stopping, if possible, the court-martial, be¬ 
cause should there be any thing censurable in the 
commanding conduct of the fleet, the professional skill 
of Admiral Campbell will be greatly depreciated.” 

The notorious naval character of the Duke of Bolton 
—the admiral entrusted with the presentation of the 
memorial—gave the coup-de-grace to this memorable 
procedure. The gallant sailor in question, had twice 
been subjected to the ordeal of a court-martial, on 
charges of cowardice and neglect of duty. 

On his return from the East Indies he was brought 
to trial by Admiral Griffin, who charged him with 
misconduct when in command of the Exeter of sixty 
guns, “ and that he did not hearten and encourage the 
inferior officers and common men to fight courageously; 
but on the contrary, behaved himself faintly, forsook 
his own station on the quarterdeck, and showed marks 
of fear by bobbing and otherwise.”* Five years after¬ 
wards, when in command of the Barfleur, one of Sir 
Edward Hawke’s squadron, he was detached in pur¬ 
suit of some of the enemy’s vessels, and took that op¬ 
portunity of stealing home to port, where he was 
found by the admiral when he returned from his 
cruise.f On this occasion, the ingenious device of 
loosing the sternpost of his ship by the oath of his 
honest accommodating carpenter, and thus proving 
that it would have been unsafe to remain at sea, saved 
his life, but bequeathed to him the appellation of 
Admiral Sternpost, in which it was his grace’s good 
fortune ever afterwards to rejoice. The sentence, there- 

* Admiralty records. Court-martial on Captain Harry Powlet. 

f Beatison’s Naval Memoirs. 


267 


1778.] OBSERVATIONS ON THE MEMORIAL. 

fore, in the memorial, u that it is often impo ssible 
to restore military fame by the mere acquittal of a 
court-martial,”—from personal experience in the mat¬ 
ter, may have been feelingly pointed by the illustrious 
officer who presented the document to his sovereign. 
That upright monarch, however, treated this object of 
his grace’s solicitude with the contempt it so eminently 
merited, and beyond the mere circumstance of receiving 
the production, took no further notice of it. 


268 


COURT-MARTIAL ON KEPPEL. 


[CII. X. 


CHAPTER X. 

COURT MARTIAL ON ADMIRAL KEPPEL. 

Charge exhibited against Keppel—The Demeanour of Palliser contrasted 
with that of Keppel, by an Eye-witness—Remarks on the Extraordinary 
Conduct of the Court—Their Attempts to elicit the Opinions of Wit¬ 
nesses as to Keppel’s Conduct—Resisted by several of the Witnesses— 
Lord Mulgrave’s Address to the Court on the Impropriety of converting 
Witnesses into Judges—Alterations in the Log-books of the Formidable 
and Robuste—The Attack on Captain Hood—He maintains his Right to 
Revise his Log-book—Alterations in other Log-books of the Fleet not 
noticed—The Log-book of the Victory, the Admiral’s Ship, containing 
the only False Entry proved by Admiral Campbell, and the Master of 
the Victory—Palliser’s Private Letters to the Earl of Sandwich during 
the Trial—Remarks on Iveppel’s Defence—Its Singular Contradictions 
— Palliser refused Permission to Address the Court, and observe on the 
Evidence—The Sentence of the Court—Public Riots—Sir Hugh Pal¬ 
liser’s House attacked by the Mob, and the Contents destroyed—He 
narrowly escapes falling into their Hands. 


1779. 

A court-martial, composed of the following mem¬ 
bers, assembled on board the Britannia, on the 7th of 
January, and as soon as sworn, adjourned to the 
governor’s house. 


1779.] 


CHARGE EXHIBITED. 


2G9 


PRESIDENT. 

Sir Thomas Tye, Admiral of the White. 

MEMBERS. 

Matthew Buckle, Esq., Vice-admiral of the Red, 
John Montagu, Esq., Vice-admiral of the Red, 
Marriot Arbuthnot, Esq., Rear-admiral of the White, 
Robert Roddam, Esq., Rear-admiral of the White. 

CAPTAINS. 

M. Milbank, William Bennett, 

Fra. Sam. Drake, Adam Duncan, 

Taylor Penny, Philip Boteler, 

John Montray, James Evanston. 

When the court re-assembled on shore, Sir Hugh 
Palliser’s application to the Admiralty for the court- 
martial, together with the following charge, were 
read. 

“ CHARGE. 

“ A Charge of Misconduct and Neglect of Duty, against 
the Horiourable Admiral Keppel , on the 27th and 
28th of July, 1778, in divers instances , as under¬ 
mentioned : 

“ I. That on the morning of the 27tli of July, 1778, 
having a fleet of thirty ships of the line under his com¬ 
mand, and being then in the presence of a French fleet 
of the like number of ships of the line, the said ad¬ 
miral did not make the necessary preparation for fight, 
did not put his fleet into a line of battle, or into any 
order proper either for receiving or attacking an enemy 
of such force; but, on the contrary, although his fleet 
was already dispersed and in disorder, he, by making 


270 COURT-MARTIAL ON KEPPEL. [CH. X. 

the signal for several ships of the Vice-admiral of the 
Blue’s division to chase to windward, increased the dis¬ 
order of that part of his fleet, and the ships were in 
consequence more scattered than they had been be¬ 
fore ; and whilst in this disorder, he advanced to the 
enemy, and made the signal for battle; that the above 
conduct was the more unaccountable as the enemy’s 
fleet was not then in disorder, nor beaten, nor flying; 
but formed in a regular line of battle on that tack which 
approached the British fleet, all their motions plainly 
indicating a design to give battle, and they edged down 
and attacked it whilst in disorder. By this unofficer - 
like conduct, a general engagement was not brought on, 
but the other flag-officers and captains were left to engage 
without order or regularity, from which great confusion 
ensued; some of his ships were prevented getting into 
action at all, others were not near enough to the enemy, 
and some from the confusion, fired into others of the 
king’s ships, and did them considerable damage; and 
the Vice-admiral of the Blue was left alone to engage, 
singly and unsupported. In these instances, the said 
Admiral Keppel negligently performed the duty im¬ 
posed on him. 

“ H. That after the van and centre divisions of the 
British fleet passed the rear of the enemy, the admiral 
did not immediately tack and double upon the enemy 
with these two divisions, and continue the battle; nor 
did he collect them together at that time, and keep so 
near the enemy to renew the battle as soon as it might 
be proper; on the contrary, he stood away beyond the 
enemy to a great distance before he wore to stand to¬ 
wards them again, leaving the Vice-admiral of the 


CHARGE EXHIBITED. 


271 


1779.] 

Blue engaged witli the enemy, and exposed to be cut 

off. 

“ III. That after the Vice-admiral of the Blue had 
passed the last of the enemy’s ships, and immediately 
wore, and laid his own ships towards the enemy again, 
being then in their wake, and at a little distance only, 
and expecting the admiral to advance with all the ships 
to renew the fight, the admiral did not advance for 
that purpose, but shortened sail, and hauled down the sig¬ 
nal for battle; nor did he at that time, or at any other 
time, whilst standing towards the enemy, call the ships 
together, in order to renew the attack, as he might have 
done, particularly the Vice-admiral of the Red, and his 
division, which had received the least damage, had been 
the longest out of action, were ready and fit to renew it, 
were then to windward, and could have borne down 
and fetched any part of the French fleet, if the signal 
for battle had not been hauled down, or if the said Ad¬ 
miral Keppel had availed himself of the signal ap¬ 
pointed by the 31st Article of the Fighting Instruc¬ 
tions, by which he might have ordered those to lead 
who are to lead with the starboard tacks on board, by 
a wind, which signal was applicable to the occasion, for 
renewing the engagement with advantage, after the 
French fleet had been beaten, their line broken, and in 
disorder. In these instances he did not do the utmost 
in his power to take, sink, burn, or destroy the French 
fleet that had attacked the British fleet. 

“ IV. That instead of advancing to renew the en¬ 
gagement, as in the preceding articles is alledged, and 
as he might and ought to have done, the admiral wore 
and made sail directly from the enemy, and thus he led 


272 COURT-MARTIAL ON KEPPEL. [CX. X. 

the whole British fleet away from them, which gave 
them the opportunity to rally unmolested, and to form 
again into a line of battle, and to stand after the British 
fleet. This was disgraceful to the British flag, for it had 
the appearance of a flight, and gave the French ad¬ 
miral a pretence to claim the victory, and to publish 
to the world that the British fleet ran away, and that 
he pursued it with the fleet of France, and offered it 
battle. 

“ V. That in the morning of the 28th of July, 1778, 
when it was perceived that only three of the French fleet 
remained near the British, in the situation the whole 
had been in the night before, and that the rest were to 
leeward, at a greater distance, not in a line of battle, 
but in a heap, the admiral did not cause the fleet to 
pursue the flying enemy, nor even to chase the three 
ships that fled after the rest; but on the contrary, he 
led the British fleet another way directly from the 
enemy. By these instances of misconduct and neglect, a 
glorious opportunity was lost of doing a most essential 
service to the state, and the honour of the British 
navy was tarnished. 

(Signed) “ II. Palliser” 

Few events created more interest and discussion, not 
only at the time, but for years afterwards, both in the 
British navy and throughout the kingdom, than the 
trials of Admiral Keppel and Vice-admiral Sir Hugh 
Palliser; and as they proceeded, the military nature 
of the inquiry became almost totally merged by the 
intemperate interference of a clamorous party,—into 
a subject of political strife which rent the service 


273 


1779.] REMARKS ON THE CHARGE. 

into opposite factions, and engrafted a character upon 
the feelings of many gallant distinguished officers, at 
variance with the honourable discharge of their pro¬ 
fessional duties, and prejudicial in the highest degree 
to the martial honour of their country.*' 

A London journal contains the following judicious 
observations. u In some of the papers it was yesterday 
stated, that the Duke of Bolton had presented a peti¬ 
tion to his Majesty, signed by himself and several other 
admirals, complaining of the Board of Admiralty for 
having so precipitately granted a court-martial on 
Admiral Keppel. It is to be hoped that this is not 
true. It were to be wished that such a naval officer 
as the Duke of Bolton would refrain from openly 
espousing Admiral Keppel. A bad advocate injures 
a good cause. 

“ Whether the charges against Admiral Keppel be 
or be not well founded, the court martial will deter¬ 
mine. The acquittal of the admiral is taken for granted 
by his friends. The court-martial, however, will have 
the good effect of beginning that inquiry which every 
man of sense in the kingdom is of opinion should take 


* Sir George Rodney ascribes the discreditable conduct of many of his 
captains in the action with M’Guichen on the 17th of April, to the party 
feelings which had infested the navy. Sir George writes, “ If all were to 
be tried who misbehaved on that day, I know not where judges could be 
found, and I do not choose delinquents should try delinquents ; but 1 
sent or will send home most of those captains who were with me on that 
day. I find the world cry out aloud, that I should have praised those who 
did their duty on that day. Show me a man—my own captain and a 
few others excepted—that deserves praise ; and then let them blame me 
if they can. I would fain think it was ignorance : I am unwilling to 
think worse. Part I am sure was villany, with the hope of upsetting the 
administration.” 


T 


274 REMARKS ON THE CONDUCT [CH. X* 

place, that the publie may know by what fatality it 
happened, that an inferior French fleet were not com¬ 
pletely destroyed off Ushant, but left so far masters of 
the sea, as to steer deliberately to Brest, without being 
pursued by our fleet. The engagement off Ushant was 
finished at three o’clock. From three to eight in the 
evening, what were the English about? This ques¬ 
tion has been frequently asked, but it never has been 
satisfactorily answered. The court-martial will clear 
up that and other mysteries. 

“ In the House of Lords’ debate on the trial of Ad¬ 
miral Keppel, his grace the Duke of Bolton proposed, 

‘ that in case of a want of flag officers, the court-mar¬ 
tial might be composed of a parcel of young captains 
who were incapable of judging.’ Young, as many of 
the captains may be, for the honour of the service, it 
is to be hoped, that there is not one of them so inca¬ 
pable as his Grace of Bolton. He has fitted up his 
house at Portsmouth in a most elegant style, for the re¬ 
ception of the Lords Bockingh'am, Bristol, Shelburne, 
and others of the nobility. Pray what have the no¬ 
bility to do with the trial of Admiral Keppel? Is it 
because he is uncle to the Duke of Bedford, a near re¬ 
lation of Lord Gower, and connected by the accident 
of blood with other nobles, that, therefore, the nobility 
are to make a common cause, and by their overruling 
influence dispose the event of the day. Let the nation 
have justice. It is very indecent of the Duke of Bol¬ 
ton to make a nobility job of the affair. Sir Hugh 
Palliser is an Irish commoner, has only the birth of a 
gentleman to plead for him, and not one of the nobility 
will open a house in his favour. 


275 


1779 .] of keppel’s friends. 

“ If the Duke of Bolton was really so rash as to 
present a petition against the trial of Admiral Keppel, 
it only shows how a brave officer may be injured by a 
brainless peer. Happily for the nation, when Sir Hugh 
Palliser is to be tried,—being a gentleman by birth and 
noble only by his actions—he will not have a single 
duke to petition the throne to put a stop to the pro¬ 
ceedings.” 

Admiral Keppel was attended during his trial, which 
extended over a period of five weeks, by his partisans, 
those leaders of the opposition in both houses of par¬ 
liament, who had taken so prominent a part in resist¬ 
ing the inquiry; and the unseemly interruptions they 
were permitted to indulge in—their clapping and hissing 
as the questions asked, and the answers of witnesses 
accorded with their sentiments of partiality to the pri¬ 
soner, or their dislike to the prosecutor, indicated, that 
the members of the court even were imbued with pre¬ 
judices, inconsistent with the sacred character of their 
judicial functions, and the unbiased feelings which 
should have guided their deliberations. The existence 
of those prejudices became more fully developed in the 
course of the investigation, by a series of singular and 
unprecedented decisions, setting the principles of com¬ 
mon sense and of common justice at open defiance, and 
branding their whole proceedings with the distinctive 
marks of unfairness to the vice-admiral. 

An eye-witness of the proceedings writes as follows: 

“ Portsmouth, January 9, 1779. 

“ The Dukes of Cumberland, Bolton, Richmond, and 
other nobles; Counsellors, Dunning, Lee, and Erskine; 

t 2 


276 THE DEMEANOUR OF THE TWO ADMIRALS. [CH. X. 

Orators, Fox, Burke, and Sheridan, and a legion of short¬ 
hand writers surround the admiral, whilst Sir Hugh 
Palliser has not a soul with him but his two agents, 
whom he seldom consults, seeming to stand only on the 
justice of his cause. 

“ There cannot be two more opposite instances in 
nature, than the behaviour of the two admirals in the 
presence of the court-martial. The prisoner appears 
to be carried tumultuously away with every tide of 
casual passion;—at one moment you see him swoln 
with anger, and his eyes darting fire at the suggestions 
of his accuser; in another instant, he appears in a 
gloomy seriousness, frequently affecting to smile con¬ 
tempt, and often bursting into coarse laughs of ridicule, 
casting his eyes upwards with vulgar gesticulations, 
and discovering, at almost every question, the most 
unbridled emotions of the mind. On the other hand, 
his accuser stands in the portentous conflict, unmoved 
at every indecency of the adverse side, with a serenity 
of countenance unruffled by any circumstance that can 
occur;—he proceeds in the examination of the wit¬ 
nesses, unreservedly collected, with all that dignity 
which ever gleams from a firm and modest fortitude, 
strongly exhibiting that bold and honest picture which 
Horace so beautifully describes in his 

‘ Justum ac tenacem propositi virum, &c.’ ” 

The first attempt of the court, with the probable 
object of sheltering their sentence under the opinions 
extracted from witnesses, was to convert mere opinion 
into matter of fact, and to wring a declaration from the 
different captains examined, whether Admiral Keppel 
“ had conducted himself unbecoming a flag officer on 


THE CONDUCT OF THE COURT. 


277 


1779 .] 

the 2 7tli and 28th of July,” and “ whether on either of 
those days he had tarnished the honour of the British 
flag.” 

The illegality of this attempt, produced a remon¬ 
strance from the prosecutor which was handed to the 
court in writing, and was strenuously objected to by 
most of the officers to whom the questions were put. 

Captain Digby, of the Ramilies, replied, “ I have 
been giving evidence upon facts, and the answering that 
question would be judging upon them, which I have 
no right to do.” 

Captain Hood answered, u I have given my evidence, 
as far as it goes, with integrity. The court must there¬ 
fore decide upon the questions asked.” 

Admiral Montague, addressing Sir Richard Bicker- 
ton, Bart., Captain of the Terrible, said, “ You are an 
old officer; you have been in more than one action; 
you have served under a brave man, Admiral Bos- 
cawen. The admiral now trying is charged with negli¬ 
gently performing the duty imposed upon him. Inform 
the court if you know of any instance on the 27th of 
July, in which he was guilty, or did not perform the 
duty imposed upon him ?” 

Sir Richard Bickerton answered—“ Ever since I 
have had the honour of knowing and serving under 
Admiral Keppel, I have had the greatest esteem for 
him, and the highest opinion of him as an officer, and 
I have so still; but as I have been giving my evidence 
upon facts, I think my answering that question would 
be judging of them, which I think I have no right 
to do.” 

Lord Mulgrave, Captain of the Courageux, on being 


278 lord mulgrave’s address to the court, [ch. X. 

similarly questioned by the court, conveyed bis dissent, 
in language conferring infinite honour on himself and 
those who preceded him in the same laudable course. 
“ I have taken an oath,” said his lordship, “ to answer 
the truth of all questions. I look upon opinion to be a 
matter liable to error. The term negligence implies a 
crime, and I must be equal to the duty of an admiral 
commanding-in-chief before I can decide upon oath 
whether he did his duty negligently or not. I have an¬ 
swered to facts, and if I am to be urged more, it is not 
the admiral accused but it is me you are trying. I hope 
the court will not press upon me to give my opinion. 
The court are to judge of the facts before them, and I 
should think myself in a most disagreeable situation as 
a witness, if I am to be called upon to answer upon my 
oath to that which is matter of opinion ; and perhaps 
after giving it to-day, at another time I may alter my 
opinion, and think it not a just one. The facts I can 
speak to as matter of knowledge; as to opinion I can¬ 
not; a matter of fact which may in one case be meri¬ 
torious, may in another be criminal; and I am called 
upon to decide, whether the acts done by the admiral 
that day were meritorious or criminal. I have an¬ 
swered to every fact, to every motion of the fleet that 
I observed, to every signal of the fleet that I saw; I 
am ready and willing cheerfully to answer every ques¬ 
tion of fact; but to answer whether I am of opinion 
that the admiral was guilty of negligently performing 
his duty, or not, does not become me as a witness. It 
has happened to me during the course of the time I 
have had the honour to serve under that admiral, to 
disapprove, in my own mind, of particular steps, and 


THE LOG-BOOKS. 


279 


1779 .] 

upon further reflection and consideration, to approve of 
them, and to feel that I was wrong: after that, will 
the court at this moment call upon me to give an opi¬ 
nion that perhaps I may alter hereafter.”* 

The forcible manner in which Lord Mulgrave con¬ 
veyed those just and honourable sentiments, instead of 
bringing conviction to the court of the glaring impro¬ 
priety of their effort to convert witnesses into judges, 
only caused them to retire, and direct the judge-advo¬ 
cate to reprimand his lordship for “ his behaviour to 
them.” 

At the commencement of the trial, Admiral Keppel 
requested that the log-books of the several masters 
might be ordered to be delivered into court, and lie 
on the table for the inspection of the members. 

It appeared upon referring to the log-books of the 
Formidable and the Robuste, that three leaves had 
been cut out of the Formidable’s, and fresh leaves 
tacked in, and that some additions and amendments, 
relating to the proceedings of the fleet on the 27th and 
28th of July, had been made to the Robuste’s. 

When the court adverted to the insertion of fresh 
leaves in the log-book of the Formidable, Sir Hugh Pal- 
liser observed, “ I was totally ignorant of the circum¬ 
stances of leaves having been cut out till it was taken 
notice of by the court, nor could any person be more 
astonished at it than myself; it is my anxious wish to 
have this matter fully investigated, and for that pur¬ 
pose I have desired the master of the Formidable, and 
the mate who made the entries in the log-book, to at- 


# “ Minutes of Admiral Keppel’s Court-martial.” 


280 COURT-MARTIAL ON IvEPPEL. [cil. X. 

tend this morning, and in order that when giving their 
evidence on that point, they may be put to the severest 
test; I desire that they may be examined by court 
and Admiral Keppel, without any previous questions 
from me. 

The master of the Formidable, on being sworn^ 
stated that one of the mates, Mr. Winkwortli, tore out 
the original leaves, and told him he had done so, as he 
had ruled one of the leaves for two days’ work, and it 
would not contain the two. In the other he omitted 
putting the minutes of the signals, from the notes of 
the midshipman appointed to take them, who had not 
put down the hours, and which omission he told me 
was his reason for tearing them out. The other, as I 
said before, he spilled ink upon, and tore that out.” 
The master further stated, “ that the log was approved 
by the vice-admiral; but he believed that neither Sir 
Hugh nor Captain Bazeley were aware of the leaves 
being cut out.”* 

The amendments made in the Bobuste’s log-book 
were seized upon by Keppel and the court as a theme 
for animadversion on the conduct of Captain Hood, 
at whose instance those amendments were made. But 
it is singular that any thing so absurd should be at¬ 
tempted as attributing dishonourable motives to the 
necessary duty of correcting the errors, and supplying 
the omissions which would be likely to accrue, in the 
hasty entry of events of such moment as those which 
the 27th and 28th of July gave birth to. It has al¬ 
ways been the custom afloat to revise the entries re- 


* “Minutes of Admiral Keppel’s Court-martial.” 


THE LOG-BOOKS. 


281 


1779.] 

lating to any important occurrence, if a more improved 
and faitliful narrative can thereby be produced, without 
which revisions log-books would generally be found 
the most uncertain and useless of records; and when 
witnesses were at hand to confirm the accuracy of the 
written particulars, if it was thought expedient to call 
them for that purpose, it is difficult to ascertain upon 
what just principle an act so obviously requisite as the 
correction of his log-book, should have been magnified 
by Keppel and the court, into a case of suspicion, or 
twisted into a charge against the truth and honour of 
an officer bearing the distinguished reputation of Cap¬ 
tain Hood* 

In all judicial inquiries into maritime proceedings of 
a civil nature, an amplified account of those proceed¬ 
ings is furnished, superseding the concise narrative of 
the log-book, and frequently detailing matter not men¬ 
tioned therein ; and this regulation of the law is based, 
of course, upon the reasonable conclusion, that the 
statements in which several witnesses have concurred, 
are more satisfactory evidence than the hurried de¬ 
scription of one. 

The Hon. Thomas Lumley, a lieutenant of the Ro- 
buste, produced his own log-book, which was copied 


* Afterwards Lord Bridport. Was made a rear-admiral in 1780. In 
1793 was promoted to the rank of vice-admiral and appointed to the com¬ 
mand of the Channel fleet under Lord Howe, and bore a prominent part in 
the action on the 1st of June, 1794, when he had twenty men killed and 
seventy wounded on board his ship, and on account of his conduct on this 
occasion, was created Baron Bridport, and received a gold chain and medal 
from the king. In June, 1795, fought a gallant action with twelve ships of 
the enemy’s line and eleven frigates, and captured three of their seventy- 
fours, In 1796, succeeded Lord Howe in commanding the Channel fleet. 


THE KOBUSTe’s LOG-BOOK. 


282 


[CH. X. 


from tliat of the ship previously to any alteration hav¬ 
ing been made. 

The log-books were then compared, and the dif¬ 
ference between the original imperfect and erroneous 
account of the signals and manoeuvres, and the more 
enlarged and accurate descriptions of the revised 
edition, appeared as under. 


REVISED LOG. 

“ A signal for us, and several other 
ships of the Vice-admiral of the 
Blue’s squadron to give chase to 
windward. 

“ Body of the French fleet S. half 
W. At half-past ten the headmost 
ships were engaged. 

“ Between six and seven o’clock, 
perceived on board the admiral, ours 
and several other ships’ signals to 
bear down into the line, which was 
repeated by the Formidable. In the 
evening, having stopped the shot- 
holes, took our station in the line, 
and continued in it the whole night, 
with as much exactness as a dis¬ 
abled ship could do, with the ad¬ 
miral making much sail. 

“ At daylight, saw three sail of 
the enemy very near us. The ad¬ 
miral made the signal to chase to 
the S. E.” 


“ COPY OF THE ORIGINAL LOG. 

“ A signal for the Vice-admiral of 
the Blue’s squadron to give chase 
to windward. 

“ Body of the French fleet S. by 
W. five or six miles. 

“ At six tacked, bore down, and 
resumed our station in the line.” 


As the remarks in tlie original log were as con¬ 
spicuous for their inaccuracy as their brevity, and as 
the alterations and additions contained a faithful re¬ 
presentation of events; the attempt to make them the 
basis of an imputation upon the credit of Captain Hood, 
and thus invalidate his evidence, assumes a character 


1779.] captain hood’s address to the court. 283 

] i ttle creditable either to the court or to the admiral on 
his trial. 

Sir Hugh Palliser, after condemning Keppel’s “ at¬ 
tack on the character of Captain Hood,” pledged him¬ 
self to substantiate the accuracy of the Robuste’s log, and 
requested permission to be allowed to call witnesses 
u for the purpose of having that matter more clearly 
elucidated;” and in order “ to resist and confute the 
cruel, the invidious attempt that had been made.” But 
as the correctness of the alterations made by Captain 
Hood constituted their crime, the prosecutor’s request 
it is needless to state, was not granted. 

The gallant commander’s own lucid address to the 
court, places this matter in its just position. 

“ Before I proceed,” says Captain Hood, u to give 
evidence, I must beg the indulgence of the court for 
leave to explain the nature, sum, and substance of the 
alterations in the log-book of the Robuste. Because I 
flatter myself, that not only this respectable court, but 
the world at large, will be well satisfied with the in¬ 
nocence of them, and I trust they cannot be construed 
in any shape to effect one side or the other. For my 
own part I never considered a ship’s log-book to be 
material evidence, much less did I ever expect that any 
words that should be put into any log-book, should be 
considered as a charge. God forbid that such a thing 
should be conceived or adopted ! The winds, the 
courses, the distances of the Robuste’s log-book stand 
unaltered. The corrections in it respect the narrative 
part only, and when I found my ship’s log-book likely 
to be produced at a court-martial, perhaps on myself, 
and not knowing but that I should appear as a prisoner 


284 captain hood’s address to the court, [ch. X. 

instead of a witness. I judged proper to revise and 
correct it, for the credit of the ship, and for the sake of 
all her officers. 

u This was not done, sir, in private, but was known 
to every officer in the ship. It was done to set forth a 
fair and faithful representation of the transactions on 
the 27th of July. 

“ Sir, I stand here an attacked man. From the 11th 
of August to the present hour, my honour has been 
wounded. In papers of that date I was put under an 
arrest for disobedience of orders. In other papers I 
was broke, and letters have been circulated to the 
greatest characters in the kingdom, charging the rear- 
division with the loss of that day. These words are 
from information I had received from one of the first 
men in the kingdom, c that had the rear-division done 
their duty half as well as the van and centre, a com¬ 
plete victory would have been obtained.’ Since which 
there have been many anonymous publications, which 
I very much despise. But, sir, I was alarmed greatly 
when in a public assembly the whole of that division 
seemed to be aimed at. It became incumbent on me 
I thought to revise my log-book that it might be a re¬ 
cord for the benefit of my officers whenever I became 
to be put upon my trial. If I have erred I have erred 
innocently. The master of the Bobuste has refused to 
take the oath that was administered to him, I applaud 
him for it. It was acting like an honest man, having a 
conscientious regard for the truth. Whenever he gives 
his evidence here, if he is admitted to give it, I am 
persuaded it will have full weight. lie offered, I am 


1779.] CAPTAIN hood’s ADDRESS TO THE COURT. 285 

informed, to swear at the same time to the truth of the 
log-book. 

“ The court will give me leave to make one obser¬ 
vation on the credibility of log-books: which in the 
opinion of the law is the most credible? The man 
who swears that the log-book has not been altered from 
such a period to such a period; or, the man who ac¬ 
knowledges the alterations and swears to the truth of 
the log-book? I am no lawyer, but common sense 
tells me that one is full as veracious evidence as the 
other. 

“ I do not think, God knows ! that log-books which 
are kept in the manner they generally are, ought to be 
implicitly taken as evidence, they only seem to assist 
the memory. I shall beg leave to call the master of 
Kobuste to answer such questions as the court shall 
think proper to put to him, if they shall judge it neces¬ 
sary in order to explain the business, and I trust that 
when the whole is investigated that I shall not be 
thought to have done any thing to the prejudice of the 
honourable admiral, or to have acted in the smallest de¬ 
gree a dishonourable part. I shall also beg that the 
lieutenants, if the court approve of it, may be called to 
produce their logs and journals taken from the original 
statine; of the matter. The court will then be in full 
possession of the alterations, and to their judgment and 
to the judgment of the public without doors, I submit 
my honour. 

“ Sir, I must beg leave to say one thing more. It 
strikes me very forcibly as an officer in the king’s ser¬ 
vice, that, if a captain of one of the king’s ships has 


286 THE FALSE ENTRY IN [CH. X. 

not the power of correcting and revising his log-book, I 
really think he is in a most deplorable situation; I 
think as far as I can understand my instructions, that 
I am authorised to do so, nay more, that I am called 
upon to do so. The master is also called upon to do 
so by his instructions. The court must know that he is 
to correct his day’s work. Why, it is done perpetually! 
there is no law against it; there can be no criminality 
in the thing, unless the words convey criminality. 
Now, sir, I declare that if I had not the power of re¬ 
vising and correcting my log-book whenever it shall be 
found erroneous, as my honour, my reputation, my ex¬ 
istence, may depend upon it, if that power is taken away, 
I declare here solemnly, that I will never again set my 
foot on board a king’s ship.”* 

Although the log-books of the Formidable and 
Robuste only, were singled out as objects of sus¬ 
picion, it afterwards appeared that alterations had 
been more generally made in those throughout the 
fleet than was at first imagined. The Ramilies’ log 
had two leaves cut out for the same reason as those in 
the Formidable, and the Shrewsbury, had two days’ 
work crossed out, and fresh entries made; but that of 
the Victory, the admiral’s own ship, was found to 
contain the only palpable undisguised falsehood in 
relating the transactions of the 27th of July. The 
Victory’s log, besides other inaccuracies, represented 
her to have lain to four hours after the engagement, 
when, in point of fact, she was sailing off the wind 

* Minutes of Admiral Keppel’s Court-martial, published by order of the 
Admiralty. 


1779.] THE victory’s LOG-BOOK. 287 

under double reefed topsails and foresails,* and going 
so fast through, the water, that the outsailed all the 
disabled ships of the Blue division, and left the Ven¬ 
geance, one of the ships of the admiral’s own division, 
three miles astern before five o’clock in the evening.*)* 

The following evidence was given by the master of 
the Victory, at the court-martial on the Vice-admiral 
of the Blue. 

Q. “ When was the addition made to the log-book 
in noting the time of her wearing?” 

A. “ Before Mr. Keppel’s court-martial began.” 

Q. “ Hoav long before that?” 

A. “ After I heard Mr. Keppel was to be tried.” 

Q. “ Did the Victory lay to any part of the after¬ 
noon of the 27th of July?” 

A. “I do not recollect that she did, but I marked 
her courses as laying to from one to five o’clock, not 
being able to give a true account of her steerage.” 

Q “ Does it appear by your log-book that the Vic¬ 
tory was laying to from one to five o’clock?” 

A. u It appears so by the log-book.” 

Q. “ After the Victory wore to the southward, what 
sail did she carry, and how many knots did she go 
while she edged away from the wind?” 

A. u She was under double reefed topsails and fore¬ 
sail, and went two knots an hour. She did not haul 
her wind till about a quarter after seven.”J 

* Master of the Victory’s evidence. Court-martial on Sir HughPalliser. 

f Evidence of Sir William Burnaby, Bart.— ibid. 

J Minutes of Sir Hugh Palliser’s court-martial, published by order of 
the Admiralty, p. 44. It is more likely that the Victory going large in a 


288 LETTERS TO THE EARL OF SANDWICH. [CH. X. 

The latitude and longitude of the Victory on the 
28 th of July, as inserted in her log, differed so mate¬ 
rially from that shown by the other log-books of the 
fleet, that Sir Hugh Palliser, without being at all aware 
of glaring incorrectness afterwards developed, writes 
as follows. 

Sir Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich . 

“ Portsmouth, January 16, 1779. 

“ My Lord, 

u I beg to know the time when Admiral Keppel’s jour¬ 
nal was delivered into the office. 1 think I can show a 
most contemptible trick in returning an erroneous 
account of the distance the fleet was from Ushant, 
according to the ships, on the 27tli and 28th of July 
last, to favour the pretence that it would have been 
dangerous to have pursued the French till we had 
seen them into port. If it comes out as I expect, it is 
a subterfuge that must prove disgraceful. 

“ Captain Hood has most manfully resisted the most 
cruel attack that can be imagined. 

“ I have the honour to be, my lord, 

“ Your lordship’s most obedient servant. 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 

The following private letters were addressed to Lord 
Sandwich in the course of Admiral Iveppel’s trial. 


strong breeze under double reefed topsails, went five knots an hour, instead 
of two, as conjectured by the master, for he did not heave the log. 


1779.] LETTERS TO THE EARL OF SANDWICH. 289 

To Lord Sandwich. 

a Portsmouth, January 7,1779. 

“ My Lord, 

“ Your lordship’s attendance, I apprehend, will de¬ 
pend entirely upon Admiral Keppel. When he sum¬ 
mons you I shall then take the liberty to desire you 
will produce his letters to your lordship, which your 
lordship will please to bring with you, and also my 
letters to you on my arrival at Portsmouth, in which I 
mention my intention to bring the whole matter to 
public view. I conclude Admiral Keppel cannot sum¬ 
mon your lordship before I have gone through all the 
evidence for the crown, which can’t be done in a very 
short time. 

“ I am, my lord, 

“ Your lordship’s most obedient, 

“ And very humble servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 


To the Same. 

“ Portsmouth, January 19,1779. 

“ My Lord, 

“ It is not possible, my lord, to describe the violence 
of the party prejudice evinced here as the inquiry 
advances, but the most astonishing thing is, the addi¬ 
tion to the message sent by the Fox frigate, which is 
vouched for by Admiral Campbell, and the captain 
and lieutenant of the Fox, though never heard by any 
one in the Formidable. Besides the absurdity of it if 
true, considering the circumstances and the time when 
sent, as well as the pains taken to conceal the true 

u 



290 COURT-MARTIAL ON KEPPEL. [CH. X. 

time when it was sent, altogether plainly shows a con¬ 
spiracy to destroy Sir Hugh Palliser. The rancour 
which Campbell and four or five of the captains have 
shown is wonderful. Captain Jervis, in order to turn 
Lord Mulgrave’s contest with the court into contempt 
or ridicule, desired the question might be put to him, 
saying he thought himself bound by his oath to an 
swer it. 

“ God knows to what extent they will carry things 
against Sir Hugh. The court is daily filled with the 
opposition noblemen and members of parliament, 
ladies, and townspeople, who, upon every occasion of 
any thing being said against the prosecutor or in be¬ 
half of the prisoner, express their approbation by 
clapping. Mr. Keppel’s letters to your lordship being 
refused by the court, has been a great disadvantage to 
Sir Hugh Palliser towards proving the alleged in¬ 
tention of re-attacking the enemy in the evening to be 
a mere pretence.” 


Sir Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich. 

“ Portsmouth, January 25.1779. 

“ My Lord, 

“ The business here goes on very heavily and dis¬ 
agreeably. The consequence of permitting a sea court- 
martial to be held on shore is felt very severely. Inde¬ 
pendently of the ill effect of having the court filled 
with the great leaders of a powerful party, every good 
purpose intended by the regulations for courts-martial, 
is defeated. It is proposed to examine very few more 
evidences, as scarcely any one is to be found who toill 



291 


1779.] LETTERS TO THE EARL OF SANDWICH. 

know any tiling relating to the points in question. It is 
proposed—if you don’t desire to be excused appearing 
—to finish with your evidence. As soon as ever you 
can make it convenient, by letting ine know the night 
before you will be here—if you come into town be¬ 
tween ten and one o’clock—you may be called in im¬ 
mediately. An apology will be made to you for de¬ 
siring you to produce private letters, but as the other 
party have set the example, I shall hope you will not 
object. 

u I am advised the letters will be very useful. I wish 
for your answer as soon as possible, and that you will 
let me know the night before you come. If I don’t 
call on you now, I cannot do it after closing my 
evidence, nor call upon you for any thing when you 
appear at the summons of the other party. 

“ I am, my lord, 

“ Your lordship’s most obedient, 

u And most humble servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 


The Same to the Same . 

“ Portsmouth, February 5, 1779. 

“ My Lord, 

“ I am fully sensible of your lordship’s friendship, 
and have long been of the same opinion as your lord- 
ship, that a court-martial on me is necessary. As to 
its being ordered by the Admiralty, grounded upon 
what has appeared on Admiral Keppel’s trial, I have 
reasons for wishing to avoid it, as that would be calling 

u 2 



292 COURT-MARTIAL ON KEPPEL. [ciI. X. 

upon those to appear who have already given evidence 
against me. I think it would be more proper if it 
were ordered at my own request. The time is very 
disadvantageous for me, as the stream of public pre¬ 
judice sets so strong against me. A court-martial being 
ordered to assemble at some distance of time, will 
give me a chance for those prejudices subsiding a little, 
which have been produced by the violence of party 
rancour. 

“ I think it probable Admiral Keppel will close his 
evidence to morrow; whether the court will allow me 
to reply to his defence and observe upon the evidence, 
I know not, but it will be the most extravagant par¬ 
tiality if they do not, as in that case I shall be pre¬ 
vented stating the strongest things against Mr. Keppel 
in their proper point of view, and it will amount to a 
condemnation of me. In short such is the present 
disposition of the people, that I consider my life in 
danger, and tremble for the consequences of the party 
poison which the officers of the fleet are infected with. 
The moment the court pronounces sentence, I will 
despatch a letter demanding a court-martial. 

“ I have the honour to be, my lord, 

Your lordship’s most obedient 
“ And most humble servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 


The Same to the Same. 

“ Portsmouth, February, 8, 1779. 

u My Lord, 

“ Admiral Keppel has closed his evidence. I imme¬ 
diately addressed the court to be permitted to reply to 



293 


1779.] LETTERS TO THE EARL OF SANDWICH. 

Admiral Keppel’s defence and observe on tlie evidence, 
as was granted to the prosecutor upon the trial of Ad¬ 
miral Knowles, but this the court refused; indeed from 
the beginning, every thing has been heard which was 
offered by the accused at any time, and almost every 
thing that I have offered has been refused. Perceiving 
myself abandoned and sacrificed to party rage, I am at 
a loss to know what steps to take, nor do I know with 
whom to communicate or advise; the only hope I have 
is, that his Majesty has not been prejudiced against me by 
the partial proceedings at this place, and that his friends 
will not allow me to be condemned without a hearing. 
The reply I should have made I have already prepared, 
and I think I ought to send it to the Admiralty as the 
court have refused it,but this I shall defer for the present. 
I think it probable the court will give their judgment 
very soon. When that is given I shall set out the next 
moment for town, and have the honour to pay my re¬ 
spects to your lordship. 

u I am, my lord, 
u Your lordship’s most obedient 

u And very humble servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser. 

u P. S. Captain Peyton has just been with me. I 
find that during the trial he struck his name off the list 
of the captains’ mess, assigning as a reason, that he 
could not concur in their plans of party animosity, and 
that the other day, he put an active stop to a scheme 
for objecting to sit at a court-martial with Captain 
Hood. 


294 COURT-MARTIAL ON ADMIRAL KEPPEL. [CH. X. 

“ The intended memorial has not been offered to 
him to sign, his sentiments being so well known.” 

The memorial alluded to in this postscript, was one 
of the many infamous measures adopted to ruin Sir 
Hugh Palliser. It was addressed to the king, praying 
him to dismiss the vice-admiral from the honourable 
and profitable offices he held, and was rendered more 
execrable from the circumstances of those most active 
in the matter, being fully aware that they would shortly 
be called as men of honour, to give impartial testimony 
as to the conduct of the officer they had so criminally 
prejudged in the unjustifiable address intended for pre¬ 
sentation to their sovereign. To the infinite credit of 
the service however, notwithstanding the baleful feel¬ 
ings of party rancour with which it had lately been 
infused, a sufficient number of signatures could not be 
obtained, to afford a colourable pretence for laying the 
memorial before his Majesty. 

The gallant Sir Samuel Hood (afterward Lord 
Hood*) writes as follows, in reference to this transac¬ 
tion. 

* Lord Hood entered the navy in 1740. In 1759, commanded the An¬ 
telope of fifty guns, and captured the Beilina, a French ship of superior 
force, after a severe action which was continued for four hours. Was pre¬ 
sented by Lord Anson to George II., and promoted for his bravery on this 
occasion. Served with Rodney at the bombardment of Havre-de-Grace, 
and with Admiral Saunders in the Mediterranean. Was appointed commis¬ 
sioner of Portsmouth Dockyard, in 1778, and also created a baronet. In 
1780, was raised to the rank of rear-admiral. In 1782, had an engage¬ 
ment with a French squadron in Basse Terre roads, in which several of the 
enemy’s ships were disabled, and upwards of 1000 of their men killed or 
wounded. Commanded the van division of the fleet in Rodney’s victory 
of the 12th of August. Afterwards captured two line-of-battle ships and 
two frigates in the Mona passage, and for his brilliant conduct was created 


1779.] 


LETTERS TO THE EARL OF SANDWICH. 


295 


Sir Samuel Hood to the Earl of Sandwich. 

“ Portsmouth Dockyard, 

“ February 10, 1779. 

“ My Lord, 

“ A memorial to the king has been handed about 
here to be signed by the captains, praying his Majesty 
to remove Sir Hugh Palliser from all his employments. 
It was carried by Captain Jervis last night to Captain 
Eobinson who begged to be excused signing it, as did 
Captain Digby also. Captain Eobinson does not know 
all the names that had signed, but on throwing his eye 
over the memorial, as Captain Jervis was reading it, he 
saw the names of Sir Eobert Harland and Admiral 
Campbell; and the captains, Sir John Eoss, Edwards, 
Walsingham, Maitland, Clements, Carter, Allen, La- 
forey, Levison Gower, and Marshall. Captain Jervis 
said eighteen had signed it, and that six or eight more 
had promised. What a glaring proof is this, my lord, 
of the malevolence and rancour of party! and what 
presumption to dictate to his Majesty whom he shall, 
or shall not employ. Let Sir Hugh’s fate be what it 
may, the king never had a more brave or able officer in 
his service, or a more zealous and faithful servant. 

“ I have the honour to be, with great deference and 
esteem, 

u My Lord, 

u Your lordship’s most obedient, 

“ And much obliged servant, 

“ Samuel Hood.”* 

Baron Hood. Commanded the Mediterranean fleet in 1793. Succeeded 
Sir Hugh Palliser as governor of Greenwich Hospital, in 1796, and died an 

Admiral of the Red in 1816. 

* Sandwich’s MSS 


296 REMARKS ON KEPPEL’s DEFENCE. [cil. X. 

During his trial Keppel had the constant professional 
assistance of Dunning, Lee, and Erskine, and his de¬ 
fence which he read to the court on the 30th of January, 
though the composition of the latter celebrated indivi¬ 
dual, will be found to exhibit the many contradictions 
inseparable from the endeavour to reconcile the con¬ 
duct of the admiral, questionable in so many particu¬ 
lars, with the lofty duties of a man, to whom the great 
fleet of England was entrusted at a period of imminent 
peril to the kingdom, when a decisive blow would have 
paralyzed the naval force of France, destroyed the 
confidence of Spain in the power and success of her 
ally, restored peace in all human probability to the ci¬ 
vilised world, and saved his country the terror of a 
foreign invasion, excited shortly after the ill starred 
events of his hapless command, when the combined fleets 
of our old continental foes, were enabled to parade with¬ 
out obstruction in view of the alarmed inhabitants of 
the shores of the English channel. 

Tlie fact, that from three o’clock in the afternoon of 
the 27th of July, Keppel was standing away from the 
French, and they were pursuing—to be squared with 
the notions Britons were wont to entertain of the duty 
of their admirals—demanded a greater degree of inge¬ 
nuity than a lawyer of even Erskine’s eminence and 
ability could bring to such a task; and, notwithstand¬ 
ing the ultimate judgment of the court, a reason which 
can be brought home to the understanding and con¬ 
viction of seamen, remains still to be assigned by those 
who upon that judgment rest Keppel’s reputation as an 
officer in chief command, how with honour to himself 
and his fleet, an enemy’s squadron, inferior in number 
and in force, which he told the world he had beaten 


297 


1779.] REMARKS ON KEPPEL’s DEFENCE. 

the day before could be permitted to depart unmolested 
the next morning, when three of their ships were al¬ 
most within gunshot of his division. 

“ I might,” says the admiral, in his elaborate defence, 
“ have pursued a fruitless and hazardous cliace of some 
few ships, if I had had my mind filled with notions un¬ 
worthy of my station. I might easily have paraded 
my shattered fleet off the harbour of Brest:” and then 
losing sight of the acknowledged facility of performing 
so desirable and essential a service—when the great 
convoys of East and West Indiamen, and nearly the 
whole foreign trade, were hourly expected up the Chan¬ 
nel—he maintains with equal earnestness, “ that the 
pursuit would have been wantonly exposing the British 
fleet under his command;” and endeavoured to esta¬ 
blish by his witnesses, that it would have been immi¬ 
nently dangerous to have attempted even that parade, 
represented in his previous declaration as a matter so 
easy of accomplishment. 

The light which the prosecutor would have thrown 
upon those jarring statements was altogether shut out, 
as it was ruled by the court, at the instance of the pri¬ 
soner, that Sir Hugh Palliser should not be allowed to 
address them on the merits of the evidence when con¬ 
cluded, and that the witnesses for the defence should 
not be questioned in their cross-examination, upon any 
circumstance not already adverted to by the admiral 
in his direct interrogations; those interrogations there¬ 
fore being studiously limited, in order to carry out the 
design of smothering testimony that might be adverse 
on the many dubious points of his conduct—this means 
of suppressing truth was so far successful. Strange and 


298 REMARKS ON THE SENTENCE. [CH. X. 

paradoxical also as it may seem, tlie admiral was en¬ 
abled to prove to tlie satisfaction of his acute, enlight¬ 
ened judges, that the readiest and most certain mode of 
getting the sternmost disabled ships of his fleet into their 
stations in the line, was not to bring to and wait for 
them, but to outsail them, and that what was right and 
absolutely necessary in the afternoon, was wrong and 
not at all necessary in the morning;—that it was the 
duty of a skilful commander to suffer a part of his 
fleet in disorder to the leeward and jammed upon a 
wind, to bring an enemy to battle ranged in admirable 
order to windward, and that it would have been un- 
offlcer-like, and risking the safety of his whole remaining 
fleet, to renew the engagement afterwards, when the 
enemy was one sail less, and “ so beaten,” unless sup¬ 
ported by the crippled Formidable, struggling on to 
overtake him under all the canvass her wounded masts 
and rigging would permit her to carry. 

On the 11th of February, the members of the court 
met to pronounce their sentence; when, honourably 
acquitting Admiral Keppel, they announced as part of 
that sentence, “ that the charges brought against him 
by the Vice-admiral of the Blue were malicious and 
ill-founded.” 

Men assembled for the purpose of a judicial inquiry 
into the conduct of one officer, but diverging from their 
direct and solemn duty to condemn another officer not 
upon his trial,—whose reasons for the construction put 
by him on the acts of the commander-in-chief they re¬ 
mained wilfully ignorant of, and whose mouth was 
gagged when he besought them to listen to his expla¬ 
nation of the matters upon which the different charges 


1779 .] REMARKS ON THE SENTENCE. 299 

were grounded,—though repugnant to that clear, uni¬ 
versal principle of natural justice, which everywhere 
declares, where justice has a voice, that the accused 
possesses the unalienable right of a fair trial, and should 
have the amplest opportunity of defending himself, be¬ 
fore he can be deemed guilty—found their flagrant 
condemnation of unknown motives, defended even in a 
British parliament, by some of the loudest ranters on 
the subject of men’s rights and liberties; and Fox, 
Burke, and others of their party, did not blush to call 
upon the representatives of Englishmen to adopt that 
part of the sentence upon Admiral Keppel, which re¬ 
ferred to his accuser, as a standard by which the latter 
was to be judged, and to force it upon their sovereign 
as a judgment by which his Majesty should be guided, 
in opposition to the deliberate opinion of the tribunal 
selected exclusively for the trial of the man, against 
whom their unprincipled but unavailing rancour was 
unceasingly levelled, from the hour the nation de¬ 
manded, and he proffered to furnish, an elucidation of 
the mysterious encounter with the inferior fleet of 
France, and the subsequent return of the British squa¬ 
dron to port, with the vague information, u that the 
enemy had been so beaten in the day, that they took 
advantage of the night to get off/’ but without an at¬ 
tempt being made at ascertaining whither they had 
steered after this imaginary beating. 

But in the minds of men more liberal and just than 
those renowned declaimers on liberality and justice,— 
the charge of malice on this occasion must recoil upon 
the members forming that court-martial, who stood 
forward the self-constituted judges of motives which 


PUBLIC BIOTS 


300 


[CH. X. 


they obstinately refused either to investigate or to hear 
explained to them. 

The acquittal of Keppel, coupled with the imputa¬ 
tion cast upon Palliser, of having exhibited a malicious 
ill-founded charge, was followed by a series of alarming 
outrages against the different members of government, 
as well as the vice-admiral and his friends. The man¬ 
sions of Lord North, Lord Sandwich, Lord Lisburne, 
Lord Bute, and Lord Mulgrave, were attacked, as also 
Captain Hood’s in Harley-street. Sir Hugh Palliser’s 
house in Pall-Mall was entered by the lawless rabble, 
the furniture set on fire and the contents otherwise de¬ 
stroyed. The Admiralty gates were pulled down, Sir 
Hugh’s residence in the Admiralty assailed, and but for 
the timely arrival of the guard to his rescue, he must 
have fallen into the hands of the besotted, infuriated 
mob. Three nights in succession London was illumi- 

O 

nated at the command of a body of ferocious rioters, 
whom the military could scarcely quell; and so com¬ 
pletely had what was then designated the u Keppel 
frenzy” taken hold of the nation, that in the most 
distant districts bonfires were kindled in sympathy 
with the blaze of the metropolis. 

At this moment of general infatuation, the vicissi¬ 
tude of human opinion, and the strange uncertain basis 
of popularity must have rushed upon the mind of Kep¬ 
pel—reflection must have carried him back to the days 
of Byng, and the sanguinary demand of an ignorant 
populace for the infliction of summary punishment on 
that devoted officer; and notwithstanding the intense, 
though unmeaning adulation poured into his ear from 
so many quarters, his own intimate knowledge of events 


1779.] ON THE ACQUITTAL OF KEPPEL, 301 

in which lie bore so prominent a part, as a judge in 
one case, and as a prisoner in the other, must have 
mournfully revealed,—that he sentenced Byng to suffer 
death, and that the ill-fated admiral was executed for 
military conduct of a less questionable character than 
that for which lie himself in the singular delusion of 
the times, had been exalted into an idol. 

But where, during this national intoxication, was the 
man whose bearing in the action of the 27th of July 
was the boast and admiration of the fleet, and whose 
example of turning to renew the battle, without a mo¬ 
ment’s thought of loss of life or damage, if followed and 
sustained on that disgraceful day, would have accounted 
in some degree for those manifestations of popular de¬ 
lirium on the merits of the admiral? He had retired 
under the shelter of a disguise to some obscure quarter, 
to avoid being torn to pieces, and in order to lull the fero¬ 
city of a maddened multitude made a sacrifice to public 
tranquillity by the surrender of all the offices of honour 
and profit conferred upon him by his sovereign, for 
more than forty years of distinguished services in defence 
of his country. 

Whilst in concealment and disguise, the following 
letter was penned. 

Sir Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich. 

‘‘London, February, 18, 1779. 

“ My Lord, 

“ After duly revolving in my mind the present state of 
things, and the confusion into which his Majesty’s ser¬ 
vice is thrown by the present violent measures and pro- 


302 SIR HUGH palliser’s conduct. [ch. X. 

ceedings of a deluded mob against me, and having 
long perceived the envy and jealousy drawn upon me 
in consequence of the favours and honours which his 
Majesty from time to time has been pleased to bestow 
upon me, as rewards for long and faithful labours in 
the service of my country. I think it best in order to 
abate the rage and prejudice raised against me, and to 
favour the means for restoring tranquillity—humbly to 
beg your lordship will intercede with his Majesty to 
permit me to resign my commission of lieutenant-gene- 
ral-of-marines, and the governorship of Scarborough 
Castle. At the same time I must beg, through your 
lordship’s favour, that his Majesty may be assured of 
the continuance of my loyalty, duty, and zeal to his 
Majesty to the last moment of my life, whatever may be 
my fate, and to whatever station I may be reduced. 

“ I have the honour to be with the greatest respect, 

“ Your lordship’s most humble, 

“ And obedient servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 


1779.] 


CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE ADMIRALTY, 803 


CHAPTER XI. 

COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER—THE DEFENCE- 

HONOURABLE ACQUITTAL. 


Sir Hugh Palliser’s Correspondence with the Admiralty—Court-martial 
on Palliser—Charge Exhibited—Evidence for the Prosecution, Ad¬ 
miral Keppel, Admiral Campbell, the lion. Boyle Walsingham ; Cap¬ 
tain Faulkner, of the Victory, Captain Marshall, of the Arethusa, re¬ 
peating Frigate, Hon. Thomas Windsor, of the Fox Frigate, the Captain 
and Master of Palliser’s Ship, the Formidable—The Defence—Evidence 
for the Defence—Sentence—Honourable Acquittal. 

1779. 

The following correspondence passed on the subject 
of the court-martial to be held on Sir Hugh Palliser. 

Sir Hugh Palliser to Philip Stephens , Esq. vf- 

“ Admiralty, February 10, 1779. 

“ Sir, 

“ As Admiral Keppel has hitherto declined bringing 
me to a court-martial, yet as he has in his defence at¬ 
tempted to charge me with neglect of duty in the after¬ 
noon of the 27th of July last. I desire you will move 


304 CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE ADMIRALTY, [dl. XI. 

my lords commissioners of tlie Admiralty to order an 
inquiry into my conduct on that day. 

u I am, Sir, 

“ Your most obedient servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 


The Same to the Same. 

“ London, February 19, 1779. 

“ Sir, 

“ I received your letter of the 18th inst., signifying 
the intention of the lords commissioners of the Ad¬ 
miralty to order a court-martial to inquire into my con¬ 
duct on the 27tli of July last, and to be held on the 
18th of next month. But I desire you will inform 
their lordships, that I am advised it will be impossible 
for me to be prepared for it so soon as the time ap¬ 
pointed, and that I will give you the earliest notice pos¬ 
sible, when I shall be ready. In the mean time, I re • 
quest their lordships will be pleased to inform me, 
whether Admiral Keppel has signified his intention of 
bringing a charge against me or not. 

“ Sir, 

“ Your most obedient servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 


Philip Stephens , Esq., to Sir Hugh Pattiser. 

“ Admiralty-office, Feb. 20, 1779. 

“ Sir, 

“ I have communicated to my lords commissioners of 




1779.] CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE ADMIRALTY. 305 

the Admiralty, your letter of yesterday’s date, inform¬ 
ing them that you are advised it will be impossible for 
you to be prepared for your trial on the 18th of next 
month—the day appointed for holding the court-mar¬ 
tial, but that you will give the earliest possible notice 
when you shall be ready; and requesting to be in¬ 
formed in the meantime whether Admiral Keppel has 
signified any intention of bringing a charge against 
you, 

“ In return, I am commanded by their lordships to 
acquaint you, that the day appointed for holding the 
court-martial will be deferred, and that Admiral Kep¬ 
pel has signified it is not his intention to exhibit any 
charge against you for disobedience of his orders on the 
27th of July last, as you will more fully see by the en¬ 
closed copy of his letter of the 18th inst., to which I 
beg leave to refer you. 

“ I have the honour to be, Sir, 

u Your most obedient servant, 

“ Philip Stephens.” 


Admiral Keppel to Philip Stephens , Esq . 


“ February 18, 1779. 

“ Sir, 

“ You will be pleased to inform their lordships, that 
the law has fixed a period, during which every man is , 
at liberty to exhibit such charges as he may think pro¬ 
per. In this instance, if their lordships mean a charge 
from me against Sir Hugh Palliser, for his disobedience 
of my orders on the 27th of July last,—however clear 
it may have appeared by the evidence on my trial, I 

x 



306 CORRESPONDENCE WITH TIIE ADMIRALTY. [CH. XI. 

readily state that I do not intend to exhibit any such 
charge against him. 

“ I am, Sir, &c. 

“ A Keppel.” 


Sir Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich. 

“ London, March 14, 1779. 

“ My Lord, 

“ I am not able at present to put on a shoe, or I 
would wait on your lordship to express my wish to be 
informed what steps will be taken in consequence of 
Mr. Lutterell’s motion for the charge upon which I am 
to be tried. I am inclined to think it will be an ad¬ 
vantage to me to have a specific charge made against 
me for disobedience of orders, as Admiral Keppel calls 
it in his letter. I hope to be duly informed of every 
step taken that concerns me, that I may be better pre¬ 
pared to know how to act for my defence. 

“ I hope your lordship does not forget my wish to be 
permitted to reside on board the Formidable during 
the trial, and, if possible, that the court-martial may 
be held on board of her. 

“ This indulgence I hope I may be granted in consi¬ 
deration of my particular circumstances, and of my in¬ 
firmities ; and the indulgence I trust will not be thought 
less reasonable, than that of passing an act of parlia¬ 
ment to hold a court-martial on shore upon Admiral 
Keppel, on account of his ill state of health. 

a I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, 

“ My Lord, 

“ Your lordship’s most obedient servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 



1779.] 


COURT-MARTIAL ON PAIXISER. 


307 


Sir Hugh Palliser to Philip Stephens , Esq. 

“ London, March 25, 1779. 

“ Sir, 

“ Being informed that the Arethusa* is taken or 
wrecked on the West of France, and Mr. William Caw- 
sey, the mate of her, being a very material witness on 
my trial, I beg the favour of you to move the Honour¬ 
able the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to make 
such application as may be proper to have him ex¬ 
changed, or to obtain permission for him to come to 
England upon his parole as soon as possible. 

“ I am, Sir, &c. 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 


A court-martial composed of the following members, 
assembled on board his Majesty’s ship Sandwich, in 
Portsmouth harbour, on the 12th of April, 1779, for 
the trial of Vice-admiral Sir Hugh Palliser, 

PRESIDENT. 

George Darby, Esq., Vice-admiral of the Blue. 


MEMBER. 

Robert Digby, Esq., Rear-admiral of the Blue. 


CAPTAINS. 


Sir Chaloner Ogle, 

Joseph Peyton, 

Mark Robinson, 

Samuel Granston Goodall, 
Robert Linzee, 

George Robinson Walters. 


Richard Kempenfelt, 
William Bayne, 
Adam Duncan, 
James Granston, 
John Colpoys, 


* The Arethusa was the repeating frigate on the 27th of July, and Mr. 

x 2 


308 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

The prisoner was brought in by the deputy mar¬ 
shal, when the order for the trial, dated the 3d of 
April, 1779, and directed to George Darby, Esq., Vice- 
admiral of the Blue, and second officer in command of 
his Majesty’s ships and vessels at Portsmouth and Spit- 
head, was read as follows: 

“ Whereas, a court-martial was assembled on board 
his Majesty’s ship Britannia in Portsmouth harbour, on 
the 7tli of January, 1779, and held, by adjournment, at 
the house of the governor of his Majesty’s garrison at 
Portsmouth every day afterwards, Sunday excepted, till 
the 11th of February following, inclusive, for the trial 
of the Honourable Admiral Augustus Keppel, upon a 
charge exhibited against him by Sir Hugh Palliser, Bart., 
Vice-admiral of the Blue squadron of his Majesty’s 
fleet; and, whereas, it appears to us, from the minutes 
of the proceedings of the said court-martial, that seve¬ 
ral matters were given in evidence respecting the con¬ 
duct and behaviour of the said Vice-admiral Sir Hugh 
Palliser, on the 27th and 28tli of July last, which de¬ 
mand strict examination, and that he should be tried 
for the same. We send you herewith the original mi¬ 
nutes of the proceedings of the court-martial above- 
mentioned ; and you are hereby required and directed 
to assemble a court-martial on the 12th day of this 
month—if the witnesses shall then be ready, or if not 
then ready, as soon afterwards as they shall be so—to 
inquire into the conduct and behaviour of the said 
Vice-admiral Sir Hugh Palliser, on the said 27th and 

Cawsey was the officer who had taken the minutes of the signals made on 
board the Victory on that day. 


THE CHARGE EXHIBITED. 


309 


1779.] 

2 8tli of July last, and to try him for the same. Given 
under our hands the 3d day of April, 1779. 

u By command of their lordships, Sandwich, 

F. Buller, 
Lisburne, 

“ Philip Stephens. Mulgrave.” 

When the members of the court and the judge-ad¬ 
vocate were severally sworn. The prisoner addressed 
the court in the following words:— 

“ Mr. President.—There is a matter which I beg 

leave to mention to the court at the outset of the 
trial. 

“ With a view to increase the weight of the preju¬ 
dices so industriously raised against me, it has been 
injuriously insinuated, that my intention in soliciting 
an inquiry into my own conduct, was to revive the 
consideration of Admiral Keppel’s; but I most solemnly 
disclaim such an intention, and declare, that my sole 
object is my own vindication; therefore, in the course of 
the present trial, I am determined to avoid, as far as my 
own justification will allow, every thing which can 
have the least retrospect to the conduct of Admiral 
Keppel, or any other person except myself.” 

Admiral Keppel also addressed the court. The pur¬ 
port of his address was, that he did not appear before 
the court as a volunteer witness, that he would stand 
in a very painful situation, and desiring that his at¬ 
tendance might be dispensed with. 

The court retired, and after a short time returned, 
when it was declared that the members found them- 


310 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

selves under an indispensable necessity to take the evi¬ 
dence of Admiral Keppel. 

It is not here intended to go at any length into the 
examinations of the different witnesses, but merely to 
advert, as concisely as possible, to that portion of the 
testimony both for the prosecution and the defence, 
which bears upon the recriminatory matter contained 
in the insinuation, that the Vice-admiral of the Blue 
and his division were not in their proper stations on 
the morning of the 27th; and that in the evening he 
and several of his ships remained to windward of the 
admiral, instead of bearing down into their stations in 
the line of battle, in obedience to the signal made by 
the admiral to that effect, and in conformity with a 
message by the Fox frigate to the vice-admiral, al¬ 
leged to have been sent before six o’clock. 

The Honourable Admiral Augustus Keppel was the 
first witness sworn. On being asked to relate to the 
court the proceedings of the squadron which was 
under his command on the 27th and 28 th of July last, 
so far as they respected the conduct and behaviour of 
Vice-admiral Sir Hugh Palliser, the admiral alluded 
to the difficulty of giving a narrative upon oath of all 
the circumstances it would be necessary for him to refer 
to, assisted only by his memory, and begged the court 
to form questions from out of the minutes of his trial, 

which he would answer to the best of his memory and 
judgment. 

The court retired, and in half an hour returned, 
when the president answered, “The court is fully 
aware of the difficulty you feel yourself under of recol- 


311 


1779.] EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. 

lecting circumstances very minutely, relative to the 
conduct and behaviour of Sir Hugh Palliser, on the 
27tli and 28th of July, but still wish you to give such 
information as may be in your power. If you con¬ 
tinue under the difficulty, the court will proceed to 
questions.” 

A. u That is certainly my wish.” 

Q. u Please inform the court what number of ships 
the division of Vice-admiral Sir Hugh Palliser con¬ 
sisted of on the morning of the 27th of July last, when 
in sight of the French fleet?” 

A. “ Ten.” 

Q. “ What number of those ships did you order to 
chase the enemy?” 

A. “To the best of my recollection six or seven, 
but in regard to that I should explain a little. We 
were in pursuit of the French fleet, a long pursuit 
fatigues every body, and I always took as much rest as 
I could get, when there was no immediate business for 
me. Admiral Campbell was my first captain, in whom 
I reposed the greatest confidence, from my knowledge 
of his ability, and that confidence was not thrown 
away at any time. On the morning of the 27th he 
came down and waked me, at what hour exactly it 
was I cannot recollect. The first question I asked him 
was, can you tell me any good news of the French 
fleet? He said they are farther from us to-day than 
they were yesterday, but I have directed several ships 
of the Vice-admiral of the Blue’s division to chase to 
windward, to close with us, because I thought they 
were too far to leeward, and under such an easy sail, 
that we were losing the use of them.” 


312 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

Q. “ Did it appear to you that Sir Hugh Palliser on 
the morning of the 27tli, did all that was in his power 
to bring the Formidable, and those ships of his divi¬ 
sion then remaining with him, into action with the 
enemy?” 

A. “It appeared to me that the Formidable carried, 
after the ships were gone from her, all the sail she pos¬ 
sibly could to get into action. The rest of the other 
officers were doing the same. I had called the ships 
from the vice-admiral, so that at that time he could 
not be bringing his ships, for they had been directed to 
come to windward, consequently he was coming on 
himself to close where he could.” 

Q. “ Did it appear to you that during the time of 
engaging the enemy, he behaved as became an officer 
of his rank and station in the fleet?” 

A. “At the time I observed the Vice-admiral of the 
Blue—I cannot be very nice as to it—but at the times 
I observed him he seemed to be coming along the 
French ships just as well as any other ship that led 
along them, either before or after him; and in doing so 
he was doing his duty as a flag-officer. I do not mean 
to narrow the question.” 

At the conclusion of Admiral Keppel’s examination, 
which occupied the court the first day, he was asked, 
“ Do you know any thing further concerning the con¬ 
duct and behaviour of Sir Hugh Palliser during the 
27th and 28th of July, either before or after the action 
than you have already related, which may be neces¬ 
sary for the information of the crown.” To this ques¬ 
tion the admiral said, “ he could not give an answer, 


313 


1779.] EVIDENCE FOE THE PROSECUTION, 

and hoped he would be excused from pointing out any 
thing whatever.” 

The president observed, “ The court are sitting to 
inquire into the conduct and behaviour of Sir Hugh 
Palliser on the 27th and 28th of July last, and must, 
therefore, desire the witness to inform them if any thing 
reprehensible in the conduct of Sir Hugh Palliser, 
which he has not already related, fell under his ob¬ 
servation on those days, and that if desired by the wit¬ 
ness, the Admiralty orders for assembling the court 
shall be read to him.” 

No definite, straightforward, or intelligible answer 
could be elicited from the admiral to this question, and 
the prisoner proceeded to interrogate him as follows: 

Q. “ Did not I visit you on board the Victory on the 
morning of the 29th of July, the second day after the 
engagement?” 

A. “ Yes; I do not exactly recollect whether it was 
the 29th, but it was a day or two after the engage¬ 
ment.” 

Q. “ Did you then signify to me your disapprobation 
of any part of my conduct?” 

A. u To that I must answer I did not; but it did 
not take from me the observations I had made.” 

Q. “ Did you not then show me the draft of a letter 
to the Admiralty, giving an account of the engage¬ 
ment?” 

A. “I did; but to the best of my recollection that 
was not the letter I sent. The letter I sent to the 
Admiralty was not the letter I showed you. I believe 
I tore it the next morning.” 


314 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH XI. 

Q. “ In that letter that you did show me, and in 
that which you sent, was not my name mentioned?” 

A. “Yes” 

Q. “Did we not converse upon different parts of 
that letter which you were pleased to show me, par¬ 
ticularly that part which mentioned the French being 
beaten?” 

A. “ I think it most probable that we did converse, 
but upon the oath I have taken, I do not remember 
any one particular about it.” 

Q. “ I will endeavour to assist the admiral’s recol¬ 
lection by asking him, if he does not recollect that I 
assented to that part of the letter, saying, I had ob¬ 
served two of the French ships as I came along the 
line, make a slack fire, and that I believed the men did 
not stand to their quarters?” 

A. “ The vice-admiral does not help my recollection 
in this particular. I do not recollect any thing 
about it.” 

Q. “ I will endeavour to bring to the admiral’s re¬ 
collection another circumstance. Does the admiral re¬ 
collect my informing him at that time, that the two 
last ships in the enemy’s rear which I engaged, ap¬ 
peared to be fresh ships, having no shot holes through 
their sails; and the admiral’s reply to me upon that I 
hope he will repeat?” 

A. “I am sure I would repeat it if I could. I be¬ 
lieve it cannot be wondered at that all this matter 
should have escaped my recollection. I do not take 
any notes of conversations ; my memory is sometimes 
very good, and it is very necessary it should be so.” 


1779.] EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. 315 

Q. u Did that letter which you did show me contain 
approbation of my conduct ?” 

A. “ That letter was torn, I believe ; I did not like 
it upon reading it over. I had many things operating 
on my mind when I wrote to the Admiralty. I did 
approve of your conduct in that letter. It approved 
of your conduct, if you read it over, in passing the 
French ships ; to that I have always said, I do not call 
back my approbation.” 

Q. “ Please to speak as to the contents of the letter?” 

A. u I have answered you as to the contents of the 
letter; it was torn, I believe, and I do not recollect 
what it contained; but the other letter, which I wrote 
afterwards, gave you some approbation—that letter all 
the world has read over and over ; but I thought your 
passing the line, with the other captains, required my 
doing you justice.” 

Q. “ Did the letter you showed me, or that you sent 
to the Admiralty, confine your approbation to passing 
the French line ? ” 

A. u I shall speak no more to the letter you say I 
showed you; for I have got quit of it, and know no¬ 
thing about it.” 

Q. “ Whilst we were at Plymouth, did you signify 
to me any disapprobation of my conduct, or any part 
of it, during the 27 th and 28th of July ?” 

A. “ These are questions I must answer very oddly, 
or go into all my opinions about the vice-admiral, which 
does not seem to be contained in his question.” 

Q. “ My question contains a desire of an answer to 

a fact.” 

A. “ If I am to answer it, I will only say I am sorry 


316 


COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

to answer it; for I will tell the court why I did not 
signify my disapprobation.” 

Q. “ That is not my question. I beg your answer 
—whether you did or did not?” 

A. “ I really feel myself more tried now, as to un¬ 
easiness, than I felt myself some weeks ago. I had my 
disapprobation, but I did not express it to you.” 

Q. “ Whilst we were at Plymouth, did you not 
communicate to me a letter from the secretary of the 
Admiralty, in which his Majesty’s satisfaction at your 
account of my conduct was mentioned ?” 

A. “ I put the letter into your hand.” 

Q. “ Does it not particularly express the king’s satis¬ 
faction at your account of the behaviour of Sir Kobert 
Harland and myself by name ?” 

The letter was read, which is as follows : 

Philip Stephens , Esq., to the Honourable Admiral 

Augustus Keppel. 

“ Admiralty Office, August 2, 1778. 

“ Sir, 

“ I received yesterday, by Captain Faulkner, and 
immediately communicated to my Lords Commissioners 
of the Admiralty, your letter of the 30th ultimo, giving 
an account of your proceedings in pursuit of the French 
fleet, from the 24th to the 27th, and of your engage¬ 
ment with it on that day. The Earl of Sandwich lost 
no time in laying your said letter before the king ; and 
I have it in command from my lords to acquaint you 
that his Majesty was thereupon graciously pleased to 
express his fullest approbation of your conduct, and 
satisfaction in the account you have given of the 


317 


1779.] EVIDENCE FOR TIIE PROSECUTION. 

spirited, behaviour of Vice-admirals Sir Eobert Harland 
and Sir Hugli Palliser, and of the captains, officers, and 
men of the fleet.” 

“ Their lordships command me to send you their 
congratulations upon the victory you have obtained ; 
in addition to which I beg leave to offer mine, and 
have the honour to be, 

“ Sir, 

“ Your most obedient humble servant, 

“ Philip Stephens.” 

Admiral Campbell was the next witness called and 
examined at great length by the court. 

Q. “ Did it appear to you that Sir Hugh Palliser 
did all in his power to bring the Formidable into 
action ?” 

A. “ I believe he did. After we tacked to stand 
towards the enemy, I believe he did every thing in his 
power.” 

Q. “ Did it appear to you, that, during the engage¬ 
ment, he behaved as became an officer of his rank and 
station in the fleet?” 

A. u I do believe he did. I saw very little of him 
in the action. I once looked for him, but did not see 
him ; but I believe he did every thing he ought to 
have done.” 

Q. “ Do you know of any thing further concerning 
the conduct and behaviour of Sir Hugh Palliser during 
the 27th and 28th of July, either before, in, or after 
the action, than you have already related, which may 
be necessary for the information of the court?” 


318 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

A. “ I said at first that I could not undertake to give 
a narrative of the Formidable’s proceedings ; the action 
happened a great many months ago. To all such 
questions as you may think fit to put to me, I will give 
the best information to the court that I can ; but with¬ 
out a specific question being put, I do not choose to say 
any thing about his conduct on that day.” 

Q. “ It is quite a simple question; it is not what you 
recollect, but only whether you do recollect any thing 
more ?” 

A. “ I understand the question perfectly. The court 
has asked every question from beginning to end that I 
think is necessary. I do not recollect any thing at 
present.” 

Prisoner asked— 

Q. “ What do you understand to have been the 
order of sailing in force on the morning of the 27th 
of July ?” 

A. “ We were, in the morning of the 27th of July, 
on the larboard tack; consequently, the Vice-admiral 
of the Blue and his division should have been upon 
the larboard quarter of the Victory, and the Vice-ad¬ 
miral of the Red and his division, upon the starboard 
quarter of the Victory.” 

Q. “ Was not the Red division upon the admiral’s 
larboard quarter on the morning of the 27th?” 

A. “Yes.” 

Q. “ Was not the Vice-admiral of the Red placed in 
that position by the admiral’s signal for the fleet to 
tack altogether, and I placed in a different position by 
that signal ?” 


319 


1779.] EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. 

A. “ No, I do not think so; the Vice-admiral of the 
Red was wide upon the weather quarter of the Victory 
in the morning of the 27th, and considerably to wind¬ 
ward.” 

Q. “ After the Victory stood to the southward, after 
the engagement, what sail did she carry all the after¬ 
noon ?” 

A. “ I have already declared that we were, to the 
best of my remembrance, under our foresail and double 
reefed topsails. T do not know whether our maintop- 
mast staysail was out, but I think not.” 

Q. “ Did the Victory lay to any part of that after¬ 
noon ?” 

A. “ No:—no part of it.”* 

Q. “ Do you know that the Formidable, and the 
ships of my division, were the last that came out of 
action ?” 

A. “Yes, certainly ; the Formidable and the greatest 
part of them, I believe all of them, except one which 
had gone ahead of the Victory.” 

Q. “ Do you know if that division suffered more 
than the other two divisions, as being last out of action, 
and by the returns made to the admiral ?” 

A. “ Yes, I have understood so.” 

The Honourable Boyle Walsingham, Captain of the 
Thunderer, was next sworn, and examined by the 
court. 

Q. “ What division did you belong to in the fleet 


* The Victory’s log falsely represents her to have lain to from one to 
five o’clock. 


320 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

under the command of Admiral Keppel, on the 27th 
of July.” 

A. “ The admiral’s division.” 

Q. “ Did you see the Formidable during the action, 
and did it appear to you that the Vice-admiral of the 
Blue behaved as became an officer of his rank and 
station in the fleet?” 

A. “ I thought the Formidable came into action 
with great spirit, by keeping up a constant and a re¬ 
gular fire.” 

Q. “ Did the Vice-admiral of the Blue come into his 
station in the line in consequence of the signals for the 
ships to windward to come into the admiral’s wake?” 

A. “No.” 

Q. “ Did you see any impediments to his doing it, 
and what were they ?” 

A. “ I saw none.” 

Q. “ Did you see the Formidable’s fore topsail unbent 
any part of that evening ?” 

A. “ Yes, for some hours.” 

The prisoner asked, 

Q. “ Did you take any notice of the Formidable 
during the time she was in action, and after the Thun¬ 
derer came out of it?” 

A. “It was in consequence of that I said what I did 
just now, that the Formidable showed great spirit in 
coming into action, and in keeping up a very warm 
and constant fire.” 

Q. “ Had I not the favour of a visit from you within 
a day or two after the action?” 

A. “ Yes; I waited on you with Lord Mulgrave.” 


1779.] EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. 321 

Q. “ Do you recollect upon that or any other oc¬ 
casion, you were pleased to make me many compliments 
on my behaviour.” 

A. u Yes, in time of action.”* 

Captain Faulkner, late commander of the Victory, 
was sworn and examined. 

Q. w Give an account to the court, at daylight in the 
morning of the 27th of July, relative to the position of 
the Vice-admiral of the Blue and his proceedings till he 
came into action.” 

A. “ The Vice-admiral of the Blue was between the 
chess-tree and lee-beam of the Victory, with his main¬ 
sail up—I should think between two or three miles 
to leeward. Almost all the ships of his division, I 
think, except the Ocean, had their mainsails up. About 
six o’clock signals were made for six or seven of the 
Blue division to chase to wind'ward, which signals they 
immediately complied with. Some time after, not long, 
theVice-admiral of the Blue himself made sail, and those 
ships stretched a head of course.” 

Q. “ Did it appear to you that Sir Hugh Palliser in 
the morning of the 27th, did all in his power to bring 
the Formidable and the ships of the Blue division, that 
were remaining with him, into action with the ene- 
my s r 

A. “ I have already said they made sail, which was 
all they had in their power to do in order to gain the 
wind.” 

Q. u At what hour were the particular ships’ signals 

* Captain Walsingham was one of the captains who signed the me¬ 
morial to the king to remove Sir Hugh Palliser from all his employments. 
—See Sir Samuel Hood’s letter, p. *295, ch. x. 

Y 


322 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

of the Blue division made to bear down into the Vic¬ 
tory’s wake ?” 

A. “ I think a little before seven o’clock.” 

Q. “ Did the Formidable make any signal of dis¬ 
tress, or to speak with the admiral, in the evening of 
the 27 th of July ?” 

A. “ None, I saw her the whole time, and she made 
none.” 

The prisoner admitted that he made no such signal, 
and declined asking witness any further questions. 

Samuel Marshal, late captain of the Arethusa, was 
sworn and examined. 

Q. u Were you appointed to repeat the signals on 
board the Victory, on the 27th and 28th of July last ?” 

A. “ I was.” 

Q. “ Give a general account of all the signals made 
on the 27 th of July, distinguishing the times when 
hoisted, the significations of the signals, and when 
hauled down.” 

“ Signals made on board his Majesty’s ship Victory, 
and repeated by his Majesty’s ship, Arethusa, on the 
27th of July, 1778. 

WHEN MADE. SIGNIFICATION. WHEN HAULED DOWN. 

h. m. h. m. 

a. m. 10 30... .for the fleet to tack. a. m. 10 42 

11 5 -for the fleet to engage .p. m. 126 

p. m. 1 2... .for the fleet to wear. 1 10 

1 40... .for the fleet to form a line a-head, one 

cable’s length asunder. 3 23 

1 50... .for the Proserpine to come within hail 2 

2 50... .for the fleet to wear. 3 

3 ... .the Proserpine’s signal. 3 15 

3 24... .for the ships to windward to get into the 

admiral’s wake. 3 30 








323 


1779.] EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. 


WHEN MADE. SIGNIFICATION. WHEN HAULED DOWN. 

h. m * h. m. 

p. m. 3 30... .for the fleet to form a line a-head, one 

cable’s length asunder. 

3 50... .the Milford’s signal. 4 33 

4 33... .for a particular ship to make more sail 4 34 

4 37. .. .observing ships out of their stations. 

4 56... .the Prince George’s signal . 5 2 

4 57. .. .the Bienfaisant’s signal. 

5 22... .the Proserpine’s signal. 6 2 

5 32_the Fox’s signal. 6 13 


6 13... .for ships to windward to get into 
the admiral’s wake, 
the Elizabeth’s signal, 
the Terrible’s signal, 
the Centaur’s signal, 
the America’s signal.” 

The Honourable Captain Thomas Windsor, com¬ 
mander of the Fox frigate, stated that he received 
orders at five o’clock in the evening, to stand to the 
Formidable, and to acquaint Sir Hugh Palliser, that 
Admiral Keppel only waited for him and his division 
coming down into his wake to renew the engagement. 
These orders were received by hail, and consequently 
liable to be mistaken, and as the time at which they 
were said to have been delivered, was thirty-two mi¬ 
nutes earlier than when the signal was actually made 
for the Fox, three miles from the admiral, and which 
distance she had to accomplish before she got within 
hail; the evidence of Captain Windsor bears the stamp 
of peculiar inaccuracy as to time, when contrasted with 
that of Captain Marshal, of the Arethusa, speaking 
from the written minutes of the signals, noted at the 
instant they were made on board of the Victory. 

Captain Jervis,* of the Foudroyant, was asked, 

* Afterwards Earl of St. Vincent. 

Y 2 






324 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XT. 

Q. “ Had you increased your distance from the For¬ 
midable during the time of your going large, until you 
hauled your wind ?” 

A. u The distance was certainly increased, by the 
Formidable’s appearing to keep her wind, and the ad¬ 
miral’s steering large; but whether the Formidable in¬ 
creased her distance, I cannot speak to; but the dis¬ 
tance was increased, unquestionably, for the Vice-ad¬ 
miral of the Blue was very near the admiral when he 
wore, and the distance was increased every minute af¬ 
terwards. The court is to decide which increased the 
distance.” 

Q. “ Did the distance increase till you hauled your 
wind ?” 

A. “ Yes; the distance was increasing undoubtedly. 
From the instant the admiral wore and was upon the 
starboard tack till he hauled his wind, the distance ap¬ 
peared to me to be increasing between the Vice-ad¬ 
miral of the Blue and the admiral—the admiral steer¬ 
ing large, and the Vice-admiral of the Blue appearing to 
me (but one cannot speak positively when a ship is at 
a distance) to be keeping his wind; but whether the 
admiral or the vice-admiral increased the distance, I 
beg to be understood not to speak to.” 

When Captain Bazeley, who commanded the For¬ 
midable was called, the prisoner addressed the court as 
follows: 

u As Captain Bazeley is one of the principal witnesses 
summoned to support my defence, and was summoned 
by me before he was summoned for the prosecution, I 
submit to the court, whether there is any objection to 
postponing his examination:—when he is called upon 


1779.] EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. 325 

by me, the court will then have an opportunity of cross- 
examining him, and consequently of asking every ques¬ 
tion which they may deem necessary, in the same man¬ 
ner as if he gave his evidence before I enter upon my 
defence.” 

The court consulted, and the judge-advocate de¬ 
livered the following resolution: 

“ The court do not think they can dispense with ex¬ 
amining Captain Bazeley in support of the prosecution.” 

Captain Bazeley stated, “ That the firing began in 
the van of the British fleet with that of the enemy 
about eleven, and the Formidable first opened her 
fire at about twelve, and began one or two ships 
ahead of the French centre, within musket-shot, and 
passed many of the enemy within pistol-shot, and 
continued in action, going along the French line, 
as near as I can recollect, one hour and forty mi¬ 
nutes.” 

Q. u How many ships did you receive the fire 
of?” 

A. “ I do not know how many; I did not count 
them as we went along. From the time we opened 
our fire, we continued it till we had passed the whole 
French line. I should conceive we were in close action 
with about fourteen sail. We received the fire of about 
nine ships before we began our fire.” 

Q. “ What was the Vice-admiral of the Blue’s beha¬ 
viour during the time of action?” 

A. u Very gallant and spirited.” 

Q. u What was the condition of the Formidable after 
she came out of action?” 


326 


COUllT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [ciI. XL 

A. “ A perfect wreck, except that of her masts and 
yards coming over the side.” 

Q. “ How soon after the Formidable came out of 
action did she wear?” 

A. u Immediately after she wore on the larboard 
tack.” 

Q. “ What was the situation of the French fleet 
while the Formidable was on the larboard tack, with 
her head towards them?” 

A. “ The French rear appeared to me to be in dis¬ 
order, and soon after we got round, three of the 
enemy’s fleet began to wear to come up on the other 
tack immediately to meet the Formidable.” 

Q. u What did it appear to you was the reason for 
the Vice-admiral of the Blue wearing to the larboard- 
tack, and laying his head to the enemy again?” 

A. u To be ready to renew the engagement when 
the admiral should come up with the ships with him.” 

Q. u What did it appear to you, was the Vice-admi¬ 
ral of the Blue’s reason for wearing back again, half an 
hour after, to the starboard tack ?” 

A. “ The signal for battle being hauled down, and 
the Vice-admiral of the Red, and the ships with him to 
windward having shortened sail, and no ships near us. 
In the disabled state the Formidable was, the Vice-ad¬ 
miral of the Blue thought it necessary to wear back to 
meet the fleet, to avoid any danger we might be ex¬ 
posed to by the enemy’s pointing to us.” 

Q. “ Did the Formidable make any efforts to obey 
the signal for getting into the line ?” 

A. “ Yes, we did immediately.” 


1779.] EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. 327 

Q. “ What were those efforts?” 

A. “ Preparing to set the mainsail, and splicing the 
tacks and sheets which were shot away on both sides 
and reeving new braces for the yards, all the braces 
being shot away, except one main brace, the only one 
left whole in the ship. That was the first object before 
we turned to knot the shrouds and get the mast pro¬ 
perly secured to make more sail.” 

Q. u Was every other effort made use of, by which 
the Formidable could have kept her station in the line 
after the mainsail was set?” 

A. “ Yes, every effort was made use of—officers and 
ship’s company immediately employed to get the ship 
refitted, till ten o’clock at night, without any inter¬ 
mission.” 

Q. “ Did the Victory carry so much sail as to pre¬ 
vent the Formidable from getting into her station ?” 

A. “ Yes; she increased her distance from the first 
instant after passing the Formidable, till dark at night.” 

Q. “ Did the Victory in general out sail the For¬ 
midable, with the same sail?” 

A. “At all times, and in all situations of sailing.” 

Q. “ Did you see the signal on board the Victory 
for ships to bear down into the admiral’s wake?” 

A. “ I did; near about seven o’clock, as well as I can 
judge; signals to bear down, with particular ships’ 
pendants of the Vice-admiral of the Blue’s division, 
which were immediately observed and repeated on 
board the Formidable.” 

Q. “ Did the Vice-admiral of the Blue bear down in 

consequence of that signal ?” 

A. “ No; he kept the admiral open in the position I 


328 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XL 

have before stated to endeavour to recover the length 
of his station, before he would attempt to go down into 
the line.” 

Q. “ Was the Formidable at the time you now speak 
of in a condition to go down and take her station in 
the line with respect to her sails and rigging?” 

A. “No, by no means in the world, either to reco¬ 
ver her station, or to keep her distance between two 
ships in the line.” 

Q. “ Had there not been time in three hours and a 
half to have brought on more sail ?” 

A. “ No, not in the condition the masts and rigging 
were in after coming out of battle, to have ventured to 
carry sail with safety on either of the masts, till the 
shrouds and stays were properly secured.” 

Q. “ Do you not think a ship going two knots and 
upwards may be able to keep her station in the line or 
between two ships?” 

A. “ No, by no means, when the admiral goes faster, 
which was certainly the case as to the Formidable the 
whole of the afternoon.” 

Q. “ Did the Vice-admiral of the Blue express his 
uneasiness at any time in the afternoon at not being in 
a condition to obey the signals then out ?” 

A. “ Frequently to me at different times, and was 
very anxious the whole afternoon.” 

Q. “ Did you bear away into the admiral’s wake at 
any time before dark ?” j. 

A. “ We did not—I judged we were about a mile 
a weather of the admiral’s wake, and three miles astern, 
and the course we steered to get up into our station, 
before we made any attempt to get into the line, was 


1779.] EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. 329 

keeping the admiral just open on the lee bow; which, 
if I am allowed to have any judgment, was, I think, 
the most proper course to recover our station.” 

Q. “ Do you think it was possible to have got the 
Formidable into a state to have bore down into her 
station by seven o’clock ?” 

A. “ I do think it was impossible.” 

Q. “ Were the courses the ship steered in the even¬ 
ing and the night particularly directed by the vice- 
admiral, or were his directions in general to get the 
ship into her station?” 

A. “ The courses were by the vice-admiral’s own 
directions to me, and when I went off the deck at any 
time in the night after ten o’clock, the same directions 
were left with the officer who had charge of it. In¬ 
deed I was never off the deck fifteen minutes together 
during the whole day and night, and never sat down 
till after ten o’clock at night to refresh myself.” 

Q. “ Did it occur to you from the situation of parti¬ 
cular ships, and the fleet in general, that it would have 
been a right measure for the vice-admiral to have 
shifted his flag?” 

A. “By no means. It did not occur to me that it 
would have been a right measure.” 

Q. “ What were your reasons for thinking it would 
not have been a right measure?” 

A. “ Because I did not think the admiral meant that 
evening to renew the battle. That was my opinion 
then, and I am still of that opinion, from every cir¬ 
cumstance I can collect, and from my own remem¬ 
brance of the manoeuvres and situation of the fleet.” 


330 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

On the fifteenth day of the assembling of the court, 
the prisoner’s defence was read by the judge-advocate, 
and is as follows: 

“ Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the Court. 

“ Before I enter into the formal vindication of my 
conduct, I entreat the indulgence of the court, whilst I 
speak a few words concerning the peculiar circum¬ 
stances under which I appear before them. There is 
some consolation in lamenting my misfortunes in the 
presence of persons with generous minds; men whose 
honourable feelings will not deny the tribute of com¬ 
miseration to the unfortunate. 

“ I may truly call myself unfortunate in the severest 
sense of the word; for all those sufferings , which now 
afflict me , have been brought on by the pursuit of a 
candid and fair hearing, to defend my character 
against the unprovoked attacks of the most inveterate 
and unrelenting enemies. 

u Four-and-forty years I have now had the honour 
to serve my king and country in the navy; during 
which long time I have not been without my share of 
the hardships, the dangers, and the distressful inci¬ 
dents so common to men of our profession. From the 
commencement of this long service, it has ever been my 
first ambition to deserve the favourable opinion of my 
countrymen, by the most industrious exertion of my 
faculties in every way proper for a naval officer; hav¬ 
ing neglected no opportunity of meeting the public 
enemy, or of performing any other duty to which I was 
competent. 


THE DEFENCE. 


331 


1779.] 

“It has been my good fortune to have had my la¬ 
bours in the service rewarded by my sovereign with 
honourable and profitable offices; and also, till the 
occasion of the present trial, uniformly to meet with 
the approbation of my superiors in command. But I 
have ever valued my honour and character as an 
officer and a man at a higher rate than the emo¬ 
luments of the most beneficial employments; and it has 
ever been my principle to be ready to make a sacrifice 
of the latter, rather than tamely submit to the assas¬ 
sination of the former. 

u When it was thought expedient to arm our fleets 
against France, though already possessed of offices 
which supplied an ample income; and though for 
thirty years of my life afflicted with a painful bodily 
infirmity, from an accident in the course of service, and 
therefore more exposed to danger from the fatigues of 
a sea-command; yet, warmed by a zeal to serve my 
country once more in the walk of my profession, I was 
happy to be honoured with the third post in the fleet 
under the command of Admiral Keppel. 

“ An engagement soon ensued, and for my share in 
it the admiral publicly and repeatedly testified his 
approbation of my conduct. But the action not being 
followed with that splendid and complete victory our 
countrymen expected, some of the friends and depen¬ 
dents of the admiral thought fit to cast injurious re¬ 
flections both on me and my division, though much 
the greatest share of the engagement had fallen to our 
lot: and it was endeavoured, by letters in the public 
prints and otherwise, to impress the world with an 
idea, that my misconduct, more particularly, was the 


332 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

cause of not having come to a second and more deci¬ 
sive engagement. 

“ I appealed to my commander-in-chief for justice to 
my character; but I found him averse to giving the 
proper check and contradiction to the reports, by 
which my honour was wounded; and, notwithstanding 
his having at first publicly approved of my conduct, I 
had too good grounds to suspect, that privately he did 
not discourage a very opposite representation of me. 

“ Inflamed with resentment by the attacks on my 
character as an officer, and by the refusal of the com¬ 
mander-in-chief either to accuse or exculpate me, I pur¬ 
sued measures, with a view chiefly to my own justi¬ 
fication, which have brought upon me the rage of a 
violent party; and the most unexampled irregularities 
have been practised, to effect my ruin and destruction, 
as well as through the pretence of my name to disturb 
the public tranquillity. 

“ To check these proceedings, I anticipated the 
wishes of my enemies, by making an immediate sur- 
render of several valuable offices, to the amount of be¬ 
tween two and three thousand pounds a year; leaving 
myself with no other mark of distinction, than my 
military rank , which 1 retained with a view only to 
have the benefit of a trial. 

“ But my enemies prescribe no bounds to their rage 
and malice. Before my trial was ordered, every species 
of threat was applied to deter me from appealing to a 
court-martial for clearing my honour; and since it has 
been known, every art , which the industry of a host 
of powerful enemies can supply, has been practised to 
disappoint me of a fair hearing. All accuse secretly; 


333 


1779 .] THE DEFENCE. 

but not one of tlie whole list chooses to come forth in 
a manly way to avow his accusation. By this unge¬ 
nerous manner of proceeding, I am exposed to the most 
extraordinary disadvantages. My real accusers become 
witnesses. No specific charge is made; in consequence 
of which I scarce know how to shape my defence. 
Every witness claims the right of attacking me as an 
accuser; so that since the first day of the trial, new 
accusations have been daily springing up. If the 
accusation fail of success, blame belongs to nobody. 
If it succeed, each will claim a share in the merit of 
making it. But even all this is not enough to gratify 
their resentment. Since my trial has been ordered, 
they have attempted to deter me from it, by conspiring 
to address his Majesty to degrade me from my rank; 
and I have too much reason to believe, that two of the 
admirals, and most of the captains examined against 
me, have been so regardless of even the semblance of 
decency as to sign it; though even when they knew, 
that they were to be called upon as witnesses. Nay, 
since the trial has been going on, daily attempts have 
been made in the public papers to alarm my judges ; 
as if themselves would not be safe from attack for 
doing me justice. 

“ With all this weight of party and prejudice co¬ 
operating against me, my enemies may have flattered 
themselves, with the hopes of disarming me of the 
fortitude requisite to sustain me in so oppressive and 
trying a situation. But, feeling a consciousness of my 
innocence, and encouraged by confidence in your firm 
impartiality, unequal and severe as the conflict is, I 
look to the issue of it without dread or apprehension. 


334 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [dl. XI. 

“ The general subject of the present trial is my con¬ 
duct as commander in the third post of the British 
fleet under Admiral Keppel, on the 27th and 28th of 
July last; more especially my conduct subsequent to 
the action with the French fleet on the former of those 
days. 

“ The first thing insinuated against me is, that at 
five in the morning of the 27th, my ship was consi¬ 
derably to leeward of her proper station. I collect 
this charge from the manner in which Admiral Kep- 
pel, on his trial, explained the object of the signal for 
six or seven of the ships of my division to chase to 
windward; for, as he represents, this signal was to 
close the interval between the Victory and me, occa¬ 
sioned by my being far to leeward; and Admiral 
Campbell, who now appears to have made this signal , 
so important in its consequences , without previously 
consulting the commander-in-chief justifies it under 
the same idea. 

“ Whether those gentlemen mean absolutely to im¬ 
pute any fault to me in this respect, is not quite clear 
from their words. But, as they may bear such a con¬ 
struction, it is not fit that I should suffer them to pass 
unnoticed. 

“ My answer is, that, at the time stated, the Formi¬ 
dable was upon the Victory’s lee bow; and that this 
was the position, in which the admiral’s last signal for 
the fleet’s tacking all together, which was in the morn¬ 
ing of the preceding day, had placed me; and that he suf¬ 
fered me to continue in it, without making any signal to 
alter my position; which implies, that he did not dis¬ 
approve of it. As to the evidence of Admiral Campbell 


THE DEFENCE. 


335 


1779 .] 

on this head, he placing me before the Victory’s beam , 
it will be found contradicted, not only by my officer’s, 
but by Admiral Keppel’s own journal, which expressly 
describes me on the 27th to have been on his lee bow 
at day-light. The words of the journal are, at day¬ 
light saw the French fleet to windward , the Vice-ad¬ 
miral of the Red and his division well on the weatlier- 
beam , the Vice of the Blue on the lee bow. Therefore 
it seems most probable, that Mr. Campbell, perhaps 
not a little solicitous to justify his own signal, I will 
not say influenced by a desire to strain every thing 
into a crimination of me, is inaccurate in the recollec¬ 
tion of my position. But be this as it may; and though 
it should be admitted, that Bear-admiral Campbell is 
right in supposing me to have got more to leeward 
in the morning of the 27th than I was the night be¬ 
fore; yet I trust that this will be no cause of cen¬ 
sure of me, unless it shall appear, which I think 
impossible, that my being too far to leeward was owing 
to some negligence or inattention on my part. Sure I 
am, that I was ever studious to keep my ship, where I 
thought the admiral’s motions required her to be ; nor 
have I the least reason to suppose, that my officers 
were wanting in exertions to second my endeavours, 
and obey my orders for this purpose. 

“ As to my conduct in the engagement itself, it was so 
unexceptionable that the most bitter of my enemies do 
not complain of it. Consequently, to enter into a very 
formal justification of this part of my conduct would 
be giving unnecessary trouble. However, I doubt not 
but that the court will be attentive to the share I had 
in the engagement; as well because the proper dis- 


336 


COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

charge of my duty, whilst the action lasted, may entitle 
me to strong presumptions in my favour, as because it 
will account for the extraordinary damages to my ship, 
which materially relate to the defence of my subsequent 
conduct. 

“ With a view to this, I beg to be indulged with a 
few words relative to the time of action itself. 

“ I went into action under very singular disadvan¬ 
tages ; for, whatever might be the intention of the 
signal for most of the ships of my division to chase to 
windward, the effect produced was separating so many 
of my division from me, and from each other, that, 
during the time of action, I had not one ship near 
enough to support me. Both the other flag officers 
were supported in the action by all the ships of their 
respective divisions ; and the admiral’s own division 
was further aided by the junction of several ships 
of mine. But the signal for chasing left me with only 
two ships in any degree near me; and these, by the 
chasm from the want of my other ships, were at too 
great a distance to take off any of the enemy’s fire, the 
nearest ship a-head of me being half a mile from me, 
and the nearest astern, a mile ; except for a few mi¬ 
nutes at the latter end of the action, when one of the 
ships astern of me shot close up to leeward of me. 
Before I began firing on the enemy, I backed my mizen- 
topsail , and it was kept so the whole time I was passing 
the French line; which, by retarding my progress , 
enabled me to give the French more of my fire , and 
consequently was the cause of my receiving more from 
them . The first ship I became close engaged with, 
was the first or second ship a-head of the French ad- 


THE DEFENCE. 


337 


1779 .] 

miral; after which I successively passed the remainder 
of the French centre, and the whole of their rear ; and 
that no ships might escape my fire, I hauled my wind , 
to close with the two sternmost ships of the enemy , which 
appeared to have kept more to windward than the other 
ships I passed, and not to have been engaged before. 
On the whole, I believe, that the Formidable fought 
seven or eight ships more than fell to the share of Ad¬ 
miral Keppel, whose log takes notice of engaging only 
six ships of the enemy, besides the French admiral, and 
is therein confirmed by the evidence of Mr. More at 
the late trial, he speaking to only seven or eight ships. 

“ These particulars of my conduct in the engage¬ 
ment I should be above relating, if it was not necessary 
to account for the extraordinary damages to my ship ; 
and if some of the witnesses against me, when they 
were examined to this point, had not spoken of me in 
such cold and indifferent language, as strongly marked 
their anxiety to prevent any favourable impressions of 
me on the minds of the court; lest my proper beha¬ 
viour, in the critical moment of action, should induce a 
favourable construction of my subsequent conduct. It 
is very true, as Admiral Keppel expresses it, that I 
only performed my duty like other officers. But the 
question which came from the court, did not lead to 
so invidious and offensive a comparison as the answer 
points at ; nor can I imagine why it was answered in 
that way, except from ill-will towards me. If any 
comparison was proper, it should have been, not of the 
conduct of one officer with another, but of the share 
they respectively had in the action, from the different 
situation of their ships. It might be, and so the fact 

z 


338 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [ciI. XI. 

was, tliat it was my fortune, and that of the ships of 
my division, to have more of the action than the ships 
of the two other divisions. Yet it would be a great 
injustice to suppose, that the captains of the other di¬ 
visions, if they had been engaged on the same terms, 
would not have acquitted themselves with equal zeal. 

“ On coming out of the action, the first moment I 
was clear of the smoke, I anxiously looked for the ad¬ 
miral, being ever solicitous to second what appeared to 
me to be his design. At this time he had wore, and I 
saw him at some distance, with the ships of his own 
division about him, and some of mine, which had joined 
him in the beginning of the engagement. He was 
standing towards the enemy, and had the signal for 
battle still flying. The Eed division was then to wind¬ 
ward of the rear of the enemy. Hence I took for 
granted , that the admiral intended to renew the en¬ 
gagement immediately ; and, rejoicing at the idea, I did 
not one moment hesitate to endeavour taking the lead 
in what then appeared to me so glorious a design. 

Therefore, though my ship was the last, or last but 
one, which came out of action, and had apparently 
suffered very much in her sails and rigging, and in loss 
of men, yet I instantly ordered the ship to be wore , and 
to stand towards the enemy , who was still within gun¬ 
shot of us , without waiting to examine into the state 
of our damages. I also directed the officers and men 
to return to their quarters. My orders were executed 
instantly ; and, by the use of temporary ropes to brace 
the yards about, the ship was wore. Admiral Keppel 
and the officers of the Victory say, that they were quite 
ignorant of this movement of the Formidable. But to 


THE DEFENCE. 


339 


1779.] 

others it was very apparent , particularly to Captain 
Marshal and the captain of the Worcester. How so 
material a motion of the commander in the third post 
escaped the notice of those on board the commander- 
in-chief, I know not. But, whatever the cause may 
have been, I feel this as one of the many instances , in 
which it was my ill-fortune not to be an object of 
their attention under any circumstances which place my 
conduct in an advantageous point of view. 

“ Some time after thus wearing and standing to¬ 
wards the enemy, I perceived that the admiral had 
hauled down the signal for battle, and shortened sail ; 
and that the same was done by the Vice-admiral of the 
Bed. This led me to imagine that the admiral had 
given up all thoughts of immediately renewing the ac¬ 
tion ; and I was not mistaken, for the admiral confesses 
and justifies it. At the same time seeing the whole 
French fleet wear to come on the starboard tack, and 
that three of them stood directly towards the Formi¬ 
dable, I directed her to be wore a second time, and 
advanced to join the admiral. This step appeared to 
me necessary to prevent the danger of being cut off ; 
and it was a further inducement to me, that I then did 
not see any thing to warrant my keeping so near to the 
enemy, and at such a distance from the admiral and 
the body of the fleet, as I was then alone. 

“ At this period arises the second article of charge 
against me, for the origin of which I am also in¬ 
debted to Rear-admiral Campbell; for it was he who 
first said, that as the signal for the line at a cable’s 
length asunder was then flying on board the Victory, 
and she was on the larboard tack, I ought to have con- 

z 2 


340 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XL 

tinued on the same tack, and also ahead of the admiral, 
that being my station in the line on the larboard tack. 

“ But the fact is, that we on board the Formidable did 
not see the signal for the line till we came abreast of the 
Victory. That signal being at the mizen peak, and 
the Victory standing end-on towards the Formidable, 
it was impossible that we should see it sooner. It was 
also invisible to us on board the Arethusa, the repeat¬ 
ing frigate; for she had been called in from proceeding 
to her station, and kept near to the Victory, Captain 
Marshal being actually on board her. This brought 
both ships into the same position in respect to the 
Formidable, and rendered it equally impossible to see 
the signal on board of either. I believe that I am quite 
accurate in stating the position of the Victory and Are¬ 
thusa at the time I am speaking of, that is from the second 
time of the Formidable’s wearing till she passed the 
Victory. Captain Marshal, having been first called by 
signal, and then hailed, had been an hour on board the 
Victory; a very extraordinary circumstance , as it ap¬ 
pears that there were no orders for him , and his being 
with the repeating frigate out of her usual station, dur¬ 
ing so critical a time , deprived me, and probably some 
others, of the full opportunity of seeing the signal for 
the line. At all events, I am certain, that in point of 
fact I never saw the signal for the line till we were 
abreast of the Victory, though I continually directed 
my attention to her; nor was it seen by any of my 
officers. This will appear the less extraordinary, when 
it is considered, that Sir Robert Harland never saw it, 
whilst on the larboard tack; though his situation on 
the Victory’s weather-bow rendered it indisputably 


THE DEFENCE. 


341 


1779 .] 

more probable, that he should see it, than that I should, 
when right ahead of the admiral. Captain Laforey 
also acknowledges, that he did not see the signal for the 
line, whilst he was on the starboard-tack, and the Vic¬ 
tory on the the larboard, till he passed the Victory. It 
is material to observe, that whilst I was standing to¬ 
wards the Victory, no ships were formed in a line 
ahead or astern of the admiral; nor was there any 
other indication of the signal for the line being flying; 
for it had not been enforced, either by the signal for 
seeing particular ships out of their stations, or by the 
signal for particular ships to make more sail; both 
which signals, being at the maintopmast head, might 
have been seen by us, though the signal for the line was 
invisible. But if I had seen the signal for the line, my 
wearing and approaching towards the Victory on a 
contrary tack would have been justifiable; because, as 
I have already explained, the signal for battle was 
hauled down, and the Victory, with the Vice-admiral 
of the Red and his ships, had shortened sail; and at the 
same time, I saw the French fleet wearing to come on 
the starboard tack, and three of their ships pointing to¬ 
wards me. Under these circumstances, it appeared to 
me, that, if I had not wore again, and stood to join the 
Victory and the rest of our fleet, the three ships of the 
enemy, which pointed to me, would have had it in 
their power to have separated me from the rest of our 
fleet. My danger at this time is apparent, even from 
the evidence of Admiral Keppel himself. About the 
time of my wearing, he made the signal to wear; and 
though he was considerably more distant from the 
enemy than the Formidable was when she wore, he 


342 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XL 

says, that he should not have deserved the name of an 
officer , if he had not wore; founding himself on the 
circumstance of the enemy’s forming their line upon the 
starboard tack, and his lines not being formed. This 
was only a little before the time, when Sir Robert 
Harland at a former trial described Admiral Keppel to 
be in so much danger, that, seeing him, as Sir Robert 
said, unsupported, and within the power of the whole 
French force then astern of him, he was coming down 
to support the admiral, without waiting for orders. If 
then it would have been so dangerous for the Victory 
to have continued on the larboard tack, what must have 
been the consequence, if my ship, alone and so much 
nearer to the enemy , had remained there ? But not¬ 
withstanding all these circumstances to justify me for 
wearing the second time, and advancing to join the 
Victory, the admiral, in his evidence, could not help 
betraying his inclination to blame me; and Rear-ad¬ 
miral Campbell, ever industrious to attack me , goes a 
step further, precipitately and decidedly imputing to 
me a positive disobedience to a signal, which I neither 
did nor could see. This is the more observable; be¬ 
cause Admiral Keppel acknowledges, that when 1 pass¬ 
ed the Victory , there was no other ship with her , not¬ 
withstanding the signal for the line , and that mine was 
the last ship which passed him; and further, that he 
then saw no possibility of forming the line on the lar¬ 
board tack, and had therefore made the signal to 
wear, which the Formidable had already executed. 
Yet he approved of all the other ships which passed 
him , but blames me. How is this partiality to be ac¬ 
counted for, otherwise, than by supposing both Ad- 


THE DEFENCE. 


343 


1779 .] 

miral Keppel and Rear-admiral Campbell, to be in¬ 
fluenced in their representations of my conduct by ill- 
will towards me? 

u One other observation only seems necessary on this 
head, which is, that the admiral himself confesses, that 
my wearing the second time , coming on the starboard 
tack, and joining him, did not prevent his renewing 
the engagement , or produce any other ill effect , and was 
so far from interfering with his views at the time, that I 
was only doing that which he was on the point of doing. 

“ A little before three o’clock, the Formidable passed 
to leeward of the Victory; and in passing, the signal for 
wearing ffrst opened upon us, and then the signal for 
the line. The latter was soon after repeated by me, 
notwithstanding the doubts which may have arisen from 
its not having been observed by several of the witnesses 
examined against me. The fact of my repeating it is 
not only mentioned in the Formidable’s log-book, but 
will be proved by the officers of the ship, particularly 
the midshipman, whom I appointed to repeat signals, 
and by other witnesses. It will also be further proved, 
by a very remarkable piece of evidence, which pro¬ 
bably never would have occurred to me, if a member 
of this court had not asked one of the witnesses, whether 
a gun was not fired, as it ought to be, when the signal 
was repeated. This question led me to call for the 
gunner’s expense-book of the Formidable, where to my 
great satisfaction, I found a most corroborating evidence 
of our repeating the signal for the line; namely, an ex¬ 
press charge of the expense of powder for the gun fired 
on the occasion, which appears to be the last gun fired 
from my ship on the day of action. The gunner’s ex- 


344 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

pense-book I shall have produced for the inspection of 
the court; and I hope that this, with the other evidence, 
will remove all doubts about a fact, which some of the 
witnesses against me have so positively denied. I shall, 
also, prove that the signal for the line was kept flying 
till it was dark; except for a short interval, during 
which it was shifted to make the signal, for ships to 
windward to bear down into the admiral’s wake, the 
first time of hoisting, more conspicuous, in the same 
manner as was done on board the Victory. As to the 
signal for wearing, it was not repeated by me; because, 
being already on the starboard tack, as that signal re¬ 
quired, I deemed the repetition improper. Rear-ad¬ 
miral Campbell, on the trial of Admiral Keppel, spoke 
as in doubt, whether the signal for wearing was made 
till after I had passed the Victory, saying, that the Vic¬ 
tory did not wear till a quarter of an hour after pass¬ 
ing on the larboard tack and to windward of the For¬ 
midable, which to the best of my recollection, is al¬ 
lowing much too long a time; for it appeared to 
us on board the Formidable, that the Victory wore 
almost immediately after passing to windward of 
us. But the purser of the Arethusa, who took the 
written minutes of signals on board the repeating 
frigate, makes this signal for wearing to the starboard 
tack to have been up half an hour; as by his account it 
was hoisted at half an hour after two; and Captain 
Marshal and the mate of the Arethusa agree with him 
that it was not hauled down till three. Consequently 
it was up a quarter of an hour before I passed to lee¬ 
ward of the Victory, even though Admiral Campbell 
should be correct in supposing, that it was so long as a 


THE DEFENCE. 


345 


1779 .] 

quarter of an hour after the Victory’s passing us on the 
larboard tack, before she wore. 

“ Within a few minutes, or to adopt Admiral Camp¬ 
bell’s reckoning, a quarter of an hour, after the For¬ 
midable’s passing the Victory, whilst the latter was on 
the larboard-tack, she wore and repassed to leeward of 
the Formidable, and very near her. 

“ Here it is proper to take notice of a very strong 
charge of disobedience to signals , which my enemies 
have repeatedly urged against me, with the utmost 
confidence, and which has been the great cause, both 
of the late trial , and all my present sufferings. The 
charge, as first stated in the public prints, was, that the 
cause of Admiral Keppel's not re-attacking the French 
at half-past three in the afternoon was my not joining 
him , but being at that time four miles to windward 
with my division. Admiral Keppel, speaking in par¬ 
liament a little time before the charge which produced 
the late trial, though he then seemed to disclaim the 
imputation of any wilful disobedience on my part, 
pointed at the same thing, for he asserted, that the 
signal for coming into his wake was flying from, three 
o’clock to eight in the evening, unobeyed. In his de¬ 
fence on the late trial, the admiral pursues the same 
idea, for he asserts, that the blue flag, for ships to 
windward to come into his wake, was hoisted the first 
time, because I continued to lie to windward ; and by 
so doing, kept my division from joining him. I am 
now citing the admiral's own words when on his de¬ 
fence; and in the evidence he has given against me on 
oath, he expressed himself to the same effect; when 
he explained to the court the occasion of first hoisting 


346 


COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

the blue flag. But the charge, thus boldly asserted, 
supposes facts , which never existed. According to Cap¬ 
tain Marshal, his purser, and the mate of the Aretliusa, 
all speaking from the written minutes of signals taken 
at the same time, the blue flag, for ships to windward 
to come into the admiral’s wake, was first made at 
twenty-four minutes after three , and it was hauled 
down a few minutes after; the two former witnesses 
mentioning thirty minutes after three, and the latter 
twenty-seven minutes: and all three agree, that it was 
not made again till thirteen minutes after six. It is 
also proved by the minutes of the purser, who was the 
person appointed by Captain Marshal for the purpose, 
that the signal, for wearing the second time, and com¬ 
ing to the starboard-tack, was made at thirty minutes 
after two , and hauled down at three; which shows, 
that, at this latter time, the Victory was in the act of 
wearing; after which she passed the Formidable to 
leeward, so near as to be almost within hail, and went 
ahead of her, and then edged away, leaving the For¬ 
midable in her wake. Within so short a time as the 
twenty-four minutes, from the Victory's wearing , to the 
hoisting the blue flag on board the Arethusa, it was 
absolutely impossible, that the Victory could have 
wore, passed the Formidable, and got so far ahead of 
her, but what I must have been much nearer to the 
Victory than the mile prescribed to me, by my station 
in the line ; and as by the Victory’s edging away I was 
left in her wake, the blue flag could in no sense be ap¬ 
plicable to me; nor was it applicable to the ships in 
general of my division; for all of them, except the De¬ 
fiance, which had joined the Red division, and the 


THE DEFENCE. 


347 


1779.] 

America, which was far ahead, were a long way to 
leeward of the admiral , when the blue flag was first 
hoisted , as will appear from examining the evidence 
of the several captains of my division, at the late trial. 
It also appears by the same testimony, and the admi¬ 
ral's own account of the ships when he made the signal 
to wear to the starboard tack, that no ship was near 
me but the Victory herself; so that, though I had been 
to windward, 1 could not be said to have kept the ships 
of my division with me. So far I justify myself on the 
supposition that the admiral might possibly have got 
to leeward of me, a little before the first time of making 
the signals for ships to windward to bear down; and 
if there was nothing more, I should stand fully excul¬ 
pated from being the cause of that signal. But an 
additional fact is come out on the present trial, from a 
witness examined against me, which removes even the 
possibility of my being the object of the blue flag , the 
the first time of hoisting it. Mr. Graham, who took 
the minutes on board the Arethusa, has informed the 
court, that the blue flag, though not repeated on board 
the repeating frigate till twenty four minutes after 
three , was hoisted on board the Victory at fifty-six 
minutes past two ; Captain Marshal not choosing to re¬ 
peat it, till the signal for the line was hauled down on 
board the Victory, to show it plainer. Compare this 
with the time of hoisting the signal to wear to the star¬ 
board tack, which was at thirty minutes after two , and 
the time of the Victory’s actually wearing, which, from 
the written minutes taken on board the Arethusa, ap¬ 
pears to have been at three , and the unavoidable result 
must be, that the blue flag , for ships to windward to 


348 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

bear down, was first made , when the Formidable was 
actually to leeward of the Victory. What then be¬ 
comes of the admiral’s confident assertion, that my 
still continuing to windward was the cause of this 
signal ? I beg the court’s particular attention to this 
exposition of the numerous untruths and misrepresen¬ 
tations , which have been applied, to make the situa¬ 
tion of my ship the cause of first hoisting the signal for 
ships to windward to bear down. I was represented 
to have been to windward of the Victory, when I was 
actually to leeward of her. If I had not been to lee¬ 
ward, the time would have placed me in the admiral's 
wake , within the distance of my station in the line; 
whereas the charge supposes me to have been so far 
and so long out of his wake , as to require an enforcing 
signal. I am represented to have continued to wind¬ 
ward , before the signal was made, which implies, that 
I had been so for some considerable time. But if I had 
really been to windward, the twenty-four minutes be¬ 
tween the Victory’s second wearing, and the first time 
of the Arethusa’s repeating the signal for ships to wind¬ 
ward to bear down, would barely have allowed time 
for the Victory’s passing to leeward of the Formidable. 
My division is represented to have been to windward 
of the admiral, when only one of them was so. They 
are said to have been kept near me, when they were 
at a distance from me, and actually to leeward of the 
admiral, and when the only ship near me was the Vic¬ 
tory herself. The signal for coining into the admiral's 
wake was alleged to be flying from three o'clock in the 
afternoon Hit eight o'clock at night , unobeyed by me. 
But the fact turns out to be, that it was never flying 


THE DEFENCE. 


349 


1779 .] 

from twenty-seven or thirty minutes after three , to 
thirteen minutes after six; and it is as certain , that it 
was not applicable to me at the soonest, till this latter 
time. 

“ But if neither I nor my division were objects of the 
blue flag the first time it was hoisted, it may be asked, 
to what ships it could be applied; and this I think 
myself able to explain to the court, though in strictness 
my justification requires no more, than proving myself 
not within the meaning of that signal. The court will 

O O 

please to recollect, that the blue flag was first hoisted 
at fifty-six minutes after two at the mizen peak, with 
the signal for the line; and that the Proserpine’s signal 
was made at three o’clock, to carry a message to Sir 
Robert Harland then to windward, to form in the rear 
of the admiral, instead of going ahead, which was the 
proper station of the Red division on the starboard 
tack; and further, that the signal for the line was 
hauled down at twenty-three minutes past three, to 
make the blue flag the plainer. It is therefore ex¬ 
tremely probable, that the blue flag was first intended 
for Sir Robert Harland’s division to bear down. But 
lest the signal for the line, the most commanding of all 
signals, should be understood to control the blue flag, 
and so prevent Sir Robert from obeying it, I conclude, 
that Captain Sutton was sent with the message for Sir 
Robert's forming in the rear; and as he was some time 
in going, and the admiral was apprehensive perhaps of 
an attack on himself and the crippled ships to leeward 
of him, it is probable, that the original signal for the 
line was hauled down to prevent any misconception of 
the blue flag, and so to expedite the purpose of the 


350 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

message. If the blue flag was not intended for Sir 
Robert Harland’s ship to windward, I can no other¬ 
wise apply it, than by supposing it made for some ships 
of the centre division, which might be then to wind¬ 
ward, instead of being in their stations astern of the 
admiral. 

u After the two ships had passed each other, the 
Formidable remained for some time, within the length 
of her station in the line; she being the ninth ship 
from the Victory, and consequently nine cables’ length, 
or rather more than a mile from her. But, as the 
admiral carried more sail than the Formidable, in the 
disabled state of her sails and rigging, could make, the 
former was gradually and constantly increasing her 
distance from the latter till night. The particular time 
when the Formidable was first left beyond the pre¬ 
scribed distance of her station in the line it is impos¬ 
sible to fix. But whatever the time was, whether an 
hour or more after being passed by the Victory on the 
starboard tack, it is the period from which I am to 
account for not preserving my station. 

a To find out whether I used my utmost endeavours 
to preserve it, there are two things to be considered; 
first, whether I steered the course proper for getting 
up to my station again; and secondly, whether I car¬ 
ried all the sail in my power. If my being out of my 
station in the line was owing to any failure on my 
part, it must have been in one or both of these points; 
and therefore they are the true and proper test of my 
conduct. 

“When the admiral had passed to leeward of us, 
he edged away, which placed us in his wake, and 


THE DEFENCE. 


351 


1779.] 

we continued to steer after him, till the Red division 
passed under our stern to form in the rear, when we 
hauled a little to windward out of their way. This, 
at the same time that it served to give room to the 
Red division to form, prevented us from being inter¬ 
rupted in refitting our rigging, without producing any 
inconvenience to us, as it was impossible in our then 
state to have kept our station between any two ships 
in a line. But as soon as we had got clear of the Red 
division, my intention was to keep the admiral a little 
open under our lee-bow, which was keeping the com¬ 
mand of the wind, for taking our station when we got 
up the length of it, and were capable of managing our 
ship in the line. This has been already proved to the 
court by the captain and the master of the Formidable, 
who have mentioned the directions I gave on the occa¬ 
sion, and that they were complied with as exactly as 
was possible, and that we constantly kept the course I 
have described. I shall also trouble the court with 
further examinations on the same head. 

“ That we carried all the sail in our power will be 
fully explained to the court, when I examine my offi¬ 
cers, to prove how greatly the Formidable had suffered 
in her sails and rigging. One of the principal impe¬ 
diments to our keeping up with the admiral, was our 
inability to bend our foretopsail till between seven and 
eight in the evening; the reason of which was stated 
to the court, both by Captain Bazeley and the master 
of the Formidable; and if it shall be necessary, it may 
be further inquired into, when I call them and my 
other officers. 

“ In the course of the evidence against me, it has 


352 


COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XL 

been attempted to impress the court with an idea, that 
the Formidable was damaged in sails and rigging little 
more than the ships in general, and not more than the 
Victory. But the court will consider and decide on 
the truth of this insinuation, when all the particulars of 
our damages are related by my witnesses. In the mean¬ 
time, it may not be improper to remind the court, how 
very improbable it is, from a comparison of our much 
greater loss in killed and wounded, than the rest of 
our fleet experienced, that we should not have suffered 
more in other respects. It fell to the lot of my division 
to have the greatest share of the action, in consequence 
of which we had more killed and wounded than Ad¬ 
miral KeppeFs and Sir Robert Harland’s divisions 
together; and the Formidable had not only more killed 
and many more wounded than any other ship , but 
even had singly , within two , as many killed and 
wounded , as all the ten ships of Sir Robert Har land's 
division collectively. 

u My enemies have laid much stress on its being so 
long before the Formidable was refitted, as if we had 
been tardy and dilatory. But I am confident, that the 
testimony of my officers, when they are examined, 
will evince the contrary; and that every possible effort 
was made to repair our damages in the shortest time. 
If the time, for which we were so employed, should 
appear long, the court will please to consider the many 
circumstances which concurred against us. The For¬ 
midable, I may safely say, had suffered in the action 
more than any other ship; and as we came last out 
of action, we consequently began to repair later. The 
time was still further protracted by our wearing imme- 


353 


1779 .] THE DEFENCE. 

diately to stand towards the enemy again, and con¬ 
tinuing to keep the men at quarters in expectation of 
an immediate renewal of the action; so that we did 
not begin to refit, till we came again to the starboard 
tack, and joined the admiral. We were also under 
other singular disadvantages, which retarded our re¬ 
fitting, when it did commence. The boatswain was 

killed in the action, which must be allowed to be a 

/ 

capital loss on such an occasion in the repair of sails 
and rigging, those being in his particular department. 
I was deprived of all use of three of my lieutenants; 
for one was wounded in the action, and two were 
so extremely ill, that, notwithstanding the greatest 
anxiety to be upon duty during the action, they were 
absolutely incapable of coming upon deck. It unfor¬ 
tunately happened too, that there was not one person 
on board the Formidable, either officer or seaman, who 
was in her when she was fitted out, or knew how the 
boatswain’s stores were stowed. Having all these diffi¬ 
culties to struggle with, we could not have refitted the 
ship so soon as we effected, if I and my officers, with 
the men, had not all submitted to the most fatiguing 
exertions, without the least remission till late at night ; 
nor could the business of the repairs have been pro¬ 
perly directed, if, by my desire, Captain Bazeley had 
not, after the action, left the quarterdeck to attend 
on the forecastle, where our principal damage was re¬ 
ceived, and by his personal activity and superinten¬ 
dence there, endeavoured, as far as was possible, to 
prevent the inconveniences from the loss of the three 
lieutenants and the boatswain. 

u Some have attempted to make use of the circum- 

2 A 


354 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

stance of the Formidable’s wearing twice, and sheer¬ 
ing out of the way of other ships to my disadvan¬ 
tage ; and to persuade the world from her being so far 
manageable in this respect , that she was manageable 
for every other purpose; and therefore, that this was 
a proof of her not being so disabled in her sails and 
rigging as I represent. But I appeal to the experience 
of sea-officers, whether a ship, with any sail set in mo¬ 
derate weather, will not easily wear, or when going 
large, as easily sheer out of the way of other ships, 
though not able to keep way with another ship car¬ 
rying more sail than she is capable of setting , which 
was the case of the Formidable with respect to the 
Victory. 

“ Another adverse attempt has been made to show the 
position of the Formidable, when she became to wind¬ 
ward of the admiral, to have been such, that by bear¬ 
ing away, she might at any time have fetched into her 
station. One or two of the officers of the Victory have 
accordingly placed me in or near the wind’s eye of my 
station, saying, that they saw me almost on the Vic¬ 
tory’s beam. But none of them pretend to have set 
the Formidable by compass; and they have been most 
positively contradicted by Captain Bazeley and the 
master of the Formidable; both of whom have tes¬ 
tified that she was left by the Victory at the distance 
of three miles, and about three points on the Victory’s 
quarter, and one mile to windward of her wake, which 
together, throws me a mile and a half astern of my 
proper station in the admiral’s wake. They will be 
confirmed in this by my other officers, and are more 
likely to be accurate in their observation; because it 


THE DEFENCE. 


355 


1779 .] 

was their business to regulate the motions of my ship 
by those of the Victory, and they had my orders to 
keep the latter a little open on the former’s lee bow; 
whereas those, from whom they differ so widely, had 
no particular reason to be nicely attentive to the rela¬ 
tive position of the two ships. Captain Marshal also, 
who appears to have been generally very accurate in 
his observations, corroborates the position of the For¬ 
midable, as described by my officers, where he ex¬ 
plains the relative situation of his own ship, in respect 
to the Victory and Formidable, when the Fox was sent 
with the message to me. But what still further ex¬ 
poses the extravagance of placing me in the wind’s eye 
of my station is, its being contradicted by Admiral 
Keppel and Rear-admiral Campbell. The former is 
very vague in describing my position. But as nearly 
as I can understand him, his remark from the couch 
does not tend to make me more than four points on 
the Victory’s weather-quarter; which, in effect, agrees 
with Mr. Campbell’s account. Such being their idea 
of my position, it differs only one point from the ac¬ 
count of my officers; for the latter place me three 
points on the Victory’s weather-quarter, and it im¬ 
ports little to my defence, which are most correct, 
when it is considered that whether I was three or four 
points on the Victory’s weather-quarter, I was in either 
case far astern of my station in the admiral’s wake, and 
consequently, could not fetch up to it, except the Vic¬ 
tory had shortened sail, or till I was able to set more 
sail than the Victory. It will scarce be objected, that 
I should have bore down into the admiral’s wake 
before I had got up the length of my station. But lest 

2 a 2 


35G COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XL 

it should, I submit to the court, that as the admiral 
did not bring too, but was constantly increasing his 
distance, it was officer and seaman-like to keep to wind¬ 
ward of my station, till I could get near the length of 
it, and was able to preserve it when recovered. The 
course I steered to reach the length of my station, if it 
could have been effected, would have brought me 
within half a mile to windward of it; and bearing 
down into the admiral’s wake sooner, would have 
been both an interruption to the ships already formed, 
and acting contrary to the signal for the line then 
flying, which, being more commanding than the other, 
controled it. 

“ I have been so long in vindicating myself against 
the charge of disobedience imputed to me, for not being 
able to keep my station according to the signal for 
the line, that I am very unwilling to trouble the court 
with any other remarks on this part of my case. But 
the unrelenting invention and ingenuity of my enemies 
compel me to request a little further indulgence on the 
same point. From the purport of some parts of the 
evidence, I can plainly see, that it is intended to lead 
the court to consider me as the cause of increasing my 
distance from the Victory. 

“ One mode of encouraging such a supposition is, that 
we continually kept close to the wind, whilst the 
Victory was going large. But the real fact is far other¬ 
wise. The course of the Formidable was south the 
whole afternoon, which was a point or two from the 
wind. Our log so states the course; and it will be 
corroborated by the testimony of my officers. The 
Victory’s log falsely represents her to have laid to from 


THE DEFENCE. 


357 


1779 .] 

one to four o'clock; and this falsehood was acknow¬ 
ledged by her master on the late trial . But during the 
rest of the afternoon, her log describes her to have 
steered south, two points from the wind, till seven in 
the evening, when she is made to go south-south-east 
two miles, and afterwards to haul close to the wind. 
This shows that we steered the same course as the ad¬ 
miral, and so furnishes an answer to the vague and 
contradictory account of our always hugging our wind. 
The truth is, that we never kept close to the wind, but 
always steered with the admiral in the same direction, 
a little under our lee, which led us after him on the 
same course with him, and without altering our position 
from him, except by an increase of distance ; and even, 
if we had been inclined to hug the wind, as is suggested, 
the bad state of our braces and bowlines would not 
have allowed it. The nearest we kept to it, was a 
short time after the admiral’s passing us to leeward, 
which was done, as I have mentioned before, that 
the Bed division, when they passed under our stern 
to occupy the rear, might have room to effectuate 
their movement, without any interruption from the 
Formidable. 

“ Another objection, aiming at the same conclusion, 
is deduced from a comparison of the Victory’s log with 
the Formidable’s, as to the rate of sailing. The rate 
marked in the Formidable’s log, from four in the after¬ 
noon, is, for the first hour, two knots two fathoms; 
from five to six, three knots; and from six to seven, 
three knots four fathoms. The Victory’s log for the 
same hours is uniformly two knots each hour. From 
this difference the argument attempted is, that my ship 


358 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

out-sailed the admiral’s; and therefore that it was my 
fault if I did not keep up to the length of my station. 
On the supposition that the two logs were accurately 
marked, and that there was no evidence to impeach 
their correctness, I am not afraid to acknowledge, that 
there would be force in this reasoning. But this would 
be a dangerous example, if courts-martial should give 
implicit credit to the marking of log-books; more par¬ 
ticularly, when the attention is necessarily so much 
otherwise engaged, as it must have been at the time 
in question, when we had been in action with the 
enemy, and still continued in sight of them for further 
engagement. A man must be little accustomed to 
naval engagements, who in such critical and busy mo¬ 
ments expects great accuracy in marking either the 
rates of a ship’s sailing, or any other particulars; and 
what commander of a ship would be safe, if his life 
and honour were to be decided upon by such an un¬ 
certain and fallible test? Former courts-martial have 
been so aware of this, that, though it is usual to call 
for log-books to inspect them, they are not in strictness 
considered as evidence ; and so Admiral Byng was told 
at his trial. But notwithstanding log-books should for 
the present purpose be received as admissible evidence, 
the danger of being much influenced by their contents 
will be the same ; and in the particular instance of the 
Victory’s log, besides the general objection, many spe¬ 
cial reasons occur to dissuade relying upon it. None 
have pretended, that her log was hove, so that the rate 
of sailing is mere guess. The log describes the Victory 
to have laid to in the afternoon of the 27th from one 
o’clock till four; during which important hours, nei- 


THE DEFENCE. 


359 


1779 .] 

ther the rate of sailing nor the course is marked. But 
the master, and other officers of the Victory, at the 
trial of Admiral Keppel, and now, acknowledge that 
she did not once lie to in any part of that afternoon; 
and this fact is also acknowledged by Admiral Camp¬ 
bell. The Victory’s log makes the second time of 
hoisting the signal, for ships to windward to bear down 
into the admiral’s wake, half an hour after four. But 
though exactness as to the time of hoisting this signal 
the second time, is of great consequence to a proper 
understanding of the transactions of the day, yet the 
time is grossly misstated; for it has been proved by 
the written minutes taken on board the Arethusa, and 
the concurrent testimony of Captain Marshal, and his 
purser, that the real time was thirteen minutes after 
six. Again, the Victory’s log mentions that the signals 
for the Prince George and Bienfaisant to chase the 
three French ships, were made at four in the morning 
of the 28th, and that they were called in at nine, which 
supposes them to have been chasing five hours. But 
it is notorious from the evidence at the late trial, and 
it appears from Captain Macbride’s evidence on 
the present one, that these two ships were called in 
within half an hour after the signal for chasing was 
made. These errors and falsifications, whether inno¬ 
cently introduced or not, are sufficient to destroy the 
credit of the Victory’s log-book. But there is yet a 
great deal more to impeach its authority as to the rate 
of sailing. Though the Victory’s log marks the rate 
to have been uniformly two knots from four o’clock till 
ten at night, yet Admiral Campbell impliedly admit¬ 
ted that the rate was something greater, when he said 


360 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

he did not believe that the Victory went above three or 
three and a half k?iots any part of the time. This 
shows, that he considers her rate of sailing as under- 
marked. The log of the Foudroyant, which ship the 
captain proves to have been in her station next astern 
of the admiral from three in the afternoon, nearly cor¬ 
responds with the Formidable’s log, as to rate of sail¬ 
ing; and, therefore, if the Foudroyant’s is not over¬ 
marked, the Victory must be under-marked. The mas¬ 
ter of the Victory and others represent the weather in 
the afternoon of the 27th to have been squally and 
unsettled, though not blowing hard. But is it likely, 
that the Victory, under so much sail as she is described 
to have had set, and during the hours she was going 
two points from the ivind , should not go more than 
two knots an hour? At seven the Victory hauled her 
wind, and kept close to it all night, and till eight car¬ 
ried the same sail as when going from the wind. But 
still her log allows two knots an hour, as if she went 
as fast with much less sail by a wind , as when she 
ivas going with more sail from the wind . All this 
shows, how unsafe it is to trust to the rate of sailing 
marked in the Victory’s log-book. But I do not mean 
to have it understood, that the Victory’s log is the only 
inaccurate one. Probably the rate of sailing in the 
Formidable’s log was marked with equal incorrectness; 
and if we suppose her log to have been as much over¬ 
marked as the Victory appears to have been under- 
marked^ this, with the circumstance of the Formid¬ 
able’s bad steering from want of headsail, will account 
for the difference between the two logs, and reconcile the 
admiral’s outsailing me. At the same time, I do not 


THE DEFENCE. 


361 


1779 .] 

found any argument in my favour on so uncertain a 
basis, as an entry of tlie rate of sailing made on guess 
and random calculation, in the hurry after an engage¬ 
ment. My view is to resist any argument on either 
side from so dangerous a source, and to draw the atten¬ 
tion of the court to the strong evidence of the corres¬ 
pondent course of the Victory and Formidable, and 
that unerring test, the fact of the admiral's increasing 
the distance , notwithstanding my steering the same 
course , and carrying all the sail in my power . 

u The next article which I conceive to be intended 
as a charge against me, after the signal for the line, and 
that for bearing down into the admiral’s wake, the 
first time of hoisting, is the latter signal, the second 
time it was made. Mr. Keppel, in his defence on the 
late trial, says, that this last signal was made a quarter 
before five . His log made the time half an hour after 
four; and Mr. More, who assisted the admiral’s secre¬ 
tary, spoke on the late trial to the same time as the 
log . Mr. Campbell is still more early in point of time, 
he having in effect said, that the blue flag was hoisted 
again within a few minutes after being hauled down, 
which makes the second time of hoisting the blue flag 
to have been before four . But all these representa¬ 
tions are now proved to be contrary to the real truth : 
each being very remote from it, but Mr. Campbell’s 
most extravagantly so. For fixing this point beyond 
a doubt, I am obliged to Captain Marshal, his purser, 
and the mate of the Arethusa, examined at the late 
trial; all of whom swear to the blue flag’s not being 
hoisted the second time, till thirteen minutes after six , 
and found themselves on the written minutes taken 


362 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

at the time; Captain Marshal, when asked the ques¬ 
tion upon oath, whether the blue flag was flying be¬ 
tween thirty minutes after three and thirteen minutes 
after six, adding an answer in the negative. This also 
is a very operative detection of the false statement of 
tiane by the admiral and his officers. It relates to a 
very material signal, it being the first made for coming 
into the admiral's wake , which could have the least 
application to me ; and as it was the first signal or no¬ 
tice for enforcing my compliance with the signal for a 
line, it demonstrates, that even the admiral himself 
did not expect me or my division to be in a condition 
to get into our station till after six. That he did not 
look for me or my ships sooner is also apparent, from 
his filling my station with the Red division, till more 
than half an hour after five: even Sir Robert Harland’s 
captain having informed the court, that it was not till 
that time, that Sir Robert received the message for 
quitting the rear and re-occupying his proper station. 
Whether the position of the Vice of the Red’s division, 
whilst in the rear, was or was not such as absolutely 
to exclude my division, till the former had left it, is a 
nicety scarce worth contending with Mr. Keppel; be¬ 
cause its being occupied by Sir Robert Harland is not 
the reason I give for being to windward and astern of 
my station; but I only advert to the fact to corrobo¬ 
rate, what I infer from the late hour of the first en¬ 
forcing signal for calling me into the line. In respect 
to my conduct on seeing the signal for coming into the 
admiral’s wake, I obeyed it to the extent of my power- 
I repeated it, and I continued those efforts for fetching 
the length of my station; in which I had been so assi- 


THE DEFENCE. 


363 


1779 .] 

duous before, that there was no room for further exer¬ 
tions. The former will be proved by my officers, and 
is indeed allowed by the witnesses against me. What 
the impediments were, which prevented the latter, 
particularly our inability to set the foretopsail till be¬ 
tween seven and eight, I have already explained at 
large. 

a In less than half an hour after the second time of 
hoisting the blue flag or signal for bearing down into 
the admiral’s wake, the pendants of particular ships 
of my division were added to the blue flag. These 
pendants were repeated on board Captain Marshal’s 
ship at thirty-six minutes after six; and immediately 
on being seen, they were repeated on board the For¬ 
midable. Had the admiral thought the ships of my 
division in a condition to come into their station in 
the line sooner , why did he delay hoisting their pen¬ 
dants till so late an hour f It is also observable, 
that the pendant of the Formidable was not amongst 
those hoisted. 

u Next comes the message to me from the admiral 
by Captain Windsor in the Fox; and as my enemies 
have made the supposed disobedience of it so frequent 
a topic of accusation, it is necessary, that I should 
consider the circumstances relative to it in a very par¬ 
ticular manner; in doing which I must be deluded 
by the most unaccountable misapprehension and error, 
if I am not able to falsify the story about this message 
almost from beginning to end. To examine all its parts 
with the minuteness, which is requisite to disappoint 
the unwarrantable inferences from it, I beg the atten- 


364 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

tion of the court to the time of sending the message , 
the time of its being delivered , and the words of it. 

u Admiral Keppel in his defence on the late trial, 
asserts, that he sent the message at five o'clock. Cap¬ 
tain Windsor, who carried it, and other witnesses, have 
sworn even to an earlier time. But they are all falsi¬ 
fied by the concurrent testimony of Captain Marshal, 
Mr. Graham, his purser, Mr. Cawsey, mate of the Are- 
thusa, and the written minutes of the purser taken 
when the signals were repeated; —evidence which Mr. 
Keppel himself cannot controvert with any grace, after 
the great encomiums he has so justly passed upon the 
extraordinary accuracy of Captain Marshal in repeat¬ 
ing signals. If Captain Marshal, his two officers, and 
the minutes in writing taken by his direction at the 
time, are to be depended upon, more than other wit¬ 
nesses speaking from their mere recollection, the sig¬ 
nal for the Fox to come within hail of the Victory to 
receive the message, was not made till thirty-two mi¬ 
nutes after five , that is, above half an hour after it is 
represented by Mr .Keppel, his officers, and Captain 
Windsor, to have been delivered. If Captain Marshal, 
whose station was three miles to windward of the Vic¬ 
tory's beam is to be credited, Captain Windsor could 
not have less than that distance to go before he could 
come within hail of the Victory to receive the message, 
and must have been half an hour in going to her; 
and the written minutes taken under the direction of 
Captain Marshal prove, that Captain Windsor did 
not arrive within hail of the Victory in less than half 
an hour; for they take notice, that the signal for the 


THE DEFENCE. 


365 


1779 .] 

Fox was hauled down at three minutes after six. 
These facts together demonstrate, that the time of 
Admiral Keppel’s sending the message was, not at 

Jive or a little before, but a little after six. -Mr. 

Keppel, speaking on his oath , has said, that he called 
the frigate, which carried the orders to Sir Robert 
Harland to go to his proper station in the van, and 
which was the Milford, at the same time that he called 
the Fox to carry the message to me. This leads to 
fixing five as the hour of sending the message by the 
Fox. But Admiral Keppel is most directly contra¬ 
dicted by Captain Marshal and his purser also speaking 
on oath, and their written minutes; according to which 
the Milford’s signal was made ten minutes before four, 
and hauled in thirty-three minutes after four; but the 
Fox’s signal was not made till thirty-two minutes after 
five, and not hauled in till three minutes after six. In 
other words, instead of Mr. Keppel’s sending these two 
frigates at or about the same time, there was a differ¬ 
ence of an hour and a half between despatching them. 
This striking error in antedating the despatch of the 
message by the Fox one hour and a half may, as I 
can plainly see, be convenient to the plan of my de¬ 
struction. But how it is otherwise to be accounted 
for, is the business of Mr. Keppel to explain. I hope ? 
for his own sake, that he confounded the Proserpine’s 
signal with the Milford’s. The Proserpine’s was hoisted 
twenty-two minutes after five, and hauled in two mi¬ 
nutes after six; as appears from the same written mi¬ 
nutes taken on board the repeating frigate. This 
brings the Proserpine and Fox within hail of the Vic¬ 
tory one minute after each other. But unfortunately 



366 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XL 

for Mr. Keppel, the Milford, and not the Proserpine, 
was the frigate sent with the orders to Sir Robert 
Harland; nor can Mr. Keppel avail himself of the 
apology I have thus created for him, without sacrific¬ 
ing the credit of Captain Windsor, Captain Berkeley, 
Lieutenant Bertie, and those officers of the Victory, 
particularly Admiral Campbell and Mr. Rogers, who 
have as positively fixed sending the Fox at a so much 
earlier time in the afternoon; nor without acknow¬ 
ledging the truth and accuracy of the officers of the 
F ormidable. 

“ The time of delivering the message sent by the 
Fox, is falsified in the same extraordinary way, as the 
time of sending it. Captain Windsor, who carried the 
message, swore at the late trial, that he came within 
hail of the Formidable, and delivered the message to 
me nearly about half an hour after five; and being 
questioned at the present one to the same point, he re¬ 
peated the same words. But the court is in possession 
of that which abundantly proves, that Captain Windsor 
is still grossly erroneous in speaking of time. It is al¬ 
ready shown, that he did not receive the message till 
after six ; and he allows he was half an hour in getting 
to the Formidable, which, without more, renders his 
delivery of the message to me at about half an hour 
after five impossible. But other circumstances concur 
to disprove the evidence of Captain Windsor in a still 
greater extent. He allows himself only half an hour 
to carry the message. But the Formidable is proved 
to have been three points on the Victory’s weather- 
quarter, and three miles distant; and Captain Wind¬ 
sor acknowledges, that to fetch the Formidable, he 


THE DEFENCE. 


367 


1779 .] 

made a circuit , going to leeward of all the ships 
of the centre division , which were formed astern of 
the Victory, and was forced to change his tack . All 
this so increased the space he had to traverse, that, 
though he went six or seven knots as he calculates, 
it must have required considerably more than an 
hour before he could reach me. This postpones the 
time of delivering the message till between seven 
and eight in the evening, and corresponds with the 
account of my officers; who are all positive, that 
the Fox did not come within hail of the Formid¬ 
able till near or about sunset , which on the 27th of 
July, and in the latitude of Ushant, where we then 
were, is a a little after half-past seven. Other cor¬ 
roborating proofs that this was the time I received the 
message, are, that we had repeated the blue flag the 
second time of its being hoisted, which was at thirteen 
minutes after six; and that we had also repeated the 
pendants of particular ships of my division, which, by 
Captain Marshal and the written minutes taken on 
board his ship, were not hoisted till thirty-six minutes 
after six , a considerable time before the Fox hailed us. 
It is further ascertained by the circumstance of our not 
being able to bend our foretopsail till a little before 
eight; in doing which, both Captain Windsor and 
Lieutenant Bertie observed us to be employed, whilst 
the Fox was near the Formidable. Thus from the 
evidence of Captain Marshal, whose most justly dis¬ 
tinguished accuracy as a repeater of signals the court 
has heard such warm encomiums upon; from the 
written minutes taken on board his ship at the time; 
and from a combination of circumstances, not gleaned 


368 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER [CH. XI. 

without great labour and difficulty out of the great mass 
of evidence on the late and present trial; the result is, 
that a message sworn to have been delivered to me at 
half-past Jive, was not really delivered till half-past seven. 
How material the error of two hours in stating this mes¬ 
sage is, will strike every one who hears me, when it is 
recollected what an influence time has on the supposed 
import of the message. If the message was delivered at 
half an hour after five, it might not have been too late 
to re-engage, had such been the admiral’s intention, and 
other circumstances independent of time did not ob¬ 
struct him. But at a quarter of an hour after seven 
in the evening, that is, a quarter of an hour before the 
message reached me, it is confessed by Mr. Campbell 
to have been so late, that the admiral had then given 
up all thoughts of re-engaging. 

H There is almost as great a disagreement about the 
words of the message, as about the times of its being 
sent and received. According to Captain Windsor, 
Lieutenant Bertie, and the officers of the Victory, the 
message delivered to me imported, not only that the 
admiral wanted the ships of my division to come down 
into his wake; but further, that it extended to me as 
well as the ships of my division, and that he waited for 
me to renew the action. The first part of the message 
I acknowledge receiving. But I deny that the message, 
repeated to me, mentioned either me, or the waiting^/or 
me to re-engage; and the few on board my ship, who 
were present when it was delivered, agreed with me in 
their account of it; for they say, that it was simply con¬ 
fined to the admiral’s wanting the ships of my division. 

“ On this contrariety of evidence about the words 


THE DEFENCE. 


369 


1779 .] 

and import of tlie message, it is tlie office ol the court 
to decide, who are best entitled to belief, and which of 
the two representations carries with it most appearance 
of probability. 

u But it may not be improper to submit to the court 
some few considerations, against yielding to the seem¬ 
ing weight of evidence, for the terms of the message, 
as it is stated against me. 

u The witnesses, who have spoken so positively to 
mentioning, that the admiral waited for me to re-engage, 
stand convicted of the grossest errors in their relation 
both of the times of receiving the message, and of the 
time of delivering it; in the former more than one hour , 
in the latter, more than two hours. They own too, 
that they speak the words entirely from memory , never 
having committed them to writing. But how can the 
court safely trust to the frail memory of persons thus 
exceedingly erroneous, as to the time of the message, 
for the words of it, in preference to those, against whose 
testimony no such objection lies? 

u The admiral was not waiting for me; nor had he 
been waiting any part of the afternoon; but, as Ad¬ 
miral Keppel acknowledges, the Victory had been the 
whole afternoon under the same sail, which was more 
than the Formidable could carry, till her foretopsail 
was bent, which was not till about eight o’clock. How 
improbable it is, that Admiral Keppel should send 
a message to tell me that he was waiting for me, when 
he was not waiting ! As it has been asserted, that he 
had been waiting for me and my division the whole af¬ 
ternoon to re-engage, and so early as half an hour after 
four was become wearied with fruitless expectations, 

2 B 


370 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CII. XI. 

what was the reason, that no enforcing signal was made 
either for me or my division, till thirteen minutes after 
six? Why were the signals for particular ships of my 
division postponed till thirty-six minutes after six? As 
I judged, it would have been unreasonable to expect, 
that my division, which had suffered so particularly in 
the action, and were latest out of it, should be fit to 
take their stations in the line sooner; and from his 
conduct in not making their particular signals till more 
than half an hour after six, it seems as if the admiral 
was of the same opinion. If the admiral was dissatis¬ 
fied with not seeing these last signals immediately com¬ 
plied with, why did he not express his disappointment 
by going a step further, and making signals for them to 
make more sail ? In respect to my ship, the particular 
signal for it was never made. But if my being out of 
the line was so unaccountable to him at half an hour 
after four, why did he omit to make my particular 
signal two hours after , when he called in the ships of 
my division]? If he was so impatient to re-engage, and 
I was the obstacle, would not making my particular 
signal have been a more expeditious way of informing 
me, than sending a message which took up more than an 
hour in carrying ? If he meant to be delicate, as he 
professes, would not the silent and disguised censure 
of a strong signal have been equally expressive, yet 
more delicate than the harsh and coarse language of a 
trimming message ? If the object of the message to 
me was to renew the engagement, why was he so long 
before he sent it, that it could not reach me till con¬ 
siderably after the latest time in the evening fixed by 
himself and his friends for another action ? 


THE DEFENCE. 


371 


1779 .] 

u Other circumstances which operate against the 
idea of an intention to re-engage in the afternoon of 
the 27th, and consequently against a message to that 
effect, might be enlarged upon; such as suffering the 
van division to occupy my post next the enemy till 
after five; the late hour of the Red division’s resuming 
their proper station in the van; the improbability of 
meaning to renew the engagement with my disabled, 
unrefitted, and still dispersed division, instead of Sir 
Robert Harland’s fresh and collected ships; and the 
incomplete forming of the centre division even after 
six. But it would be almost endless to pursue these 
topics; and therefore I hasten to a more decisive indi¬ 
cation of the designed import of the message, I mean, 
Admiral Keppel’s own comment. 

“In Admiral Keppel’s public letter about the en¬ 
gagement, he declares that he allowed the French to 
reform their line in the afternoon of the 27th, with an 
expectation that they would try their force with us the 
next morning . Is not this language an avowal by 
Mr. Keppel, that the next morning was the time he 
had in view for re-engaging? The log-book of the Vic¬ 
tory is of the same tendency; for it takes notice of 'pre¬ 
paring to renew the engagement at daylight the next 
morning; but is without one syllable about renewing 
the action the preceding afternoon. When it was first 
inserted in the public prints, that the message to me 
was to signify that the admiral waited for me and my 
division to renew the action, I appealed to Mr. Keppel 
to protect me against so cruel a misrepresentation; 
asking him whether it was possible, that he ever 
should send me such a message; and though he de- 

2 b 2 


372 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CII. XI. 

dined doing me the full justice I expected, yet lie 
would not say that he had sent such a message, but 
replied in these remarkable terms, lam told that such 
words were used. But if he had been convinced, that 
such was the message, would he have hesitated avow¬ 
ing it, would he have referred to the report of other 
persons? His language upon oath is of the same unde¬ 
cided, ambiguous kind. He will not say that he sent 
that message. He cannot trust to his own remem¬ 
brance of it. He cannot exactly recollect the words. 
He leaves the labour and hazard of recollection to his 
own officers; particularly to Admiral Campbell, whose 
ill offices I have experienced in a great variety of in¬ 
stances. But whatever the terms of the message were, 
whether it was for my division to come into their sta¬ 
tions, or whether it was that the admiral waited for 
me and my division to renew the engagement, I trust, 
that I shall be found to have done all that could be 
expected at the very late hour I received it. What¬ 
ever might be the admiral’s intention, when he sent the 
message to me, it did not come to me till after that 
time was passed, at which Rear-admiral Campbell con¬ 
fesses, that the admiral had relinquished every idea of 
a further engagement till the next day. Convinced 
that a night engagement was not the object of the 
admiral, it only remained for me to continue my efforts 
for completing the repairs of the rigging, more espe¬ 
cially in setting my foretopsail; in which I was so success¬ 
ful, as to get into my station in the line, and to be quite 
ready for action again before daylight in the morning. 

“ As to sending a message to inform the admiral of 
my inability to get the length of my station, making a 


373 


1779 .] THE DEFENCE. 

signal of distress, or shifting my flag , they did not 
strike me at the time as either necessary or applicable 
to the circumstances under which I acted; nor do 1 
yet know of any reason, which, on a review of my 
situation the evening of the day of the engagement, 
should induce to such an opinion. But I have already 
expended so much time in my observations on the 
subject of the message, that I find myself forced to 
postpone the particular reasons, which may evince the 
propriety of my not adopting either of those measures, 
till the close of the examination of my witnesses, when 
I hope to be indulged by the court with a hearing 
of such further remarks, as shall then appear neces¬ 
sary for my final justification. 

“ After the message, I know of only two other articles 
hinted at against me, which require the least notice; and 
in respect to them very few words will be necessary. 

“ One is, that I did not carry my distinguishing 
lights the evening of the 27th. But my witnesses, par¬ 
ticularly some whose business it was to attend the 
lights, will prove the fact of my carrying all of them. 
When this matter was first questioned, I really thought 
it probable that the topliglit was not kept burning; 
because I recollect being told of some difficulty about 
it from a wound the lantern had received in the 
action, and that I observed it was of no great con¬ 
sequence. But I gave no orders to countermand any 
of the lights; and always took for granted, that my 
stern light was kept burning the whole night. 

“ The remaining article relates to the situation of 
my ship at daybreak the morning of the 28th. Sir 
Charles Douglas, from an observation he made at the 


374 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

dawn of day, conceives that he then saw my ship 
greatly ahead of my station in the line. But though I 
have not the least doubt, that he says what he believes 
to be the truth, yet I am persuaded, he must have mis¬ 
taken some other ship for mine. In the course of the 
trial I shall examine some witnesses to prove that I 
really was astern of the admiral at the time, when it is 
supposed that I had got ahead of him. 

a I now draw near to a conclusion for the present, 
having only to remind the court in what light Admiral 
Keppel viewed my behaviour on the two days, to 
which the court’s inquiries are limited, before the com¬ 
mencement of those differences, from which the pre¬ 
sent trial originates. 

“ The day but one after the action I visited the ad¬ 
miral on board the Victory. He received me with his 
usual marks of regard, friendship, and confidence, 
without the most distant hint of being dissatisfied 
with the least part of my conduct. On the contrary, 
he communicated to me the draft of a letter he in¬ 
tended to send to the Admiralty, either the same or 
one very little different from that afterwards published 
in the Gazette. He discoursed with me on several 
parts of the letter; and when he came to the part in 
which he praises Sir Robert Harland and me by name 
for our spirited behaviour , he said, that he thought it 
best to mention it in a general way without particu¬ 
larizing; and this came from him in such a manner, 
that I thought he alluded to my ship’s having been so 
much more engaged, and having suffered so much 
more than Sir Robert Harland’s. Is it possible, that 
Admiral Keppel should be capable of so much dupli- 


THE DEFENCE. 


375 


1779.] 

city , as to have thus commended me in a public letter 
in the same ample manner as Sir Robert Harland, and 
to have thus communicated with me on the subject of 
it, if he had then entertained the least ill opinion of 
any part of my conduct? In this court Mr. Keppel, 
being on his oath, endeavoured to qualify his commen¬ 
dation of me by narrowing it to my behaviour in time 
of action , and spoke as if his letter was so expressed. 
But the letter itself contains no such qualification; and 
I did not wonder to see him under embarrassment , 
when he so disingenuously endeavoured to control 
the effect of his open praise, by having recourse to 
secret and mental reservation. Soon after we arrived 
at Plymouth, Mr. Keppel received a letter from the 
secretary of the Admiralty, which contained his Ma¬ 
jesty’s approbation of my conduct repeated in Mr. 
Keppel’s own words, and expressed to be founded 
upon his representation. This letter was also shown 
to me by Admiral Keppel. Before we left Plymouth 
for the second cruise, he wrote a second letter to the 
Admiralty, in which he once more includes me in the 
praise and commendation of the officers under him. 

“ After such unqualified and deliberate acts of ap¬ 
probation of my conduct on the 27tli of last July from 
Mr. Keppel, as I have here enumerated, it will be 
difficult for him to account for his present censures of 
my conduct on the same day, without either fixing on 
himself a charge of the greatest duplicity , or of suf¬ 
fering his evidence on oath to be influenced by the 
spirit of anger and revenge. 

a Here, gentlemen, I close my defence for the pre¬ 
sent, surrendering both my life and honour into the 


COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. 


376 


[cil. XI. 


hands of the court, with a full assurance that I shall 
meet with the same protection from you as each would 
expect from his brother officers in a like situation; and 
that you will not allow truth and innocence to be 
made a sacrifice to the clamour and noise of party , or 
to the prejudiced testimony of persons avowedly acting 
from the dictates of private malice. 

“ Gentlemen, I will detain you with only one sen¬ 
tence more. My mind sees no medium between life 
with entire honour , and death without; and I ardently 
wish that your judgment, be what it will, may be di 
rected by the same alternative. 


Evidence for the Defence 

Captain Bazeley was again called in. 

Q. “ How near was the nearest of our ships to the 
Formidable ahead and astern at the time of our going 
into action.” 

A. “ The nearest ship ahead, a good half mile, and 
the ship next astern a mile, to the best of my judgment 
and recollection.” 

Q. “ After the Formidable was wore in the rear of 
the enemy, were there any preparations for renewing 
the action on board the Formidable?” 

A. “ Officers and ship’s company were immediately 
ordered to quarters.” 

Q. “ How near were we at the time to the enemy?” 

A. u About random shot.” 

Q. “ Were there any shots fired at the Formidable at 
that time?” 

A. “ After the helm was a weather, and the ship in 



THE DEFENCE. 


377 


1779.] 

tlie act of wearing, two or three shots were fired at her 
from the sternmost ship of the enemy’s rear.” 

Q. “ From the circumstances you described relative 
to the Formidable when examined by the court the 
other day, I would now ask you under these circum¬ 
stances whatever messages might have been sent to the 
Formidable, or whatever signals were made, was it 
possible for the Formidable to have got into her sta¬ 
tion in the line?” 

A. “ It was impossible, unless the admiral had short¬ 
ened sail to give us that opportunity.” 

Q. “ Was it safe to have set more sail upon the fore¬ 
mast sooner than it was done?” 

A. “ By no means safe in any respect whatever.” 

Q. Were any of the lieutenants of the Formidable 
so ill as to be unable to come upon deck on the 27th 
of J uly.” 

A. “ The fifth and sixth lieutenants were so ill as 
not to be able to go to quarters, the second lieutenant 
was wounded in action, and the boatswain was killed. 
The loss of the assistance of three lieutenants and the 
boatswain retarded the refitting of the ship, and that 
very sensibly, having but very few petty officers in the 
ship that ever were in the service before, and no man 
in the ship that knew where any part of the boat¬ 
swain’s stores were stowed.” 

Q. “ Did the men on board the Formidable behave 
with great spirit and good order?” 

A. “ Every praise is due from me to the officers 
and seamen in the Formidable for their spirited beha¬ 
viour in action, and their attention to their duty in re- 


378 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

fitting tlie ship, without having one single moment to 
refresh themselves, till after the ship was refitted at 
ten o’clock at night.” 

Q. “ Did I express any anxiety during the after¬ 
noon and the night for getting the ship refitted, and 
getting up with the admiral?” 

A. “ Very anxious both in the afternoon and in the 
night, and to my knowledge, till after ten o’clock, the 
vice-admiral was never off the deck for fifteen mi¬ 
nutes, from after the time the fleet tacked together at 
ten o’clock in the morning till ten o’clock at night. I 
never left the deck myself, therefore I can speak to it 
positively.” 

Q. u Did I desire you to go upon the forecastle 
yourself in the afternoon, and why?” 

A. “ I received the vice-admiral’s orders to go for¬ 
wards on the forecastle to attend the refitting of the 
fore part of the ship, and he said he would undertake 
himself, assisted by two lieutenants, to attend to the 
rigging and other matters that wanted refitting about 
the main and mizen masts. At times I went aft from 
the forecastle to the quarterdeck.” 

Captain James Kinneer late first lieutenant of the 
Formidable, corroborated Captain Bazeley’s evidence: 
he stated u that after passing the enemy’s line, the 
Formidable wore, and that the sternmost of the 
enemy’s ships fired upon the Formidable while she 
was wearing, that the officers and men were ordered 
to their quarters in expectation of going again into 
action, and that three ships drew out of the French 
fleet and pointed towards the Formidable.” 


THE DEFENCE. 


379 


1779 .] 

Daniel Guerin, midshipman of the Formidable, 
stated, “ I remember the Fox frigate coming under 
the Formidable’s stern near sunset, and heard Captain 
Windsor say that Admiral Keppel desired Sir Hugh 
Palliser’s division to bear down into his wake, and I 
heard Sir Hugh answer, 4 Very well, very well; I have 
made the signal for that purpose.’ I was close to Sir 
Hugh Palliser in the upper stern gallery.” 

William Rhodes, captain’s clerk of the Formidable, 
said, 44 I remember the Fox coming under the Formi¬ 
dable’s stern in the evening of the 27th of July as the 
sun was going down. I was on the quarterdeck, and 
stepped into the captain’s cabin to attend to the mes¬ 
sage, supposing he had one to deliver. The captain of 
the Fox said, 4 it was the admiral’s desire that the ships 
of your division should bear down into his wake;’ the 
word was desire and not order. You answered 4 very 
well, very well, I have repeated the signal for that 
purpose.’ You were standing at that time in the cap¬ 
tain’s stern gallery—the upper stern gallery.” 

The court asked, 44 Did you hear the vice-admiral 
return any other answer or message to the Fox than 
you have already related?” 

u I heard no other message but what I have related: 
it was very well, very well, and that he had repeated 
the signal for that purpose. I further recollect that it 
struck me at the time that several of the ships had 
bore down before the message was delivered, as I 
noticed on the quarterdeck.” 

The reading of Admiral Keppel’s despatch, giving 
an account of the action of the 27tli of July, and com- 


380 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

mending the spirited conduct of Vice-admiral Sir 
Hugh Palliser, closed the defence; when the follow¬ 
ing additional observations were delivered by the 
prisoner. 

u Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the Court, 

“ The examination of my witnesses being now con¬ 
cluded, I entreat that the court will permit me to add, 
to the defence I have already offered, some consi¬ 
derations, which either have not yet been submitted to 
your attention, or have not been enforced so fully as 
their importance may require. I feel, how much I have 
already exercised the patience of the court; and there¬ 
fore I am extremely averse to intruding any further 
matter upon them. But I have so much at stake on 
the issue of this trial, and the activity of my enemies 
has been so conspicuously exerted to fix blame upon 
me, even where I deemed my innocence most invul¬ 
nerable, that should I, from a dangerous excess of con¬ 
fidence, pass over any points, however immaterial 
they may sometimes have appeared to me, which my 
enemies have essayed to strain into importance, my 
silence might be misunderstood, and a conviction of 
the obviousness of the subject might be suspected to 
proceed from a dread of investigation. 

“ Many questions have been asked about the prac¬ 
ticability of my shifting my flag; and it is to the ho¬ 
nour of the court, that thay have been so assiduous in 
examining to a point, on which my enemies have so 
often laboured to ground a censure of me. In my last 
address to the court I only spoke generally to this head. 


THE DEFENCE. 


381 


1779 .] 

But I will now open my mind upon it witli particu 
larity. 

“ The imputation for not shifting my flag refers to 
the twenty-fifth article of the fighting instructions, the 
words of which are, that c if any flag ship be disabled, 
the flag may go on board any ship of his own squa¬ 
dron or division.’ 

a By this instruction it is clearly optional in the flag 
officer to shift his flag or not, according to circum¬ 
stances; and in my situation the afternoon and even¬ 
ing of the day of action, so foreign and inapplicable 
did the instruction appear to me, that I own, nothing 
could be more distant from my thoughts at the time, 
than the idea of shifting my flag; for which I submit 
to the court’s better judgment the following reasons. 

“ The battle was over and the signal for battle 
hauled down; the immediate renewal of the action by 
the admiral, when I had wore close to the enemy, 
having been declined, for prudential reasons, the pro¬ 
priety of which I have no right here to call in question. 
—We were not pursuing an enemy, nor steering to¬ 
wards one. But the admiral, as he describes his own 
motion in respect to the French, had wore and laid his 
stern to them. On first describing this manoeuvre, 
which the admiral stated to have been for collecting 
the ships, he styled it an appearance to run away. 
But recollecting himself, he afterwards, on the judge 
advocate’s reading these latter words, well observed, 
that it was better to omit them in the minutes; and his 
wishes were complied with.—The enemy was not 
coming to attack us , but was forming to leeward of our 
fleet.—I knew, that my ship would be refitted and 


382 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CII. XI. 

ready for action by daylight next morning; and every 
motion of the admiral indicated to me, that he did not 
intend to re-attack before the morning. My reasons 
for this opinion were many, and are already before the 
court. In substance they are, the Red divisions leaving 
the rear between five and six; the uncollected and un¬ 
refitted state of my division at that time and during the 
rest of the afternoon till night; the incomplete forming 
of the centre division; the distance of the French fleet 
from us; the late hour of the Red division’s getting into 
their station ahead; and the admiral’s never shortening 
sail, till eight o’clock in the evening, to give the For¬ 
midable and Vengeance, and other crippled ships, the 
opportunity of collecting and gaining the length of their 
stations in the line. These circumstances, it should 
also be recollected, received the strongest confirmation 
from the admiral’s public letter, and the Victory's log - 
book. Besides, to the shifting of my flag many things 
would have been essential. I must have shortened 
sail, and laid to, which would have thrown me at a 
much greater distance from my station. We must have 
new-reeved all the tackle-falls, and repaired all the gear 
necessary for hoisting our boats; which would have 
retarded the work going on for setting more sail. The 
ship, to which I should have shifted my flag must also 
have laid to, and this would have kept her more astern 
and out of her station. The moving from one ship to 
the other, with my signal colours, necessaries, and at¬ 
tendants, is an operation, which would have required, 
as I conceive, some considerable time. 

u All this being considered, shifting my flag might 
have produced great inconveniences, by increasing the 


THE DEFENCE. 


383 


1779 .] 

Formidable’s distance from her station, and also keeping 
another ship out of it. But I know of no good pur¬ 
pose, which could have been answered. Nor do I con¬ 
ceive, that our naval history will furnish an instance of 
a flag-officer’s shifting his flag under such circum¬ 
stances. 

“ As to the signal for the line’s being out, it is far from 
necessarily proving an intention of immediate renewal 
of the action. The inference in this respect from a 
line depends on circumstances. If the admiral had 
been standing with his fleet towards the enemy, I 
agree that the indication would have been strong in¬ 
deed ; and, as in that case I certainly should have con¬ 
cluded, that his object was to hasten on an engagement 
before night; so, without doubt, I should have been 
forward to insure my having a proper share of the 
glory of a second action, either by endeavouring to 
bear down to engage the first ship of the enemy I 
could have fetched, or by shifting my flag; of which 
measures I should have preferred the one, which would 
have been likely to bring me into action soonest and 
most effectually. This assertion, I expect, the more 
credit in; because it is in proof, that, early in the af¬ 
ternoon of the day of action, though my ship came last 
out of the engagement, and was the most damaged, yet 
I wore so instantly, and so closely to the enemy, that 
my ship was nearer to the French fleet to renew the 
fight, than the Victory or any other ship of our fleet. 
But the admiral was not standing towards the enemy. 
He had put his stern to them; and there were all the 
other indications I have already described to show, that 
the line was forming, not for an immediate renewal of 


384 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CII. XI. 

tlie fight, but to collect all the ships for action early the 
next morning. And here I beg leave to take notice of 
a circumstance, which corroborates my idea of the ad¬ 
miral’s intention. At the late trial I proposed it as a 
question to a witness; whether, from the motions of 
the admiral, and his public letter, the witness did not 
infer, that there was no intention to re-engage till next 
day. The admiral strenuously resisted the putting such 
a question; and the court over-ruled it. This circum¬ 
stance will be found in page 33 of the trial printed by 
authority. But I do ask, whether any thing could 
more evince the admiral’s consciousness of the sense 
conveyed by his own words, than such a dread to hear 
the construction of them ? 

“ In the course of the trial, it has been asked, whether 
I made any signal of distress. The twenty-second 
article of the fighting instructions explains what this 
signal is; and then the twenty-third article points out 
how other ships are to act, when such a signal is made 
by flag-ships, and it is thus expressed: c If the admiral or 
any flag-ship should be in distress and make the usual 
signal, the ships of the fleet are to endeavour to get as 
close up into a line between him and the enemy as they 
can, having always an eye to defend him, if the enemy 
should come to annoy him in that condition.’ But 
taking these two articles together, I submit to the court, 
that they are only applicable to flag and other ships, 
which meet with some material disaster during battle, 
and when hard pressed by the enemy; as is plain from 
the terms, which suppose, either an enemy to be actually 
attacking, or to be at least advancing for the purpose. 
The situation of the Formidable was not of this kind; 


THE DEFENCE. 


385 


1779 .] 

for, though she was so much astern, and to windward 
ol her station, she was far from being within the mean¬ 
ing of the signal, the enemy not making the least at¬ 
tempt to annoy her after she had joined the Victory } 
but on the contrary being more to leeward of the For¬ 
midable than the body of our own fleet. 

“ In respect to sending a frigate to the admiral, to 
inform him of our not being able to keep up with him, 
I had no frigate to send till about eight o’clock, as must 
appear to the court from the evidence of Sir William 
Burnaby; which shows, that early in the afternoon the 
Milford, being the frigate belonging to my division, was 
called to the Victory by signal, and was employed by 
the admiral. But if she had not been so employed, I 
know not for what purpose I should have sent her to 
the admiral; for I concluded, that the condition of the 
Formidable was so apparent as to make a message un¬ 
necessary; especially as lie omitted to throw out my 
ships pendant with the pendants of the ships of my 
division. 

“ I shall now take a short notice of some few other 
things, as they severally occur to me. 

“ I had brought to the remembrance of the court 
many striking acts of approbation of my conduct by 
the admiral, for the sake of contrasting them with the 
criminating tendency of his evidence to this court. 
There wanted nothing more to expose such inconsis¬ 
tency; nor did I look for more. But chance has 
thrown other matter in my way. Sir William Burna¬ 
by’s account of the admiral’s sending his compliments 
to me, and of the conversation about me the day after 
the engagement, is a new proof, how well satisfied he 

2 c 


386 


COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

was with my conduct at that time. If he had thought 
me disobedient, would he have been so eager in send¬ 
ing his compliments to me, or so ready to exclaim with 
a sort of feeling for me, that I had received more da¬ 
mage than any of the fleet ? 

“ It gave me singular satisfaction to see, how clearly 
the proofs of my having my distinguishing lights burn¬ 
ing in the night after the action came out at last. The 
two men, who had the care of the lights, swore with 
so much particularity and so convincingly, that, all 
doubts apparently vanished in the minds of those who 
heard their evidence. My obligation to the honest 
simplicity of these men is very great; because by con¬ 
firming the less positive testimony of other witnesses, 
it takes from my enemies a topic of abuse, which was 
so long slighted by me, and so industriously circulated 
to mislead the public opinion concerning me, that it 
had at length grown into a serious accusation. 

“ I am also glad that it has been in my power to pro¬ 
duce positive testimony of the repetition of the signals ; 
particularly the signal for the line, whilst I was within 
my station. Very impartial persons have, I believe, 
entertained a doubt on this head. But I flatter myself 
that it is entirely removed. I was myself quite certain 
that the signals were repeated; because I was par¬ 
ticularly observant of signals the whole day; and if I 
thought, that the fact was still doubted, I should be in¬ 
duced to call a witness, who could speak very positively 
to the point of signals, but stands in such a relation to 
me, and has been so constantly attendant on me in 
court, that I am not willing to call him, unless there is 
an absolute necessity. 


THE DEFENCE. 


387 


1779 .] 

“ The dangerous state of the foremast of the For¬ 
midable, which was the great impediment to our car¬ 
rying sufficient sail to keep up with the admiral, is a 
point of great importance to the clearing my character 
from the imputation of not using my utmost endeavours 
to preserve my station. I was therefore very anxious 
to give the court the fullest explanation on this head; 
and though the carpenter spoke confusedly, in respect 
to the time when he first knew of the rottenness of the 
mast, yet my captain and the lieutenant, who attended 
on the forecastle, have given such ample testimony of 
our having known of the rottenness of the mast at the 
time, that I trust the fact cannot be doubted by any 
unprejudiced person. I well remember being informed 
of the condition of the mast, and the anxiety I was un¬ 
der from the consequential delay in bending our fore¬ 
topsail. 

“ On the trial of Admiral Keppel, much animad¬ 
version was made on log-books. But in the course of 
the present, it has appeared, how very little dependence 
is to be had upon entries in them, of transactions in the 
time of actual engagement, or during the busy mo¬ 
ments of preparing for further action. If I was dis¬ 
posed to retaliate on those, who have heretofore made 
such such ill-natured remarks on the log-books of par¬ 
ticular ships, the logs of Admiral Keppel’s and Sir Ro¬ 
bert Harland’s ships, and the examinations of their 
several masters, furnish ample scope for the severity of 
animadversion. But it is not requisite for my defence 
to say more, than that I trust the court will not allow 
my innocence to be affected by such uncertain and con¬ 
tradictory records. 


2 c 2 


388 COURT-MARTIAL ON PALLISER. [CH. XI. 

“ In the course of Admiral Keppel’s evidence, he took 
care to disclaim being an accuser, and to thank God 
that he was not so. But did the tenour of his evidence 
correspond with this declaration? Was not his evi¬ 
dence criminating in almost every part ? Have not he 
and his friends all joined in the accusation of me ? 
Have they not sealed their accusation with their tes¬ 
timony upon oathf Shall the open accusation of 
others, however growing out of self-defence never be 
forgiven; and a secret accusation, vainly attempted to 
be sustained by the accuser’s oath, escape all censure ? 
—It is not fit, that I should pursue the comparison 
further. Let the hearts of those who hear me feel the 
rest. 

“ It is now time to leave the court to their own judg¬ 
ment of the case before them. If I have omitted any 
thing material, their wisdom and humanity will supply 
it. If I am mistaken in any of my facts, or in my rea¬ 
soning upon them, their candour will correct the error, 
without hastily imputing to me an intentional mis¬ 
representation. 

“ Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the Court, 

“ To conclude, I flatter myself that, as at first, Ad¬ 
miral Keppel’s commendation of me, procured me the 
approbation of my sovereign; so your honourable ac¬ 
quittal of me, now , will dissipate the cloud of preju- 
judice, and restore me to the good opinion of my 
country.” 


The sentence of the court was as follows: 

“ At a court-martial assembled on board his Majesty’s 



THE SENTENCE. 


389 


1779 .] 

ship the Sandwich, in Portsmouth Harbour, the 
12th of April, 1779, pursuant to an order from the 
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 3d 
day of April, 1779, and directed to George Darby, 
Esq., Vice-admiral of the Blue, and second officer in 
the command of his Majesty’s ships and vessels at Ports¬ 
mouth and Spithead, and held by adjournment every 
day afterwards (Sundays excepted), till the 5th of 
May following, for the trial of Vice-admiral Sir Hugh 
Palliser, Bart., viz.: 

“ The order aforementioned having been accom¬ 
panied with the original minutes of the proceedings of 
the court-martial lately held for the trial of the Ho¬ 
nourable Augustus Keppel; and reciting that it ap¬ 
pears by the said minutes that several matters were 
given in evidence at the said trial respecting the con¬ 
duct and behaviour of Vice-admiral Sir Hugh Palliser 
on the 27th and 28th of July last, which demand 
strict examination: the court proceeded to examine 
witnesses touching the said several matters, and to try 
him for the same; and having maturely considered the 
whole—also what the prisoner has alleged in his de¬ 
fence, together with what has been given in upon 
evidence in support thereof—are of opinion that his 
conduct and behaviour on those days were in many 
respects highly exemplary and meritorious ; at the 
same time cannot help thinking it was incumbent on 
him to have made known to his commander-in-chief 
the disabled state of the Formidable, which he might 
have done by the Fox at the time she joined him, or 
by other means. Notwithstanding his omission in that 
particular , the court are of opinion he is not in any 


390 


THE SENTENCE. 


[CH. XI. 

other respect chargeable with misconduct or mis¬ 
behaviour on the days aforementioned, and therefore 
they acquit him, and he is hereby acquitted accord¬ 
ingly.” 

The president having received the vice-admiral’s 
sword from the marshal, delivered it to him, address¬ 
ing him in the following words: 

“ Sir Hugh Palliser, I feel the highest gratification 
in being authorised by this court to return your sword, 
which you have hitherto worn with so much profes¬ 
sional reputation, and which I trust will soon be 
drawn again in the honourable defence of your 
country.” 


1779 .] 


CORRESPONDENCE. 


391 


CHAPTER XII. 

SIR HUGH PALLISER APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF GREEN¬ 
WICH HOSPITAL-HIS DEATH AND CHARACTER. 

Palliser tenders his Services Afloat—Appointment to Greenwich Hos¬ 
pital—Returned for the Borough of Huntingdon—Proceedings in Par¬ 
liament—Fox’s Motion on the Subject of Palliser’s Appointment—The 
Animosity of Fox and Burke—Their Attempts to run down and ruin 
Sir Hugh Palliser—Fox’s unprincipled Public Conduct — Bentham’s 
Character of Fox—His Motion on Palliser’s Appointment—Replies of 
Lord North, Lord Mulgrave, and Commodore Johnson, to Mr. Fox’s 
Attack on Palliser—Palliser’s Address to the House—His Observations 
on the Ungenerous Conduct of Burke—Majority against Fox’s Motion 
—Palliser retires from Public Life—The King’s Attachment to Pal¬ 
liser—The Royal Family Palliser’s frequent Guests at Greenwich— 
Palliser receives the Princess Caroline at his House on her Arrival, pre¬ 
vious to her Marriage—The Death of Sir Hugh Palliser—His private 
and professional Character. 

1779 to 1796. 

It would appear from the following letters, that upon 
his acquittal, Sir Hugh Palliser tendered his services 
afloat, and that he experienced a very natural feeling 
of disappointment, when the administration, after this 
honourable triumph over the malicious designs of 


392 


CORRESPONDENCE. 


[CH. XH. 

their common enemies, did not at once, boldly and 
openly, mark their sense of his just merits, and of the 
infamy of the false and treacherous assailants of his 
character, by restoring him the offices of distinction 
and profit which he had nobly resigned, that the aban¬ 
donment of his hard-won honours might allay the 
madness of the mistaken multitude, who in their blind 
delusion had plunged the metropolis into riot and 

confusion for several successive davs. 

%/ 

Sir Hugh Palliser to Philip Stephens , Esq. 

“ Abbey, near Scarborough, 

“ 30th June, 1779. 

“ Sir, 

“ I desire you will acquaint my Lords Commissioners 
of the Admiralty, that I think it my duty to offer to 
serve at this, and at any time, and anywhere their 
lordships’ may please to command. 

“ I am, Sir, 

“ Yours, &c. &c. 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 


Sir Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich . 


“ Pall Mall, August 13, 1779. 

“ My Lord, 

a I have seen Lord North this morning, and repeated 
my request for continuing or being restored to the ma¬ 
rines. His lordship received me civilly, but that was 
all. I could not draw one word from him in reply to 
my prayer, so that if his Majesty has no remains of 


CORRESPONDENCE. 


393 


1779.] 

consideration for me on account of my past services 
and my present sufferings—and I have no advocate with 
his Majesty—I must submit to the most trying and 
mortifying treatment from friends as well as enemies, 
that ever man experienced; all proceeding from having 
done my duty well, justified myself against attacks, 
and brought before the public the true causes of the 
miscarriage of our fleet against an inferior force—the 
first instance of the kind—and which I am now con¬ 
vinced proceeded from motives that I could not sus¬ 
pect it possible to have existed in that quarter, until I 
distinguished myself on that occasion in action against 
the enemy, when deserted and left, I am now satisfied 
intentionally, in order to be sacrificed. I never sus¬ 
pected that I had an enemy; yet from that moment, 
strange but true it is, that I lost all my friends. The 
first instance, I believe, of an officer being degraded 
and suffering—especially in this country— for behaving 
in a distinguished manner in action, and I hope for 
the sake of his Majesty’s service, that I shall be the 
last example of that disgraceful kind. 

“ I must endeavour to reconcile myself to my hard 
fate, and to forget every thing but your lordship’s 
friendship and kindness to me, which time can never 
erase from the memory of, 

u My Lord, 

u Your lordship’s most obedient and 
u Most humble servant, 

“ Hugh Palliser.” 

“ After this unbiased testimony in favour of a brave 
man,” observes Beatison in allusion to the sentence, “ it 


394 fox’s attack on [ch. xii. 

might have been reasonably expected that this dis¬ 
agreeable affair would have come to an end, and that 
the spirit of resentment would have dropped; but quite 
the reverse was the case. When Sir Charles Hardy, 
Governor of Greenwich Hospital died, his Majesty con¬ 
ferred this office upon Sir Hugh Palliser as a recompense 
for his services and the sacrifices he had made, and 
during the prorogation of parliament, a vacancy hap¬ 
pening by death for the borough of Huntingdon, Sir 
Hugh was elected. 

“ He had not long taken his seat, when an attack 
was made upon the ministers for conferring on him 
the governorship of Greenwich Hospital, and Mr. Fox 
addressed the house in a speech of considerable length 
and bitterness, directed against the First Lord of the Ad¬ 
miralty, for the appointment of Sir Hugh to this office, 
who had been convicted, he said, of preferring a ma¬ 
licious and ill-founded charge against his superior 
officer. This speech was answered by Lord North. 
As soon as he sat down, Sir Hugh Palliser rose, and 
delivered one of the ablest performances that was 
ever heard within the walls of the House of Com¬ 
mons.”* 

Fox on the occasion referred to by the historian, as 
on other occasions when the unhappy events of Kep- 
pel’s command, and his dispute with Palliser, became 
the subject of discussion, displayed in his rancour 
and false representations, that recklessness of moral 
principle when a favourite object of his ambition was 
to be achieved, or one exciting his antipathy to be 


* “ Beatison’s Naval and Military History,” vol iv., p. 438. 


SIR HUGH PALLISER. 


395 


1779 .] 

trampled upon, which darkened the many other noble 
features of his distinguished character. Partiality for 
his relative, Admiral Keppel, or zeal in the cause of 
his party, remembering even the latitude of question¬ 
able conduct which politicians assume in the encom- 
passment of their ends, without being supposed to incur 
the responsibility of a sacrifice of honour, can scarcely 
justify the efforts of Fox to reach the goal of his anxie¬ 
ties—the destruction of the ministry—over the ruins of 
a tried and faithful officer’s reputation. But the glitter 
of his practised eloquence, banded with the dazzling 
oratory of Burke,—his coadjutor in this and other 
scenes of political detraction, ere the days of Burke’s 
apostacy from his principles and his party,—faded be¬ 
fore the stern simplicity of truth on the lips of the 
honest, unflinching seaman, and in this infamous attempt 
to mislead the judgment of his hearers, and tarnish the 
reputation of a man, to whom honour was dearer than 
life, Fox was repulsed with the ignominy which justice- 
loving Britons are wont to cast upon the studied tra- 
ducer, no matter how brilliant or deluding the diction 
in which his slander may be couched. 

Perhaps the public character of Fox was never more 
faithfully portrayed, than in the few lines at the com¬ 
mencement of a letter from Jeremy Bentham to Sir 
James Mackintosh. The earnest philosopher writes to 
his friend then in India. 

“ Alas ! while the propitiatory incense was lighting 
up, the idol—Fox—was no more. Peace be to his 
ashes !—My expectations of him were never sanguine. 
He was a consummate party leader; greedy of power, 
like my old friend Lord Lansdowne,—but, unlike him, 


396 bentham’s character of fox. [ch. xit. 

destitute of any fixed intellectual principles, such as 
would have been necessary to enable him to make, to any 
considerable extent, a beneficial use of it. lie opposed 
the Grenville act; he opposed the Irish Union: Pitt, 
or any body else in power, might have made him op¬ 
pose any thing by adopting it. I knew not where to 
find him—and if I understand right, no more did any 
body else. Like that of a lawyer, his wish was to see 
all waters troubled;—Why? as feeling himself, in so 
superior a degree, a master of the art of fishing in them. 
Since your leaving England, three opportunities of 
being made known to him presented themselves to me : 
two by relatives of his when he was in the zenith of 
his power, were often expressed or implied;—I closed 
with neither. Had he any thing to say to me, I would 
have heard it with the respect due to his character; 
having on my part nothing to say to him, I should 
have considered the time spent in his company as so 
much time thrown away. Dr. Parr, in his kindness, 
under the notion I suppose, of doing me a service, took 
pains to throw me in his way, or draw down upon me 
the light of his countenance. He seemed disappointed 
at observing me as indifferent to his living idols, as 
Shadracli and Meshech were to the golden one of 
Nebuchadnezzar. Had I seen any opening for enter¬ 
taining any such expectations from him in respect of 
the cleansing of the Augean stable, as I should from 
you if you were in his place, I should have cried Lord ! 
Lord ! till he had been tired of hearing me.”* 

In the course of the discussion on the navy esti- 


* “ Bowling’s Memoirs of Bentham.” 


PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 


397 


1780.] 

mates, December 4, 1780, Mr. Fox rose, and asked 
bow was tbe navy to be expected to flourish, when 
the person convicted of having preferred a false and 
malicious charge against his superior officer, and who 
was barely acquitted when tried by a court-martial, 
upon charges exhibited against him, was promoted to 
a post of distinction, of honour, and of profit; and here 
he begged leave to say he did not blame that person: 
it was the First Lord of the Admiralty who was to 
blame, who ought to be made the subject of that 
house’s inquiry. What had been said formerly when the 
accusation was first preferred against his honourable 
relation Admiral Keppel, but that the accuser was the 
instrument—the Admiralty the principal? It was at¬ 
tempted to be denied on the part of the Admiralty; 
but what would men say, when the accuser, after 
being pronounced by the sentence of one court-mar¬ 
tial, a false and malicious accuser, and being barely 
acquitted by the other, was rewarded with an office of 

high honour and great emolument? What had been 
the accuser’s own sense of his conduct immediately 

after the first sentence was pronounced? Had he not 
resigned his seat at the Admiralty board? Mr. Fox 
concluded, after more observations and assertions, by 
saying, “ that an inquiry into the appointment of Sir 
Hugh Palliser ought to be brought on as soon as pos¬ 
sible.” 

Lord North said, “ that as the honourable gentle¬ 
man had suggested, whenever an inquiry into the con¬ 
duct of the Admiralty was brought, either on the pre¬ 
sent grounds or on any other, he would not attempt to 
hurry it by taking refuge under any form of the house, 


398 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

or by any shifting of the question whatever. With 
regard to the present threatened inquiry, the sooner it 
was brought on the better. The honourable gentleman 
had declared he rested his reasons for thinking an in¬ 
quiry necessary in the present case, principally on the 
sentence of the court-martial which tried Admiral 
Keppel, and in which sentence, the person who pre¬ 
ferred the charges against Mr. Keppel, was pronounced 
a false and malicious accuser. As the honourable gen¬ 
tleman meant to bring on an inquiry, he would not go 
into a very ample discussion of that point now; he 
would only say what he had before said more at large, 
and would say more at large again. The court was 
convened for the purpose of trying Mr. Keppel and 
not Sir Hugh Palliser; the court-martial had a regular 
charge submitted to their consideration and decision 
against the one; they had no charge whatever against 
the other. In pronouncing sentence, therefore, upon 
the motives of the accuser, they had exceeded the 
line of their duty, and had condemned a man unheard, 
who had no opportunity of entering upon his defence. 
He was ready to avow his share of the measure in 
appointing Sir Hugh Palliser to Greenwich Hospital, 
and to defend and support it in that house, or wher¬ 
ever it should happen to be agitated. The honourable 
gentleman had dwelt upon the sentence of the court- 
martial which tried Sir Hugh and termed it a bare 
acquittal. He saw the matter in a very different point 
of view, and he read the sentence with a widely dif¬ 
ferent construction. If he understood the meaning of 
the word meritorious, according to its true acceptation, 
it was, that an officer whose conduct had been de- 


1780.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 399 

dared, after a most strict inquiry into it, to have been 
highly meritorious, was an officer who deserved re¬ 
ward, and that exemplary conduct meant, such con¬ 
duct as was an example to other officers, and a fit 
object of imitation. 

“ Under this, which appeared to him to be the true 
and natural reading of the sentence, Sir Hugh Palliser 
was undoubtedly an object of reward, and after his 
conduct had been declared highly meritorious and ex¬ 
emplary, the administration would have been crimi¬ 
nally neglectful not to have given him reward.” This 
his lordship emphatically declared, was his opinion of 
the case; he avowed fully, and was ready to stand or 
fall by it. “ Let gentlemen,” he said, “ recollect the 
peculiar circumstances that made Sir Hugh Palliser’s 
acquittal more than commonly honourable to him. 
Let them call to mind the art that was used to get the 
public in a flame against him previous to his trial, the 
great pains that were taken to run him down, to ren¬ 
der him the object of universal indignation! Let gen¬ 
tlemen call to mind also, what was the language of 
even the other side of the house on the subject of his 
impending trial. A gentleman (Mr. Burke), of great 
eloquence, not at present in the house, exclaimed, 

4 Don’t send Sir Hugh Palliser to his trial; for God’s 
sake have mercy! Men’s minds are so inflamed 
against him, that his judges cannot surmount their 
prejudices.’ The honourable gentleman has used some 
very fine words against the administration, which, 
were they true, are very strong, but unfortunately 
there was not the least truth in them.” 

Sir Hugh Palliser rose immediately after Lord 


400 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

North, and said, “ I did not call the honourable gen¬ 
tleman, Mr. Fox, to order, though he gave me sufficient 
cause for it; because I would not appear afraid to hear 
any thing he might say at any time, or in any place, 
or on any ground he might wish to attack me. I am 
not surprised at the attack now made upon me. After 
such harsh reflections and high menaces, as are said to 
have been uttered, concerning me in this house, whilst 
I was absent, it was scarcely possible that my enemies 
should decline all censure of me when present. 

“ Thus, foreseeing that there would be an attempt to 
raise a new storm against me on my first re-entrance 
within these walls, and through me to excite new con¬ 
vulsions in the state, I am come, in some degree, pre¬ 
pared for resistance; and I earnestly entreat the com¬ 
mittee to grant me a patient hearing, whilst I offer 
some observation in behalf of the most injured cha¬ 
racter in the kingdom. Notwithstanding the extreme 
violence of the prejudices against me on the acquittal 
of Admiral Keppel, and the outrages which followed, 
I never so yielded to the impressions of adversity, as 
to be without the hope of finally obtaining justice from 
the voice of my country. It was this hope, with the 
consciousness of the rectitude of my conduct and in¬ 
tentions, which sustained my spirits throughout the 
succeeding unequal conflict; these encouraged me to 
persevere in the vindication of my honour at the im¬ 
minent risk of seeing that and my life sacrificed to 
the rage of party. Had I been in the least inclined to 
waive the contest, my enemies affected to be so mer¬ 
ciful as to give me a fair opportunity. They strongly 
expatiated on the cruelty of permitting a trial which, 


PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 


401 


1780 .] 

as they conceived, even on the supposition of innocence^ 
must from the universality of the prejudices against 
me, amongst my brother officers, terminate in my con¬ 
viction and death. They solemnly washed their hands 
of my blood. They tenderly declared themselves fully 
satisfied with my present sufferings; nay, to alleviate 
these, they were so compassionate, that though they pro¬ 
scribed me from the honourable line of my profession, 
they had no objection to my having an ample pension 
for my support in retirement. Such was the language of 
my enemies both in and out of parliament. But I did 
not hearken to it; I was neither terrified by their me¬ 
naces, nor soothed by their pretended kindness. The 
event of my trial confirmed me in the expectation, 
with which I had before consoled myself. My judges, 
proving superior to the influence of party, and the 
dread of unmerited unpopularity, discharged their 
office with determined impartiality; and the result was 
a sentence which I shall always think most honourable 

to me. In the introductory part of it, my judges de¬ 
clared, that ‘ my conduct and behaviour were, in 

many respects, highly exemplary and meritorious.’ 
Though too, the court had scrutinized into every part 
of my conduct, with an almost unexampled strictness, 
the only omission which could be suggested was, that 
I did not inform the commander-in-chief of the dis¬ 
abled state of the Formidable. But so far was the 
court from imputing this to a blameable cause, or 
from attributing the least ill consequence to it, that 
they stated it in dubious and reluctant terms, simply 
pointing it out as a matter of opinion; and having so 

2 D 


402 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CII. XII. 

done, they concluded with an c absolute acquittalF 
Indeed, had I conceived that there was a probability 
of imputing such an omission to me, I should have 
been more full in my explanation on this head. I did 
take notice that the signal of distress in fighting in¬ 
structions was not applicable; and that the condition 
of the Formidable was so apparent, as to make any in¬ 
formation from me unnecessary. I also noticed that I 
had no frigate by which I could send information; the 
Milford, which was the only frigate of my division, 
having been taken from me by Mr. Keppel early in the 
afternoon. But I might have advanced several steps 
further, to obviate the idea of omission. Till the 
Fox reached me between seven and eight at night, 
Mr. Keppel’s own conduct did not leave me the least 
room to suppose him ignorant of the Formidable’s ina¬ 
bility to reach my station in the line; for he not only 
did not make any enforcing signal to signify his expec¬ 
tation of seeing my division in the line, till thirteen 
minutes after six, when the signal for coming into his 
wake was hoisted the second time; but also, on put¬ 
ting out the pendants of several ships of my division 
at half an hour after six, he did not think fit to make 
my pendant one of the number, whence I concluded 
that he knew my condition, and therefore did not ex¬ 
pect me. In respect to afterwards sending information 
by the Fox, if I had thought it necessary, I had not 
the opportunity, the Fox having separated from me 
before I could finish what I had to say to her captain. 
What other means I could have devised to send an 
explanation to Mr. Keppel, time enough to answer any 


1780.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 403 

purpose, I am still to learn. But all this is not of im¬ 
portance to me. The terms in which the omission is 
stated, with the acquittal which follows, sufficiently 
protect my character, being repugnant to the most re¬ 
mote idea of criminal imputation. 

“ Since my trial, I have patiently waited for the sub¬ 
siding of public prejudices; and so far as regards my 
exculpation from the charges for my conduct the day 
of engagement, I have reason to believe that the pro¬ 
ceedings on my own trial have opened the eyes of 
many; who, before they knew what was my defence, 
had been seduced into an injurious opinion of me; and 
I trust, that the more the grounds on which my judges 
acted are examined and understood, the more con¬ 
vincing the proofs of my innocence will appear. But 
still some unfavourable impressions continue to ope¬ 
rate against me, on account of my accusation of Mr. 
Keppel; and for this I have been blamed, even by 
some persons of great respect who were far from being 
indisposed to form an impartial judgment if they were 
furnished with the necessary materials. In this part of 
the case my ill fortune exposes me to the most embar¬ 
rassing disadvantages. On the one hand, there is a 
sentence acquitting Admiral Keppel, and declaring my 
charges malicious and ill-founded. But, on the other 
hand, the manner in which I was urged and driven to 
become an accuser, and the grounds on which I could 
have sustained my charges, are not only ill-understood, 
but in truth have never yet been explained by myself. 
The proper time for discussing this matter was, when 
Mr. Keppel was on his trial; but then the opportunity 

2 d 2 


404 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

was denied me. Tlie trial being closed, and a judg¬ 
ment of acquittal irrevocably pronounced, it might 
seem invidious and unbecoming on my part, to publish 
to the world, what I should have offered in support of 
my charges. Such a measure I have therefore de¬ 
clined hitherto, nor will I be ever induced to adopt it, 
by any thing less than its being authoritatively called 
for, or the most apparent impossibility of otherwise 
resisting the attempts to complete my ruin. But then 
the difficulty is, how to avoid such an extremity, 
without surrendering myself a quiet victim to the per¬ 
secuting spirit of my enemies. The leaders of them 
have been continually loading my name with re¬ 
proaches, and though some of them, on many accounts, 
have a title to much respect, yet even these so forgot 
manliness of character as to assail me with the most 
embittered eloquence in this house, when it was 
known that I could not be present to defend myself. 
Now, too, that I am present, they know the advantage 
they derive from my being unendowed with qualifi¬ 
cations for a popular assembly; and thence they are 
encouraged to recommence their attacks; though surely 
they cannot imagine that I shall sit still, without at 
least endeavouring to give a check to any aspersion 
aimed at me personally. Under these circumstances, 
should I continue acquiescing in these public attacks 
of my character, without any attempt to repel them; 
more especially at this time, when I am threatened 
with new efforts to keep me out of the service of my 
country; I should establish the credit of the misre¬ 
presentation, by which I deem myself so highly in- 


1780.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 405 

jured. Some explanation on my part is therefore 
immediately requisite, to disappoint my enemies of the 
final accomplishment of their designs. 

u It is not, however, my intention to revive the con¬ 
sideration of the past transactions relative to Admiral 
Keppel and myself, further than he and his friends 
shall compel me by their hostilities. I am well con¬ 
vinced, not only that very ill consequences have already 
arisen to the public service from the contest between 
that gentleman and me; but that new mischiefs will be 
generated, if the subject is renewed. Under this impres¬ 
sion, I think it incumbent on me to make great sacri¬ 
fices of my own private feelings, rather than administer 
the least pretence for any further discussion of the 
grievances of which the honourable admiral and I 
respectively complain. Therefore, on the present oc¬ 
casion, I shall avoid speaking to many points, in which 
my character is interested; and I shall keep within 
much narrower limits, than I should prescribe to my¬ 
self, if I aimed at the full defence of my conduct to¬ 
wards the honourable admiral who is opposed to me. 

“ The friends of the honourable admiral, in their 
invectives against me, seem to place their chief reliance 
on the sentence pronounced by his court-martial; I 
mean that part of the sentence which declares my 
charges 4 malicious and ill-founded This is the bitter 
spring, from which my enemies draw poison to impreg¬ 
nate their licentious declarations. 

44 If the admiral’s friends were content with appeal¬ 
ing to this sentence as a testimony of his innocence, 
I, on my part, for the sake of public tranquillity, would 


406 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

forbear all complaint and objections. But when the 
admiral, or his friends, aiming at a further persecution 
of me, apply that sentence to fix upon me the stigma 
of being a false and malicious accuser, I cannot ac¬ 
quiesce. The injury is too gross to be patiently sub¬ 
mitted to; as such, I feel, and will resist it. 

“ Sir, I can make many important objections against 
the proceedings of the honourable admiral’s court-mar¬ 
tial ; and so far as they affect me, I deny their autho¬ 
rity. Should my enemies persevere in their threatened 
motion, to disqualify me from the service of my coun¬ 
try, they shall find me ready to lay before this House 
a full and pointed explanation of all the hardships and 
irregularities, by which I conceive both the public and 
myself to be aggrieved; and I will undertake to prove 
my objections from the trial printed by authority of the 
court, and the one published by authority of the admi¬ 
ral himself. At present it would be premature to enter 
minutely into such a discussion, there being no motion 
before the committee to warrant it. But after having 
heard the sentence of Mr. Keppel’s court-martial, so 
loudly and indignantly pressed against me, I trust, that 
the committee will indulge me with some present ge¬ 
neral observations upon it. 

“ I might say of the sentence, that the part, which 
condemns me for malice, was extra-judical, and there¬ 
fore ought not to affect me; and, legally speaking, I 
should be justified. The court was not constituted to 
try me, or my motives. The honourable admiral alone 
was the subject of their jurisdiction. Whether he was 
innocent or guilty, was the only inquiry to which the 


1780.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 407 

court was competent; and so the court sometimes told 
me, when I put questions to the witness that related to 
my own conduct. 

u But for the present I will not further urge the 
court’s incompetence. The complaint, which I shall 
now enforce is for their not hearing me. As prose¬ 
cutor, I had clearly a right to observe upon the evi¬ 
dence ; I had a right to reply to the admiral’s defence. 
To observe upon the evidence and defence, after ex¬ 
amining witnesses to support it, is the right of every 
complainant, either by himself or counsel, in every 
court. I say this of my own country; but should I ex¬ 
tend the assertion to every other country in Europe, I 
should not run the risk of much contradiction or ex¬ 
ception. To hear observations from one party only, 
is contrary to natural justice, contrary to the practice 
of all courts I have heard of. That both parties should 
be heard, is as essential to justice in court-martials, as 
it is before other judicatures. The maxims of 4 Audi 
alteram partem’ is universal; it is the golden rule, for 
the guidance of all courts. But plain and obvious as 
this right of being heard is, I was opposed in it by the 
honourable admiral himself; and it was denied to me 
by his court-martial. Admiral Keppel objected to my 
being heard on the merits in any stage of the trials 
and the court yielded to the objection throughout. 

“ On the close of the evidence for the prosecution, I 
offered to address the court, and tendered a paper for 
that purpose; but the admiral instantly objected to my 
being heard, explaining himself to mean, that I had no 
right to make a speech on the merits in any stage of 


408 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

the case; and the court, without knowing what the 
paper contained, after some deliberation, resolved not to 
hear it. I then solicited to know, whether I should be 
at liberty to address the court on the close of the evi¬ 
dence on each side. The admiral repeated his objec¬ 
tions to my being heard on the merits in any stage, and 
emphatically said, that he would oppose it to the last 
minute . If the court had answered my question nega¬ 
tively, my intention was, to have protested against 
their proceedings, and declined any further attendance. 
But I was misled into a belief, that finally I was to be 
heard; for Admiral Montague, one of the court, de¬ 
clared, that when Admiral’s Keppel’s witnesses had 
been examined, he should be extremely glad to hear 
every thing the prosecutor had to say; and this decla¬ 
ration was not contradicted, or in any way disputed^ 
by the rest of the court. The fact, I now state, ap¬ 
pears only in the trial published by authority of Mr. 
Keppel; the words, which passed after the court’s re¬ 
solution not to hear my paper, having been ordered 
to be expunged from the judge-advocate’s minutes, 
though part of the matter expunged had been mi¬ 
nuted by the judge-advocate at my particular requi¬ 
sition. 

w After the defence, and the examination of the ad¬ 
miral’s witnesses, I again pressed the court for a hear¬ 
ing, and claimed a right to reply to the defence, and to 
observe upon the evidence; giving as an additional 
reason, that the defence was in great measure a re¬ 
crimination of me the prosecutor. But I was again in¬ 
terrupted by the admiral, who insisted that it was un - 


1780.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 409 

precedented; and I was again refused a hearing by the 
court, notwithstanding Admiral Montague’s promise to 
hear every thing that I should have to say. Thus the 
trial closed with a sentence, acquitting the accused, 
and condemning the accuser, after hearing the former, 
whenever he thought fit to address the court; but 
without once hearing the latter, either in support of his 
charges, or in justification of himself. 

“ Such are the extraordinary proceedings, on the 
authority of which I have been continually the sub¬ 
ject of popular declamation, both in and out of par¬ 
liament ; such is the sentence, on the basis of which an 
honourable member of this house has, I am told, pledged 
himself to impeach one of his Majesty’s ministers, and 
to give the final blow for my destruction. 

“ But before he becomes an accuser, with such a 
sentence for his sanction, the honourable gentleman 
may find it convenient to deliberate on the difficulty of 
justifying such an irregular proceeding as I have de¬ 
scribed. If he undertake the task, he will have many 
strange assertions to make, many embarrassing pro¬ 
positions to maintain; such as I cannot imagine any 
man, however confident, will presume to offer in this 
house. 

“ Will the honourable gentleman say that it is con¬ 
sistent with justice and impartiality to hear one party 
only ? 

“ Will he assert, that it is consonant to justice to hear 
every thing from the accused, and at the same time to 
refuse hearing any thing from the accuser ? 

“ Will he assert that an accuser has no right to be 
heard on the merits in any stage of a trial ? 


410 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CIL XII. 

u Will lie deny, that it is the practice of parliament, 
and of all our courts of justice, to hear accusers and 
complaints of every kind, by themselves or their coun¬ 
sel, on the merits? 

Will he allow, that if this house should impeach any 
of the king’s ministers, it will be justifiable in the House 
of Lords to refuse a hearing to those appointed to con¬ 
duct the impeachment? Or, will he say, that they 
would submit to be restrained to the examination of 
witnesses only ? 

“ Will he deny, that, since the era of the revolution, 
the twelve judges of England have subscribed their 
names to a paper, which solemnly recognises the right 
of the prosecutor to observe on the evidence, and reply 
to the defence in treason; or will he deny, that Lord 
Holt, the then chief justice of England, was one of 
those judges ? 

“ Will he deny, that the volumes of state trials prove 
a continual exercise of the same right, in crimes of 
every class and denomination; in those of the higher 
order, those of the middle order, and those of the 
lower one; as well in felonies and misdemeanours, as in 
treasons ? 

“ Will he deny, that the late lord chief justice of the 
common pleas, when solicitor-general, exercised this 
right towards a noble lord* now living; or that the 
present chief justice of the same court, apologised for 
not exercising it on the trial of the Duchess of Kincr- 
ston? 

“ Will he deny, that in Mr. Horne’s case, the pre¬ 
sent lord chief justice of England recognised the right 


* Lord North. 


1780.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 411 

of reply as too clear to hear argument, even though the 
accused, to avoid a reply, should decline offering a syl¬ 
lable of evidence ? or will he deny, that Mr. Horne’s 
defence was replied to by the present lord chancellor, 
who was then attorney-general? 

“ Will the honourable gentleman deny, that in all 
complaints and accusations by individual members of 
either House of Parliament, it is the constant practice 
to hear observations from, and to allow the reply to, 
the complainant; or will he deny, that a late member 
of this house exercised this right in the last session of 
parliament, on a very serious charge against a noble 
lord now near me ?* 

“ Will he deny that the judge-advocate, or any other 
person prosecuting, has a right to be heard at land 
courts-martial on the merits, when such prosecutor re¬ 
quires it ? 

“ Will he deny, that the prosecutors, who appear 
and demand to be heard on the merits, are heard at 
naval courts-martial and say that it is unprecedented f 
u Will he deny, that the captains, who accused Ad¬ 
miral Knowles, were heard in observation on the evi¬ 
dence, and in reply to his defence ? 

“ Will he deny that Admiral Knowles was heard in 
observation on the evidence, and in reply to his de¬ 
fence of his captains on four several trials ? 

u Can he name one instance of a prosecutor, who 
was refused to be heard by a naval court-martial, ex¬ 
cept the instance of myself at the trial of Admiral 
Keppel; or, if he can find such, will he say, that it is 


* Lord North. 


412 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

conformable to established practice and approved pre¬ 
cedents, and ought to be followed ? 

“ Will he assert, that it is just to condemn any man 
as a false and malicious accuser, without a trial or hear¬ 
ing of any kind; more especially in a case in which one 
part of the defence was a recrimination of the ac¬ 
cuser? 

“ Will he deny, that I am entitled to the benefit of 
that chapter of Magna Charta, which declares, 1 that 
justice shall be denied to none , that none shall be 
taken or imprisoned ', none shall be outlawed , none shall 
be banished , none shall be destroyed , unless by the law¬ 
ful judgment of his peers , or the laws af the land f 
“ Will he say, that it is not contrary to Magna 
Charta , contrary to justice , contrary to the law of the 
land , to condemn , to disqualify , to record me guilty, 
before I have been tried or heard ? 

“ Will he say, that it was right in Admiral Mon¬ 
tague to promise a hearing to me, and the court to ac¬ 
quiesce in it, and afterwards for the same judges to re¬ 
fuse me a hearing? Or will he undertake to produce 
one other example of such a conduct from any court of 
this country on a solemn trial? 

u Will the honourable gentleman assert, that if he 
should be an accuser of any minister, or any man, in 
this house, it will be justifiable to refuse hearing a 
speech from him on the merits, in any stage of his ac¬ 
cusation ; or that he ought not to be heard on close of 
the evidence for the accused? 

“ Will the honourable gentleman risk having it re¬ 
corded in the journals of this house, that, if he should 


1780.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 413 

ever be so unfortunate as to have a charge against him, 
whether from a malicious accusation or any other 
matter, it will be just to condemn and punish him with¬ 
out hearing one word from him in his exculpation; 
without suffering that eloquence, by which he has so 
often attacked and defended others, to be once exerted 
in behalf of himself ? 

“ I cannot convince myself, that the honourable 
gentleman will risk his fame and popularity on such 
language and doctrine. But though he should be 
transported by the rage of party, by zeal for the ad¬ 
miral, his friend, by hatred of me, or by any other in¬ 
centives, as to make such a mockery of truth and jus¬ 
tice; or even though his committee of safety should 
publish to the world their implicit assent to the po¬ 
sition, that an Englishman, or any man, may be con¬ 
demned to utter ruin, without trial or being heard; I 
trust that they will not have the countenance of this 
honourable assembly. At least, I trust, that there will 
not be here found a majority of such determined bigots 
to the cause of the honourable admiral and the party he 
is attached to. If, too, the honourable'gentleman should 
thus deeply pledge himself to establish a precedent of 
injustice, it is not impossible, but that he may live to 
suffer by his own invention. He is well read in the 
page of human life; he knows the strange vicissitudes 
to which it is liable; he is not ignorant, that none are 
exempt from a portion of its bitterest calumnies; he 
must feel, that the more elevated the station, the more 
exposed it is to the rude assault of winds and tempests. 
Lightning will blast and shiver the proud and lofty 
palace, whilst the low and humble cottage escapes un- 


414 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. Nil. 

hurt. Let the honourable gentleman then, for a mo¬ 
ment explore the deep abyss of future events; and he 
will there see, that even he may be accused, that even 
he may be forced before the awful tribunal of justice. 
But should he be thus arraigned, how can he claim to 
plead in support of his own innocence; or should he 
so claim, may not his judge sternly pronounce this 
severe and tremendous sentence of retribution ? ‘You 
are the unjust judge, who condemned your fellow-sub¬ 
ject without trial or hearing. He strenuously urged 
you to listen to his exculpation, before you re¬ 
corded him guilty; he solemnly warned you against 
establishing such a precedent of injustice. But your 
heart was steeled against the tender feelings of hu¬ 
manity. Your ear was deaf to the loud cry of justice; 
and, under the pretence of public good, you made a 
sacrifice to an unbridled passion of private resentment. 
Thus by his fate you promulgated a law for punishing 
without a trial; a law for your own destruction. The 
law is most harsh and cruel. But you are its author; 
you overwhelmed your adversary by enforcing it. Go, 
thou, and by the same law, perish likewise. This is 
your sentence. Let it be eternized for the future in¬ 
struction of mankind. But henceforth let the law be 
repealed. Your punishment alone will suffice to teach 
men how to respect the equal course and order of jus¬ 
tice.’ Should the honourable gentleman defend Mr. 
Keppel’s court-martial for condemning me unheard, is it 
possible, that he can reflect on the affecting situation I 
have imagined for him, and not tremble ? Or can those 
rash persons, if such there be, who shall stoop to search for 
precedents to uphold him in so unjust a conflict, who shall 


1780.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 415 

ransack tlie annals of injustice to sanctify such doc¬ 
trines; can they, I say, after this notice, proceed in 
their office without fear of the consequences?—No; I 
think it impossible! Let them then retire in time; 
let them desist from the inglorious pursuit before they 
are covered with shame and disgrace. Sorry I am, 
that the occasion should extort from me such strong 
colouring, such impassioned language. But, the honour¬ 
able gentleman and his friends are not yet pledged to 
palliate or defend the condemnation of me without 
trial or hearing; and I wish, if they will not shrink 
from the task of being advocate for violated justice, to 
leave them without the least excuse for such a con¬ 
duct. I am the more sorry to speak thus strongly, 
because I feel for the judges of the honourable admi- 
ral’s court-martial. When they reflect on the serious 
consequences from the dangerous example of condemn¬ 
ing an officer unheard, I am sure, that they will be 
afflicted at one part of their proceedings. I do not on 
this occasion allude to their acquittal of the honourable 
admiral, or to the approbation they have expressed of 
his conduct; but I mean, that they will lament having 
refused me a hearing, and yet condemn me for malice. 
Thus much I say concerning them, lest the gentlemen 
should suppose that I impute to them, a deliberate and 
intentional deviation from justice. Great as my suffer¬ 
ings have been from their imputation of malice to me, 
I really exculpate them in point of intention; and I will 
do them the justice to believe, not only that the injury 
I complain of was not wilful, but that they will be 
most happy to see me fully relieved from its dire 
effects. 


416 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CII. XII. 

“ These observations on the proceedings of Admiral 
Keppel’s court-martial I summit to the committee, very 
much detract from the weight and authority of their 
sentence. However, I do not ask to impeach the sen¬ 
tence, considered as an acquittal of the honourable ad¬ 
miral. No, let him enjoy every benefit possible to be 
derived from an acquittal; let his friends perpetuate 
the memory of it by illuminations, by triumphal pro¬ 
cessions, by parliamentary congratulations, by offerings 
of boxes, by addresses, by statues, by columns and mo¬ 
numents, by incriptions; let his day of acquittal be 
commemorated as an anniversary. But when the 
friends of the honourable admiral extend their views 
still further; when they declaim against me as con¬ 
victed of a malicious accusation; when mobs are ex¬ 
cited to destroy my person and property, to enter 
forcibly and pull down my dwelling-houses, and to in¬ 
sult my friends and servants; when there are in parlia¬ 
ment, persons so lost to all sense of justice as to palliate 
such outrages and felonies, or rather almost to defend 
them; when the friends of the admiral, accuse me of 
criminal disobedience as an officer, and in the same 
breath use threats to deter me from a trial; when, 
during the pendency of my trial, they confederate to 
inflame my judges against me, and so to reach my life; 
when, notwithstanding my acquittal, they still pro¬ 
claim me a guilty person; when they justify Mr. Kep- 
pel’s judges for refusing to hear me, his prosecutor, and 
for condemning me as such unheard; and when, to 
complete the measure of injustice, they threaten to 
make the sentence by a court, which neither would 
hear nor had power to try me, the ground for record- 


PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 


417 


1780 .] 

ing me as infamous by a vote of parliament; I say, 
sir, wlien all those provocations occur, can it be ex¬ 
pected, that I should tamely and passively submit my¬ 
self to the injuries thus heaped upon me, rather than 
utter any thing to the disparagement of Mr. Keppel’s 
court-martial, or their proceedings ? I am zealous for 
the good of my country, I am as ready to make sacri¬ 
fices of my own personal convenience to it, as my ene¬ 
mies can be. But I cannot think it either for the 
honour or advantage of my country, that any officer or 
man should acquiesce in such treatment. If an inquiry 
into the justice of the proceedings of Mr. Keppel’s 
court-martial should produce any public mischief; if 
thereby his acquittal becomes less splendid, less honour¬ 
able; his friends, who force on the discussion, are re¬ 
sponsible both to their country and him; not I, who 
am ready to bury in oblivion, past injuries, if the ho¬ 
nourable admiral’s friends shall abstain from new pro¬ 
vocations. 

“ It may perhaps be said in justification of Mr. Kep- 
pel’s court-martial, that there are instances of sentences 
by other courts-martial, acquitting the accused, and 
reprobating the accuser for making the charge. That 
there are such instances, I readily admit. Nay, though 
every thing beyond trying the accused is certainly ex¬ 
tra-judicial, yet where the accuser has been heard in 
support of his charge, and fails grossly; or has declined 
to be heard, and admits that his charges are not proved, 
it may be excusable, under very aggravated circum¬ 
stances, to censure the accuser, for the sake of more 
completely marking the injury done to the honour of 
the accused. But I call upon Mr. Keppel’s friends to 

2 E 


418 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CII. XII. 

name one example of sucli a stigma on an accuser, 
without allowing him to be heard in support of his 
charge, and defence of himself for making them. With¬ 
out such a hearing, how is it possible to form an ade¬ 
quate judgment of the conduct of the accused, or of the 
grounds and motives on which he proceeds? Who 
can say what new lights may arise, when a great mass 
of evidence is explained, digested, and commented 
upon? Besides, as I have already urged to the com¬ 
mittee, it cannot be fair and just, to hear the evidence 
observed upon and applied by one of two contending 
parties, without allowing the same benefit to the other. 
If that equal advantage had not been denied to me by 
the honourable admiral’s court-martial, who can pre¬ 
tend to say what would have been the consequence? 
My defence before the court-martial upon me proves, 
that the recrimination, on which the honourable admi¬ 
ral rested part of his defence, was capable of being 
falsified; and though there was not so much evidence 
to this point before his court-martial as occurred after¬ 
wards, yet there was a matter amply sufficient to have 
evinced my innocence in the most material allegations 
against me, if I had not been restrained from explaining 
myself to the court. The evidence of Captain Marshal, 
commander of the repeating frigate, so warmly and de¬ 
servedly applauded by Admiral Keppel, with the testi¬ 
mony of the mate and minuting officer of the same frigate, 
without any thing more, if I had been allowed to make 
my comments on the signals those three witnesses swore 
to, would have effectually disproved the chief part of 
the recriminatory charge in Mr. Keppel’s defence. If, 
too, the court had suffered itself to have been possessed 


1780.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 419 

of tlie key to so material a part of the case, who can 
pretend to say, that it would not have caused impres¬ 
sions favourable to me ? What might have been the 
result, it would not become me to give my sentiments, 
further than saying, that I am confident it would have 
cleared me from the imputation of malice, even in the 
minds of those members of that court, who gave their 
consent to that part of the sentence, which was not 
unanimous as the acquittal was. I have still too re¬ 
spectable an opinion of the judgment and honour of 
those gentlemen, to believe that they would have 
entertained so injurious an opinion, if they had heard 
me. 

“ So much I offer to the committee, to protect 
myself against any argument from that part of the 
sentence of the honourable admiral’s court-martial, 
which condemns me for malice. 

u Now, sir, I beg the indulgence of the committee for 
a short time longer, in order that I may explain in 
what light I shall appear before the committee, if the 
extraordinary and irregular condemnation of me for 
malice, annexed to the honourable admiral’s acquittal, 
is laid aside. 

“ If Admiral Keppel’s case and mine are compared, 
independently of the words in the sentence which im¬ 
pute malice to me, the most eloquent of his friends will 
find it no easy task to discriminate between us, with 
the least show of advantage to the honourable admiral. 
We have both been accusers; we have both been ac¬ 
cused ; we have both been tried; we have both been 
acquitted. In any one of these points, what can the 
honourable admiral’s friends object to me, without de- 

2 e 2 


420 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CIT. XII. 

tracting from his fame, from his merits, from his im¬ 
portance, at least in an equal degree ? 

“ They indignantly object as a reproach to me, that 
my charges were a recrimination. But are there no 
circumstances under which a recrimination may be 
justified? Because recrimination is presumptively and 
at first a ground to suspect, that the accuser is in¬ 
fluenced by bad and interested motives; is it, therefore, 
to be always concluded that a recrimination cannot be 
true, cannot proceed on just and honourable grounds? 
If the person accused thinks that the crime or fault 
imputed to him belongs to his accuser, is it incon¬ 
sistent with honour to undertake proving it ? If, too, 
the original accuser, preferring a secret, undermining, 
and indirect attack on his opponent’s reputation, de¬ 
clines making his charge in a legal way, and so endea¬ 
vours to disappoint the man he criminates of a trial; 
is not such conduct a strong provocative to a well- 
founded recrimination ? Is there no example of such 
recriminations in the naval service, and have they 
always been condemned ? Did not Admiral Knowles’s 
captains recriminate, on the ground of their conceiving 
that he had attempted to shift his own faults upon 
them? Was not the admiral tried and censured on 
this recrimination? Was not the conduct of his cap¬ 
tains much approved of by their brother officers at the 
time? Will the officers of the navy concur in the 
opinion, that no provocations, no injuries from their 
commanders, shall justify a recrimination, however 
founded in truth? Suppose, however, for a moment, 
that recrimination is ever wrong; suppose that there was 
no example of it before, how can the honourable admi- 


1780.] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 421 

ral and his friends detest me for recrimination, without 
condemning him ? Are they clear that there has not 
been as much of recrimination on his part as on mine ? 
Are they certain that he did not recriminate with cir¬ 
cumstances far more unfavourable than those which 
occurred in my case ? My accusation of him, was made 
so as to put him upon his trial; I specified my charges; 
I risked being a prosecutor; I abstained from being a 
witness. But the admiral accused me at first in du¬ 
bious and obscure terms; and, though on his own trial 
he avowed accusation, he never would consent to bring 
a charge against me. Thus, when I was tried, he be¬ 
came a witness against me, and delivered his testimony 
in so narrative a way, and with so much freedom and 
copiousness of observation, as to discharge the offices 
both of accuser and witness, and so, in substance, to act 
in two characters, whilst in point of form and respon¬ 
sibility he appeared only in one.—Which then of the 
two accusations was the most manly, the most direct, 
the most open, and most agreeable to law and justice? 
Which of the two accusations most participated of the 
quality of recrimination; mine which followed a secret 
and indirect accusation, or his which followed an 
avowed and direct one ? 

“ The common notion I am aware is, that I made a 
charge against the admiral to screen myself from a 
trial. But nothing can be further from the real fact. 
Before I made any charge against the admiral I gave 
him the fullest opportunity of first charging me. Nay, 
in effect, 1 publicly called upon him in this house to 
bring me to a trial; for when he insinuated here, that 
he was disposed to overlook and hide my faults, I re-* 


422 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [ciI. XII. 

jected the proffered favour as an insult; and I claimed 
an accusation from him, if he thought me deserving of 
the least censure; observing that hints and insinua¬ 
tions were worse, and more mischievous than charges. 
Had the admiral avowed accusation when he was 
then urged to it, I could have had an immediate trial? 
without being exposed to the odium of first appearing 
as an accuser. But the admiral would neither ex¬ 
culpate nor accuse me; knowing that the Admiralty 
would not grant me a trial without a charge of some 
kind or other; or that if one had been granted without 
any charge under these circumstances, it would have 
been called a sham trial. By this manoeuvre I was 
driven into the fatal alternative, either of becoming an 
accuser of a man too great to be questioned without 
the utmost hazard, or of submitting to the injurious 
imputation of being deemed the cause of our doing 
so little in the action, when, if there was blame, I 
thought that it belonged to him. Having made my 
charges against the admiral in a legal way under this 
embarrassment, I again evinced my anxiety for a trial 
on myself. For this purpose I wrote to the Admi¬ 
ralty, and desired that the admiral might be required 
to make his charge against me, and that I might be 
put upon my trial immediately after his was over. He 
was so required; but he still declined a legal accu¬ 
sation. Yet as his defence was a direct recrimination 
of me, immediately after the sentence acquitting him, 
I wrote once more to the Admiralty to demand a 
trial on the ground of the charges appearing against 
me on the admiral’s defence. Upon this, the Admi¬ 
ralty once more called upon Mr. Keppel for an accu- 


1780 .] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 423 

sation. But notwithstanding this third requisition, 
founded upon his defence, he still refused to make his 
charges legally. However, he would not absolutely 
renounce his right, as I understand the words of his 
letter, but only disclaimed an intention to charge me; 
his last letter truly observing, that the law had fixed a 
period for bringing charges, which in fact was not 
then elapsed. Thus he made sure of bringing me to 
a trial in a manner the most advantageous to himself, 
the most disadvantageous to me. On the one hand, 
he had every reason to think that when the proceed¬ 
ings of his court-martial were considered by the Admi¬ 
ralty, his recriminating defence would force them to 
undertake the prosecution of me, instead of being 
responsible as a prosecutor, and I was sure to be left 
without any specification of charges. On the other 
hand, by adverting to the time which the law allows 
for such accusations, he seemed to reserve to himself a 
right to prosecute, if, contrary to his expectations, the 
Admiralty should not direct a trial. Consider these 
facts, and compare my conduct as an accuser with the 
admirals. The result will be, that all the art and policy 
were on the side of the admiral; all the openness, 
and, if we judge by events, all the unguardedness, 
were on mine. But I do not envy the honourable 
admiral such a superiority. It has been urged against 
me, that I was too late in my accusation; and that if I 
had thought the honourable admiral guilty of miscon¬ 
duct, I ought to have avowed my sentiments imme¬ 
diately, and without waiting till he accused me. I 
answer thus: From the beginning, the conduct of the 
admiral was not adequate to my expectations. I 


424 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

thought that the engagement of the 27th of July was 
injudiciously conducted; that the manner of carrying 
us into action was disorderly; that there was too 
much neglect of manoeuvres, too much contempt of the 
enemy, too much confidence at first; and too much 
awe of the enemy, too much distance from them, too 
much diffidence of ourselves afterwards. But my 
friendship and esteem for the admiral, his previous ser¬ 
vices to his country, his high name in the world; these 
moved me to a favourable construction; and thus in¬ 
fluenced, I imputed the miscarriage of the day to error 
of judgment, to ill health, to ill advice, to ill fortune, 
to every thing devoid of that evident and positive cri¬ 
minality, which might force me to undertake the pain¬ 
ful office of accusing one whom I then deemed my 
friend. As there was not room for praise, I did not 
bestow it; and as I then conceived that the admiral’s 
failures might not be wilful, I both avoided public 
accusation, and most rigidly abstained from secret de¬ 
traction. But new lights and new occurrences pre¬ 
sented to my mind a very different view of the admi¬ 
ral’s conduct. When the discontents increased through 
the nation, in consequence of the reflection, that a su¬ 
perior fleet of England had, for a time, declined con¬ 
tinuing to engage an inferior one of France, and per¬ 
mitted it to return into port in the middle of summer, 
unpursued; the officers, relations, friends, and depend¬ 
ents of the honourable admiral thought fit to account 
for so unusual an event at the expense of my re¬ 
putation; and for that purpose some of them pub¬ 
lished to the world, that my defaults had prevented 
a second engagement. Being thus injuriously attacked, 


1780 .] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 425 

I both personally and by letter solicited the ho¬ 
nourable admiral to give a check to such asper¬ 
sions. But he refused to do this justice to my charac¬ 
ter, and, on conversing with him and his first captain 
I found, that they not only countenanced the slanders 
against me, but added to their number, by refusing to 
acknowledge, either that on coming out of the action I 
instantly wore to return to the enemy, or that they had 
even once seen me on the proper tack for that pur¬ 
pose. This explanation from the honourable admiral 
and his first captain, excited both astonishment and 
suspicion. I was amazed at their denial of such in¬ 
controvertible facts, and at the admiral's adopting a 
language so inconsistent with the high commendation of 
me in his public letter; and I then saw, that there was a 
plot concerted to destroy my character without a trial, 
and so to make me chargeable for the admiral’s faults. 
My feelings on the occasion were the stronger, because 
I was conscious, that the chief part of the battle had 
fallen to the share of me and my division; that I had 
set an example of forwardness to pursue our blow, by 
instantly returning upon the enemy, and continuing to 
stand towards them again; that though the last out 
of the engagement, I was advancing to be the first in 
the renewal of it; and that I should have had that 
honour, if the admiral had not declined renewing the 
action, and taken his fleet in a direction from the enemy. 
Under these circumstances, it was natural that I should 
scrutinize the admiral’s conduct more rigidly, and no 
longer see it with the partial eyes of a friend, and on 
such a view of the unhappy miscarriage, I at length 
imputed to real neglect, what I before had ascribed to 


426 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

causes which might be pardoned, more especially in 
consideration of former services, and such as at first did 
not seem to me to preclude the hopes of better manage¬ 
ment in case of again meeting the enemy. Indeed, if, 
in Mr. Keppel’s place, there had been a man indifferent 
to me, one of whom I had not before formed a very 
high opinion, it is probable, that my mind would have 
shaped a different course; probably my first judgment 
of the matter might have been the same harsh one, as 
is conveyed by the charges against the admiral. But 
what apology can be made for the lateness of his ac¬ 
cusation ; he, who had the charge of the fleet, and the 
command in chief; he, in whom the nation reposed its 
confidence, not only for the discharge of his own duty, 
but to see that those under him completely performed 
what they owed to the state ? What apology can he 
make for first praising me by a public letter, and in 
equal degree with Sir Robert Harland, and afterwards 
accusing me for the same affair ? Shall he be at liberty 
to retract his applause, and to substitute accusation for 
it ? Shall he be allowed to say, that his heart dictated 
censure, whilst his pen wrote praise ? And shall mere 
silence restrain me from accusation, or be imputed to 
me as insincerity and inconsistency ? 

“ As to the state of the proofs on the two trials, I pur¬ 
posely avoided all comparison; because that would be 
entering into the merits of them, which I think would, 
at this time, be improper. 

“ If the admiral’s friends choose to pursue the sub¬ 
ject, and to contrast my trial and the terms of my ac¬ 
quittal with his, I do not fear the comparison. His 
sentence, it is true, is more pompously expressed than 


1780 .] PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. 427 

mine; but when the incidents to the two trials are con¬ 
sidered, it will be more than a counterbalance for the 
external brilliancy of his own acquittal. The admiral 
had every advantage to favour him on his trial. He 
was aided by the influence of the most extensive family 
connexions; he was backed by the whole party in op¬ 
position to government; the heads of which daily 
crowded the trial to countenance and protect him. He 
was not wholly unaided even by some of the profess¬ 
ed friends of the administration. His judges through¬ 
out refused a hearing to me as prosecutor. Having 
announced myself an accuser, I, from motives of deli¬ 
cacy, declined to appear as a witness. Before the trial, 
parliament altered the place of trial in his favour, to 
accommodate him, without so much as a solicitation of 
this distinction from himself; and a number of ad¬ 
mirals petitioned the king to throw a slur upon the 
accusation. But I had no such advantages. In¬ 
stead of them, I had the most trying difficulties to en¬ 
counter; the prejudice from having been declared, by 
Mr. Keppel’s judges, a malicious accuser; the prejudice 
from the inflamed and mad state of the multitude 
through the kingdom; the prejudice from having my 
accuser a witness; the prejudice from the votes of 
the two houses of parliament in favour of Mr. Kep- 
pel; the prejudice from the continual efforts of the 
party in opposition to government against me, to deter 
me from having a trial; the prejudice from the efforts, 
nay, from the menaces, of the same persons, to aggra¬ 
vate the difficulties of such a disadvantageous trial; 
whilst, from beginning to end, there was the most ap¬ 
parent passiveness on the part of those in government 


428 


MR. FOX’S MOTION. 


[CH. XII. 

and their friends; the prejudice from tlie want of a 
specific charge; the prejudice from the threats to my 
judges if they acquitted, with the prejudice from the 
applause promised if they condemned. With such ad¬ 
vantages on Mr. Keppel’s part, acquittal became so easy 
to him, that, though there had been faults the most 
censurable, condemnation was barely possible. With 
such disadvantages on my side, it was even surprising 
how innocence could escape the fiery trial. Which 
acquittal was then most honourable. Admiral Keppel’s, 
with every prejudice, every indulgence, every exertion, 
every advantage for him; or mine, with every pre¬ 
judice, every obstacle, every hardship, every advantage 
against me ?” 

On the first of February, Mr. Fox brought forward 
his motion on the appointment of Sir Hugh Palliser to 
the government of Greenwich Hospital, which he con¬ 
sidered as an insult to the honour of the navy. He 
reverted to the sentence which had pronounced the 
charges false and malicious. He asserted it was no 
new doctrine for a court-martial to pronounce on the 
motive of the accuser, justified the act, and said that 
questioning the propriety of that sentence was arraign¬ 
ing the honour and the justice of the officers who com¬ 
posed Admiral Keppel’s court-martial. 

Lord North in reply declared that he should not at¬ 
tempt to follow the honourable gentleman over the vast 
field of matter which he had produced, supporting with 
a great deal of eloquence as he always did,—and he must 
give him leave to say, with a great deal of art—the 
motion which had just been read. 

The honourable gentleman had said that Sir Hugh 


1781 .] lord north’s REPLY TO MR. FOX. 429 

Palliser’s resignation of liis places and employment was 
a tacit admission of his criminality. Does the ho¬ 
nourable gentleman mean to say that no man resigns 
but from a consciousness of criminality ? Surely, he 
will not be the first to lay down that doctrine. He 
knows that resignation proceeds from different causes. 
The cause of a resignation may be good, bad, or in¬ 
different. Some men resign their places, for the sake 
of public quiet; some resign from arithmetical cal¬ 
culation, that it may be better to give up a place of 
small value now, in order to get a better one at an¬ 
other time. Others again, from motives of political 
sagacity; they discover a storm approaching, and snuff 
it gathering in the sky, they see an administration as 
they think tottering, and leave them in the hopes of 
coming into high office by joining an opposite party. 
All these the gentleman well knows are motives of re¬ 
signation; why then must it follow that the vice-ad¬ 
miral was compelled either by a bad or an indifferent 
motive to resign? For his part he believed the vice- 
admiral resigned from a very good motive, in order to 
restore public peace, in order that the storm, the 
frenzy, the madness of the times might subside. Had 
it totally escaped the honourable gentleman’s memory 
that the town was in a tumult for three nights to¬ 
gether, illuminated at the command of a mob, and no¬ 
thing but disorder to be seen in every quarter. His 
lordship said, that the honourable gentleman had nib¬ 
bled at the constitution of the second court-martial, 
but all the honourable gentleman said on that head* 
and all he had thrown out on many other points was 
merely with a view to confound and mislead the house. 


430 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

What further rendered the sentence of that court- 
martial an honourable acquittal was, that the vice- 
admiral went down to his trial, when a loud and al¬ 
most universal clamour prevailed against him; when 
every means were taken both within doors and without 
to prejudice him; when gentlemen in that house did 
all they could to prevent his being tried. But what 
had been the vice-admirals conduct? He insisted on 
a trial; he knew that ruin or honour must be the issue; 
he stood the danger, and his character is re-established. 
His lordship concluded by saying, he had not the least 
fear, but that the naval and military members would 
do an act of justice, by rescuing an injured and gal¬ 
lant officer from the violent rage of unprecedented per¬ 
secution, declaring that part of the sentence which pro¬ 
nounced the accusation malicious and unfounded as an 
extra-judicial opinion; that Vice-admiral Palliser had 
never been tried on any such charge, that he had been 
honourably acquitted by the court which tried him, 
and that he had served his country with undoubted 
bravery and honour for forty-five years. 

Mr. Miller said, “ The part of the kingdom he came 
from regarded Sir Hugh Palliser in a very different 
light from that in which Mr. Fox had chosen to de¬ 
scribe him. The more considerate and candid of his 
constituents considered the vice-admiral as a gallant 
officer, persecuted in a cruel manner, and endeavoured 
to be sacrificed to party connexions, by those who on 
all occasions stand forward the determined foes of go¬ 
vernment, and stop short at no means of embarrassing 
its necessary operations. The honourable gentleman 
had asserted that the appointment of Sir Hugh Pal- 


1781.] COMMODORE JOHNSON’S REPLY. 431 

User would create ill-blood and dissension in the navy. 
The appointment had taken place some months, and 
he had not stated a single instance of its having had 
that effect.” 

Commodore Johnson said, “ He never would admit 
the doctrine first thrown out by the honourable gen¬ 
tleman who made the motion, and afterwards adopted 
by Admiral Lord Howe; c that it was wrong for an 
inferior officer to prefer an accusation against his com¬ 
mander-in-chief, and that the practice ought to be re¬ 
probated.’ If the doctrine was observed, the service 
would be ruined, and the honour of every officer in 
the fleet would be at the commander-in-chief’s mercy, 
and there would be an end of all discipline. Who but 
the officers of a fleet could point out the misconduct of 
a commander-in-chief. A commander who acted up¬ 
rightly and conscientiously could have no dread of 
facing the tribunal of a court-martial. He could not, 
however, by any means subscribe to the idea that a 
court-martial appointed to try one man was warranted 
in censuring another, who had not been heard in his 
defence; at the same time he was aware that it was 
sometimes done; he had himself sat upon courts-mar¬ 
tial, where it had been attempted, but it had always 
been censured as unjust and unwarrantable. 

“ He was far, however, from meaning to approve of 
the vice-admiral’s whole conduct; he thought his mili¬ 
tary conduct in the highest degree praiseworthy, but 
his political conduct was the opposite. He could not 
agree that the 27th of July was a day that gave any 
glory to this country, just the contrary. It was the 
most unfortunate day this country ever saw. There 


482 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

was great blame somewhere, for such a disgraceful 
event as that a French fleet could engage on a sum¬ 
mer’s day a British fleet superior in every respect, and 
get safe back to port. It was scarcely credible, yet it was 
too true, Great Britain would never have such an op¬ 
portunity of shaking the marine of France. Where was 
the blame due? He would say that he thought Ad¬ 
miral Keppel had acted more weakly than wisely, in 
writing that letter to the Admiralty which had been 
published in the Gazette, as the contents were not 
really the import of the admiral’s opinion. The service 
could not exist without discipline, and if Sir Hugh had 
behaved as ill as the honourable admiral near him at 
different times declared he had, he ought to have been 
brought to an immediate court-martial when he landed. 
Great stress was laid by Mr. Fox upon Sir Hugh Pal- 
liser not having preferred his accusation against the 
commander-in-chief when he first came on shore; but 
surely the argument pressed as strongly against the 
commander-in-chief. The commodore said he was far 
from meaning to defend the political conduct of Sir 
Hugh Palliser, he thought it extremely reprehensible. 
But would any one tell him that when he found by 
the concurring testimony of the witnesses in general 
the vice-admiral’s conduct in the action was so spi¬ 
rited, so gallant, so glorious as it was allowed to be, 
that he ought to be given up and blasted for ever for 
a political error? When he looked into these trials 
and saw how nobly the vice-admiral rushed into action, 
and received the whole fire of the French fleet, when 
he viewed him ranging along the enemy’s line, bravely 
backing his topsails that he might continue to fight the 


1781.] COMMODORE JOHNSON^ REPLY. 433 

longer, and when he saw that after he had passed the 
last ship of the enemy, he wore his own ship to renew 
the action, and torn, shattered, and disabled as he was, 
like a British bull-dog, turned to have another bout 
with them; when he looked at this, he admired the 
bravery of the vice-admiral, honoured his zeal, and 
thought him entitled to every possible praise. He 
wished the house to see the whole affair in a candid 
and impartial light. Did not every man know that 
what the noble lord (North) observed relative to the 
temper of the times was strictly just. The popular 
fury bore down all before it; even that house caught 
the infection; he wondered not, therefore, at the vote 
of thanks to the admiral for having preserved the 
honour of the British flag some months after it was 
lost. Let the most zealous friend of Admiral Keppel 
(and no man esteemed and admired him more than he 
did), look back with a sober retrospect to those times, 
and ask himself whether the pretended was the real 
cause of the popular frenzy. Was London illuminated 
for three nights together on account of the glory of the 
27th of July? It was not to the glory gained on the 
27 th of July that they imputed the illumination of 
London, neither was it for the admiral having con¬ 
veyed home mercantile fleets that were in port before 
he sailed, but the public satisfaction on finding that 
a brave officer, a skilful commander, and a good-na¬ 
tured honest man had come off with honour after an 
arduous trial. Let the house remember that the vice- 
admiral was the darling officer of that brave and po¬ 
pular commander Sir Charles Saunders at the siege of 
Quebec. Let them look at his actions during the 


434 


PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [cil. XII, 

course of tlie last war, let them not forget what praise 
was due to him, and what just expectation might be 
formed of his future services, from his behaviour in a 
single memorable instance a few years since. In that 
case, what had been the vice-admiral’s conduct? He 
came up with two British ships in sight of a French 
seventy-four. He asked what they slackened sail for? 
He was answered they were about to hold a council of 
war in order to determine whether the French ship 
should be attacked. He instantly replied, ‘ Do you 
debate the matter! Til fight the ship,’ and he fol¬ 
lowed this reply with immediately giving chase, and 
attacking the enemy; the result was he brought the 
ship back a prize before the council w r as over. Was 
an action like this to be passed over in silence, and 
totally blotted from the memory, because at a sub¬ 
sequent period the same man acts erroneously on 
shore.” 

Admiral Keppel said, “ The honourable gentleman 
who spoke last (Commodore Johnson) had been very 
strong in his expressions of the 27 th of July. God 
knew he liked to hear as little of that day as the ho¬ 
nourable gentleman; but, as he felt the satisfaction of 
having done his duty and being unanimously acquitted 
by a court-martial, and as he had received the thanks 
of that house for his conduct, he was indifferent to any 
oblique reflections, or any direct imputations that 
might be cast upon him; and though he was proud of 
enjoying the good opinion of the service, he did not 
feel himself greatly indebted to the honourable officer 
who spoke last for his compliments, because in pro¬ 
portion to the praise which the honourable gentleman 


1781.] palliser’s reply to mr. fox. 435 

had given him on the one hand, he had fully done 
away with, by the censure which he had levelled at 
him on the other; the value therefore of his condem¬ 
nation and applause was pretty equal. 

“ That the 27th of July was an unfortunate day for 
England he freely admitted, and as he had said before, 
he wished as little to hear that day mentioned as the 
honourable gentleman, at the same time he could not 
but declare himself much obliged to his honourable 
relative, Mr. Fox, for having moved the present ques¬ 
tion.” 

Sir Hugh Palliser rose, and began with saying, That 
the last time he had the honour to speak in that house, 
he was so much indisposed with cold and hoarseness, 
that he could not finish what he had to say, other¬ 
wise he should have taken notice of several things that 
had dropped from Mr. Fox, who distinguished him¬ 
self as the leader of the present persecution of him. 

On the present occasion so much had been said by 
several other gentlemen who had already spoken in 
the debate, and in so much better terms than he was 
capable of expressing himself, that he would ask the 
indulgence of the house to hear him only on a few 
points. 

He said that he found he was misunderstood by 
Mr. Fox in one particular, that of his supposing he 
meant to attack the sentence of Mr. Keppel’s court- 
martial ; in his former speech he had declared he did 
not wish to impeach that sentence, so far as related to 
Mr. Keppel’s acquittal. 

Mr. Fox claimed a right to quote that part of the 
sentence which condemned the vice-admiral for making 

2 f 2 


430 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. Nil. 

a malicious and groundless charge, as a public record, 
and under shelter of that description of it, said, his 
quoting it was not to be considered in a personal light, 
but as a right he had to quotej in the freedom of de¬ 
bate, a public transaction* 

Upon this ground, Sir Hugh said, perhaps he could 
not properly take it up as personal, but he declared 
that whenever the honourable gentleman should in 
future quote that part of the sentence in the partial 
unjust way he had done, he would always rise and re¬ 
proach him with want of candour; because, when the 
honourable gentleman said that sentence declared him 
convicted, and condemned him for making a false and 
malicious charge, he ought to add what is also part of 
the same record; that he was neither upon trial, nor 
heard either in support of the charges which he had 
regularly and legally brought before that court, nor in 
his vindication for bringing them, nor in his own de¬ 
fence on the recriminating charge against him, upon 
which the person on his trial had partly rested his 
defence: upon all of which heads he (Sir Hugh) had 
repeatedly claimed his right to be heard, and was as 
repeatedly denied it. Hence it was plain the ho¬ 
nourable gentleman did not quote that record as he 
called it, for the purpose of conveying right informa¬ 
tion of a public transaction to the nation at large, but 
in effect, by his partial quotation of it, he misled and 
deceived the nation, and kept up injurious prejudices 
against him; therefore he would always accuse him 
with want of candour, and of acting a part unworthy 
of himself; and the honourable gentleman was more 
open to this reproach than any member would be who 


1781.] PALLISERS REPLY TO MR, FOX. 437 

had not attended the trial, nor carefully perused the 
minutes of the trial, for such as had not, by being led 
away by the stream of prejudice raised by noise, cla¬ 
mour, and riot, expressly for the purpose of confound¬ 
ing all truth, and for establishing those prejudices, 
might not know that he (Sir Hugh) had been refused a 
hearing upon every point. But the honourable gen¬ 
tleman attended the trial himself, he had heard those 
denials given to the vice-admiral, he knew the objec¬ 
tions to hearing him did not originate with the court 
but came from Mr. Keppel who was upon trial. He 
said that in his own mind he was convinced that it 
never entered into their minds to entertain a doubt 
about the propriety of hearing him; nay, after Mr. 
KeppePs objecting to it the first time, the court ac¬ 
quiesced in the declaration of one of its members that 
finally, after all the evidence was gone through, they 
would hear him. 

Sir Hugh added, though the objection to his being 
heard on the merits in any stage of the trial, was first 
made by Mr. Keppel, yet he believed it did not ori¬ 
ginate with him, for so soon as it was known that Sir 
Hugh intended to address the court, all Mr. Keppel’s 
friends about him, consisting of many noblemen and 
gentlemen, leaders in the opposition, assembled about a 
table in court, and appeared to be in consultation, the 
issue of which was that Mr. Keppel came forth with 
his objection in writing, and in the style of a mandate 
said, he objected to Sir Hugh being heard on the 
merits of the case in any stage of the trial, so that he 
(Sir Hugh Palliser) did not lay the injustice wholly at 


438 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

the door of the court, for he did not think any of the 
members intended wilfully to do him injustice, but he 
attributed it to the party who formed the objection, 
which was undoubtedly made from the apprehension 
that, if he had been heard, Mr. Keppel would not 
have been totally acquitted, and a sentence of malice 
would not have been passed upon him. 

He might give the honourable gentleman the same 
reproach upon his want of candour, in stating the vice- 
admiral’s motives for quitting his employments, and 
rebuke him as a noble lord rebuked a very respectable 
admiral the other night for having taken upon him to 
account for his lordship’s motives, without knowing 
them from himself. 

The honourable gentleman had attempted to lead 
his hearers into the opinion that he did it out of fear of 
his threats against him in parliament, and from a con¬ 
sciousness of guilt; but he was never more mistaken in 
his life, than in supposing him afraid of him or his 
threats, for amongst all his foibles, that of fear did not 
belong to him,—that fear was a tax which conscience 
pays to guilt. Let it therefore be applied to those who 
wantonly calumniate, and blast the characters of others 
and who are afterwards afraid to stand a full hearing— 

o 

object to hear the injured party—and do all that in 
them lies to prevent that injured party from having a 
fair trial. 

He confessed, indeed, that upon one occasion he 
was afraid. He was afraid of a mad, deluded, furious 
mob. This mob first forcibly entered his house, and 
finding him there, destroyed his property, and attempted 


1781.] PALLISEllS REPLY TO MR. FOX. 439 

to pull down his house, but at the moment of forcing 
an opening into it, the guard happily came to his relief 
and saved him from being torn to pieces. Then he 
confessed he was really afraid, was forced to abscond 
in disguise, and conceal himself in an obscure place, 
for he durst not show himself in London, much less 
offer to come into that house. 

It was under these circumstances he wrote his 
letter of resignation. What he did on this occasion 
was exactly the same as was done by one of the most 
famous admirals we read of in history, who under the 
like circumstances of prejudice and outrage, which had 
risen to a height his friends could not support him 
against, laid down his commission, declaring he had 
done it to quiet the people. Afterwards, when those 
prejudices subsided, he resumed his commission, and 
rendered more service to his country at sea, than any 
one man ever did. He spoke of the famous Dutch Ad¬ 
miral, Yon Tromp. 

His real motives for resigning would best appear 
from his letter of resignation, written in the obscure 
place to which he had retired; this would have been 
written in a better style perhaps, if his mind had been 
more tranquil at the time, but such as it was, he would 
read it to the house. 

He here appealed to the house, whether this letter 
betrayed any consciousness of guilt, or fear of the ho¬ 
nourable gentleman’s, Mr. Fox’s, threats in parliament. 
Occasion had been taken on a former day by the same 
gentleman, to insinuate to the house, that he had acted 
in this manner under the influence of some persons who 
were supposed to be enemies to Admiral Keppel. 


440 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [CH. XII. 

He declared he had not taken any steps under the in¬ 
fluence or with the advice of any man, that he had acted 
in all things as he thought consistent with what a mili¬ 
tary man, and a man of honour ought to do when his 
reputation is unjustly attacked, that is, he had trusted 
entirely to the merits of his cause, without applying to 
any party or set of men, or to any minister for assist¬ 
ance, countenance, or protection. 

Nor had he applied to any flag officer to interfere 
by memorial to the king in a cause depending, nor had 
solicited any officer in the service to take a part in it, 
yet, so strong had the seeds of party been sown in the 
navy, that after Admiral Keppel’s trial was over, and 
after his own trial was ordered, two flag-officers, and 
some captains became so regardless of even the sem¬ 
blance of decency, that even when they knew they 
were to be called as witnesses on his trial, they signed 
an address, intended to be presented to the king, pray¬ 
ing that Sir Hugh’s flag might be taken from him, 
and that he might not be allowed the benefit of a 
trial. 

Such was the baneful influence of party, and so 
much was that party afraid of Sir Hugh’s having a fair 
trial, knowing that at a fair trial, he must be acquitted, 
and many disagreeable truths would come out, that a 
sufficient number of officers could not be found to sign 
the memorial, to countenance the delivery of it, and 
therefore it was dropped. 

A good deal had been said to lessen and depre¬ 
ciate the part he had taken in the action. 

He was exceedingly unwilling to say any thing that 
seemed like sounding his own praise, but he could not 


1781.] palliser’s reply to mr. fox. 441 

lielp observing to the house that he had gone singly and 
alone into the middle of the French fleet, and had fought 
his way to the end of their line, and had turned again 
to renew the action. This he had done without, in the 
smallest degree, suspecting a design to sacrifice him, till 
it was put into his head by the admiral himself. But 
after doing his duty in a distinguished manner in ac¬ 
tion, to be attacked and persecuted as he had been by 
his chief, and by a confederacy of so many powerful 
persons, both in and out of the house, was a treatment 
which no officer in this or any other country had ever 
met with before; however, he thanked God he hitherto 
had the fortitude to resist it. He was glad to see Mr- 
Burke had lately returned to his seat, as he had some¬ 
thing to say which he would have been unwilling to 
mention behind his back. He had been told that on a 
former occasion, whilst he was overwhelmed with in¬ 
justice and adversity, the honourable gentleman pro¬ 
posed that an ample pension should be settled on him to 
enable him to live comfortably in retirement. This, 
Sir Hugh said, he considered as the most indignant 
insult which one man could offer to another in his 
then situation. He considered it as a bribe held out to 
him to sacrifice his own honour to subscribe to his own 
guilt, though he knew himself innocent to tempt him 
to avoid a fair trial, and thereby conceal from the 
public, truths which they had a right to know. But 
rather than accept such a proposal he would submit to 
be reduced to stand at his own gate, and beg from every 
traveller that passed, unless, indeed, the honourable 
gentleman who was capable of making so indignant a 
proposal should pass, for from him he would not even 


l 


442 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. [dl. XII. 

under the severest extremity of wretchedness deign to 
receive assistance. Yet he would thank him for one 
thing he had said, which was, “that if Sir Hugh Pal- 
liser was obstinately bent on having a trial, he solemnly 
washed his hands of the poor gentleman’s blood, but he 
would take care it should not be a sham trial,” for this 
he returned thanks, for he thought it added lustre to 
his acquittal. 

Admiral Keppel had taken occasion to mention Sir 
Hugh’s application to him by letter, and by a personal 
visit, desiring him to do Sir Hugh justice, to contra¬ 
dict the scandalous reports propagated against him by 
the admiral’s relatives and dependants, and the officers 
of the Victory. 

He had first to observe that the admiral had pub¬ 
lished that letter partially and not wholly. In his letter 
he (Sir Hugh) said any thing that might be agreed upon 
would satisfy him, and indeed any thing that amounted 
to the admiral’s authority to contradict them would 
have been satisfactory. But he refused it, upon which 
he spoke, and he was sure the admiral now present 
would do him the justice to remember it nearly in these 
words. “ Is it possible that you can countenance such 
injurious reports against me. I never yet knew why 
the battle was discontinued till it had been decisive; I 
cannot let the matter stand upon this footing; my repu¬ 
tation is wounded, the nation is dissatisfied, they have 
a right to know if there was any fault, where it lies.” 

Mr. Burke went on to an examination of the sen¬ 
tence of the court-martial which tried Admiral Kep¬ 
pel, and endeavoured to prove that the court had not 
not only acquitted the admiral unanimously, but that 


1781.] CONCLUSION OF THE DEBATE. 443 

they had also unanimously given it as their opinion 
that the charge was malicious and ill-founded. Having 
put his argument with great ingenuity, and reasoned 
upon it with that eloquence which he was peculiarly 
gifted with. He indulged rather in a ridiculous than 
a serious refutation of the arguments that had been 
used, not only to prove that Vice-admiral Palliser was 
not declared to have preferred a malicious charge by 
the unanimous opinion of Admiral Keppel’s court- 
martial, but that Sir Hugh was honourably acquitted 
by his own. 

Lord Frederick Campbell wound up the debate, 
and said he should be on the side of justice, and should 
vote for an amendment, because he would never accede 
to the doctrine that any mail in this country, in any 
court, either in a court-martial or a court of law, could 
be deemed guilty of any specific crime without a trial 
or being heard in his own defence. At a quarter after 
two the amendment was put, and carried by a majority 
of 214 against 149. 

The animosity against Sir Hugh Palliser exhibited 
in those discussions, drew forth many just and severe 
animadversions from the public writers of the day. 
An able pen thus addresses Sir Joseph M awbey, one of 
the most intemperate of Pallisers assailants in the 
House of Commons: 

“ In reading the account of a late parliamentary al¬ 
tercation in the newspapers, I was much surprised at 
the expressions which you are said to have used on 
that occasion, respecting the re-employing Sir Hugh 
Palliser. Your saying that his name had been of late 
universally and deservedly detestable was, at best, but 


444 AN ADDRESS TO SIR JOSEPH MAWBEY [CH. XII. 

detestable language. Perhaps your party zeal made 
you forget the dignity of your auditory, as well as the 
great and universally acknowledged merit of that offi¬ 
cer, whose name you were then vilifying. As you are 
said to have grounded your opinion of Sir Hugh Pal- 
liser’s criminality on the sentence of Admiral Keppel’s 
court-martial, and on the ineligibility of some of the 
judges who afterwards sat on Sir Hugh, I shall take 
the liberty to make a few remarks on each of those 
heads. 

w You are said to have asked the honourable gen¬ 
tleman, Mr. Pulteney, if he had forgotten the sentence 
of the court-martial which acquitted Admiral Keppel, 
declaring that a man who had been convicted of pre¬ 
ferring a malicious and ill-founded charge against his 
superior officer, was unworthy of employment. But I 
insist that Sir Hugh Palliser was not convicted, and 
that the word malicious in the sentence pronounced 
by Admiral Keppel’s court-martial, was clearly extra¬ 
judicial; because it declared a man to be a criminal 
who had not been tried. The court was constituted to 
try Admiral Keppel upon certain specific charges; he 
was the only person then before it as a criminal; and, 
therefore, he ought to have been the sole object of its 
sentence. No charge had been properly preferred 
against Sir Hugh; he had not been put on his defence; 
nor had any witnesses been examined either for or 
against him; and, therefore, the court-martial, in passing 
a sentence of severe censure on Sir Hugh Palliser, 
acted clearly contrary to every principle of justice and 
equity. What Sir Hugh Palliser’s motives were for 
preferring charges against his supreme officer, I cannot 


445 


1781.] ON ADMIRAL IvEPPEL’s SENTENCE. 

precisely say; but I applaud the act, and earnestly 
wish that no British admiral, under similar circum¬ 
stances, may ever escape a legal and strict inquiry. 

“ Fully convinced that the conduct of Sir Hugh 
Palliser’s judges, throughout the whole of his trial, 
was clearly unexceptionable, I must conclude, that your 
insinuations against them are ill-founded and illiberal. 
There was not any attempt made to procure an act to 
try him on shore, in order to favour the purposes of his 
friends in attending the trial; nor were the witnesses 
influenced by the repeated clappings or hissings of un¬ 
principled party men. Every question which could 
tend to criminate Sir Hugh was put to the witnesses, 
and, at the same time, ample scope was given him to 
prove his innocence. None of the witnesses were 
urged to judge on the facts they had declared upon 
oath, nor was any attempt made by the judges to 
collect the opinion of witnesses, for the purpose of 
framing or justifying their final sentence. 

“ I beg to leave to ask whether, on a fair inquiry, 
you think yourself warranted to say, that the conduct 
of the other court-martial was equally unexceptionable 
and praiseworthy. I can truly say, I have no inten¬ 
tion to arraign the characters of Admiral Keppel’s 
court-martial, either collectively or individually; but I 
freely own, that some parts of their conduct in the 
course of that very important trial, excited my abhor¬ 
rence. With respect to their characters or their per¬ 
sons, I am wholly ignorant, touching their conduct on 
the trial, I think that I am in some measure qualified 
to judge. 

“ When Mr. Pulteney, much to his honour, arraigned 


446 AN ADDRESS TO SIR JOSEPH MAWBEY [CH XII. 

the conduct of ministers in suffering that brave and 
gallant officer, Sir Hugh Palliser, to be run down and 
driven from the service; when he defied any man in 
the house to say, after reading the evidence, that any 
thing to be found in it amounted to a reasonable pre¬ 
tence why Sir Hugh Palliser should not be employed, 
or rather why the country, in a difficult crisis, was to 
lose the services of a brave and gallant officer; and 
when he hoped that ministers who had acted a 
cowardly part in suffering him to be run down, and 
sunk under the weight of popular tumult, would cor¬ 
rect their error, and make an injured man some amends, 
by directly calling him into the public service; you 
thought proper to oppose him by a patriotic display of 
party prejudice, consummate ignorance, and egregious 
invective. 

“ Without pretending to understand the premises, 
you implicitly rely on the sentence which Admiral 
Keppel’s court-martial pronounced on the accused and 
the accuser; and on that illegal, inequitable, and incon¬ 
clusive part, which, without even the semblance of a 
trial, conveyed a severe censure on the unknownable 
motives of Sir Hugh Palliser,—you have ventured to 
condemn the conduct of that able, brave, and loyal offi¬ 
cer. But a seaman proceeds in a different manner; by 
looking beyond the sentence of the court-martial to 
those facts upon which it was or ought to have been 
framed, and by taking a proper survey of the whole 
evidence, for and against the prosecution, he becomes 
competent to form a judgment upon the matters in 
question, and to determine on the propriety or impro¬ 
priety of your boasted sentence. 


447 


1781.] ON ADMIRAL KEPPEL’s SENTENCE. 

“ I have taken some pains to investigate all the ma¬ 
terial transactions of the memorable 27th and 28th 
days of July, and I am fully convinced that Sir Hugh 
Palliser fought gallantly and acted judiciously;—that 
he suffered much from the fire of the enemy, and more 
through the base designs and mistaken zeal of his fellow- 
subjects. Sir Hugh has been charged, indeed, with not 
getting into his station in the line of battle, in the after¬ 
noon of the 27th; and with not shifting his flag on 
board another ship when he found the Formidable 
unable to yield obedience; and with not making her 
disabled condition known to his supreme commander. 
But it clearly appears from the evidence, that the first 
charge is unjust, the second ridiculous, and the last in¬ 
significant. But to be more particular—until the For¬ 
midable could set her foretopsail—which was not till 
about eight o’clock—the great quantity of sail which 
Admiral Keppel carried, rendered Sir Hugh Palliser 
utterly incapable of either taking his station in the line 
of battle, or of keeping it if he had been in it; and had 
Sir Hugh shifted his flag on board of another ship, be¬ 
cause the Formidable could not keep up with the Vic¬ 
tory, in running away from the enemy, he would have 
justly deserved the censure of his sovereign, and the 
contempt of all his fellow-subjects. 

“ As Sir Hugh Palliser is known to possess in an emi¬ 
nent degree, all the great qualifications of a naval offi¬ 
cer, it must be deemed unfortunate for his country to 
lose the benefit of them. Upon a minute investigation 
of the evidence, I firmly believe, that Sir Hugh Palliser 
did all that an able and a brave subordinate officer 
could do, on the day of battle; and I am persuaded 


448 PALLISER RETIRES FROM PUBLIC LIFE. [CH. XII. 

that, had he then commanded the fleet, our internal 
enemies would not have been furnished with an oppor¬ 
tunity of illuminating their houses on account of an 
event that was clearly injurious and disgraceful to their 
country. Had he been commander-in-chief on the 27th 
of July, he would not have separated his ships by or¬ 
dering a partial chase to windward, on the morning of 
that day. Nor would he have suffered the French to 
attack his fleet, without its being formed into order 
of battle;—that he would not have stood to a great 
distance beyond the rear of the enemy, before he 
wore to stand toward them again, nor would he have 
checked the Queen, Hector, Centaur, Exeter, Shrews¬ 
bury, Cumberland, and Stirling Castle—when doubling 
the line upon the enemy under a great deal of sail—by 
hauling down the signal for battle;—that he would not 
have embarrassed his disabled ships, and tarnished the 
honour of the British flag, by hurrying away from the 
following and inferior foe;—nor would he afterwards 
have shamefully allowed the natural enemies of his 
country to depart in peace.”* 

The active services of Sir Hugh Palliser in his pro¬ 
fession, terminated with his appointment to the gover¬ 
norship of Greenwich Hospital; and on the formation 
of the Rockingham administration, he withdrew alto¬ 
gether from the busy scenes of political strife; passing 
the remainder of his days in the dignified retirement 
which his duties at Greenwich permitted him to enjoy. 
Here, the king,—whose feeling for this persecuted offi- 

* The substance of two letters to Sir Joseph Mawbey, Bart., by a Sea¬ 
man, author of an address to the Honourable Admiral Augustus Keppel, 
containing remarks on both courts-martial. 


THE DEATH OF PALLISER. 


449 


1796.] 

cer amounted to strong personal attachment—was his 
frequent visitor, and accompanied by the queen and 
other members of the royal family, was on many occa¬ 
sions the honoured recipient of the governor’s hospita¬ 
lity. Almost one of his last official duties was the recep¬ 
tion, at his house in the hospital, of the unhappy Princess 
Caroline, when she landed from his Majesty’s ship, 
Juno, on the advent of her regal but ill-omened bridal. 

The wounds received by Palliser from the explo¬ 
sion of the arms-chest, when he held command of the 
Sutherland on the West India station, had, for the last 
few years of his life, been so intensely painful, that his 
death, which occurred on the 19th of March, 1796, in 
the seventy-fourth year of his age, was looked forward 
to by himself with feelings of happy anticipation, as 
the only possible release from his protracted suffer¬ 
ings. 

The kind hearted upright monarch, whose favour 
was not easily won or lost, evinced the respect and 
esteem during the last illness of his favourite officer, 
which had accompanied and sustained him in that 
trying period, when through the unrelenting malignity 
of formidable enemies, a cloud of appalling darkness 
hung over his reputation and future fortunes; and daily 
messages of solicitous inquiry were despatched from 
Windsor to the admiral’s residence in the Yache Park, 
Buckinghamshire, whither he had retired shortly before 
his dissolution. 

It now only remains for his biographer to quote 
the language of those who, as public writers and pri¬ 
vate friends, have depicted a character upon which 
many prominent qualities of moral and intellectual ex- 

2 G 


450 


CHARACTER OF PALLISER. 


[CH. XIX. 

cellence were stamped. The writer is indebted to 
living witnesses of the admiral’s kindness and benevo¬ 
lence of heart in his social sphere, for the following 
brief remarks, contained in letters written July, 1843. 

“ I have a lively recollection of Sir Hugh, who was 
very kind to me, and would fain have had my father 
send me to Cambridge, where he offered to do his best 
to procure me the valuable advantage of a-stu¬ 

dentship. I sat up with Sir Hugh several times during 
his last illness, and remember only what was most likely 
to impress my juvenile mind, such as his unceasing 
consideration and condescension towards me. His case 
was particular, and my father drew up a statement of 
it for Mr. Cruikshank, an eminent surgeon of London, 
who was accustomed to mention it to his pupils, when 
I afterwards attended his lectures.”* 

X 

w tv* ^v* w w 

“ I well remember Sir Hugh, you know, and have 
often heard my husband speak of his mild kind man¬ 
ners, and goodness to the poor, and of his having ad¬ 
ministered the sacrament to him in the presence of his 
father, Mr. Jones, and Mrs. Walters the night before 
his death.” 

The subjoined passage of a letter, from an Irish 
relative, conveys the testimony of an officer who had 
ample means of observing the demeanour of the Vice- 
admiral of the Blue, during the engagement with the 
enemy on the 27 th of July. 

* An important nerve was supposed to have been injured which was 
only partially re-united, and the pain at last became so intense, that a wine 
glass full of laudanum at a dose failed to procure him any alleviation. 



1796 .] 


CHARACTER OF PALLISER. 451 

“ Rathfarnham, January 10, 1781. 

“ I am concerned to find that your enemies are still 
unremitting in their attempts to persecute you, but they 
are feeble, and are solely meant to disperse the cloud 
that deservedly hangs over another. Could I have had 
any doubt of the rectitude of your conduct on the 27 th 
of July, it was wiped away by Colonel Innes, who com¬ 
manded the marines on board the Formidable that 
day, whom I had the honour of meeting here, and who 
says that you were only blameable in exposing your 
person too much, and doing more than could have 
been expected from one of your station; and that not a 
man of your ship conceived that the admiral intended 
to renew the action that day, after having neglected 
to do it when the French were in confusion; and he 
fully confirmed what your witnesses deposed on your 
trial with respect to the late hour of the delivering of 
the message by the Fox, which he would have then 
done if he had been called on.” 

The private estimate of character expressed in the 
following letter, corresponds with the language of the 
author of the “ Naval and Military Memoirs of Great 
Britain,” when in his historical capacity, the conduct of 
Palliser as an officer and a public man has fallen under 
his notice. 


Mr. Beatison to Sir Hugh Palliser . 


“ Kirkaldy, Fifeshire, 
“ August 5, 1789. 


“ Sir, 

“ I consider myself as extremely unfortunate in 
having left London before you did me the honour 

2 g 2 


452 CHARACTER OF PALLISER. [CH. XII. 

of calling for me at my booksellers, No. 67, in the 
Strand. Believe me I should have been proud to have 
unfolded the plan of my work to you, which I flatter 
myself will meet your approbation. To have received 
any information from so experienced an officer as Sir 
Hugh Palliser, a character I greatly venerate, I should 
have considered as so great an acquisition to my la¬ 
bours, that I have not words to put a proper value on 
it: and when you consider how very anxious I am to 
render my work as complete as possible, I hope you 
will not deem me too presumptuous, nor intruding too 
much on your time, when I request you will be so 
kind as to direct your secretary to transmit me such an 
account of your long and faithful services, as will suit 
your leisure to draw up. This, with what other par¬ 
ticulars you are pleased to furnish me with, I will 
esteem the greatest obligation, and whatever condi¬ 
tions you are pleased to annex to this favour, be as¬ 
sured shall be strictly adhered to. 

“ I have the honour to be, Sir, 

“ With the greatest respect, 
u Your most obedient, 
u And very humble servant, 

“ R. Beatison.” 

Charnock says, “ An anonymous writer, who cer¬ 
tainly was no relative or interested person, from his 
having much misstated the manner in which he re¬ 
ceived his fatal hurt, gives the following character of 
Sir Hugh Palliser. ‘As a professional man he was 
found superior to most of his contemporaries in ma- 


1796.] CHARACTER OF PALL1SER. 453 

ritime skill—judicious in his dispositions, and decisive 
in their subsequent operations: in private life con¬ 
ciliating in his manners, and unshaken in his friend¬ 
ships. 7 

“ To this character we have briefly to add from our¬ 
selves, that however his friends may wish that in some 
points he had acted differently from what he did, his 
most violent enemies cannot but confess their own 
malignity in having endeavoured to attach to him 
as crimes, things which never existed even in his 
thoughts, and in having reprobated those very errors 
which their own conduct fatally gave birth to. 

“ It is no difficult matter to form a judgment upon 
facts after they have taken place, and we believe no 
moderate man will at the present day deny, that if the 
popular voice had been less clamorous, neither party 
would have proceeded to the lengths they did, the 
service would not have been torn into contending fac¬ 
tions and parties, and the country would have been 

materially benefit ted. No one can dispute on the one 
hand but that the vice-admiral had a warm temper, 

and in too great a degree for a cautious and designing 
man; on the other hand no one can disbelieve him to 
have possessed honour, judgment, and intrepidity. For 
sixteen years of his life he seldom lay down on a bed, 
from constant pain in his leg, which he bore with the 
most manly fortitude. He was under the necessity of 
composing himself in an easy chair, sleeping at in¬ 
tervals, and when awake, he placed the wounded limb 
on the contrary knee, in which position in rubbing the 
bone—for it literally was no more—to assuage the 


CHAKACTEli OF PALLISEli. 


454 


[CH. XII. 


pain, he remained till sleep again insensibly overtook 
him.”* 

A nautical writer of considerable ability thus 
addressed Admiral Pigot, one of the vice-admirabs per¬ 
severing calumniators. 


“ If you really intend to bring Sir Hugh Palliser’s 
sentence before the House of Commons, it will be but 
fair, I presume, to bring Admiral Keppel’s there also. 
But why, sir, bring the sentence of a naval court- 
martial before the House of Commons? Can the mem¬ 
bers of that house be supposed capable of deciding on 
contradictory evidence respecting professional and im¬ 
portant points? Or can they be thought qualified to 
investigate the whole mass of evidence given to the 
court, with that accuracy which is requisite for deter¬ 
mining on the justice of their sentence? Surely the 
court-martial, in saying that Sir Hugh Palliser’s con¬ 
duct was in many respects highly exemplary and meri¬ 
torious, did acquit him with great honour. The omis¬ 
sion which they mention, whatever weight it might 
have in point of formality between Sir Hugh, as a 
subordinate officer, and his commander-in-chief, could 
nowise operate to the prejudice of the then service; 
nor does it appear that Admiral Keppel was really 
ignorant of the disabled state of the Formidable. 

“ The houses of parliament have already done, sir, 
what in my opinion requires their serious reconsider¬ 
ation. They voted thanks to Admiral Keppel for 


* Cliarnock’s Biographia Navalis, in voce Palliser. 


1796.] CHARACTER OE PALLISER. 455 

Laving gloriously upheld the honour of the British 
flag on the 27th and 28th of July; and they have con¬ 
ferred the same honour on Sir George Bridges Bod- 
ney ‘ for the late signal and important services ren¬ 
dered to his king and country,’ But is it possible to 
reconcile two acts so diametrically opposite in their 
objects? Admiral Keppel never offered to attack the 
enemies of his country on the evening of the day re¬ 
ferred to, though he had several opportunities for 
doing it; but Admiral Bodney no sooner saw the com¬ 
mon enemy, than he gave chase, and did his utmost to 
take, sink, burn, and destroy. Admiral Keppel, in 
good weather, and in the best season of the year for 
its continuance, with more than sixteen hours’ day¬ 
light before him, and when more than a hundred 
miles from the nearest part of the coast, shrunk from 
the imaginary dangers of a lee shore, and turned his 
stern to the flying enemy! But the gallant Bodney, 
in the turbulent month of January, with stormy wea¬ 
ther, a high sea, a long winter’s night coming on, and 
in the vicinity of a dangerous lee shore, boldly pushed 
his fleet between the enemy and that very danger. 
Admiral Keppel neither took nor destroyed a single 
ship, nor did he gain so much as the shadow of a vic¬ 
tory. But Sir George Bodney, under all the before- 
mentioned dangerous circumstances, took and de¬ 
stroyed seven sail of the line. In short, the two ad¬ 
mirals, though their cases are in almost every respect 
as different from each other as darkness is from light, 
have received the same honorary reward from the 
houses of parliament. The brave Bodney will, I pre- 


456 CHARACTER OE PALLISER. [CH. XII. 

sume, know how to estimate honours so indiscrimi¬ 
nately conferred. 

“ Presuming, sir, that you have read my address to 
Admiral Keppel and those letters which, in this paper, 
I lately addressed to the Earl of Sandwich and Sir 
Joseph Mawbey, I think it unnecessary to say any¬ 
thing at present on the several subjects. If you or 
any of the admiral’s friends think that I have erred in 
any particular, you will greatly oblige me by imme¬ 
diately entering upon a fair and dispassionate refu¬ 
tation. The part you took in the representation of 
the twelve admirals, and your subsequent conduct, 
respecting that great and good officer Sir Hugh Pal- 
liser, are not yet forgotten. If you think that you dis¬ 
cover error in any part of my publications, your ex¬ 
posing it to public view will be an act of justice; from 
your rank in the navy I infer your knowledge in the 
business; and from the active part you have repeatedly 
taken, I conclude that you want not inclination to sup¬ 
port the cause which you have espoused. 

“I am, to this hour, an utter stranger to Admiral 
Keppel, Sir Hugh Palliser, the judges, and the wit¬ 
nesses, therefore hope to be thought free from every 
personal influence. I can truly say that love to my 
country, and justice to an injured individual, were the 
motives which induced me to appear in public; and 
I rejoice to find, that truth, and a mediocrity of pro¬ 
fessional knowledge, have enabled me to stem that 
torrent of sinister design, party prejudice, and popular 
frenzy, which has been, and will long continue, a dis¬ 
grace to the kingdom. You will not, I presume, be 


CHARACTER OF PALLISER. 


457 


1796 .] 

surprised at my saying that I cannot, as a well-in¬ 
formed seaman, pay any regard to the sentence of 
Admiral Keppel’s court-martial. To say that the 
charges preferred by Sir Hugh Palliser were ill- 
founded, would be to speak contrary to that know¬ 
ledge which, as a seaman, I have been at some pains to 
obtain from the evidence; and to join in saying they 
were malicious, I must give up my understanding as a 
man. I think Sir Hugh Palliser has, in every part of 
his conduct, deserved well of his country; and I am 
sorry to think that he has met with such an unsuitable 
return. As the ministry certainly acted an unjust as 
well as a timid part in abandoning him to the mer¬ 
ciless rage of an unprincipled party, it is highly in¬ 
cumbent on them to make some reparation, by imme¬ 
diately calling Sir Hugh to the service and confidence 
of his king and country.”* 

The same writer addresses the Earl of Sandwich, 
and says: 

u Several months have elapsed, my lord, since I first 
declared my readiness to enter the lists with any who 
shall think fit to appear in favour of Admiral Kep- 
pel’s conduct, or against that of Sir Hugh Palliser: 
but no one has yet thought proper to accept the chal¬ 
lenge. Admiral Keppel and his friends, however wil¬ 
ling, are utterly incapable of refuting what I have said 
on the subject; and that success, which my abilities 

# Substance of three letters to Admiral Pigot. By a Seaman. The 
writer of those letters requested the printer to declare his real name to 
all who should complain of being aggrieved by what he had said. 


458 CHARACTER OE PALLISER. [CH. XII. 

could not have commanded, has been fully obtained 
by the goodness of that cause which I have espoused. 
That an insignificant seaman should venture to inter¬ 
pose between an incensed multitude, and the innocent 
object of their rage, may be thought surprising; that 
success should crown his weak endeavours, in that 
very important business may be deemed still more sur¬ 
prising, and that, of all those mighty champions who 
have endeavoured to turn the kingdom upside down, 
to serve the mischievous purposes of a party, none 
should oppose him, may be accounted the most sur¬ 
prising of all. But when the transactions of the 27th 
and 28th of July are viewed in their unfolded state, and 
the subsequent conduct of the minority leaders is duly 
considered, all the before-mentioned wonders will 
dwindle into nothing, when compared with the match¬ 
less effrontery of the few, and the astonishing credu¬ 
lity of the many. My lord, many are now ashamed 
of the late popular delusion; and future generations 
will read the account of our Keppel-frenzy, with a 
mixture of wonder and unbelief. That an admiral, 
who had twice turned his stern to an inferior fleet 
of the enemy’s ships, was honoured with public de¬ 
monstrations of joy in various parts of the kingdom,— 
with honorary rewards from several public bodies, 
and with the almost unanimous thanks of both Houses 
of Parliament, will hardly be credited by our remote 
successors; and so far as the account shall gain credit, 
it must excite their astonishment. 

“ Some insist that Sir Hugh Palliser was convict¬ 
ed of having preferred an ill-founded and malicious 


1796.] CHARACTER OF PALLISER. 459 

charge against his superior officer, and that he was 
sentenced by Admiral Keppel’s court-martial; but I 
beg leave to say, my lord, that Sir Hugh was not con¬ 
victed ; and that the sentence, so far as it respected him, 
was clearly extra-judicial, if not malicious also. Every 
part of a legal sentence ought to be founded on legal 
conviction, and legal conviction can only flow from 
legal evidence; but no witnesses had been examined 
either for or against Sir Hugh, therefore he could not 
possibly be convicted, and as he neither was nor could 
be legally convicted, no part of the sentence should 
have any reference to him. To try one man, ard to 
pronounce sentence against another, is certainly a new 
species of legal process. 

u Although I have no particular connection with 
any man in the administration, yet, as a member of the 
community, I wish to support its government; and as 
a seaman, I think it my duty to investigate those naval 
transactions, in which the welfare of my country is 
eminently concerned. It being your lordship’s pro¬ 
vince amidst our present intestine divisions, to choose, 
or recommend proper persons for the command of our 
fleets, officers of quite opposite political characters, are 
frequently proposed for your approbation. 

“ Some, of a certain description, mention Lord Howe 
and Admiral Keppel as the only naval officers ca¬ 
pable of effectually interposing between Great Britain 
and her numerous enemies; whilst others, of a very 
different complexion, recommend Sir Hugh Palliser as 
one who is every way qualified to render essential 
service to his country. The former two, my lord, have 


460 CHARACTER OF PALLISER. [CH. XII 

lately been tried; and their conduct has effectually pre¬ 
vented our boasting of the issue. Both, no doubt, have 
their friends and advocates; but is there a Briton, 
uninfluenced by party, who would not rejoice to 
think that our fleets could now meet those of our 
enemies on the same terms, respecting force, as they 
did when the two minority admirals turned their sterns 
to the inferior and following insulters of our flag. 
This, my lord, being the true state of the case, it may 
reasonably be asked, what men would risk the con¬ 
sequences of reintrusting such officers with supreme 
command. 

“ Respecting Sir Hugh Palliser, my lord, I beg leave 
to say, that his naval conduct has been strongly marked 
with ability, bravery, and integrity. He not only 
fought gallantly, in passing along the French line on 
the ever to be lamented 27th of July, but he appeared 
eager to renew the engagement, until Admiral Keppel, 
by hauling down the signal for battle, and shortening 
sail, rendered it necessary to provide for the Formid¬ 
able’s safety, by wearing her again from the advancing 
enemy, and repairing the damages she had sustained. 
By the open and spirited reply which you made 
to the Marquis of Rockingham concerning Sir Hugh 
Palliser., I am persuaded that your lordship enter¬ 
tains a very high opinion of his ability and honesty 
as an adviser, and believing that Sir Hugh is not less 
qualified to execute than to advise, I conclude that his 
behaviour should he be again called into the service of 
his king and country, will fully answer your most san¬ 
guine expectations. 


1796.] CHARACTER OF PALLISER. 461 

u Although I think well of Admiral Keppel’s former 
services, I cannot help looking upon their late recog¬ 
nition as being rather ill-timed; and as to his late be¬ 
haviour, I am persuaded that there is not a member in 
either house capable of proving any one act on the 27 th 
of July, 1778 ‘a glorious upholding of the honour of 
the British flag,’ or that any part of his conduct on 
the succeeding day can possibly be deemed suitable 
to that parliamentary description. On the 27th Ad¬ 
miral Keppel returned the enemy’s fire, when they 
bore down and attacked him on a contrary tack; but, 
on the 28th, he certainly avoided all manner of inter¬ 
ference with the flying foe. 

a To conclude, my lord, I beg leave to repeat, that 
it is your unquestionable duty to appoint men of 
known ability, courage, and loyalty, to the command 
of our fleets, and to bring to trial all such as appear 
to have acted unworthy of their important trust. The 
charge of 1 driving every officer of reputation out of 
the service,’ frequently urged against you by our in¬ 
ternal enemies, ought to be treated with becoming 
contempt; and that very unwarrantable conduct which 
appeared before, on, and after Admiral Keppel’s trial, 
should excite to greater and more spirited exertions of 
national justice. Britain may not always produce 
twelve admirals capable of attempting to stop the 
course of justice; our patriots may never again dare to 
attend a court-martial for the purpose of perverting 
judgment; nor may our Houses of Parliament think it 
consistent either with their own honour or with the 
interest of their country, to vote addresses of thanks to 


462 


CHARACTER OF PALLISER. 


[CH. XIL 

any admiral who shall appear, in future, to have twice 
turned his stern to the enemy’s ships when he might 
have engaged them with great advantage. 

“ Having delivered my sentiments freely respecting 
those authorities which Admiral Keppel’s advocates 
have recourse to in defence of his late naval conduct, 
I take the liberty to call on the judges, the witnesses, 
and all his parliamentary friends to refute, if they can, 
what I have advanced. Should they all continue silent 
on the several subjects, it may naturally be concluded, 
that the badness of their cause has enabled a single 
individual to prevail against the strange assertions of 
that numerous and powerful host. Although I believe 
that I am personally a stranger to all the gentlemen 
alluded to, several of them have some time ago been 
made acquainted with my name prefixed to copies of 
my c Address to Admiral Keppel,’ I hope, my lord, you 
will do me the justice to believe, that I neither publish 
my name to serve the purpose of ambition, nor con¬ 
ceal it through any motive of fear. Respecting what 
I have written, I trust I shall always be ready to 
give up cheerfully, or to defend strenuously, accord¬ 
ing to the strict rules of justice, of decency, and of can¬ 
dour.” 

The opinions of the writer above quoted, who avow¬ 
edly was no personal friend nor interested panegyrist, 
were those universally formed of the character of Pal- 
liser by his contemporaries, whose judgments were not 
warped by party prejudice or the base detraction of in¬ 
terested calumniators; and the career of unsullied honour 
and professional distinction which awarded him the 


CHARACTER OF PALLISER. 


463 


1796.] 

esteem of all good men, the approbation of his country, 
and the affection of his prince, afforded him at its close, 
when bodily anguish could obtain no relief, the in¬ 
estimable solace of inward satisfaction and mental 
peace. 


THE END. 


C. "WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND. 



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